767, 83d Congress, extending the unemployment compensation program to Federal civilian employees, are applicable to employees of non-appropriated fund activities such as Navy and Marine Corps Exchanges, Commissioned Officers' Messes Ashore, Chief Petty Officers' Messes and Enlisted Mens' Clubs Ashore, and Recreation Departments. Op JAGN 1954/265. 21 December 1954. § 52. State or Local Regulations, Taxes, or Licenses § 52.31. Vehicle insurance coverage or proof of financial responsibility. Employees of the United States, when operating United States vehicles on official business, are not required to comply with the Missouri Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law (ch 303, Revised Statutes of Missouri (1949)) which requires all motorists in the state to provide proof of financial responsibility or provide certain minimum liability and insurance coverage. (Citing JAGA 1948/5126, 7 Jul 1948; par 3, JAGA 1952/1653, 28 Jan 1952.) JAGA 1954/8433. 26 October 1954. CLAIMS II. CLAIMS BY THE UNITED STATES. § 25. Compromise and Settlement. III. CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. A. IN GENERAL. § 33. Construction and Application of Claims Statutes and Regulations, Generally. § 77. Training and Maneuvers. 2. Claims of Military Personnel and Civilian Officers or Em ployees. § 92. Loss, Injury, or Death Incident to Service. 3. Operation of Motor Vehicles. § 127. Scope of Employment. 4. Operation of Aircraft. § 137. In General. II. CLAIMS BY THE UNITED STATES § 25. Compromise and Settlement § 25.31. Persons authorized to execute release. Paragraph 100.1, SR 735-150-1 provides for the collection of charges raised on reports of survey without processing through claims procedure if the charges are accepted. Paragraph 4, SR 25-220-1 provides that an Army judge advocate may execute a release when an insurer of a defendant in a claims action tenders payment in full. Current regulations make no specific provisions for execution of a release when an insurer tenders payment in full for a charge which has been accepted without the necessity of a claims action. Such tenders are frequently made by insurers in accident cases which involve government vehicles and privately owned vehicles driven by military personnel or civilians. Held: Releases cannot be executed by an Army commander or by a member of his staff other than a judge advocate. However, a claims action is not a condition precedent to the execution of a release under par 4, SR 25-220-1 and under that provision the judge advocate of an Army, the Military District of Washington or a theater or command judge advocate could execute releases in the situation presented. (Cf. JAGA 1953/6255, 29 July 1953.) JAGA 1954/5474. 21 June 1954. III. CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES A. IN GENERAL § 33. Construction and Application of Claims Statutes § 35. Particular Words and Phrases $ 35.5. Employee of the government. In view of the decision in Cobb v. United States, 81 F Supp 9, it appears that Army personnel may be held not to be employees of the United States in the sense that liability will attach to the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for their negligent acts committed while on Reserve Officer Training Corps duty, that such personnel may be held to be "loaned servants" for whose negligent acts the educational institutions concerned may be held liable, and that therefore, the United States will raise, in proper instances, the "loaned servant" defense in suits against it under the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 USC 2671 et seq). (See also CSJAGA 1949/ 9519, 11 Apr 1949.) JAGA 1954/1605. 24 February 1954. Three negligence actions against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act arose by reason of a collision between a private automobile and a tank retriever owned by the United States but properly in the possession of the New York National Guard. The tank retriever was being driven by a civilian employee of the National Guard. The National Guard unit by which he was employed was not in the active military service of the United States. The driver received his salary by check issued to him by the United States. Held: The United States was not liable since the driver was not an employee of the government. While the driver was not an enlisted member of the National Guard, as a civilian employee he would be considered to be in the military service of the state under the New York Military Law, secs 1 and 19, and he should be so treated. It was admitted that the National Guard unit was not in the active military service of the United States at the time of the collision. Until the unit has been called into active duty, there can be no liability of the federal government for the conduct of the members of the National Guard. The whole government of the militia remains with the states except when employed in the service of the United States. Accordingly, the driver was not an employee of the United States, notwithstanding the fact that he received his pay from the United States. (Citing U. S. ex rel. Gillett v. Dern, 64 App DC 81, 74 F2d 485; McCranie v. U. S., 199 F2d 581, cert den 345 US 922, 97 L ed 1354, 73 S Ct 780; Dover v. U. S., 192 F2d 431; Williams v. U. S., 189 F2d 607; Dicicco v. State of New York, 152 Misc 541, 273 NY Supp 937; Fries v. U. S., 170 F2d 726 and other cases. Distinguishing U. S. v. Holly, 192 F2d 221; U. S. v. Duncan, 197 F2d 233 and Elmo v. U. S., 197 F2d 230.) Lederhouse v. U. S. (DC NY, 1954) 126 F Supp 217. § 49.11. Waiver. § 49. Defenses The validity of waivers signed by civilian personnel purporting to release a civilian athletic association of a naval activity and the Department of the Navy from