Census Bureau, "Money Income and Poverty Status of Families ind Persons in the United States: 1981" (Series P-60, No. 134

sals that simply shift program costs to beneficiaries

on the erroneous notion that the elderly can and should
ven greater burden. But, Medicare currently pays only
e elderly's health care bill. The Part A deductible
ally rises from $304 to $350 in FY 84, over a 15%
(The Part A deductible rose from $204 in 1981

1 1982, over a 27% increase, due to the 1982 Budget
ation Act.) The Part B premium rises automatically
to $13.60 from $12.20, almost a 10% increase, and
ductible, which was $60 in FY 81, is now $75, a
Beneficiary liability for Medicare Part B
services alone is approximately 69% of total
s' charges due when deductibles, coinsurance and

ase.

d claims are included. Moreover, the unwillingness e number of physicians to accept assignment (i.e.,

care services. The imm nd frightens not only Americans deeply conce

es, their children, a

plain fact of the m care system is priced most. Under current HI Trust Fund will be of the next decade. facing the collapse of t ssible, affordable healt poor. Change is unavoid 27e the political will a odate the needs of al te the right to healt tplace.

Unfortunately, the Ad costs away from the

in Hospitalization lion)

der current law, Med tal services from the ement after payment c der Part A of Medical iciaries pay the foll

- 2nd through 15th da -16th through 60th d

is on top of the rise

led from $304 to $3 for an elderly Medic of-pocket expenses fo eficiary would increas Medicare recipients,

A and Part B deduct: Sorb another precipito dicare.

of the rise in the Part A deductible automatically $304 to $350. Since the average Medicare hospital erly Medicare beneficiary is 11 days, total

xpenses for an average hospitalized Medicare

stration is attempting to sell this "health care in-
al by adding a "catastrophic" stop loss provision that
y Medicare beneficiaries for all covered hospital costs
- of hospitalization in a single spell of illness.
loss protection proposal would benefit only two
derly Medicare patients requiring long term, acute
lization. It does not provide any benefit to the

of Medicare patients who will be paying huge, addi-
of-pocket costs for hospitalization.

ociation is rather cautious about proposals to
Medicare voucher system. While we believe that the
capitation concept has merit, we are deeply concerned
1 be used merely as a means of budgetary relief.
he voucher proposal, Medicare beneficiaries would
fixed sum or credit with which to purchase their
cance in the private insurance market. The purpose

osal is to restrain the inordinate rate of increase
are cost by injecting a degree of competition in
of a health plan and by making the consumer more
o rising cost by asking them to assume a greater
such costs out-of-pocket. As a sweetener, the Medicare
posals usually include a catastrophic stop-loss
at insures beneficiaries against out-of-pocket losses
cain amount. However such stop-loss protection

11

e to Medicare beneficiaries, because it applies only
re services and ignores the major source of catastrophic
cost for the aging long-term (nursing home) care.
to the success of any voucher proposal is informed
›ice among competing qualified plans. If consumer
Lousness" or cost-sharing is to be an effective means
g competition and containing cost, consumers must

1s essential, ther man provisions :

on on the terms

pating qualif etail greater pro

cold have to be b ustrative costs. E: sm wise consumer c lemaps the most dif

l is establishing tions believe that

I be considered in d so that adequate h Conversely the Assoc Sidual health status ely that would have greatest need for he

of the least ability t rest, most vulnerable

enjums.