order, claiming it should stay open without incident until March 2002. FirstEnergy argued that a shutdown would cause an unnecessary financial burden. Rather than following its own safety procedures and shutting down Davis-Besse, the NRC relented and allowed the plant to operate until February 2002. After the Davis-Besse plant had been shut down, workers repairing one of five cracked control rod nozzles discovered extensive damage to the reactor vessel head. The workers found a large corroded hole the size of a football in the reactor vessel head next to one of the nozzles. The GAO concluded in a scathing report on May 2004 that the risk estimate used by the NRC to decide whether the plant needed to be shut down was flawed. The NRC severely underestimated the risk Davis-Besse posed, even exceeding risk levels generally considered acceptable by the Agency. The GAO report shows that the NRC was ill-equipped, illinformed, and far too slow to react. The NRC's reaction to DavisBesse was inadequate, irresponsible and left the public at great risk. The NRC later reported that the plant might have been as close as 60 days to bursting its rust, damaged lid. Fortunately, the health of tens of thousands of Ohio residents was not harmed, but this was a disaster waiting to happen. Let's talk about security. So, Mr. Chairman, it's very difficult for me to sit here today and to listen without objectivity as the NRC and the nuclear industry lobbyists tell us how much has been spent, how much security has improved in the last 3 years. The facts and independent experts tell us differently. For example, we know that one security firm, Wackenhut, provides nearly half of the guard forces at our Nation's nuclear sites. Yet, as was documented by the Department of Energy's Inspector General, the report in January of this year questions surround Wackenhut's competency and objectivity to fulfill this crucial mission. The DOE Inspector General found that in simulation attack drills, Wackenhut attackers told the Wackenhut guard defenders the buildings that were being attacked, the targets at those buildings and whether a diversionary tactic would be used. The IG also noted an industry-funded study found that as many as 50 percent of the guard forces in a New York plant did not meet physical fitness requirements, guards reported for duty drunk, worked 70 to 80 hours per week and were allowed to repeat weapons qualifying tests until they passed them. In spite of this poor record, and obvious conflict of interest, the commercial industry still decided to hire Wackenhut to provide the attack teams in force-on-force drills at NRC commercial sites. This could be called a case of the fox guarding the hen house and anyone with a shred of common sense-it's a poor decision. It undermined public trust and raises serious questions on who is making the decisions at the NRC. Understandably, the NRC has decided that the less it says the better. It has polled public security information from its Web site. It has restricted public access by public interest groups to information by requiring none disclosure forms or thorough reclassification, even if the information was previously unclassified. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit two documents for the record. The first is a letter from Public Citizen to the NRC dated August 19th; and the second is a Freedom of Information Act request submitted by a coalition of public interest groups dated August 18th. Both documents question the rational behind the NRC's announcement in August 2004 that "certain security information formally included in the reactor oversight process will no longer be publicly available and will no longer be updated in the NRC's Web site." The same information, including performance indicators and physical inspection information, was available on the NRC Web site after September 11. It was temporarily pulled from the Web site for review and returned to it after it was deemed to have no value to potential terrorists. What has changed to make this information unacceptable for public review? Since the NRC won't hold public hearings, it's up to this subcommittee to find out. Mr. Chairman, we all know that these nuclear plants are decades old and they are decaying. Yet despite the billions of dollars spent to upgrade security at these nuclear plants, the NRC clearly has a long ways to go before it can restore public trust in its position. I have to wonder if an incident such as if this happened at Davis-Besse in Ohio happened today, whether the NRC would tell us about it. The NRC should work to allay public fears about public safety not to foster them. I really look forward to hearing your testimony. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich follows:] Statement of Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Hearing on "Homeland Security: Monitoring September 14, 2004 Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, and to our witnesses here today. I welcome this opportunity to discuss nuclear security in an open session, as both Congress and the public have been stymied for far too long in getting truthful answers to the many questions we have about nuclear safety and security. Three years ago, two incidents shook the faith of the American people in our security. The first, of course, was the tragic attack on our country by terrorists on 9/11. The other, less known incident, was the hidden problem ongoing at the Davis Besse nuclear reactor in Ohio. 1 These are the facts. In February 2001, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission began investigating an aging mechanism that often caused cracking in reactors. As a result of these findings, in late September 2001, the NRC determined that the Davis-Besse plant was at risk and should shut down by December 31, 2001. FirstEnergy, the plant owner, resisted the order, claiming that it could stay open without incident, until March 2002. FirstEnergy argued that a shutdown would cause an unnecessary financial burden. Rather than following its own safety procedures and shutting down Davis-Besse, the NRC relented and allowed the plant to operate until February 2002. After the Davis-Besse plant had been shut down, workers repairing one of five-cracked control rod nozzles discovered extensive damage to the reactor vessel head. The workers found a large, corroded hole the size of a football in the reactor vessel head next to one of the nozzles. GAO concluded in a scathing report in May 2004 that the risk estimate used by the NRC to decide whether the plant needed 2 to shut down was flawed. The NRC severely underestimated the risk Davis-Besse posed, even exceeding risk levels generally considered acceptable by the agency. The GAO report shows that the NRC was ill equipped, ill informed and far too slow to react. The NRC's reaction to Davis-Besse was inadequate, irresponsible and left the public at grave risk. The NRC later reported that the plant might have been as close as 60 days to bursting its rustdamaged lid. Fortunately, the health of tens of thousands of Ohio residents was unharmed, but this was a disaster just waiting to happen. So, Mr. Chairman, it is very difficult for me to sit here today and to listen objectively as the NRC and nuclear industry lobbyists tell us how much has been spent, and how much security has improved in the last three years. The facts and the independent experts tell us differently. For example, we know that one security firm, Wackenhut, provides nearly half of the guard forces at our nation's nuclear sites. Yet, as was documented by the Department of Energy 3 |