[Extract from letter of Hon. M. Blair, P. M. G] WASHINGTON, September 3, 1861. Meigs begged me this afternoon to get you to order 15-inch guns from Pittsburg for your gunboats. He says that the boats can empty any battery the enemy can make with such guns. He advises that you contract for them directly yourself, telling the contractor you will direct your ordnance officer to pay for them. Concerning the contractor, the committee say that he is "a Californian who followed Frémont to St. Louis." I left California for Europe on the 1st of January. On the 1st of August, I think, Mr. Beard left there, coming overland to St. Louis. I never wrote to him, or in any way communicated with him, or knew of his intended coming. His arrival was equally a surprise and pleasure to me. I knew him to be a man of unusual energy and capacity, accustomed to the management of men on large works, and immediately applied to him to undertake the building of the fortifications. I sent an officer with him to make his examinations, and he began his work, I think, on the second day after his arrival. I assigned him one of my ablest officers to lay out and superintend the work, and to remain constantly with him, gave him every facility he asked, and drove him to the extent of his capacity. Six thousand men were employed upon it, working night and day, and it was finished rapidly in a workmanlike and durable manner. Extra pay was allowed to the laborers, forty cents per day, I think, and extra expenses incurred under the pressure authorized. I was satisfied with him and the work done by him. I asked no bonds from him, because he was a stranger and could have given none. He began his work before the contract was made, and accident delayed its execution by General McKinstry. When the prices for his work were under discussion, and were referred to me by General McKinstry, I directed this officer to reduce them to what was just and reasonable to both parties, having reference to the circumstances under which the work was done, and the extra prices that had been paid, so as to leave the contractor what might be strictly a fair profit on his labor; and his decision, whatever it was, was approved by me. For costs of construction, and other details with which I am not acquainted, I respectfully refer the committee to the testimony of the quartermaster and the contractor, whom I have asked to have summoned. To show their nature and value the report and testimony of the engineers who planned and were superintending the work will be furnished the committee. The object aimed at was the completion of the city defences in the shortest possible time. The works were thoroughly and well built, covering and comprehending the city itself and the surrounding country on a length of about ten miles, and the total cost is, I think, less than $300,000! In my judgment, having in view the time and manner in which they were built, the money was well applied, and as a measure of expediency and policy it was fully worth to the government what it cost. And while examining into the conduct and events of the war, I think it right to call the attention of your committee to the fact, that a committee charged to "investigate fraud" came into a department which was under martial law, in the midst of civil dissensions, encouraging insubordination, discrediting and weakening the authority of the commanding general then absent in the field; and I offer testimony to show that their conduct, whilst at St. Louis, created a public opinion that their special object was to make out a case against myself, which should justify my removal from that department.-(See page 79 of their report.) And I offer testimony to show that they avoided and declined to receive, and - have suppressed, testimony which militated against this object, and, further, to show that there are in their report many inaccuracies and perversions and some positive falsehoods. The labors of the investigating committee appear to have resulted in a single resolution, in which the purchase of certain arins by myself is made a prominent subject. With respect to the sale of these arms by the government I have nothing to say. They were new, and I am told were sold without being condemned. The contract price at which they were bought by the government was, I believe, $17 50. The price at which they are set down in the ordnance manual is $21. After they had been rifled and otherwise improved, I purchased them at $22. Taking into consideration the advance in price of arms eaused by the war, I submit that the purchase is not deserving of special cen sure. I have digressed from the rule laid down at the outset in this paper, but as the passage of the resolution which is soon to be before the House would be a vote of censure, and as the report itself, together with other official accusations, have been broadly spread over the country, I respectfully ask that the committee will cause this statement, together with the accompanying documents, to have equal and immediate publicity given to them, in order that Congress may act understandingly, and the censure asked for go where it properly belongs. The turbulent condition of the State at the end of August rendered it, in my judgment, necessary to issue a proclamation, extending martial law to the State of Missouri, and enforcing some penalties for rebellion. As explanatory of some of the difficulties of my position, and of my ideas concerning the conduct of the war in my department, I refer the committee to the annexed correspondence with the President in this connexion. So late as the 6th to the 10th September, as accompanying papers under this date show, no immediate danger was apprehended for Jefferson City or Lexington. Price was