No decision has fixed any limits upon the time within which a conditional release may be revoked by the Executive. Frequently the conditional commutation states that the release is upon conditions "similar to parole." But since both conditional pardons and commutations are a part of the Executive prerogative, presumably the power of revocation remains outstanding as long as the President may desire. Of course, the grant may stipulate the duration of the conditions, in which case no question would arise after the expiration of that period. There are no cases on the question whether a hearing must be given before a conditional pardon is revoked for alleged breach.35 It would seem that a hearing of some kind should be given. However, a revocation without hearing might be supported upon the ground that the grant provided for such procedure or that the power to grant conditional release impliedly reserves uncontrolled power to revoke.38 Effect of pardon.—It is said that a pardon "reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and where the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence."7 This expression is not literally true. Proof of the conviction may be used to discredit the recipient of a pardon as a witness; and in some jurisdictions renders him incompetent. It is manifest that when such consequences follow, a full pardon does not make the person "as innocent as if he had never committed the offence." 39 See detail of pardons granted, Rep. Att'y Gen. (1932) 371 et seq. Parole is frequently not available in these cases, so that there is no necessary conflict with the parole statute. 85 In Ex parte Weathers, 33 F. (2d) 294 (D. C. Fla. 1929), the court dismissed as without merit the contention that a hearing had not been granted. 36 See Note (1908) 67 Cent. L. J. 188, for suggestions as to procedure on recommitment for breach. "Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380 (U. S. 1867). 38 Vedin V. McConnell, 22 F. (2d) 753 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927). See Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt? (1915) 28 Harv. L. Rev. 647. In the Federal courts, the pardoned witness is competent. "The disability to testify being a consequence, according to the principles of the common law, of the judgment of conviction, the pardon obliterated that effect." Boyd v. United States, 142 U. S. 450, 453 (1892). 40 A full pardon restores property which has been confiscated by reason of the offense pardoned, provided the property has not become vested in third persons or the proceeds covered into the treasury. "The property and the proceeds are not considered as so absolutely vesting in third parties or in the United States as to be unaffected by the pardon until they have passed out of the jurisdiction of the officer or tribunal." 41 Likewise a pardon restores rights and powers lost or suspended by the conviction.42 GOOD-TIME DEDUCTIONS History. The first statute providing for the reduction of sentences of Federal prisoners because of good conduct was enacted in 1867. This authorized a deduction of 1 month in each year from the term of sentence of Federal prisoners confined in State jails or penitentiaries, upon the certificate of the warden or keeper with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.1 In 1870 the application of this statute was limited to prisoners in institutions where no good time credits were allowed; in all other cases the deductions applicable to State prisoners were to be applied to Federal prisoners. The schedule of credits was changed in 1875 so that convicts confined in any State or territorial prison or penitentiary where no system of good conduct deductions existed might earn a credit of 5 days "in each and every calendar month during which no charge of misconduct shall have been sustained * 198 When provision was made for the erection of United States prisons, the Attorney General was authorized to establish rules for reductions of sentences because of good behavior of prisoners confined Osborn v. United States, 91 U. S. 474 (1875). 4 Knote v. United States, 95 U. S. 149 (1877). "Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Bosworth, 133 U. S. 92 (1890) (power to transfer property); 36 Opinions Att'y Gen. 193 (1930) (right to receive veterans' benefits). 114 Stat. 424 (1867). The Department of Justice was not created until 1870. 16 Stat. 162 (1870). Nor was provision made for United States prisons until 1891. 26 Stat. 840 (1891). In 1872 the duties of the Secretary of the Interior relating to the imprisonment or discharge of Federal prisoners were transferred to the Department of Justice, so that the approval of good conduct deductions now rests with the Attorney General. 17 Stat. 35 (1872). 216 Stat. 151 (1870). 18 Stat. 479 (1875). 73115-39-VOL. I-4 therein, but not to exceed 2 months for the first or any succeeding year of imprisonment.* In 1902 a general revision of good-time credits was made, placing all Federal prisoners whether in United States penitentiaries or jails or in State or territorial jails, prisons or penitentiaries, upon an equal basis. The schedule of credits was made more liberal and graduated so as to increase with the length of the sentence. And it was also provided that when a prisoner had several sentences, the basis for computation of deductions should be the aggregate of the sentences. This law, with some amendments and additions, is now in operation." By whom administered.-Good-time credits are primarily under the control of the officials of the particular institution, since they are charged with the duty of maintaining proper discipline among inmates. All Federal penal institutions are supervised by the Department of Justice through the Bureau of Prisons and the formulation of general policies governing the administration of good-time deductions rests with the Bureau. Uniform policies are, so far as possible, applicable to all Federal institutions. Persons eligible.-The statute provides that every Federal prisoner confined, for a definite term other than for life, "in execution of the judgment or sentence in any United States penitentiary or jail, or in any penitentiary, prison, or jail of any State or territory *** whose record of conduct shows that he has faithfully observed all the rules and has not been subjected to punishment, shall be entitled to a deduction from the term of his sentence 996 It is to be noted that the prisoner must be actually confined in execution of his sentence; there * * 26 Stat. 840 (1891). 