Suspension may be on condition of good behavior and may be subsequently revoked for a violation of the conditions 2 or for any other reason which the court deems sufficient." The court retains jurisdiction two terms later even if imposition of sentence had only been suspended "until the next term of court." A new judge in the same court may impose sentence at such subsequent term." A sentence that defendant pay costs, and that further sentence be suspended, is valid."

Florida courts may not suspend execution of sentence." If a statute authorizes fine or imprisonment, this gives the court the alternative, but it may not impose imprisonment and fine and suspend the imprisonment on condition the fine is paid, because commutation and mitigation of penalties are not within the court's powers. Another reason is that a statute authorizing fine or imprisonment does not authorize both, the imposition of one of the alternatives exhausting the court's power. This does not mean that a court may not impose a fine with alternative jail term in case of default in payment, which is authorized by statute.10 Apparently, there is here only a difference in form. Whereas the court may impose a fine with alternative jail sentence in case of

(1890); see Ragland v. State, 55 Fla. 157, 46 So. 724 (1908); Tanner v. Wiggins, 54 Fla. 203, 45 So. 459 (1907). When imposition of sentence is suspended, there is no conviction which will entitle the prosecuting attorney to his fee. State v. Barnes, 24 Fla. 153, 4 So. 560 (1888).

Ingram v. Prescott, 111 Fla. 320, 149 So. 369 (1933); see State v. Barnes, 24 Fla. 153, 4 So. 560 (1888), for a suspension of imposition on condition that the defendant pay costs.

Carnagio v. State, 106 Fla. 209, 143 So. 162 (1932); Ex parte Williams, 26 Fla. 310, 8 So. 425 (1890).

'Er parte Williams, 26 Fla. 310, 8 So. 425 (1890).

s Ibid.

• Ibid.

Tanner v. Wiggins, 54 Fla. 203, 45 So. 459 (1907); Ragland v. State, 55 Fla. 157, 46 So. 724 (1908); Pensacola Lodge v. Florida, 74 Fla. 498, 77 So. 613 (1917).

$ Tanner v. Wiggins, 54 Fla. 203, 45 So. 459 (1907); Ragland v. State, 55 Fla. 157, 46 So. 724 (1908).

'Tanner v. Wiggins, 54 Fla. 203, 45 So. 459 (1907).

"Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws Ann. (Skillman, 1927) § 8419; see Albritten v. State, 112 Fla. 472, 150 So. 607 (1933). Such an alternative sentence to imprisonment was held void for uncertainty before the statute was passed. Ez parte Martini, 23 Fla. 343, 2 So. 689 (1887).

default, it may not sentence to both fine and imprisonment and suspend the imprisonment on condition the fine is paid.

PROBATION

There are in Florida no provisions for adult probation 1 or any form of supervision during the period of suspended imposition of sentence.

PAROLE

Although the term "parole" is applied to some releases from the Florida State Prison granted by the pardon board, such releases are, except for possible exempting and restor ing effects of a conditional pardon,1 practically the same as conditional pardons and are administered in the same fashion, being considered as grants of executive clemency.

There is neither an indeterminate sentence law nor a statute providing for paroles from the State prison. Releases from prison termed "paroles" are accomplished under the constitutional power of the board of pardons to pardon and commute punishment.3

There is no parole board other than the board of pardons. The State has, in fact, suffered from a total lack of parole facilities.*

Although no definite portion of sentence need be served in order for a prisoner to be eligible for this so-called "parole," the practice of the board of pardons has been to require that one-third of the sentence be served.

No provision has been made for a regular system of supervision for those "on parole," except under a former act pro

1 Juvenile probation is provided for. Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws (Skillman, 1927) §§ 3684 ff.

1 Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws (Skillman, 1927) § 8495 seems to extend restoration of citizenship rights only in case of a "full pardon," but, in applying this statute, the Florida Supreme Court has held that when the conditions of a conditional pardon are fulfilled, it is the same in effect as a full or absolute pardon. Ea parte Alvarez, 50 Fla. 24, 39 So. 481 (1925).

For the Florida law relating to conditional pardons see post, Executive Clemency.

Fla. Const. art. IV, § 12.

"Prisoners are usually paroled to some responsible person, who is required to report periodically to the board as to conduct." Statement from the secretary of the Florida State Board of Pardons, March 25, 1937.

viding for a State board of social welfare. This system was never placed in operation."

Parole from the State industrial schools is administered separately."

In construing the constitutional provision which grants the board of pardons power to commute punishment and grant pardon, absolutely or conditionally, the Supreme Court of Florida has cast some doubt on the possibility of legislative reform of the parole situation in Florida.R

The legislature would be restricted by the State constitution if it attempted to provide for parole officers for proper parole administration. This is quite important in

Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws (Skillman, Supp. 1936) § 4139 (13). By its terms this act terminated on July 1, 1937, unless reenacted. It was not reenacted. The act provided for a trained commissioner of social welfare. "There shall be employed by the State board a secretary who shall be known as the commissioner of social welfare and who shall serve at the pleasure of the board and whose compensation shall be fixed by the board, but shall not exceed the sum of $4,200 per annum from funds appropriated by the State, and who shall be allowed in addition thereto the actual necessary traveling and other expenses incurred by him in the performance of his duties as shall be approved by the State board and who shall have the following minimum qualification : Training in methods and basic principles of social work; at least 5 years administrative experience in social agencies of recognized standing; and adequate administrative experience." Id. § 4139 (2).

