Design Alternatives for Computer Network Security, Volume 1; Volume 13The Bureau, 1978 - 159 pages |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 18
Page
... Applied Technology , the Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology , the Office for Information Programs , and the Office of Experimental Technology Incentive Program . THE INSTITUTE FOR BASIC STANDARDS provides the central basis ...
... Applied Technology , the Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology , the Office for Information Programs , and the Office of Experimental Technology Incentive Program . THE INSTITUTE FOR BASIC STANDARDS provides the central basis ...
Page 15
... applied at each step of an N - th party scheme . ( Should the user be involved in each step , or only at the first ? ) 4 . Determination of the default conditions for N - th party accesses ; i.e. , whether allowed or precluded . 5. Some ...
... applied at each step of an N - th party scheme . ( Should the user be involved in each step , or only at the first ? ) 4 . Determination of the default conditions for N - th party accesses ; i.e. , whether allowed or precluded . 5. Some ...
Page 35
... applied , particularly in those areas in which failures would grant unauthorized access . 2.6.5 Self - Checking The proper operation of the security mechanisms should be verified on an on - going basis by means of both diagnostic and ...
... applied , particularly in those areas in which failures would grant unauthorized access . 2.6.5 Self - Checking The proper operation of the security mechanisms should be verified on an on - going basis by means of both diagnostic and ...
Page 48
... applied at each step : The same basic notions apply , although the number of possible . combinations increases , e.g. , usage of a set of one - time passwords or the same one repeatedly , the possibility of involving two or more SC's ...
... applied at each step : The same basic notions apply , although the number of possible . combinations increases , e.g. , usage of a set of one - time passwords or the same one repeatedly , the possibility of involving two or more SC's ...
Page 52
... applied to capabilities by Garwick ( GAR - 73 ) , but might also apply to objects or subjects if hierarchical relational structures exist of the general form A implies B implies C , etc. Such structures might very well apply to a set of ...
... applied to capabilities by Garwick ( GAR - 73 ) , but might also apply to objects or subjects if hierarchical relational structures exist of the general form A implies B implies C , etc. Such structures might very well apply to a set of ...
Common terms and phrases
access authorization access control access control matrix access group additional addressing approach aspects audit information basic buffer capabilities checking clear text communications net communications network communications path connection creation considered control commands control information control messages crypto cryptographic devices data and control Data Encryption Standard data processing dialog distributed domain enciphered encipherment encryption devices ensure entities error control fail-secure functions gateway handled HOST computers HOST-level HOST's ICD's identification/authentication implicit initial interface involved issues matrix methods mini-HOST mode multiplexed N-th party accesses N-th party authentication network control programs Network Security Center node object one-time passwords operation pair passwords performed physical and procedural possible private key problems procedural controls processor profile information protection protocol Reference Monitor relay request requestor requirements resource SC-to-SC SC's scheme security control mechanism separate sequence numbers server structure structured programming terminal tradeoffs updates usage utilized
Popular passages
Page iv - In no case does such identification imply recommendation or endorsement by the National Bureau of Standards...