Design Alternatives for Computer Network Security, Volume 1; Volume 13The Bureau, 1978 - 159 pages |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 25
Page 5
... assumes security integrity because the supracomputer interconnections are via secured ( often crypto ) communications lines . " As mentioned in the preceding quote , the real problem area in network security is lack of global control ...
... assumes security integrity because the supracomputer interconnections are via secured ( often crypto ) communications lines . " As mentioned in the preceding quote , the real problem area in network security is lack of global control ...
Page 7
... assume more of the total security functions . We are then faced with two questions : ( 1 ) what global security - related policies must be developed to ensure network security ; and ( 2 ) by what global and / or local mechanisms can ...
... assume more of the total security functions . We are then faced with two questions : ( 1 ) what global security - related policies must be developed to ensure network security ; and ( 2 ) by what global and / or local mechanisms can ...
Page 10
... assume for this investigation that the nature of the hostile elements and the resources to be protected in a DOD environment is well known , and do not address these matters any further . However , the policy and requirements issues ...
... assume for this investigation that the nature of the hostile elements and the resources to be protected in a DOD environment is well known , and do not address these matters any further . However , the policy and requirements issues ...
Page 12
... assume that environment - dependent entities such as a terminal which must be operated within a special room , are dependent upon physical and procedural controls to ensure that these restrictions are maintained . Alternate ...
... assume that environment - dependent entities such as a terminal which must be operated within a special room , are dependent upon physical and procedural controls to ensure that these restrictions are maintained . Alternate ...
Page 16
... assume that every requestor has a capability profile ( e.g. , a " C - List " ) which consists of essentially the list of objects to which he has access , and the relevant privileges on those objects . Similarly , an object might have an ...
... assume that every requestor has a capability profile ( e.g. , a " C - List " ) which consists of essentially the list of objects to which he has access , and the relevant privileges on those objects . Similarly , an object might have an ...
Common terms and phrases
access authorization access control access control matrix access group additional addressing approach aspects audit information basic buffer capabilities checking clear text communications net communications network communications path connection creation considered control commands control information control messages crypto cryptographic devices data and control Data Encryption Standard data processing dialog distributed domain enciphered encipherment encryption devices ensure entities error control fail-secure functions gateway handled HOST computers HOST-level HOST's ICD's identification/authentication implicit initial interface involved issues matrix methods mini-HOST mode multiplexed N-th party accesses N-th party authentication network control programs Network Security Center node object one-time passwords operation pair passwords performed physical and procedural possible private key problems procedural controls processor profile information protection protocol Reference Monitor relay request requestor requirements resource SC-to-SC SC's scheme security control mechanism separate sequence numbers server structure structured programming terminal tradeoffs updates usage utilized
Popular passages
Page iv - In no case does such identification imply recommendation or endorsement by the National Bureau of Standards...