for taking an appeal begins to run from the time sentence was pronounced."

Statutes.-The first statutory power was granted in 1911 in cases of nonsupport and included the right to "suspend any sentence, stay or postpone the enforcement of execution or release from custody." 10

In 1923, circuit courts were given power to suspend imposition of sentence,11 and in 1929 this power was extended to municipal courts in misdemeanor cases.12 Although this statute specifically authorized the courts to suspend imposition of sentence upon any terms the judge might deem proper, including probation of the defendant, there was no provision for probation officers or other means of supervision until 1937, when the office of director of probation and parole was created, with the duty, among others, of supervising all State parolees and probationers.18 With this addition, the Arkansas provisions deserve to be classed as a probation law rather than as a mere suspension of sentence law, and it will therefore be discussed under the heading of probation.

It should be noted that this statute relates only to suspending imposition of sentence. There is no right in any court indefinitely to suspend execution of sentence, either at common law or by statute.14 Nor does the statute give the court power to set aside or remit a sentence after its execution has begun.15 Also, the statute refers only to circuit and municipal courts; therefore, there is no power in a mayor's court to suspend either imposition or execution of sentence.10

'Davis v. State, 184 Ark. 1062, 45 S. W. (2d) 35 (1932). In this case the municipal court imposed sentence and suspended execution. Three months later, the court set aside the order of suspension. Defendant thereupon prayed an appeal. Held, the 30-day period for appeal had elapsed.

10 Ark. Acts 1911, p. 166, § 23; Ark. Dig. Stat. (Crawford and Moses, 1921) § 5784.

11 Ark. Acts 1923, p. 40; Ark. Dig. Stat. (Crawford and Moses, Supp. 1927) § 3229a. This act has been held constitutional. Emerson v. Boyles, 170 Ark. 621, 280 S. W. 1005 (1926).

12 Ark. Acts 1929, p. 20.

13 Ark. Acts 1937, No. 178; Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) §§ 12772 (a), 12772 (b).

14 Davis v. State, 184 Ark. 1062, 45 S. W. (2d) 35 (1932); Ketchum v. Van Sickle, 171 Ark. 784, 286 S. W. 948 (1926).

15 Emerson v. Boyles, 170 Ark. 621, 280 S. W. 1005 (1926).

10 Freeman v. City of Benton, 191 Ark. 1131, 89 S. W. (2d) 738 (1936).

The extent of the practice of suspending the imposition of sentence in Arkansas is indicated by the fact that in the years 1932–34, 919 sentences out of 4,245, or approximately 21.6 percent, were suspended.1 However, there is little uniformity in the use of the power in the various circuits, the number of suspensions ranging from about 39 percent in the fifth and fourteenth circuits to none in the thirteenth and fifteenth circuits.18 No figures are yet available as to the extent of probation under the act of 1937.

Deferred sentence.-Another device is used in Arkansas, generally called "deferred sentence." It is a postponement of action in pronouncing sentence and suspending it from one term of court to the next.19 The defendant is released from custody and his conduct is observed to determine the appropriateness of suspending sentence at the next term of court. This appears to be an informal substitute for the preprobation investigation practiced in States where courts are equipped with probation officers. It appears that this practice is largely confined to cases in which the defendant pleads guilty, although this is not always true.20

PROBATION

Historical development.—The first statute providing for suspension of sentence in nonsupport cases does not mention probation. The first general suspension of sentence statute used the word "probation," but no provision was made for probation officers or other means of supervision, although in practice the judge in some cases tried to maintain at least a minimum of supervision, or used the sheriff

"Biennial Report of the Attorney General of Arkansas. 1932-34.

18 Ibid.

29 On a plea of guilty at one term of court, Judgment may be entered at a subsequent term. Thurman v. State, 54 Ark. 120, 15 S. W. 84 (1891); Greene v. State, 88 Ark. 290, 114 S. W. 477 (1908); Joiner v. State, 94 Ark. 198, 126 8. W. 723 (1910); State v. Wright, 96 Ark. 203, 131 S. W. 688 (1910); Phillips v. State, 100 Ark. 515, 140 S. W. 734 (1911); Barwick v. State, 107 Ark. 115, 153 S. W. 1106 (1913); Cox v. State, 114 Ark. 234, 169 S. W. 789 (1914); Collatt v. State, 165 Ark. 136, 262 S. W. 990 (1924); see Ark. Dig. Stat. (Crawford and Moses, 1921) § 3218.

"Collatt v. State, 165 Ark. 136, 262 S. W. 990 (1924).

1 Ark. Acts 1811, p. 166, § 23; Ark. Dig. Stat. (Crawford and Moses, 1921) 5784.

Ark. Acts 1923, p. 40; Ark. Dig. Stat. (Crawford and Moses, Supp. 1927) 3229a. See ante, Suspension of Sentence.

or prosecuting attorney for this purpose. At least in the larger counties, however, such arrangements were utterly inadequate. It was not until 1937, when the office of director of probation and parole was created, that Arkansas can be said to have adult probation.*

Present organization.-The act of 1937 creates a Statecontrolled system of probation, headed by a State director of probation and parole."

