tion that when the commutation becomes effective on approval of the Governor, the defendant be granted an immediate parole. Commutations in Arizona are in effect a combination of executive clemency and parole. The sole purpose of the recommendation of a commutation of the minimum sentence is usually to effect a parole. While the Governor usually approves the recommendations of the board in executive clemency cases, he does not always do so. Recently there has been considerable public criticism in Arizona of parole and the release of prisoners. In several cases where the board has recommended commutations, the Governor, because of this criticism, has refused his approval.

It is, of course, possible to commute the maximum sentence, and this is sometimes done, although not as often as commutation of the minimum. The effect of a commutation of the maximum is to entitle the convict to unconditional release at the expiration of the new maximum, less any good time allowance.

Reprieve.-The Governor has power to grant reprieves, but it seems that this power is also limited by the statute creating the board of pardons, i. e., he can only grant reprieves, like pardons, upon recommendation of the board.31 There is no limitation on the length of time for which a reprieve may be given, nor the number of reprieves possible.32

Whenever a reprieve or stay of execution is granted to a person under sentence of death, the Governor is required within 10 days to publish a statement of his reasons for such action in a newspaper of general circulation and in the county where the conviction was had.83

Parole. The same board which passes upon pardons also administers parole, but in this latter function the board's power is exclusive; the Governor has nothing to do with the paroling of prisoners.34

See State v. Sims, 17 Ariz. 410, 413, 153 Pac. 451 (1915).

Rodriguez v. State, 18 Ariz. 74, 156 Pac. 94 (1916) (7 successive reprieves granted, covering a period of 21⁄2 years); Peralta v. State, 18 Ariz. 79, 156 Pac. 96 (1916); Chavez v. State, 18 Ariz. 80, 156 Pac. 97 (1916); Perez v. State, 18 Ariz. 81, 156 Pac. 97 (1916).

* Ariz. Rev. Code Ann. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 5217.

34 Id. § 5220; State v. Superior Court, 30 Ariz. 332, 246 Pac. 1033 (1926).

73115-39--VOL, I-7

Effect of pardon.-The granting of a pardon ends all imprisonment or penal control over the person pardoned and also restores full citizenship privileges.

A reprieve merely postpones the execution of judgment and does not and cannot defeat its ultimate execution.35

GOOD-TIME DEDUCTIONS

History-As early as 1901, during territorial days, a law dealing with good-time deductions was passed in Arizona which was substantially the same as the existing law. The only change that has taken place is with reference to the administrative body. Under the law of 1901 good-time deductions were handled by a board of control which had charge of all penal institutions.1 In 1928 the board in charge of good time deductions became the board of pardons and paroles.2

By whom administered.-The matter of good-time deductions is administered by the State board of pardons and paroles.3

Persons eligible.-Every convict faithfully performing the labor required of him and being in all respects obedient to the prison rules, or if unable to work, yet faithful and obedient, is entitled as a matter of right to good-time deductions.1

Amount of deduction.-Eligible prisoners are entitled to a deduction of 2 months from each of the first 2 years, 4 months from each of the next 2 years, and 5 months from each of the remaining years of the term. In addition, all prisoners in the State prison, while working on the public highways, the prison farms or holding any other position of confidence and trust, while working as trusties, outside the

25 Rodriguez v. Sims, 18 Ariz. 74, 156 Pac. 94 (1916).

1 Ariz. Rev. Stat. (1901) §§ 3563, 3589.

2 Ariz. Rev. Code Ann. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 5318.

& Ibid.

• Ibid.

Id. 5318. The deduction must be from the maximum term of sentence and not from the minimum in indeterminate sentence cases. Clark v. State, 28 Ariz. 470, 204 Pac. 1032 (1922); Orme v. Rogers, 32 Ariz. 502, 260 Pac. 190 (1927). Where the minimum and maximum sentences are close together the prisoner may be released before the end of the minimum sentence because of good-time deductions. Clark v. State, 23 Ariz. 470, 204 Pac. 1032 (1922).

prison walls and without requiring armed guards, are allowed a deduction of half their term of sentence."

Forfeiture. Any convict assaulting or in any way endangering the life of any person connected with the prison or committing any flagrant violation of the rules, loses all good time allowance theretofore earned. But the board may order a forfeit only after due proof of the offense and notice to the offender. Furthermore, the forfeiture may not be imposed for a violation of rules committed without violence or evil intent. The board is sole judge as to what constitutes violence or evil intent. The board may also forfeit the double time earned by trusties, in case of breach of trust in any manner and upon recommendation of the superintendent of the prison.

Restoration.-No provision has been found in regard to the matter of restoring lost good-time credits.

EXPIRATION OF SENTENCE

Effect of release. It is provided by statute that a sentence of imprisonment in a State prison for any term less than for life suspends all the civil rights of the defendant and forfeits all public offices and all private trusts, authority or power during the term.1 Upon discharge his civil rights, including the rights of suffrage, are automatically restored, and it is not necessary that a pardon be granted by the board of pardons and paroles before the defendant is entitled to vote.2

Discharge gratuities.-Discharged prisoners are given $5 in cash and a suit of clothes costing not more than $15. They also receive a nontransferable ticket on any railroad adjacent to the place of discharge for any continuous distance not to exceed 300 miles. The ticket is void unless used

Ariz. Rev. Code Ann. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 5319.

