clearly demonstrated that foreign sources, even in nearby South America, were vulnerable to enemy disruption. In arriving at what constitutes a proper policy as to oil we have several specific guides of recent date. During the war years when our World War II experiences were fresh in mind, the Petroleum Industry War Council, an industry group advisoy to the Federal Government, adopted what it deemed to be a proper policy as to oil which included a clear statement to the effect that foreign oil be used to supplement when needed but not to displace domestic oil. In 1947, a Senate Special Committee Investigating Petroleum Resources gave consideration to this question. In its final report, the committee made several pertinent observations on this point and stated that the facts impelled the conclusion that as a matter of policy the Nation should take steps to guarantee a domestic petroleum supply adequate for all eventualities. More recently the matter of a proper national oil policy has been the subject of study by the National Petroleum Council, which is the existing industry group advisory to the Federal Government, and consists of representatives of all elements of the industry, including the importing companies. This study was made at the request of the Secretary of the Interior Krug. On January 13, 1949, this Council unanimously adopted a policy which recognizes that the domestic industry is the first line of defense and that national security and welfare in the first instance depends upon a healthy domestic industry. The following excerpts from this policy are clear, positive, and unambiguous: “The national security and welfare require a healthy domestic oil industry.” "Continuing supply to meet our national oil needs depends primarily on availability from domestic sources. Due consideration should be given to the development of foreign oil resources, but the paramount objective should be to maintain conditions best suited to a healty domestic industry which is essential to national security and welfare. To this end, adequate and equitable availability of essential materials is a fundamental requisite." "The Nation's economic welfare and security require a policy on petroleum imports which will encourage exploration and development efforts in the domestic industry and which will make available a maximum supply of domestic oil to meet the needs of this Nation." "The availability of petroleum from domestic fields produced under sound conservation practices, together with other pertinent factors, provides the means for determining if imports are necessary and the extent to which imports are desirable to supplement our oil supplies on a basis which will be sound in terms of the national economy and in terms of conservation." "The implementation of an import policy, therefore, should be flexible so that adjustments may readily be made from time to time." "Imports in excess of our economic needs, after taking into account domestic production in conformance with good conservation practices and within the limits of maximum efficient rates of production, will retard domestic exploration and development of new oil fields and the technological progress in all branches of the industry which is essential to the Nation's economic welfare and security." We think that it is imperative that the future policy as to petroleum be one that provides a domestic industry capable of supplying all peacetime requirements and in addition assuring a reserve producing capacity available for use in case of any emergency. In 1932 the Congress adopted a policy reflected in the import excise taxes encouraging the domestic industry to attain such a position. Under this policy the industry proceeded in its normal way in developing the petroleum resources of the Nation with the result that at the beginning of World War II the industry had built up a reserve-producing capacity, above current needs, of approximately 1,000,000 barrels daily which was readily and under all circumstances available for use, and not subject to interruption by enemy submarines. The congressional policy that resulted in this enviable position prior to World War II has been disrupted by the reciprocal trade agree ments program. If we are to regain this favorable position, the trade agreements program must be adjusted to meet the peculiarities of the world petroleum situation. We often hear the argument that the United States should conserve its petroleum resources and rely upon imported oil for current needs. This argument is plausible on its face. Upon examination, however, it is found to be inherently fallacious and also involves a program that imperils our national security. In the first place, the program posed by this argument is not one of "conservation" but one of "reservation" or "hoarding" or "nonuse." This Nation has not attained its position of leadership among nations through nonuse of its resources but to the contrary, full use thereof, recognizing, of course, the need for conservation and avoidance of unnecessary waste. It is through use that we have progressed to new ways and means. An analysis of the results of a program of "reservation" or "nonuse" is most revealing. In the first place, let us assume that a given oil field is "reserved" or "locked up" or "hoarded" for some future emergency use. It is an engineering fact that due to the characteristics of many oil fields the closing in of the wells therein