The director is appointed by the State board of pardons and paroles (also created in the same act), upon civil service examination. He is responsible for the proper supervision of all State parolees and probationers."

Preprobation investigation.-No provision is made for investigation of defendants to determine their eligibility for probation. Even in the act of 1937, the duties of the director of probation and parole specifically mentioned refer only to supervision of persons placed on probation, and not to investigation of defendants before the court to aid the court in determining whether they are fit persons to be placed on probation.

Persons eligible.-No restrictions are provided on the eligibility of defendants for suspension of sentence and probation."

Discretion to suspend sentence and place on probation rests entirely with the judge. He is not bound by a recommendation by the jury in that regard.1o

Terms and conditions.-Suspension of sentence may be on such conditions as the court shall deem proper as to probation, restitution of property involved, and payment of costs of the case.11 The period of suspension and probation may be indefinite.

Termination and revocation.-Suspension may be revoked and sentence pronounced at any time the court is in

Ark. Acts 1937, No. 178, § 5a; Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) § 12772 (a). Juvenile probation was provided for in 1911. Ark. Acts 1911, p. 166; Ark. Dig. Stat. (Crawford and Moses, 1921) §§ 5765, 5766.

5 Id. (Pope, 1937) §§ 12768, 12772 (a), 12772 (b).

10 Criglow v. State, 183 Ark. 407, 36 S. W. (2d) 400 (1931); Clarkson v. State, 168 Ark. 1122, 273 S. W. 353 (1925).

" Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) § 4053.

session, when deemed for the best interests of society and the defendant.12 Since the suspension may be for an indefinite time, there is no limit to the time when such suspension may be revoked.13 The statute of limitations applies to institution of proceedings, not imposition of sentence.14

Revocation may be by the judge after a hearing without a jury.15

Probation officers: Qualifications.-The State director of parole and probation must be a "properly qualified person," appointed "after a proper examination," and he is classified under the civil service. His salary is $3,000 a year, in addition to traveling expenses.16

Probation officers: Powers and duties.-The State director of probation and parole, in addition to his parole duties, is responsible for the proper supervision of all State probationers and of their records and may call on all police and peace officers for aid." The statute states that the supervision of the State director "shall supplant parole supervision by any other State agency except that held by the courts." Since the courts, in the past, have never exercised any parole supervision in Arkansas, the statute may refer to probation supervision. If this is the case, local courts may still exercise probation supervision in addition to that given by the State director.18

Effect of suspension and probation.-If imposition of sentence has been suspended, the defendant has not been "convicted" of crime so as to exclude him as a witness,19 or to revoke his license as a physician.20 However, by statute, the postponement is made a conviction in that all

13 Denham v. State, 180 Ark. 382, 21 S. W. (2d) 608 (1929); Hartley v. State, 184 Ark. 237, 42 8. W. (2d) 7 (1931); Freeman v. City of Benton, 191 Ark. 1131, 89 S. W. (2d) 738 (1936).

14 Freeman v. City of Benton, 191 Ark. 1131, 89 S. W. (2d) 738 (1936).

15 Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) § 4054.

1 Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) § 12772 (a).

17 Id. 12772 (b).

18 Ibid.

19 Owen v. State, 86 Ark. 317, 111 S. W. 466 (1908); Michigan-Arkansas

Lumber Co. v. Bullington, 106 Ark. 25, 152 S. W. 999 (1912).

20 State Medical Board v. Rodgers, 190 Ark. 266, 79 S. W. (2d) 83 (1935).

costs are due and payable as though sentence had been pronounced.21

Interstate cooperation.—The 1937 legislature passed an act authorizing the board of pardons and paroles created in the same year to make compacts with other States "relating to the supervision of parolees and probationers of this State and other States." 22 The Governor is also directed to make such compacts.23

PAROLE

History. The original parole and general sentence laws of Arkansas were enacted in 1907.1 Under the terms of this act the State penitentiary board was given authority to grant parole to all eligible inmates. This basic parole law remained unchanged until 1937. Although from time to time the official designation of the parole board was altered, such change in designation usually accompanied the frequent changes in the government of the Arkansas prison system.

In 1927 the Governor was given power to appoint a State parole officer, whose duty, among other duties, was to keep in touch with all persons on parole in order that reports of violations might be given to the Governor and parole board.

In 1933 the superintendent of penal institutions assumed the duties of the warden and of the parole officer, the last two offices having been abolished in that year.3

The law of 1937 made considerable progress in the matter of parolee supervision by establishing the office of the director of probation and parole."

21 Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) § 4055. Compare Huddleston v. Craighead County, 128 Ark. 287, 194 S. W. 17 (1917) decided before this statute was adopted, holding that a suspended sentence is not a conviction entitling the prosecuting attorney to his fee.

22 Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) § 12771.

23 Id. 5400.

1 Ark. Acts 1907, No. 440.

2 Ark. Acts 1927, No. 37, § 18.

a Ark. Acts 1933, No. 30, §§ 15, 16, 17.

4"An act providing for the creation of a board of pardons and paroles; the appointment of a State director of probation and paroles and specifying the duties and powers of said board in administering its functions; and for other purposes." Ark. Acts 1937, No. 178; Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) §§ 1276812773.

Id. § 12772.