Bridge Rails Need Not Be Automobile Proof

"While it is the duty of a municipality to use ordinary care in the construction and maintenance of highways, and to erect guard rails or barriers where their absence would leave the highway unsafe for ordinary travel, it is not an insurer against accidents, and not bound to erect barriers of sufficient strength to withstand the shock of a carelessly driven automobile," said the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the case of Yocum vs. Town of Bloomsburg, 137 Atlantic Reporter, 668.

Tax Levies Sufficiently Itemized-Clerk May Correct His Record of Meeting at Which Ordinance Was Passed

Delinquent taxpayers unsuccessfully attacked village tax levies in the case of People vs. Irvin, 156 North Eastern Reporter, 292, decided by the Illinois Supreme Court.

The tax levying ordinances each contained the same itemization, viz.:

"For salaries of village officials, $700; for street and alley improvements and maintenances, $1,000; for election expenses, $50; for printing and supplies, $50; total $1,800."

The court said:

"It is not necessary in these ordinances to give in detail each particular object for which the tax is to be expended. It is sufficient that the ordinances specify the object and purpose of the appropriation and the amount appropriated for such purpose. These ordinances are sufficiently specific to meet the requirements of the statute.

"It is contended that the ordinances were not passed by the required number of votes. The clerk's record shows that five of the six members of the board of trustees were present, and that each of them voted for the passage of this ordinance. The clerk testified to the truth of this statement. While his record as originally made showed only three members voting, prior to the trial he amended it, in accordance with the rule in People vs. Hartquist, 315 Ill. 228, 146 N. E. 140, to make it conform to the facts."

City Is Not Liable for a Collision with a Safety Island If Due Care Was Used to Light the Place

A motorist drove into a safety island in a Jacksonville, Florida, street one dark morning, and sued the city for damages. Reversing a judgment in her favor, on the principal ground that the city was not at fault even if a nearby electric light was not burning, the Florida Supreme Court said in the case of City of Jacksonville vs. Bell, 112 Southern Reporter, 885:

"The use of such devices (safety islands) by municipalities in which heavy traffic is prevalent is to be commended, rather than condemned. Obstructions placed in public thoroughfares which are intended for the protection of the general traveling public do not constitute a nuisance and are not

prohibited by the law. That law which is applicable to the right of maintenance of safety gates on railroad crossings should be applied to

the maintenance of such safety devices as are here under consideration.

“If, as a matter of fact, the light was not burning at the time and if it had been the duty of the municipality to keep a light burning at and during all hours of darkness, it could not be held liable in this instance for actionable negligence upon the sole ground that the light was not burning because it is conclusively shown that if the light was not burning at the time, it had been burning immediately before the accident, and there had not sufficient time elapsed since the light had been seen burning by a city officer for the city to have been charged with notice of the unlighted condition.

"Whether the light was burning or not could not affect the right of the defendant in this case to recover, because the undisputed evidence, in fact her own testimony, shows that she was familiar with the street and that she had full knowledge of the alleged obstruction and of its character. It has been repeatedly held that if one knows of an obstruction and knows that by the exercise of ordinary care he can avoid striking it while traveling along the street, his act in striking it is, per se, contributory negligence."

An Ordinance Requiring Snow to Be Removed By Owner or Occupant of Abutting Land Within a Stated Time-Held Valid

In the recent case of State vs. Small, 137 Atlantic Reporter, 398, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court sustained the validity of an ordinance of the city of Portland reading as follows:

"Section 1. The owner, tenant, occupant, or any person having the care of any building or lot of land bordering on any street, lane, court, square, or public place within the city, where there is any footway or sidewalk, shall after the ceasing to fall of any snow, if in the daytime, within three hours, and, if in the night-time before 10 o'clock of the forenoon succeeding, cause such snow to be removed from such footway or sidewalk."

For failure to comply, a penalty is provided of a fine of not less than two nor more than ten dollars, and an additional sum of not less than one or more than ten dollars for every hour the snow shall be permitted to remain on such footway or sidewalk beyond the limit fixed for its removal. The Court said:

"Where there is a conflict among the authorities as to whether such municipal by-laws are valid, the weight of authority sustains them as a proper exercise of the police powers. . . .

"It is true that such burdens have some attri-. butes in common with taxes for the general repair of streets, and the cases holding such by-laws invalid appear to be decided on the ground that the burdens thus imposed are not equally apportioned. . . .

"The more generally accepted rule, however, treats such municipal by-laws as police regulations. . . . Even if viewed as a form of taxation, it must be of the nature of local assessments, which, by eminent authorities, are also held to be an exercise of the police powers; . . . or at least are not governed by the same constitutional limitations as taxes for general purposes.