would result in permanent injury to the productivity of the field. If the oil wells are not productive the operators thereof are unable financially to maintain them and as a result the physical equipment involved deteriorates and wastes away unless the Government through subsidy maintains them. In addition the manpower of the industry cannot be retained but would drift away into other endeavors unless the Government keeps it in an unproductive state through subsidy. Of even greater importance than the physical wasting away of the industry there also would result a stagnation of its mental abilities and of the efforts to find new ways and means of providing future supplies of petroleum. It must be kept in mind that if such a program of reservation is followed the industry would not be keeping pace with the increasing normal needs of our Nation for petroleum. It would be stagnated at the present level so, as a result, a few years hence-2, 5, or 20 as the case may be, if we should be faced with an emergency and the foreign imports of oil on which we had become dependent were cut off through enemy action, the stagnated domestic industry would be able to supply only a part of our normal requirements, not considering what an emergency might add thereto. It would take many years to revive it. Gentlemen, the future military safety as well as the economic welfare of the United States may well depend upon an abundant supply of nearby petroleum along with a trained personnel sufficient to its production and use. The thin thread that connects this country with the uncertain supply in remote places is too slender for such dependence. The power to determine a policy of national safety rests with the legislative branch of our Government-it is yours to decide. Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, in connection with Mr. Franklin's statement, there is a very interesting article in This Week, of, I think, February 13, by Maj. Alexander P. de Seversky, in which he points out the importance of a reserve of oil within the United States, and also points out that the Saudi Arabian fields could not be defended. I think that is so important that, with your permission, I would at least like to call your attention to it, and with your permission I would like to have it in the record. The CHAIRMAN. It is a very lengthy article? Mr. BROWN. Not very lengthy; one or two pages. (The article referred to is as follows:) THIS MAP CAN SAVE AMERICA! (By Maj. Alexander P. de Seversky) With the danger of another world war grimly real, the American people today are deeply concerned about military preparedness. But one critical element in the security equation has not received sufficient attention. It may prove to be the weakest link in our chain of defense. I refer to vital strategic materials indispensable to our survival. When Japan sealed off our normal supplies of crude rubber and other key materials in the last war, it struck a body blow at American industry. That will seem a minor disaster compared to the industrial starvation which will be imposed upon us in any new war-unless we recognize the danger in time. That danger derives from revolutionary changes in war-making which, unhappily, have not yet been fully grasped. The most crucial fact to which we must adjust our minds, and the sooner the better, is this: From now on, transoceanic, interhemispheric air warfare is not only possible but inevitable. It is a fact which torpedoes many established ideas on national defense, war production, and the future roles of armies and navies. It is bound to be resisted by some military thinkers whose minds are hobbled by tradition and service loyalties. But it is a fact to which we must gear our planning if the United States is to remain safe in a turbulent world. Let's look for a moment at some recent developments which underlie all future plans for the security of the United States. In the last war the biggest weapon of our Strategic Air Force was the B-29 long-range heavy bomber. Today the B-29 is already officially considered only a medium-range bomber. Though its striking radius of 2,000 miles is still impressive, we now have in the air and in production the B-36, which, with current improvements, will have a 13,000-mile flying range. This means a 5,000-mile striking radius for a fully loaded bomber. On December 7 and 8, the United States had a dramatic preview of things to come when a B-36 flew nonstop from Texas to Hawaii and back-a total distance of over 8,000 miles, with a full military load (bombs, crew, and equipment required for a combat mission). THEY'LL STRIKE ANYWHERE The B-36 is an example of the long-range strategic air power which will revolutionize our ideas of military strategy. Such planes can rise from our own continent. Then, without need for overseas bases, they can strike at almost any point in the anatomy of a European or Asiatic enemy-and return home. We do not know whether Russia has such aircraft today. But common sense demands that we assume the development of such air power by potential enemies. Even if a war should begin on a 2,000-mile basis, it will inevitably be transformed into a 5,000-mile contest before a decision is scored. Such comparable extension of range took place during World War I and World War II, and we have no reason to doubt that it will happen again. Now let's see what this new concept of 5,000-mile air warfare does to our designs for