Supervision.-In granting parole the board must provide proper means of supervision of the paroled prisoner in accordance with the rules and regulations of the board and under the direction of the bureau of pardons and paroles."

The assistant director of the bureau must, with the approval of the director, divide the State into geographical parole districts and designate a parole officer as district supervisor of each district. He must also select such secretarial and other assistants as may be necessary for each district.50

The assistant director must designate one of his assistants as employment director. It is the duty of the assistant director to aid persons coming under the supervision of the bureau in securing employment.51

In exercising supervision over parolees the assistant director may utilize the services of such probation officers and other subordinate assistants of the department as he deems

The corrections commission is directed to promulgate the rules and regulations necessary to secure the effective supervision and control of parolees affected by interstate compacts concerning extra-state supervision of parolees."

54

Procedure on violation of parole.-Upon a showing of probable violation of parole conditions, the assistant director of the bureau of pardons and paroles may issue a warrant for the return of any paroled prisoner to the institution from which he was paroled. When any probation officer, parole officer, or peace officer has reasonable ground to believe that the prisoner has violated his parole, he may, without warrant, arrest him and surrender him to the warden of the penal institution having jurisdiction.'

49 Id. § 6.

50 Id. § 1.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

55

53 Id. ch. 1, § 13. In 1935 the legislature authorized the Governor to enter into interstate compacts which would provide for the reception and supervision by each State which is a party to the compact of parolees of each of the other States which are parties to the compact. Mich. Comp. Laws (Mason, Supp. 1935) § 17509-1.

54 Mich. Laws 1937, No. 255, ch. 3, § 8.

55 Id. § 9.

If a parolee fails to return to the prison enclosure when required by the assistant director, or if he escapes while on parole, he is treated as an escaped convict.56

Pending hearing, a parolee charged with parole violation must remain incarcerated.57

If the parolee is convicted of committing a felony or misdemeanor while on parole he is, of course, incarcerated at once, but if the violation charged is some other act or omission he is entitled to a fair hearing before incarceration.58 The prisoner is entitled to counsel and to witnesses in his favor, at his expense. Witnesses for the parolee are subpoenaed by the parole board.59

When the parole board has determined the matter it enters such order as it deems advisable.60

Recommitment: Effect on eligibility for further parole.A prisoner is eligible for reparole at any time unless he is reincarcerated for another offense in which case he must serve at least the minimum sentence for that offense less good time.

Recommitment: Effect on original sentence.-When a parolee has been returned for violation of his parole, he may be required to serve out the portion of his maximum term of imprisonment which remained unexpired on the date of his "declared delinquency." When a parolee commits a crime

Id. § 8.

ST Ibid.

Id. § 10.

Ibid. If the parolee is without funds, provision is made for a subpoena at the expense of the State. Ibid.

o Id. § 11.

61 Id. 8. Under a previous law the commissioner could revoke all of the good-time deductions to which the parolee was entitled at the time he violated the conditions of his parole. The returned parolee was not entitled, as a matter of right, to any good-time deductions on the remaining portion of his maximum term of imprisonment. However, if, after his return to imprisonment the commissioner wanted to allow him good-time deductions for the remaining portion of his maximum term, he might do so-on the same basis on which he would allow good-time deductions to a new prisoner. Opinions Att'y Gen., Feb. 18, 1932. An assault upon a parole officer by the parolee, when the officer took him into custody, constituted a serious act of insubordination, which warranted the commissioner in cancelling the goodtime allowances of the parolee accumulated to the date of the assault. Robinson v. Gries et al., 277 Mich. 15, 268 N. W. 794 (1936). Presumably the same result would be reached under the present provision that "all orders and rules and regulations made by any such board, commission, or officer,

73115-39-VOL. I -37

while on parole and is convicted and sentenced there for he must begin the service of the second sentence as soon as the first sentence has been served or annulled.62 Parole is considered as a service of the sentence so that good-time deductions are earned as though the parolee were in prison,63 but such deductions may be cancelled upon return for parole violation.

Final discharge.-When a parolee has faithfully performed the conditions of his parole for the period of time fixed in the order releasing him, he is deemed to have served his full sentence and the parole board must enter an order of final discharge and issue the parolee a certificate of discharge.** No parole can be granted for less than 4 years in cases of murder, forcible rape, armed robbery, kidnapping, extortion, or breaking and entering an occupied dwelling in the night.

the duties of which are hereby transferred to the state department of correc tions, shall continue in effect at the pleasure of the said department, acting within its lawful authority." Mich. Laws 1937, No. 255, ch. 5, § 1.