"The chief ground relied upon by the respondent is the shortness of time allowed for the removal of snow when it ceases to fall in the daytime. Three hours for such removal may work a hardship under some conditions, as in case of laborers or clerks living in suburban districts whose hours and place of employment take them some distance from home during the daytime, while ordinarily in the compact portions of a city it would not be unreasonable.

"The time limit for removal in by-laws of this nature, however, is a matter resting in the sound judgment of the legislative body of the municipality. The Court will not interfere simply because in its judgment a longer time should be allowed, unless the time fixed is so short that, on its face, or upon facts shown in evidence, it appears to be clearly unreasonable. As between three hours and four hours, or even five hours, which have been held reasonable limits . . we cannot say, as a question of law, that the line between reasonableness and unreasonableness has been passed."

Appropriate Streets May Be Temporarily Assigned for Coasting Purposes and Closed to Vehicular Traffic

Under a proper statute or ordinance, the authorities of a municipality may set apart a street or highway, or part of one, for use in coasting or sled riding, holds the Court of Quarter Sessions for Beaver County, Pennsylvania, in the case of Commonwealth vs. Wagoner, 18 Municipal Law Reporter, Pennsylvania, 159. The opinion cites similar conclusions reached by the appellate courts of Indiana, Michigan, Connecticut, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The court says, in part:

"When a street is being repaired it is generally closed by the street committee or the burgess and barriers are erected to prevent the use of said street during the time said repairs are being made. This power is also exercised where persons are seriously ill on the street and quiet must be maintained. It has also been exercised in order to prevent accidents which may be caused, and are caused, by coasting upon the streets in a borough. It is well known that when the streets in boroughs are in condition for sled riding thereon children, and even older people, will use them for coasting; and if vehicles are permitted to use the same streets, or cross the streets at the time they are being used for coasting, accidents are bound to happen. In order to avoid this difficulty it is a universal custom in this vicinity at least, and it evidently is in existence in other places, to close certain streets in the borough against vehicular traffic, and to compel the coasters to use only a certain street, or a certain part thereof. So that whenever the necessity arises, the burgess or the street committee have the power, and it may be their duty to close certain of the streets, or parts thereof, temporarily against vehicular traffic, and

confine the coasting to said streets so as to avoid accidents."

Fire Limit Ordinance Held Void as Conflicting With the Alabama Code

Under the provision of the Alabama statutes, that a city or town council may prescribe fire limits within which buildings of inflammable material shall not be erected, an ordinance fixing "inner" and "outer" fire limits and permitting construction of dwelling-houses of inflammable material in the "outer" limits, is void, holds the Alabama Supreme Court in the case of Williamson vs. City of Anniston, 112 Southern Reporter, 109. The Court says:

"The controlling purpose of the ordinance is to create two distinct fire limits in which a different rule as to the character of material to be used in the construction of a certain class of buildings is prescribed, and its provisions are so interlinked with reference to the two that it is more than probable that it would not have been adopted so as to cover the outer fire limit without the proviso allowing the use of other than fireproof material in the construction of residences, and hence the whole ordinance must fall."

It seems that this decision is not necessarily inconsistent with the right of Alabama cities to enact a building code which, without reference to the fire limits, will require a greater degree of fire protection in the construction of multi-family buildings, business buildings, theaters, etc., than in single-family dwellings. The decision merely says that, under statutes permitting cities to prescribe fire limits and prohibiting erection of buildings of inflammable materials within such limits, a city cannot create an "outer" zone within the fire limits for the purpose of exempting dwelling-houses from the fireproof requirements of the ordinance.

City Cannot Authorize a Private Structure in a
Street If It Impairs an Abutter's
Air, Light and View

The city of Cleveland could not empower an owner of properties on opposite sides of a street to construct a connecting overhead bridge, if an objecting property owner's air, light and view would be thereby impaired, although the value of his property might be enhanced, declared the Ohio Court of Appeals in the case of Anthony Carlin Company vs. Halle Brothers Company, 155 North Eastern Reporter, 398. The court said:

"The dedication of this street embraced not only the surface of the ground but the light, air, and view above, and an individual would have no more right to obstruct the natural penetration of light and the free circulation of air above than to obstruct the surface of the street; and it is well settled that an individual cannot appropriate to his own exclusive use a portion of a street dedicated to the public use. Chicago Dock & Canal Company vs. Garrity, 115 Ill. 155, 3 North Eastern Reporter, 448. Nor could the city of Cleveland by any process of municipal legislation, or otherwise, grant any greater rights in Huron road than it possessed, which, as above stated, is only a fee in trust for public uses, that is for all uses as a street, subject always to the property rights in the street of abutting lot owners."