Studemund's way of connecting em or en etymologically with ecce may be the true way; but it is very uncertain. Meanwhile, I venture to suggest another way in which ecce may perhaps be etymologically connected with em or en. I suggest that ecce may be directly derived.

from em or en by the addition of the suffix -ce (demonstrative), just as illic (= ille-ce) is derived from ille.

The placing of the syllable en before the indefinite umquam converts it into the interrogative enumquam (Plaut. Rud. 987, 1117; Trin. 589; Ter. Phorm. 329, 348, etc.). The placing of the syllable ec- before the indefinite quis converts it into the interrogative ecquis. Similarly ecquando is the interrogative form of quando in its indefinite sense. From these facts, without identifying the en of enumquam with the exclamatory particle em or en, it would seem a reasonable inference that the en- of enumquam and the ec- of ecquis are one and the same. If so, we have here an instance in which a nasal loses its nasal character, and suffers assimilation to a following guttural surd stop; and the same phenomenon may perhaps be found in ecce, namely, em-ce (or en-ce) = ecce—just as, apparently, en-quis ecquis. In that case the relation of ecce to em or en would be precisely the same as the relation of illic (nom. sing.) to ille, and the correspondence both in sense and in syntax between em and ecce would be explained. Moreover we should not then have to disconnect em and the Greek, as Studemund's derivation would oblige us to do.

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HERMATHENA-VOL. XI.

L

CHARLES EXON.

NOTES ON ARISTOTLE, PARVA NATURALIA.

437, 12. ὁ γὰρ λογος αἴτιός ἐστι τῆς μαθήσεως ἀκουστὸς ὤν, οὐ καθ ̓ αὑτὸν ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

MANIFESTLY there should be no comma here at wv,

though Biehl after Bekker prints one. It wrongly implies that aкovoròç v belongs to what precedes instead of to what follows. The meaning is that λóyos is heard only κατὰ συμβεβηκός, the direct or proper object of hearing being ψόφος oι φωνή. Speech, as a vehicle of ideas, is heard only because as the next lines show) ἐξ ὀνομάτων σύγκειται, τῶν δ ̓ ὀνομάτων ἕκαστον σύμβολόν ἐστι. Plato, Theaetetus, 203 B, makes the same point, that the direct object of hearing is the sound of words, not their sense, as is plain when we are addressed in an unknown tongue.

437, 8. καὶ βραδέως μεταβάλλοντος τοῦ ὄμματος οὐ συμβαίνει, ὥστε δοκεῖν ἅμα ἓν καὶ δύο εἶναι τό θ' ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον.

Here again a comma is wrongly printed after συμβαίνει by Biehl, not however by Bekker. It breaks the connexion, which is logically as close as possible, between συμβαίνει and the following words. Συμβαίνει ὥστε δοκεῖν is precisely the same in sense as συμβαίνει δοκεῖν. The comma, if pressed, would give a completely false view of the meaning.

437, 19-22. εἰ δ' ἄρα ὑπάρχει μὲν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἠρέμα λανθάνει ἡμᾶς, ἔδει μεθ ̓ ἡμέραν τε καὶ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ἀποσβέννυσθαι τὸ φῶς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πάγοις μᾶλλον γίγνεσθαι σκότον.

Commentators, from Ideler to Ziaja, contentedly refer μεθ ̓ ἡμέραν to the extinction of the small internal light

within the eye (assumed in the Timaeus as the cause of vision) by the great light of the sun, which, according to Aristotle's principles, would be certain to happen as soon as the internal light issued forth into the external world of day. This view involves difficulties both in the general sense and in the grammar. I take the former first.

Aristotle here makes no mention of pápavois, but only of oẞious. The former of these is distinguished by him from the latter in many places. Cf. de Caelo, III. vi. 305", 9-13, de Juvent., 469, 21-23. ἀλλὰ μὴν πυρός γε δύο ὁρῶμεν φθοράς, μάρανσίν τε καὶ σβέσιν. καλοῦμεν δὲ τὴν μὲν ὑφ ̓ αὑτοῦ μάρανσιν τὴν δ ̓ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων σβέσιν : and 469, 32, διόπερ οὐ μόνον μαραίνεται τὸ ἔλαττον παρὰ τὸ πλεῖον πῦρ, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴ καθ ̓ αὑτὴν ἡ τοῦ λύχνου φλὸξ ἐντιθεμένη πλείονι φλογὶ κατακαίεται. Such was Aristotle's doctrine-valeat quantum valet-of μápavois, and to this he everywhere adheres. In the passage before us, however, he speaks only of aßiais or ȧróaßeσiç: see above 14, 23. Under other circumstances, Aristotle might here have referred to μápav

