Similarly, the protocol does not apply to herbicides, which involve the same chemicals and have the same effects as those used domestically in the United States, the Soviet Union and many other countries to control weeds and other unwanted vegetation. "While the United States is not a party to the Protocol, we support the worthy objectives which it seeks to achieve. We have repeatedly endeavoured to find adequate means to attain those objectives. We have never used biological weapons of any kind, bacteriological or otherwise. We were not the first to engage in gas warfare in the First World War and we have not engaged in it since that time. We played a crucial role in preventing the horrors of gas warfare during the Second World War. In 1943 President Roosevelt issued on behalf of the United States a most serious warning to the Axis Powers threatening them with severe retaliation if they resorted to gas warfare. The President stated that the use of poison gas 'has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind' and added categorically that 'we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies'." In August 1968 the British Government introduced a proposal at the Geneva Disarmament Conference to establish a new international Convention for the Prohibition of Microbiological Methods of Warfare, to supplement but not to supersede the 1925 Protocol.19 The British proposal would have the convention tackle the biological weapons first, and hopefully: 1. Declare biological warfare under any circumstances to be contrary to international law. 2. Ban the production of biological agents for hostile purposes. 3. Require the destruction of stockpiles of biological agents and special equipment intended for use in hostilities. 4. Ban research and development aimed at the production of biological warfare agents and equipment. Bans of this sort would require either international inspection or an extraordinary international sense of agreement so that a kind of voluntary self inspection would be in effect. While such sweeping disarmament seems most unrealistic, and would appear to be removing a major option from the arsenal of weapons available to the great powers, it must be remembered that the British, in the above four points, would focus the convention only on biological weapons. These are regarded by many as constituting a grave potential threat, but at the present time perhaps only in an intermediate stage of development. Words cannot be put into the mouths of any nation which may participate in such a convention, but it seems that the logic might be to forestall further development of biological weapons before they reach military readiness in part or their potential danger in full. In November 1968 the Canadian and Polish Governments introduced a resolution requesting the Secretary General of the United Nations to prepare a report, with the assitance of expert consultants, on the effects of chemical and biological weapons. The resolution which is based on a recommendation by the states participating in the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva was 19"Arms Control: Demand for Decisions," Science, Dec. 6, 1968 (p. 1106). passed by the General Assembly on December 20, 1968. Less than a month later Secretary General U Thant appointed a 14-member group of consultant experts to assist him in the preparation of the report.20 The group has already held its organizational meeting and is expected to submit its report by July 1, 1969. On the day that the resolution was passed U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. James R. Wiggins, provided the following terms of reference for preparing the report: The aim of the report is to provide a scientifically sound appraisal of the effects of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. At the same time, the report should serve to inform Governments of the consequences of the possible use in war of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, taking into account resolution 2162 B (XXI) of the United Nations General Assembly of 5 December 1966, and should contribute to the consideration by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament of the problems connected with these weapons. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should be treated by experts with experience in the respective technical fields. The report should include the following data: 1. The basic characteristics of chemical and bacteriological (biological) means of warfare. 2. The probable effects of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons on military and civilian personnel, both protected and unprotected. 3. Possible long-term effects on human health and ecology. 4. Environmental and other factors affecting the employment of chemical and bacteriological (biological) means of warfare. 5. Economic and security implications of the development, acquisition and possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and of systems for their delivery. The above five point outline of what the report should include, together with paragraphs 30-32 from the Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization (September 1968), indicate that a very important document may emerge from this rapidly moving effort in the United Nations. The paragraphs from the Secretary-General's Annual Report are as follows: "30. While progress is being made in the field of nuclear disarmament, there is another aspect of the disarmament problem to which I feel too little attention has been devoted in recent years. The question of chemical and biological weapons has been overshadowed by the question of nuclear weapons, which have a destructive power several orders of magnitude greater than that of chemical and biological weapons. Nevertheless, these too are weapons of mass destruction regarded with universal horror. In some respects they may be even more dangerous than nuclear weapons because they do not require the enormous expenditure of financial and scientific resources that are required for nuclear weapons. Almost all countries, including small ones and develop From the United States the Secretary General designated Dr. Ivan L. Bennett, former Deputy Directo of the Office of Science and Technology, Executive Office of the President of the United States, Washington, D.C., and now director, New York University Medical Center. ing ones, may have access to these weapons, which can be manufactured quite cheaply, quickly and secretly in small laboratories or factories. This fact in itself makes the problem of control and inspection much more difficult. Moreover, since the adoption, on 17 June 1925, of the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, there have been many scientific and technical developments and numerous improvements, if that is the right word, in chemical and biological weapons, which have created new situations and new problems. On the one hand, there has been a great increase in the capability of these weapons to inflict unimaginable suffering, disease and death to ever larger numbers of human beings; on the other hand, there has been a growing tendency to use some chemical agents for civilian riot control and a dangerous trend to accept their use in some form in conventional warfare. "31. Two years ago, by resolution 2162 B (XXI), the General Assembly called for the strict observance of all states of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, condemned all actions contrary to these objectives and invited all States to accede to the Protocol. Once again I would like to add my voice to those of others in urging the early and complete implementation of this resolution. However, in my opinion, much more is needed. "32. During