national defense and military strategy. The map on the opposite pages gives you a bird's-eye view of the situation. Our conventional ideas of geography were formed on the basis of the old surface methods of transportation. In the aviation era they have lost most of their meaning for peacetime and all meaning in time of war. Distance and space relations, measured both in time and direction of flight, are completely different. RUSSIA'S BACK YARD Once, we thought of the Orient as located to the west of us, with Europe to the east. But in the aerial age we are getting used to looking "down" on our planet from the North Pole. Thus viewed, the continents which seemed east and west of us, we discover, really lie to the north. On this new map, Europe and Siberia lies between us and Africa, the Sudan, India, Indo-China, the East Indies and northern Australia. In hostile hands, the European-Siberian land mass constitutes for us a barrier to the regions beyond, effectively blocking our access to them. In aerial terms, the places I have just mentioned are closed to the United States. They have become a sort of back yard of Soviet Russia, the dominant air-power nation of the Eurasian continent. By the same token, however, South America is our aerial back yard, safely outside the aviation reach of Russia. Our North American land mass stands as a barrier between Eurasia and Latin America. Shipping between North and South America is coastwise, generally beyond the striking range of the Soviet Air Force. It will move under air power firmly anchored on the American shore line. The map reproduced here represents graphically this new power relation between the American and Eurasian continents if they clash in war-given the inevitable striking range of 5,000 miles. The "reach" of North America is fixed by its four extremities-Alaska, Newfoundland, California, and Florida-in an approximate square. The portion of the globe dominated by an American Air Force of 5,000-mile radius operating from these outposts forms a vast circle (shown in blue). Theoretically, an American Air Force of such range could destroy any target in this area. The Eurasian continent, bounded by such points as Murmansk, the Caucasus, Kamchatka, and Baikal, is somewhat oval. The area covered by an equivalent Soviet Air Force operating from the outer edges can be represented by an ellipse (shown in yellow). In like manner, the Soviet Air Force could destroy every target in this area. And should the present Communist advance in China engulf the whole country, Russia would not have to wait for 5,000-mile bombers to exclude us from its back yard in Asia. It can do so with its copies of our B-29's already on hand. Where the American circle and the Russian ellipse overlap (the green portion) will be the aerial no-man's land. There the contest for mastery of the whole air ocean will be unfolded. It is the area within air power of both nations, and encioses the industrial vitals of both belligerents. That will be the combat area, the area of decision. Here the offensive potential of each nation will confront the well-deployed and well-supplied defensive air force, the antiaircraft, ground-to-air missiles and the rest of the defensive potential of the opposing nation. NO ADVANCE POSTS In the past a belligerent could establish local control of the sky over some distant spot for use either as a military advance post or as a source of strategic supplies. We maintained such patches of isolated control in the last war in China, Burma, Iran, Iraq, and other points-just as the British Empire, in the days of sea power, maintained isolated naval bases. But in the future local dominance of this type will no longer be possible. In the next war, a detached point inside the enemy's orbit of bombardment will not be able to survive unless it is endowed with air defenses of a magnitude to challenge the enemy's entire striking air force. To hold a series of isolated points, that is to say, we would need a series of air forces, each of them big and strong enough to defeat the foe's total striking aerial strength. Clearly this would be an economic impossibility. Thus everything in the yellow sector, which is Russia's back yard, would be lost to us-just as surely as everything in the blue segment would be denied to Russia. As this central fact becomes understood, it will bring explosive upsets in all our established military concepts. The triphibious land-sea-air team devised in World War II to carry short-range aviation within striking distance of the enemy will be a thing of the past. Air power of global range will attack industrial vitals directly and at once, operating from continental home bases. But the emergence of such interhemispheric warfare will affect not only military strategy. It will affect profoundly every aspect of our national lifeour industrial set-up, allocation of materials, deployment of manpower, nearly everything. The most important effect will be on the sources of supply of critical materials essential to the conduct of modern war. The United States, for all its amazing natural riches, is still, in many respects, a have-not nation. It depends on the outside world for a long array of strategic materials, from crude rubber and additional oil to tungsten, cobalt, manganese, etc. To illustrate, the future Air Force will be jet-powered. Cobalt today is the key material in the manufacture of gas turbines. Yet 75 percent of our