still on the upper Osage, and I was organizing as rapidly as possible a force to march from Rolla and from Jefferson City upon Springfield, with the intention of forcing him to retreat, or cutting off his communications with Arkansas. Want of transportation, arms, and money was delaying this movement. We had just effected lodgments at Paducah and Fort Holt, and were occupied in contesting with the rebels western Kentucky, for which re-enforcements were constantly required. The condition of North Missouri required a vigorous effort to suppress rebellion in that quarter, and an expedition which occupied a considerable part of our real force was sent there under Generals Pope and Sturgis. These three points, on which we were actively engaged, fully taxed our resources. At this time I sent for General Hunter, to give him command of the movement upon Springfield. On the 11th it will be seen that General Pope, with all the force under his command, was fully occupied in North Missouri. On the same day I received the rumor-and only as a rumor-of General Price's arrival at Clinton, more than 300 miles from St. Louis. Upon the 12th a despatch from General Davis informed me of Colonel Mulligan's arrival at Lexington. Colonel Mulligan reports a portion of his command, Colonel Marshall's regiment of cavalry, as scouring the country. The same day another despatch from him informs me that Price is reported near Warrensburg, with a force variously estimated at from 5,000 to 15,000 men. He informs me measures were being taken to begin fortifying Lexington. Finally, it appears that General Davis was giving his attention vigilantly to that section of the country. It will be seen from the telegrams of this day that Cairo was also requiring more troops. On the 13th the regiments were ordered from St. Louis to Jefferson City, and two others from Jefferson City to the relief of Lexington, (Lexington is 240 miles from St. Louis, and 115 miles from Jefferson City,) if, in the opinion of General Davis, who occupied that place, it was deemed expedient. And gen erally it will be seen that all possible activity and promptitude was used in sending forward troops to the points threatened along the Missouri river, and meeting with all our disposable force the movements of General Price. It will be seen that up to the 13th Boonesville, and not Lexington, was considered the threatened point. On the 14th General Sturgis was directed to move with all practicable speed upon Lexington. General Pope's despatch of the 16th gave me every reason to believe as he did—that a re-enforcement of 4,000 men, with artillery, would be there in abundant time; and, if the committee will take the time to read the accompanying papers, it will be seen that from every quarter where there were disposable troops the promptest efforts were made to concentrate them on Lexington, but chance defeated these efforts. Also on the 14th, in the midst of this demand for troops, I was ordered by the Secretary of War and General Scott to "send 5,000 well armed infantry to Washington without a moment's delay." It will in some degree explain my condition to insert the following telegram: [Vol. 2, page 96.] HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, St. Louis, September 15, 1861. Reliable information from the vicinity of Price's column shows his present force to be 11,000 at Warrensburg and 4,000 at Georgetown, with pickets extending towards Syracuse. Green is making for Boonesville with probable force of 3,000. Withdrawal of force from this part of the Missouri risks the State; from Paducah, loses western Kentucky. At the best, I have ordered two regiments from this city, two from Kentucky, and will make up the remainder from the new force being raised by the governor of Illinois. Colonel E. D. TOWNSEND, J. C. FREMONT, Major General Commanding. Ass't Adj't Gen'l, Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C. It is well to recall the fact that the State of which I had the task to obtain possession, and which was in active rebellion, contained a white population of over a million-equal to that of Virginia, and 150,000 greater than that of Kentucky-and that the difficulties were increased by the fact that the several important points needed to be occupied for that purpose were very distant from the centre of operations at St. Louis, with long lines of communication to be kept open, in the midst of a brave and enterprising enemy. To St. Joseph, 330 miles; to Sedalia, 189 miles; to Jefferson City, 125 miles; to Rolla, 118 miles; to Ironton, about 80 miles; to Cairo and Paducah, 200 miles. HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, Subjoined is a list of our total force, with its distribution: St. Louis, (including Home Guard).. Under Brigadier General Pope, (including Home Guard). Jefferson City, (one quarter Home Guard). Rolla Ironton Cape Girardeau.. Bird's Point and Norfolk... Cairo, (including McClernand's brigade).. 