62 Id. ch. 3, § 8.

63 Ibid.

64 Id. § 12. Under a previous law a convict who was sentenced to a term of 3 to 6 years, after serving approximately 1 year, was placed on parole for a period of 1 year. After the expiration of the parole period, the Governor forwarded an absolute discharge to the first friend for delivery to the parolee. In the meanwhile, the parolee had violated his parole and fled from the State. The discharge was returned for cancellation, a warrant was issued for the arrest of the parolee, and he was returned to prison. After the issuance of writs of habeas corpus and certiorari to review the proceedings, the court held that delivery of the discharge to the first friend did not constitute a constructive delivery to the parolee, and that the Governor had the power to revoke the discharge and to cause the prisoner to be apprehended and returned to prison. "The contention that the prisoner cannot be required to serve the balance of his sentence, because no proceedings were taken to return him to prison before the parole period has expired, is so wholly without merit that it requires no discussion." In reaching the foregoing conclusions, the court said, inter alia, that "the purpose of a parole is to keep the prisoner in legal custody while permitting him to live beyond the prison inclosure so that he may have an opportunity to show that he can refrain from committing crime. It is a conditional release, the condition being that if he makes good he will receive an absolute discharge from the balance of his sentence; but if he does not make good he will be returned to serve his unexpired time. The absolute discharge is something more than a release from parole. It is a remission of the remaining portion of his sentence. Like a pardon, it is a gift from the executive, and like any other gift it does not become effective until it is de livered and accepted." In re Eddinger, 236 Mich. 668, 211 N. W. 54 (1926). Quaere, whether the decision would have been the same with regard to the reimprisonment of the parolee if the parole period had extended for the full length of the maximum term of the sentence and if the maximum term, as well as the parole period, had expired before the warrant was issued for the rearrest of the parolee.

EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

Power in Governor with advisory board.--The constitution of Michigan provides that the Governor shall have power to grant "reprieves, commutations, and pardons after conviction for all offenses, except treason and cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitatitons as he may think proper, subject to regulations provided by law relative to the manner of applying for pardons."

In treason cases, the Governor may suspend execution of sentence until the case is reported to the legislature at its next session, when the legislature may take action.2

The pardoning power is vested exclusively in the Governor, and any law which restricted this power would be unconstitutional and void. The power cannot be exercised directly or indirectly by any other body or official. An indefinite suspension of imposition of sentence beyond mere delay has been considered an infringement of the pardoning power. So also an indeterminate sentence law, with authority in a board to release on parole, was held invalid as an attempted exercise of the pardoning power.5

"There are many reasons why a power of this kind should be confided to the highest executive officer. It involves a wide discretion. The proceedings upon the trial may be reviewed. New evidence may be taken upon which to rest the pardon, thus, in effect, granting a new trial. It may be ex parte, after the witnesses have disappeared or are dead. It may and often is based upon an alleged reform of an offender. Youth or age may furnish an excuse for its exercise. Petitions which a good natured

1 Mich. Const. art. VI, § 9. 2 Ibid.

Rich v. Chamberlain, 104 Mich. 436, 62 N. W. 584 (1895). In this case it was held, however, that a law creating a board of pardons with purely advisory functions was not an infringement.

People v. Brown, 54 Mich. 15, 19 N. W. 571 (1884); cf. In re Probasco, 269 Mich. 453, 257 N. W. 561 (1934) (statutory power of court to modify or set aside revocation of motor vehicle driver's license does not amount to a pardon).

People v. Cummings, 88 Mich. 249, 50 N. W. 310 (1891). This decision was followed by a constitutional amendment authorizing the indeterminate sentence. Mich. Const. art. V, § 28.

public sign without reading, and importunities of interested persons and friends may be expected wherever there is hope of success. It is therefore of the highest importance to the public that this power should be carefully exercised and that the fullest responsibility should rest upon the person to whom it is confided. The office of Governor seems to be generally considered the proper one with which to lodge such responsibility, and the public have a right to insist upon his performance of the duty. Not only is it beyond the power of the legislature to impose the duty upon others, but it should not in any way lessen his responsibility to the public, when he sets aside the judgment of court and jury by opening the doors of a prison to a convicted felon."

The Governor shall communicate to the legislature at each session information regarding each case of clemency granted with reasons therefor."

Advisory board.-No express provision of the Michigan constitution confers authority upon the legislature to establish an agency to aid in the administration of the pardon laws. Judicial construction, however, has implied such a power from the constitutional grant authorizing the legislature to regulate the manner of applying for pardons. In 1893, the legislature created an advisory board of pardons, with power to investigate petitions for pardon and make recommendations to the Governor. This was held constitutional.8 It was held that the statutes did not undertake to prohibit the Governor from granting pardons without first obtaining the board's advice, and the court refused to decide whether such a requirement would be constitutional."

The board was abolished in 1921, and a commissioner of pardons and paroles substituted.10 But in 1937 a comprehensive correction law was enacted, which created a parole board within the department of correction. This board

Rich v. Chamberlain, 104 Mich. 436, 441, 62 N. W. 584, 585 (1895), per Hooker, J. Dissenting. The majority opinion is in substantial agreement on this point.

Mich. Const. art. VI, § 9.

8 Rich V. Chamberlain, 104 Mich. 436, 62 N. W. 584 (1895). People v. Marsh, 125 Mich. 410, 84 N. W. 472 (1900).

10 Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) § 17515 et seq.