cobalt requirements must be imported. The same is true of chrome, so vital for high-grade steel-alloy production. Only 15 percent of the needed amount is found in the United States. The situation is just as acute with tungsten, manganese, and other materials without which a war machine cannot function. All of these can be found and developed in South America. Unless we make certain that we shall enjoy a continuous flow of these products in time of war, we may find ourselves dangerously, if not fatally, handicapped. We have only to recall our plight at the start of the last war to realize the seriousness of the problem. Our leaders had counted smugly on rubber, hemp, a hundred other indispensable items from the East Indies, the Philippines, Indochina. Smugness gave way to alarm and near despair as Japanese aviation closed one Pacific door after another to us. THE AIR-POWER AGE Are we heading for another such disillusionment-on a far bigger scale? I am convinced we are unless we wake up to the realities of the air-power age. Again we are basing strategic and industrial plans on materials that will be denied to us by hostile aviation. Consider a concrete example. It is no secret that a great deal of diplomatic and military effort has been centered in recent years on the Near East. Strategic blueprints are geared to the assumption that Arabian oil will be available to us. But those oil fields are practically on the border of the Soviet Union. They are within easy striking reach not only of Stalin's strategic bombers but of his shortrange dive bombers and fighters as well. Within hours after the start of hostilities, we may be sure, the Arabian oil fields will be subjected to devastating air attack by the Soviets. Our chances of holding them will be no better than would be Russia's chances of defending oil fields in the American orbit, let us say in Mexico. AERIAL DESTRUCTION What is true of the Near East is no less true of every other region within range of the Soviet Air Force. What Russia cannot or does not need to capture for its own use, it can deny us by destruction from the air. To place any reliance on supplies from such regions is to stake our victory on self-delusion. Such is the picture. It leaves us no reasonable alternative to the intensive development of sources of strategic supplies in our Western Hemisphere. Research on substitute materials must be stepped up. Those that have no substitutes must be stock-piled without delay. Our planning must discount oil from the Near East, rubber and tungsten from China and the East Indies, all other vital supplies heretofore provided by areas in the yellow zone of our map. A premium should be put on weapons forged out of materials located in our own hemisphere. The common defense of our hemisphere by all the nations of the Americas is no longer merely a desirable objective. Under the conditions of tomorrow's global aerial range it becomes a dire necessity. South America cannot survive without the kind of defenses that only industrial United States of America can generate. The United States, in turn, cannot fight a modern war successfully without the natural resources of South America, actual and latent. The Eurasian Continent is naturally self-contained. To blockade it by air or sea is a futile gesture, since it does not have to rely on outside sources of supply. Unfortunately the Americas, in spite of their great abundance and diversity of natural resources, are not yet completely self-contained. Our immediate goal in the sphere of economic warfare must be to make them so. WATCH THE FARMS A systematic appraisal and reorganization of the economic potentials of North and South America should be made. An Inter-American Resources Planning Board should be set up at once, embracing agricultural as well as industrial potentials in its scope. Though we still think of farming as related only to food supplies, it is also a vital industrial source. A great many of the products of the soil and of livestock are important, since, through chemistry and other industrial processes, they provide essential materials for modern weapons. We cannot escape a far-reaching revision of our farming and related industries in line with South American productive capacity. We must look to South America, and especially to Argentina, to provide the cattle, leather, and farm products that will be drained off in the United States for indispensable war purposes. MILITARY PLANNING Along with orderly economic planning on a hemispheric scale, we must, of course, have military planning to match. Our fighter aircraft, ground-to-air guided missiles, rockets, antiaircraft artillery, radar network-the whole elaborate system of air defense-must be extended throughout the Americas. The production of such defensive means, moreover, should be spread throughout the hemisphere. Only thus can we avoid clogging and overburdening all transport within the Americas when the test of war is upon us. The manufacture of fighter planes, guided missiles, and other defenses must be encouraged. Where necessary, Latin-American manufacturing must be subsidized. Because air-lift methods will inevitably grow as a substitute for surface transportation, Latin-American air lines must be built up. They should be helped to develop self-sustained operation by setting up depots, repair shops, maintenance units, as well as plants for the production of cargo planes and their spare parts. |