-the extinction of the smaller light of the eye by the greater light of day, but he really does nothing of the kind, and for an obvious reason. He is arguing against Plato ad hominem, i.e. on Plato's own ground. The theory of the Timaeus (as interpreted by Aristotle) is that the 'Augenlicht' mixes with the daylight, being homogeneous with it, but is quenched at night. The doctrine of μápavois is Aristotle's own, not Plato's. Aristotle has just before objected to the Platonic (and Empedoclean) 'emission' theory of vision on the ground that, if it were sound, we should see in the dark. He now attacks Plato's explanation of the fact that we do not see in the dark, viz. that the 'Augenlicht' is quenched-karaoẞévvurα-in the nighttime. But how can light be quenched? asks Aristotle. Fire can be quenched by τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν, since it

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involves their contraries τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρόν ; hence, eg., τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρακώδεσι πῦρ καὶ ἡ φλόξ are extinguishable by τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν. These (τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρόν), however, do not appertain to pwc.1

Therefore, light is not subject to aßios. Should it be argued that τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρόν do appertain to it, but in a degree imperceptible to us, Aristotle would reply that if they did, and if accordingly pws were extinguishable, it should be so not merely at night, but even in the day time, whenever the agencies which counterwork ordinary fire and flame happen to be present. For example, we should, in the day time, find light extinguished when it fell upon, or into, water, and frosty or cold weather should be particularly dark weather. This not being so, the supposition that the contraries which lead to its extinction appertain to light is false. Hence light cannot be extinguished. Throughout all this, nothing is said, or thought, of uápavois.

The grammatical difficulty is-what are we to do with Tε? It is not translatable in any even superficially tolerable way, unless we accept the reference to μápavors, which has just been proved erroneous. We cannot take it in its usual preparatory or anticipative force, and coordinate it either with the immediately succeeding kaì, or with that of the following clause. Reference to μápavoiç being given up, to translate both in the day-time, and in water,' would be nonsense. What Aristotle aims at is to show that it would be extinguished in water, even in the daytime. On the other hand, Eucken has clearly enough proved how untenable are the grounds on which some have based a theory of re used without conjunctive force— an otiose τε (in τε γάρ, etc.). Το take τε here with the καὶ of the following clause would leave the first kai without explanation. Therefore it appears to me that T should be

1 For the purpose of this note it does not matter whether, with Thuret, &v,

b18, is referred to θερμὸν καὶ ξηρὸν, οι with others, to τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἡ φλόξ.

corrected to ye here, as in a host of other places, gradually being brought to light in the MSS. of Aristotle as well as of Plato. In μɛ0' iμέpav yɛ, the particle lends that weight to the μ0' upav which we should have expected the writer to give it from its importance in the argument—an

fortiori argument, of which it expresses the very point. The ka immediately after ye would of itself suffice to explain how this became altered into Tɛ.

438*, 15. ἀλλ ̓ εὐφυλακτότερον καὶ εὐπιλητότερον τὸ ὕδωρ τοῦ ἀέρος.

So Bekker and Biehl. Priscian's metaphrasis of the TEρì aio0noεws of Theophrastus (§ 35, Wimmer) has almost the same words in reference to the same point. Aià rí ovv ἐν ὕδατι ἡ κόρη ; ἐπειδὴ εὐφυλακτότερον καὶ εὐπιλητότερον ἀέρος dwp. But Evníληтоv is not, according to Aristotle, more applicable to water than to air. It is not applicable to water at all. He says, Meteor. IV. ix. 387a 15,πiλnтà d' öσa Tāv πιεστῶν μόνιμον ἔχει τὴν πίεσιν, ἀπίλητα δ ̓ ὅσα ἤ ὅλως ἄπιεστα ἢ μὴ μόνιμον ἔχει τὴν πίεσιν. Water belongs, accordingly, to the class of amíλnra. It did not need the Florentine experiment to show that water is less-not more-compressible than air. On the other hand, it is much easier to isolate or seclude a portion of water than a portion of air in a cup or capsule. Aristotle therefore thinks that as, for vision, a portion of the diapavés had to be enclosed within the eye, water is more convenient for nature's purpose than air. The word which exactly denotes the greater convenience of water in this respect is ἐναποληπτότερον, which I propose to read here instead of EUTANTÓTεpov. This latter rests (as far as I know) on the reading of a single MS. P. Alexander distinctly supports vаπоλπtótepo.v His words are-διὰ τὸ εὐφυλακτότερον εἶναι τὸ ὕδωρ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ δύνασθαι μᾶλλον σώζεσθαι ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἀποληφθῇ ὁ γὰρ ἀὴρ εὐδιάπνευστός τε καὶ δυσαπόληπτος τῷ διαπνεῖσθαι ῥᾴδιον [Thurot;? ῥᾷον]) εἴη ἂν ἐξ ὕδατος [sc. ἡ κόρη] καὶ διὰ τὸ