"The said board of social welfare shall have general oversight of all placed on parole from State institutions, receiving reports at stated intervals from such persons or from those who assume responsibility for their good behavior, or from agents of said board, or from county boards of visitors, county welfare boards, federation of social agencies or other welfare organizations whose services may be enlisted to assist it in carrying out its duties in the several communities and counties where such organizations are or may be established. Said board shall send duplicate reports to the superintendents of the State institutions concerning the conduct of those on parole. Said board shall encourage and assist in the development of welfare work on a county-wide basis." Ibid.

"The supervision of persons on parole is one field into which the board has not advanced because of its financial limitations." Statement of the inquiry secretary of the Florida State Board of Social Welfare, March 27, 1937. For such institutions the power of parole is in the hands of the board of commissioners of State institutions, and the Governor grants paroles at the request of the superintendents of the schools. Usually 1 year must be served in such a school in order for an inmate to be eligible for parole. Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws (Skillman, 1927) §§ 8637, 8656.

*"In our judgment the power to commute punishment and grant pardons for crimes after conviction had been conferred upon [the pardon board] and it is not competent for the legislature to exercise such power." Singleton v. State, 38 Fla. 297, 303, 21 So. 21 (1896); see Fla. Const. art. IV, § 12.

Compare this view with that taken by the Vermont court under a similar provision. See post Vermont, history.

"The legislature shall provide for the election by the people or appointment by the Governor of all State and county officers not otherwise provided

view of the frequent charge that administration of clemency is controlled by political considerations.10

EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

Power in board of pardons.-The constitution of Florida provides that the "Governor, secretary of state, comptroller, attorney general, and commissioner of agriculture, or a major part of them, of whom the Governor shall be one, may, upon such conditions and with such limitations and restrictions as they may deem proper, remit fines and forfeitures, commute punishment, and grant pardon after conviction, in all cases except treason and impeachment, subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law relative to the manner of applying for pardons."

The constitution gives the Governor power to suspend the collection of fines and forfeitures, and grant reprieves for a period not exceeding 60 days,2 for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment. In cases of conviction for treason, the Governor has power to suspend execution of sentence until the case is reported to the legislature at its next session. The legislature may then pardon, grant a further reprieve or direct the execution of the sentence. If the legislature fails to make disposition of the case, the Governor directs enforcement of the sentence."

The pardoning power thus conferred is exclusive and cannot be exercised by the legislature.*

for by this constitution, and fix by law their duties and compensation." Fla. Censt. art. III, § 27.

Because of this constitutional provision, parole officers (unless identified as "employees") must be elected or appointed by the Governor, and so any statutes making provision for a parole and probation system can only specify qualifications to be met in order that the appointments will not be political. 10 This comment has been made with reference to the Florida situation: “As long as political ambitions and aims are as powerful as they are, it will always be difficult, if not impossible, to control pardons and paroles as they should be." 91st Annual Rep., Prison Ass'n of N. Y. (1936) 89.

1 Fla. Const. art. IV, § 12. Before 1896, the board consisted of the Governor, justices of the supreme court and attorney general.

The judges of the supreme court have advised, however, that while the Governor may not grant a reprieve of more than 60 days, he may grant two or more successive reprieves, amounting in the aggregate to more than 60 days. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 62 Fla. 7, 55 So. 865 (1911). Fla. Const. art. IV, § 11.

'Singleton v. State, 38 Fla. 297, 21 So. 21 (1896) (legislative act undertaking to restore "civil rights" to person convicted of felony held invalid).

The Governor is required to communicate to the legislature, at the beginning of every session, every case of reprieve, pardon, or commutation granted, stating the name of the convict, the crime for which he was convicted, the sentence, its date, and the date of its remission, commutation, pardon or reprieve.5

Persons eligible.-The constitution expressly states that the pardoning power extends to "all cases except treason and impeachment." It has been held that an attorney fined for contempt of court, after the expiration of the term of court at which the fine was imposed, cannot ask the court to remit it, but must apply to the board of pardons."

Procedure: Application. The pardoning power is "subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law relative to the manner of applying for pardons." The legislature has directed that every applicant to the board of pardons for clemency must post a notice of his intention to make application for a period of 10 days, at the court house and in two or more places in the county where the offense was committed. One copy must be posted in the immediate vicinity where the offense was committed. As an alternative, the applicant may publish notice of his intention in a newspaper in the county for the same period of time. The notice must state the nature of the charge or offense and the time or term of the court when convicted.

8

All applications are required to be in writing and accompanied by: (1) A copy of the indictment or information upon which the conviction was had, (2) a statement of the facts testified to at the trial, (3) a copy of the notice posted prior to the application and proof by affidavit that the legal requirements regarding its posting were fulfilled, and (4) such other papers as the applicant desires."

Fla. Const. art. IV, § 11. The Governor need report on cases of pardon only at regular sessions of the legislature and not at special sessions (1) unless special reference thereto is made in the proclamation convening the session or (2) unless it is called "legislative business" or (3) unless the information is requested by a two-thirds vote of each house. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 64 Fla. 21, 59 So. 7S6 (1912).

• Granat v. Dulbs, 108 Fla. 116, 145 So. 879 (1933).

Fla. Const. art. IV, § 12.

Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws Ann. (Skillman, 1927) § 8492.

• Id. § 8493.