the twenty-three years of the existence of the United Nations, there has never been a thorough discussion in any United Nations organ of the problems posed by chemical and biological weapons, nor has there been a detailed study of them. Recently the matter has been receiving more attention and it is felt that the time has come to deal with it more fully. I therefore welcome the recommendation of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly that the Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to study the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. I believe that such a study, which would explore and weigh the dangers of chemical and biological weapons, would prove to be a most useful undertaking at the present time. It could attract attention to an area of multiplying dangers and of diminishing public appreciation of them. It could also serve to clarify the issues in an area which has become increasingly complex. Certainly a wider and deeper understanding of the dangers posed by these weapons could be an important element in knowing how best to deal with them. If the governments give "wide distribution to the report in their respective languages, through various media of communication, so as to acquaint public opinion with its contents," as the resolution passed in the General Assembly recommends; the purpose of the resolution then depends on how completely, competently, and honestly the 14-member group in Geneva does its work. The limiting factor here is that the group's work is to be based on accessible material." If "accessible material" means unclassified material, the document may not be much more revealing than some others which have already been prepared on the subject. IV. CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN Congressional interest in chemical and biological warfare seems to have been at its height in 1959-60. In June of 1959 the House Committee on Science and Astronautics held investigative open and executive session hearings into the status of research and development in CBW, to gain an understanding of both their then current capabilities and what lay in the future as research proceeded. A report based on these hearings was prepared by the committee and presented to the House." The report recommended that support for CBW research be increased. In the House of Representatives concern about U.S. policy has often been spearheaded by Congressman Robert Kastenmeier. On September 3, 1959, Mr. Kastenmeier introduced a concurrent resolution in the House (H. Con. Res. 433) calling for reaffirming "the long-standing policy of the United States that in the event of war the United States shall under no circumstances resort to the use of biological weapons or the use of poisonous or (noxious) gases unless they are first used by our enemies." Congressman Kastenmeier asserted upon introducing the resolution, that in the absence of a no-first-use declaration by the United States, countries like the Soviet Union, which have ratified the Geneva protocol against chemical and biological warfare, were deftly propagandizing that American CB preparations were intended for aggressive use. He argued that passage of the no-first-use resolution would make American intentions clear on this point and would constitute a political victory in the uncommitted world. The resolution was opposed by both the Defense and State Departments. (See apps. E and F.) Congressional action was never taken. In August of 1960 the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate prepared a staff report 22 which discussed relevant factors to be considered in determining the extent to which control and reduction of CB weapons could be part of any arms control program. The information contained in the study has value with respect to several areas of national policy: arms control, military strategy, civil defense and peace applications. Since the appearance of the two congressional documents there have been no extensive congressional inquiries into U.S. policy in the development, use or control of CB weapons. During a 1967 exchange between Senator Symington and the then Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus Vance, on expenditures for CBW, it was suggested by Senator Symington that, "some time in the future we might have a hearing on chemical and biological warfare." 23 This proposal was accepted by the subcommittee chairman, 21 Op. cit. Research in CBR, report of the Committee on Science and Astronautics. Senator Gore, and by Senator Aiken, the committee's ranking Republician. No date has yet been set although current opinion indicates that the committee will be holding hearings in this area, as well as on other arms control subjects such as the development of the ABM system. In addition to committee activities, individual members of the Congress have been active in discussing the issues which surround CB warfare. Congressman Kastenmeier has continued to voice his concern over U.S. policy, or lack of it. In March of 1965, following reported incidents of use of antiriot gases in Vietnam, he and several other Members of Congress 24 addressed a letter to the President 25 containing a request for the removal of control and direction over the use of chemical, biological and radiological weapons from the military and the restoration of exclusive control and direction to the Presidency. The President was also called upon to provide the world with a statement of the Administration's policy on the "first-use" of these weapons. In his reply to Mr. Kastenmeier for the President, Cyrus Vance stated that, "While national policy does proscribe the first use of lethal gas by American forces, there is not, and never has been, a national policy against the use of riot control agents.26 Senators Clark, Tydings and Hartke are among those who have also expressed their views on United States policy on CBW. On July 15, 1968, Senator Clark observed that the Defense Department program in CBW might be decreased. He recommended that a thorough examination of the chemical and biological program be made before appropriations for these programs were approved.27 During the 1968 Senate debate on Department of Defense appropriations the Senate passed an amendment proposed by Senator Clark which required the Secretary of Defense to transmit to the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs of the House, semiannual reports of the amounts spent on research, development, test, evaluation, and procurement of chemical and biological weapons and agents, including those used for defoliation and other military operations.28 The amendment was deleted from the Defense appropriations bill in conference with the House. Senator Tydings expressed his concerns about the need for effective international control of CBW in an October 1968 speech delivered at the dedication of a new laboratory at the Edgewood Arsenal (an Army chemical research installation in Maryland). He recommended the following: "First, that we maintain and improve our own deterrent capability as long as that is necessary. "Second, that we develop on a high priority basis, an early warning system for our own Nation against chemical or bacterial warfare. 24 George Brown, Phillip Burton, John Conyers, Charles Diggs, Don Edwards, Edith Green, Augustus Hawkins, Patsy Mink, Robert Nix, Richard Ottinger John Race, Joseph Resnick, Benjamin Rosenthal, William Ryan, Charles Wilson. 25 Congressional Record (House). Mar. 25, 1965 (pp. 6076–6078). 26 Letter from Cyrus Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to Mr. Kastenmeier, Mar. 31, 1965; 27 Congressional Record (Senate), July 15, 1968 (p. 88633). 28 Congressional Record (Senate), Oct. 3, 1968 (p. S11960). |