or city treasurers, as the case may be, or the cost may be apportioned between them, on properly issued warrants.*

43

Once the court has fixed the salary of an officer, mandamus lies against the city council to make the appropriation for that amount." But where the record did not show that the judges fixed the salaries, it was held that mandamus would not lie to compel the county board to appropriate the necessary funds.45

Probation officers: Powers and duties.-In the exercise of their official duties, probation officers and sheriffs may arrest any probationer found by them violating the terms of probation. The arresting officer has a duty to take the probationer before the court having jurisdiction over him for further order.46

Ill. Stat. Ann. (Jones, 1936) § 37-784. In counties of the third class, a chief probation officer may receive from $5,000 to $0,000 a year; 3 assistants may receive from $2.600 to $3,000. Other officers may receive from $2,400 to $2,600. The lower limits are a minimum.

In counties of the second class the maximum for a chief officer is $1,200; other officers may receive not more than $800.

In counties of the first class, compensation is limited to a per diem of $3 plus traveling and other expenses.

In other counties traveling expenses are not paid unless the officer is called out of the county and other expenses are to be paid only upon court order and approval by the county board.

An officer receiving a gratuity or compensation from a private person is guilty of a misdemeanor and his removal is made mandatory. Ibid.

Members of the police force of any city or village may serve as probation officers if specially detailed by their commanding officer but they may receive no additional compensation for the work. Id. § 37-780.

"People ex rel. Cannon v. Chicago, 351 Ill. 396, 184 N. E. 610 (1933). The provision for a minimum compensation to probation officers appointed by municipal court judges does not come within the constitutional prohibition against the general assembly's imposing taxes on municipal corporations for local corporate purposes, since the system of probation is not local in character and the duties of probation officers have no particular relation to corporate functions of a city. Ibid.

4 People ex rel. Callahan v. Whealan, 356 III, 328, 190 N. E. 698 (1934). The county board has not the power to fix salaries and, therefore, cannot increase or decrease salaries of officers, nor can it reduce the number of officers fixed by the circuit and superior courts. Ibid.

Probation officers do not perform any of the duties of county officers but are officers of the court appointing them and their duties are limited to assisting the court. Their compensation cannot be provided for by a tax levied to pay the salaries of county officers. People ex rel. Gauss v. Chicago, 273 Ill. 110, 112 N. E. 278 (1916).

The office of probation officer is not a county office for which compensation must be fixed by the county board according to the constitution, but is an office in the county created by the legislature, and the employees of the office are within the terms of the Officers and Employers Pension Fund Act of 1915. Shea v. Sweitzer, 285 Ill. 465, 120 N. E. 760 (1918).

Ill. Stat. Ann. (Jones, 1936) § 37-781.

47

Probation officers must investigate the case of any person ❝ to be placed on probation. They must notify the court of previous convictions or previous probation. They must keep the court informed as to the conduct of the probationer, and reports must be in writing. They must preserve complete records of cases investigated. They must take charge of all persons placed on probation under the prescribed regulations and give to the defendant full instructions in regard to his probation. They have a duty to require "such periodical reports as shall keep" them informed as to the probationer's conduct. When the probationer moves out of the county where the crime was committed, the officer under whose supervision he is placed must report to the officer in the county to which the defendant has removed. The latter officer must take charge of the defendant as if the probation originated in his county. He is required to report the results of his supervision once each month to the original officer.48

Probation officers have a duty at the end of the period of probation promptly to report the conduct of the probationer during the entire period.19

The chief probation officer has the duty of supervising and controlling the work of all subordinate officers subject to the rules and directions of the court. Case records must be kept in one office under the supervision of the chief officer. He has the authority to suspend any officer under his supervision for a period not exceeding 30 days, and may file charges against the officer with the court, but may not discharge him.50

Out-of-State probation.-Persons placed on probation may be permitted to reside, while on probation, in another State 51 if the probationer is a resident 52 of the second State or has his family there and can obtain employment there; or if

47 Probation officers appointed by the circuit court have no jurisdiction over Juvenile and relief cases. Opinions Att'y Gen. (1935) No. 802.

48 Ill. Stat. Ann. (Jones, 1936) § 37-781.

49 People v. Cahill, 300 Ill. 279, 133 N. E. 228 (1921).

BO Ill. Stat. Ann. (Jones, 1936) § 37-783.

51 Providing that State enters into a compact with the Governor of Illinois who is empowered to act on behalf of the State.

52 A resident is one who has actually lived in the second State for more than 1 year before coming to the sending State and has not resided in the latter for more than 6 months before commission of the offense for which he was convicted.

neither of these conditions are satisfied, if the second State consents to receive him. The receiving State may investigate the home and prospective employment of the probationer before consenting to receive him.

The second State assumes the duty of supervising out-ofState probationers on the same basis as its own probationers. Officers of the sending State may at all times enter the receiving State to retake the offender. No formality is necessary for this except the establishment of the authority of the officer and the identity of the offender. But the receiving State may hold up an attempt to retake the defendant if any charges are pending against him in the receiving State.53

PAROLE

History.-Parole originated in Illinois in 1891 when provision was made for the release on parole of inmates of the State reformatory. The first adult parole law was enacted in 1895. This law provided that an indefinite sentence should be imposed upon any person over 21 years of age convicted of any crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary other than treason or murder. The commissioners of each penitentiary were constituted a prison board with authority to grant parole to any person so sentenced to the penitentiary. This statute was detailed and rather comprehensive in scope. However, it made no provision for the supervision of parolees. In 1917 the act of 1895 was amended so as to except persons convicted of manslaughter and rape, as well as those convicted of treason and murder, from the indefinite sentence provisions of that act. Furthermore, it was provided that the provisions of the act of 1895 should "not apply, so far as they concern his parole, to any person over 21 years of age convicted and sentenced to a penitentiary in this State, who may be shown, upon his trial, to have been previously sentenced to a pententiary in this or any other State or country." The

Ill. Stat. Ann. (Jones, Supp. 1936) §§ 37-831 to 37-834.