* Id. § 5318.

Id. § 5319.

1 Ariz. Rev. Code Ann. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 4903.

'Opinion Att'y Gen. (June 24, 1936). Released felons returning on the prison grounds in the night time are guilty of a felony. Ariz. Rev. Code Ann. (Struckmeyer, 1928) 4578.

within 3 days of discharge, except in case of inability caused by illness. At any time within 3 months before his discharge, the prisoner is permitted to allow his hair and beard to grow.3 Prisoners discharged before the expiration of the maximum period of sentence are aided in securing proper employment by the parole clerk.*

ARKANSAS

SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE

Suspension of sentence at common law.-It has been repeatedly decided that Arkansas courts have no inherent power to suspend execution of sentence indefinitely.1 "At common law a court has power to suspend sentence temporarily or for a reasonable time in order to afford time to consider motions for new trials on the ground of newly discovered evidence and the like, and to enable the court to inform itself as to the severity of the sentence to be pronounced," but "it is evident that when a court undertakes on its own motion to suspend a sentence indefinitely, it really refuses to enforce the punishment provided by statute, unless it shall at some future time conclude that it is proper to do so. The power to exercise discretion as to the enforcement of the punishment provided by law and pronounced by the court is vested in the Governor." 2

Whether or not there is inherent power, in the absence of statute, indefinitely to suspend imposition of sentence has never been decided. It has been held that a court may postpone the pronouncing of sentence to a subsequent term, in order to afford time for deliberation, appeal, and the like.3

3 Ariz. Rev. Code Ann. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 5329.

4 Id. § 5327.

1 Scruggs v. City of North Little Rock, 179 Ark. 200, 14 S. W. (2d) 1112 (1929); Davis v. State, 169 Ark. 932, 277 S. W. 5 (1925); Holden v. State, 156 Ark. 521, 247 S. W. 768 (1923).

2 Davis v. State, 169 Ark. 932, 935, 936, 277 S. W. 5 (1925).

3 Thurman v. State, 54 Ark. 120, 15 S. W. 84 (1891); Greene v. State, 88 Ark. 290, 114 S. W. 477 (1908); State v. Wright, 96 Ark. 203, 131 S. W. 688 (1910); Oor v. State, 114 Ark. 234, 169 S. W. 789 (1914); Collatt v. State, 165 Ark. 136, 262 S. W. 990 (1924). See Ark. Dig. Stat. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) 3218.

In some cases the court seems to have extended this rule to permit indefinite suspension. More recently the court has again indicated that only temporary suspension for reasons connected with the proper discharge of the function of sentencing is permissible."

Where the court erroneously does undertake to suspend execution of sentence, it has power to correct that error and order sentence to be executed, even after the period fixed in the sentence has expired. Thus in one case, defendant was sentenced to 1 year in the penitentiary and then execution was suspended. Sixteen years later, he was cited to appear, and was ordered to serve the sentence on the ground that he had violated the condition of the suspension. This was upheld. While at large under the void order of suspension, said the court, the defendant was "in the same situation that he would have been had he escaped from custody. A sentence of imprisonment is satisfied, not by lapse of time after it is pronounced, but by the actual suffering of the imprisonment imposed by it. The reason is that the time at which a sentence shall be carried into execution is not provided by statute and forms no part of the judgment of the court."

Moreover, it has been held that when a court imposes sentence and then erroneously suspends execution, the time

In a number of reported cases, it appears that the trial court had indefinitely suspended imposition of sentence. In the earliest of these, the Supreme Court felt it unnecessary to decide whether the court had such power or not. Owen v. State, 86 Ark. 317, 111 S. W. 466 (1908) (person released on suspended sentence after plea of guilty held not "convicted" so as to be disqualified as a witness). In the others the Supreme Court mentioned the practice without criticism. Joiner v. State, 94 Ark. 198, 126 S. W. 723 (1910); Barwick v. State, 107 Ark. 115, 153 S. W. 1106 (1913); Huddleston v. Craighead County, 128 Ark. 287, 194 S. W. 17 (1917).

Davis v. State, 169 Ark. 932, 277 S. W. 5 (1925); Massey v. Cunningham, 169 Ark. 410, 275 S. W. 737 (1925).

•Freeman v. City of Benton, 191 Ark. 1131, 89 S. W. (2d) 738 (1936); Davis v. State, 184 Ark. 1062, 45 S. W. (2d) 35 (1932); Scruggs v. North Little Rock, 179 Ark. 200, 14 S. W. (2d) 1112 (1929); Ketchum v. Van Sickle, 171 Ark. 784, 286 S. W. 948 (1926); Stocks v. State, 171 Ark. 835, 286 S. W. 975 (1926); Davis v. State, 169 Ark. 932, 277 S. W. 5 (1925); Massey v. Cunningham, 169 Ark. 410, 275 S. W. 737 (1925); Ex parte Holdaway, 105 Ark. 1, 150 S. W. 123 (1912) (payment of fine postponed).

↑ Stocks v. State, 171 Ark. 835, 286 S. W. 975 (1926).

Id. at 837-838, 286 S. W. at 976. So where a sheriff without authority undertakes to release a convict on certain conditions, he can be rearrested any time to serve his sentence. Massey V. Cunningham, 169 Ark. 410, 275 S. W. 737 (1925).