6, 899 5,488 2,400 9,677 4, 700 3,057 650 3,510 4,826 To these difficulties began now to be added the loss of consideration and credit, which the apparent withdrawal of the confidence of the government caused. The visit of high officers charged with inquiring into the affairs of my department, and the simultaneous and sustained attacks of leading journals, accumulated obstructions to my movements until I was openly removed from the command of the department. Except the victory, little advantage resulted to Price from the capture of Lexington, exposed and resting upon a broad river, which there was no chance for a large army to cross in case of defeat. As a military position, its occupation had no value for him. On the contrary, had I possessed the means of transportation to move forward my troops rapidly, I should have been well content to give up Lexington for the certainty of being able to compel Price to give me battle on the north side of the Osage; as he could not cross the Missouri without exposing himself to certain defeat, no other course would have remained open to him. In fact, when I did go forward, the appearance of my advance at Sedalia was the signal for his precipitate retreat. I ask the attention of the committee to the unreasonableness of expecting a general to be always successful. Admitting even that the western department had been thoroughly well supplied with men and arms, it could scarcely have been expected that no single casualty could have been met with in the course of the campaign. And it would seem more reasonable to judge of the capacity of the commander by the general results of his operations. From this statement, and the accompanying papers, the committee will form some idea of the condition of the department when I assumed command at the end of July. At the end of October, when I had succeeded in organizing and equipping an army, and was beginning to handle it in the field, we were everywhere, and uniformly along the whole extent of our lines, successful against the enemy. At Springfield one of the most brilliant actions, and at Fredericktown one of the most admirably conducted battles of the war had been fought. Isolated railroads had all been connected at St. Louis, and were in full and continuous operation over their whole extent. Additional cars had been provided, and at twenty-four hours' notice 10,000 men could be moved upon them from any one point to the opposite side of the State. All our posts, so far as the railroad went, had been fortified and connected by telegraphs, which were everywhere in full operation, and the daily mails were running to Springfield, from which place an officer, alone and in uniform, could ride through with safety to St. Louis. Quiet and comparative peace had been restored to the State, and the enemy was in full retreat before us to its southern boundary. A compact had been entered into with him, under which the authority of the State and federal courts was acknowledged, liberty of opinion and security of person were guarantied to both sides, all guerilla parties suppressed, and the war strictly confined to responsible officers and the armies in the field. The State was in reality reclaimed, and in condition to leave the army free for the especial object of descending the Mississippi. The rebels already acknowledged the inutility of resistance to the federal authority; the doubtful came to the side of power, and the loyal who had borne the brunt of war, when to stand by the Union involved danger and losses, were everywhere encouraged to new efforts, and rewarded for their past aid. The fall rains were over; the fine weather of the Indian summer had come; the hay was gathered and corn hardening, and we were about to carry out the great object of our campaign, under the most favorable auspices, with fewer hardships from exposure, and impediments from transportation, than at any other season. The spirit of the army was high. It was mainly composed of western men, whose interest as well as whose patriotism was involved in the opening of the Mississippi river, for the preparations to which they had contributed every possible effort, and we had every reason to believe that the campaign would open with a signal victory in the defeat or dispersion of the rebel army, with a move on Memphis as the immediate result. These were the circumstances under which, without reason assigned, I was relieved of my command. It is not grateful to me to have been myself compelled to set out the merits of my administration; but it was necessary in order to bring attention to points which otherwise might not have been presented, and which are necessary to a clear understanding of the subjects inquired into. Many acts which have been censured were, I think, for the public good. I know they were with that intention. I do not feel that in any case I overstepped the authority intended to be confided to me. Myself and the officers and men acting with me were actuated solely by a desire to serve the country. And I feel assured that this is realized by the people of the west, among whom we were acting. After consultation by the committee Mr. Gooch was instructed to take the statement and papers submitted by General Frémont and examine them, with a view to determine what further inquiries it might be deemed necessary to make. The witness was informed that when Mr. Gooch should have prepared himself for the further examination the committee would call him before them. The witness: I shall be ready at any time to answer any questions the committee may desire to propound to me. [Examination consequently suspended for the present.] WASHINGTON, January 30, 1862. General JOHN C. FREMONT-examination resumed. By Mr. Gooch: Question. Will you state concisely what powers were given you when you were assigned to the command of the western department? Answer. No specific powers were given to me. But no restriction whatever was placed upon me in taking command of the department. Question. Did you understand that you had the right, or were expected, to exercise any powers other than those which you held by virtue of your commission as major general? Answer. I understood and expected to exercise any and whatever power was necessary to carry out the work I was sent to accomplish. Question. Whether strictly within the limits of the power conferred by your commission or not? Answer. Yes, sir. Question. From whom did you derive your power in that respect? Answer. From the President, and from conversations with the Secretary of |