Ill. Laws. 1891, pp. 56-58, §§ 16-19. The reformatory was authorized to receive offenders between the ages of 10 and 21. Id. pp. 54-55, §§ 9-12. Though the act of 1891 marked the beginning of parole in Illinois, release of the Juvenile inmates of the reform school on ticket of leave had been authorized by an act of 1867. Ill. Pub. Laws 1867, p. 42, § 17.

Ill. Laws 1895, pp. 158-160. This act was held constitutional in George v. People, 167 Ill. 447, 47 N. E. 741 (1897).

power to grant parole was transferred to the State board of pardons. In 1899 an act was passed which consolidated, amended, and supplemented the previous parole laws. This act provided "that every male person over 21 years of age, and every female person over 18 years, who shall be convicted of a felony or other crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, except treason and murder, shall be sentenced to the penitentiary, and the court imposing such sentence shall not fix the limit or duration of the same, but the term of such imprisonment shall not be less than 1 year, nor shall it exceed the maximum term provided by law for the crime of which the prisoner was convicted, making allowance for good time, as now provided by law." This act provided for the parole of such offenders by the board of pardons, for the appointment of a parole agent for each of the penitentiaries, and for the supervision of certain parolees by the sheriffs of the various counties. The act further provided for indefinite sentences to the State reformatory and for the parole of the inmates of that institution by the board of pardons upon the recommendation of the board of managers of the reformatory. The constitutionality of the act of 1899 was several times attacked, but its validity was sustained,10 and until 1917 it remained the basis of the parole law of Illinois.11 With the passage of two acts in 1917, a foundation was laid for the present parole system in the State. One of these acts, known as the Civil Administrative Code of Illinois,12 trans

a Ill. Laws 1897, p. 203. The board of pardons was composed of three members appointed by the Governor. Ill. Laws 1897, p. 262, § 1.

Ill. Laws 1899, pp. 142-146.

Id. p. 142, § 1.

• Id. p. 143, § 4.

Id. p. 146, § 9. 8 Id. p. 144, § 4.

Id. p. 146, § 10.

10 See People v. Dryer, 187 U. S. 71 (1902); People v. Prochamsky, 294 III. 482, 128 N. E. 474 (1920); People v. Nawosky, 254 Ill. 146, 98 N. E. 242 (1912); People v. Hartsig, 249 Ill. 348, 94 N. E. 525 (1911); People v. Joyce, 246 Ill. 124, 92 N. E. 607 (1910); People v. Hagenow, 188 Ill. 545, 59 N. E. 242 (1900).

11 In 1901 the act was amended so as to exclude persons convicted of kidnaping and rape from its indefinite sentence provision. Ill. Laws 1901, p. 146. In 1915 certain prisoners upon whom definite sentences or sentences for life were imposed were brought within the terms of the act. The periods which such persons should serve to become eligible for parole were defined. Ill. Laws 1915, p. 376.

12 Ill. Laws 1917, p. 4, et seq.

ferred the functions of the board of pardons 18 to the department of public welfare which was created by the act. No provision was made for a separate parole board within the department, but as a matter of practice the assistant director of the department, the criminologist, and the superintendent of prisons were assigned to assist the superintendent of pardons and paroles in parole matters. A very detailed act relating to sentences and parole was also passed.1 It was provided by this act that all persons other than those convicted of treason, murder, rape or kidnaping should be sentenced to indefinite sentences. Provision was made, however, for the parole of persons sentenced to life imprisonment or to a definite term, as well as persons sentenced to an indefinite term, in accordance with the sections of the act relating to eligibility for parole. The 1917 acts, as amended by acts of 1919,15 1927,10 and 1922,17 contain the present statutory law of Illinois relating to parole. The 1917 act effected a major change in parole administration. By that act the office of superintendent of pardons and paroles was abolished and there was created the new office of supervisor of paroles. The power to grant paroles was placed in a parole board composed of the supervisor of paroles and nine other members appointed by the Governor. The board was attached to the department of public welfare as a coordinate unit. The supervision of parolees was left in the department under the direction of the supervisor.18 In 1933, the membership of the board was decreased so as to include the supervisor of paroles and only six other members.18 The supervisor was designated as chairman of the board in both the 1927 and 1933 acts. The parole law of 1917 and the amendments and additions to it have not been discussed in detail. They constitute the present

13 Id. p. 27, § 53 (9).

"Id. p. 353 et seq. as to the constitutionality of this act, see People v. Cohen, 307 Ill. 837, 138 N. E. 294 (1923); People v. Hawkins, 306 Ill. 29, 137 N. E. 385 (1922); People v. Bernstein, 304 Ill. 351, 126 N. E. 683 (1922); People v. Krell, 300 Ill. 390, 133 N. E. 310 (1921); People v. Hussian, 291 Ill. 577, 126 N. E. 596 (1920); People v. Harmon, 291 Ill. 578, 126 N. E. 596 (1920); People v. Connors, 291 I¡l. 614, 126 N. E. 595 (1920).

15 Ill. Laws 1919, p. 436 et seq.

10 Ill. Laws 1927, pp. 846, 848, and 850.

17 Ill. Laws 1933, p. 1063; id. p. 484 et seq.

18 Ill. Laws 1927, pp. 846, 848, 849 and 850. Ill. Laws 1933, p. 1063.