32 Stat. 397 (1902), 18 U. S. C. § 710 et seq. (1934). 32 Stat. 307 (1902), 18 U. S. C. § 710 (1934). This section as enacted applied to every prisoner "who has been or shall hereafter be convicted"; but the concluding section of the same act specifically provided that it applied only to sentences imposed subsequent to the effective date of the act. It was held that the latter section was controlling. United States v. Farrar, 139 Fed. 260 (C. C. A. 2d, 1905); United States v. Jackson, 143 Fed. 783 (C. C. A. 9th, 1906). In 1906 the law was clarified so that the deductions set out in the 1902 act were made applicable to sentences imposed prior to 1902 if the deduction otherwise allowable amounted to less than under the 1902 act. 34 Stat. 149 (1906), 18 U. S. C. § 712 (1934). fore good time cannot be granted for time spent in a county jail pending appeal from a penitentiary sentence although the sentence dated from the date of commitment to the county jail. Nor is a prisoner who has been committed after violation of probation entitled to good time for the period of probation. Formerly a parolee was entitled to good time deductions, but in 1932 the parole law was amended so that no deductions are allowed parolees.10 Prisoners confined in county jails or other institutions of temporary confinement are not entitled to the credits.11 The non-Federal institution must be one falling within the classification of a State, as distinguished from a local or county, institution. Prisoners transferred to prison camps or employed on public works may be allowed an additional deduction of 3 days per month of actual employment for the first year and not more than 5 days per month thereafter, in the discretion of the Attorney General.12 Amount of deduction.-The credits allowed per month are as follows: Five days upon a sentence of not less than 6 months nor more than 1 year; 6 days upon a sentence of more than 1 year and less than 3 years; 7 days on sentences between 3 and 5 years; 8 days on sentences between 5 and 10 years; and for sentences of 10 years or more, 10 days per month. For the purpose of computing these deductions the aggregate of the sentences, where a prisoner has two or more sentences, is the basis.13 In addition to these deductions, prisoners in any industry or prison camp may earn *Aderhold v. Elis, 84 F. (2d) 543 (C. C. A. 5th, 1986), cert. denied, 57 Sup. Ct. 122 (1936). Swope v. Lawton, 83 F. (2d) 814 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936). *See Morgan v. Aderhold, 73 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Henratty V. Zerbst, 9 F. Supp. 230 (D. C. Kan. 1934). 1047 Stat. 381 (1932), 18 U. S. C. § 716a (1934). "In re Corcoran, 47 Fed. 211 (C. C. Calif. 1889); but cf. In re Deering, 60 Fed. 265 (D. C. Calif. 1894). "46 Stat. 392 (1930), 18 U. S. C. § 744h (1934). Another provision allows prisoners in certain camps an additional flat deduction of 5 days per month. 45 Stat. 1318 (1929), 18 U. S. C. § 852 (1934). The 1930 law is being applied to all camps. 32 Stat. 397 (1902), 18 U. S. C. § 710 (1934). However, a sentence for escape is not combined with the other sentence; in other words the prisoner earns good time only on the sentence for escape. Aderhold v. Hudson, 84 F. (2d) 559 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936). 3 days per month during the first year and 5 days thereafter, for the time actually employed in the industry or camp.14 The statute originally provided that deductions could begin only after the arrival of the prisoner at the institution to which he was sentenced.15 However, with respect to prisoners sentenced on or after July 29, 1932, the deductions "shall be computed beginning with the day on which the sentence commences to run." 18 Ordinarily, sentence begins to run from the date the person is received at the institution for service of the sentence. It is specifically provided, however, that if the prisoner is committed to jail temporarily to await transportation to the place in which his sentence is to be served, the sentence begins to run from the date he is received at such jail or other place of detention.17 Credits are not finally earned until the actual time served plus deductions equals the combined sentences. "The month is only a basis for the estimate, it being adopted as such because it is the most convenient basis. The 'record of conduct' essential to entitle the prisoner to the credit is not his record for any particular month or year, but for the entire term.” 18 Forfeiture.-Misbehavior or violation of any of the rules of the institution constitutes grounds for the forfeiture of credits theretofore accumulated as well as any that might be subsequently earned. Thus it has been held that an inmate who has been returned to prison after an escape forfeits "all credit for good behavior throughout the term, not merely that previously earned." 19 Likewise a prisoner returned because of parole violation, who had been released after serving one of two sentences, forfeits all good-time credits on both sentences.20 14 46 Stat. 392 (1930), 18 U. S. C. § 744h (1934). 15 32 Stat. 397 (1902), 18 U. S. C. § 710 (1934). Thus even though the Judgment provided that time spent in jail pending appeal should apply on a penitentiary sentence, no good time could be granted for this period. Aderhold v. Ellis, 84 F. (2d) 543 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936), cert. denied, 57 Sup. Ct. 122 (1936). 16 47 Stat. 381 (1932), 18 U. S. C. § 710a (1934). 17 Id. § 709a. 18 28 Opinions Att'y Gen. (1909) 110. And see Ebeling v. Biddle, 291 Fed. 567 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923); Carroll v. Zerbst, 76 F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935). 19 Carroll v. Zerbst, 76 F. (2d) 961, 962 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935). 20 Aderhold v. Perry, 59 F. (2d) 379 (C. C. A. 5th 1932); Morgan v. Aderhold, 73 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934). |