responsibility for injury, death, or personal loss resulting from an act or omission during an athletic event is questionable. Civilian personnel participating in athletic events upon federal property would be doing so either as invitees or licensees. In either case there would be a duty of the occupier of the land owing to such personnel that the property be reasonably safe for the purpose for which used. While the participants would assume some risk of injury that is inherently present in athletic competition, nevertheless, the occupier of the land would be legally responsible for the results of negligent acts or omissions. The athletic association itself would be liable for damages attributable to the negligence of the association or its agents. The waiver therefore is an attempt to avoid the consequences of negligence. The enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act reflects a policy of responding in damages for negligence. In view of this broad departure from the shelter of sovereign immunity the waivers would appear to have little prospect of negating such statutory policy if relied upon to defeat a claim against the United States. While the signing of such waivers may have a deterrent effect on the assertion of claims, aside from their validity in law, their use for such purpose is a matter of policy. Op JAGN 1954/248. 1 September 1954. B. BASIS AND PARTICULAR TYPES OF CLAIMS § 77.1. Generally. 1. IN GENERAL § 77. Training and Maneuvers Funds appropriated for the maintenance and operations of the Department of the Army are not available for the payment of claims arising from maneuver damage since a specific appropriation makes funds available for the payment of claims, including maneuver damage claims and the appropriation for maintenance and operation of the Department of the Army is specifically limited to expenses which are "not otherwise provided for". (Citing Titles III, IV, Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1955, PL 458, 83rd Cong, 68 Stat 337; par 9, AR 25–25, 2 Jul 1951; 7 Comp Dec 665; 31 Comp Gen 491, 492; JAG 311.21, 1 Sep 1921; JAG 112.1, 4 Nov 1921; JAG 451.1, 3 Jul 1924.) JAGA 1955/1251. 27 January 1955. 2. CLAIMS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL AND § 92. Loss, Injury, or Death Incident to Service § 92.1. Generally. See 1 ALR2d 222; 93 L ed 1205. As a result of a collision on an Army reservation an action was brought against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The plaintiff was a member of the Army on active duty and not on leave or furlough. However, at the time of the accident he was not engaged in the performance of any military duty as it was pay day and the usual military activities had been suspended for the day. Held: The United States is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act since, while the plaintiff had been relieved of specific duties during the balance of the day on which he was hurt, he was on active duty in the service of the United States and at the time was subject to call for military duty. (Citing Feres v. U. S., 340 US 135, 95 L ed 152, 71 S Ct 153. Distinguishing Brooks v. U. S., 337 US 49, 93 L ed 1200, 69 S Ct 918.) Ritzman v. Trent (DC NC No. 368), decided 17 November 1954. A veteran was discharged from the armed services as a result of a knee injury incurred while on active duty. He subsequently received treatment of the knee in a Veterans Administration hospital and brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act for damages for negligence in the treatment. He received a compensation award under the Veterans Act, 48 Stat 526, 38 USC 501a. Held: The veteran was entitled to sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act since the injury occurred after his discharge and while he was in a veteran's hospital. His case is governed by Brooks v. U. S., 337 US 49, 93 Led 1200, 69 S Ct 918, 8 Bull. JAG 49, wherein it was held that servicemen were covered by the Tort Claims Act where they were injured while in a furlough status, off the military reservation, and riding in a private automobile. Also, the receipt of payments under the Veterans Act was not an election of remedies and did not preclude recovery under the Tort Claims Act but only reduced the amount of any judgment under the latter Act. (Distinguishing Feres v. U. S., 340 US 135, 95 L ed 152, 71 S Ct 153, 9 Bull. JAG 234.) [Justices Black, Reed and Minton, dissenting, on the ground that the veteran's injury was inseparably related to military service and the Brooks case should not be held controlling since but for his Army service the veteran could not have been in the veteran's hospital as he was eligible and admitted for the treatment there solely because of war service. Moreover, he was actually being treated for an Army service injury.] United States v. Brown (S Ct No. 38), 348 US 110, 99 L ed -,75 S Ct 141, 6 December 1954. Two servicemen were injured when the vehicle in which they were riding was struck by a military vehicle. The accident happened on a military reservation but the injured men were riding in a private vehicle and were on business of their own and in a pass status. Held: The government is not liable in damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act. A person on pass status is subject to call for military duty at all times. Accordingly, while the injured men in the instant case were in civilian clothes and entitled to a pass, they were still on the post and still in the course of activity incident to service and thus were within the intent and meaning of the decision in Feres v. U. S., 340 US 135, 95 L ed 152, 71 S Ct 153, in which it was held that the government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims |