The reason given by some officials for their possession of the equipment is not entirely satisfactory. In Dallas, for example, where wiretapping without the consent of one party is not permitted, the chief of police was quoted as stating that his department used the bugging equipment "to make sure our good debugging equipment is in working order."

The results of the Wiretap Commission's study, which was conducted by only a few people, are certainly interesting, but they are particularly revealing when contrasted with the results of a Department of Justice study which was released 2 days ago. That study noted that there were only 11 convictions last year in cases it prosecuted under the electronic surveillance statutes.

Privacy invasions, as typified by illegal eavesdropping, has a chilling effect in our society. Before speaking, many people weigh the costs of speaking freely against the risk of the possible word-for-word disclosure of their conversations to unintended recipients. The comment, "I can't talk over the telephone," has become the trademark of mistrustful individuals.

One step in restoring the confidence of Americans must be an ag gressive and affirmative approach to enforcing the criminal statutes against illegal wiretapping. If any one factor has led to the continuance of eavesdropping, it is the failure of law enforcement-Federal, State, and local-to take the offensive against this type of crime. The authorities must take the initiative and prove to the public that they are as interested in protecting the people's privacy as they are their property.

Thank you.

Chairman PIKE. Thank you, Mr. Hershman.

We will go next to a man who has been in the law enforcement business, Mr. Anthony J. P. Farris, former U.S. attorney, Houston, Tex.

STATEMENT OF ANTHONY J. P. FARRIS, FORMER U.S. ATTORNEY, HOUSTON, TEX.

Mr. FARRIS. Mr. Chairman, my name is Anthony J. P. Farris, and I am an attorney with Farris, Pain & Horne in Houston. From February 14, 1969, to December 30, 1974, I served as U.S. attorney for the southern district of Texas, with the principal office in Houston. The district is the eighth largest of the 94.

I understand I am here to testify about allegations of illegal electronic surveillance by local law enforcement authorities in Houston, Tex., about the lack of aggressiveness by the FBI in investigating those allegations, about allegations that the FBI and DEA had known about illegal electronic surveillance by Houston Police Department officers and neither investigated them nor reported them, and about allegations that both FBI and DEA agents had either participated in illegal electronic surveillance, or at least witnessed it.

These matters first came to light when the IRS commenced an investigation of a big-time heroin dealer in Houston in 1971. That investigation led the IRS into an investigation of illegal electronic surveillance by certain members of the Houston Police Department. The latter investigation commenced in September of 1972 and resulted in indictments of nine officers in May of 1974.

When the allegations of Houston Police Department illegal electronic surveillance began to surface in the late summer and early fall of 1973, my chief assistants and I commenced communication with the FBI in Houston about these possible violations and started to send material to the FBI. Allegations then commenced about participation in illegal electronic surveillance by the FBI and DEA. In preliminary and pretrial hearings in the case of United States v. Dudley Clifford Bell, Jr. in November of 1973, counsel for defendant alleged that the FBI special agent in charge knew about the Houston Police Department's illegal activities and did not investigate them. He also alleged that electronic eavesdropping equipment had been sold to a named FBI agent in Houston and that Federal funds had gone to the purchases of equipment for electronic surveillance purposes by local law enforcement entities.

I sent a copy of that transcript to the FBI special agent in charge in Houston in the fall of 1973. In short, the FBI in Houston had information before them of probative value of allegations of illegal electronic surveillance by local and Federal authorities in the fall of 1973.

The investigation being conducted by the IRS in the fall of 1973 resulted in indictments of seven Houston police officers and two former police officers in early 1974. From late 1973 until early 1974 I attempted to keep the same IRS agents on the investigation of the Houston police department with the idea in mind that it was really an ongoing investigation. Commissioner Alexander denied that request through his assistance because the IRS is chartered to investigate only title 26 matters.

Chairman PIKE. I want to interrupt you for a moment. I want the photographers sitting in front of the table to please move. These witnesses are doing the best they can, but I personally find the photographers sitting right in that place offensive.

Go ahead, Mr. Farris.

Mr. FARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Commissioner Alexander denied that request through his assistants because the IRS is chartered to investigate only title 26 matters. From late 1973 to April 1974, my chief assistants and I continued to communicate with the FBI in Houston relative to the Houston Police Department electronic surveillance and we did so by telephone, in person and in writing. In April 1974, we sent a lengthy letter with exhibits to the FBI special agent in charge in Houston and asked him formally, firmly, and in writing to commence his investigation if he had not already done so. A copy of this lengthy letter and copies of the exhibits were sent to the General Crime Section in the Department of Justice in Washington. The FBI only saw fit to assign one agent to this complex investigation of the country's fifth largest police department. This FBI agent submitted reports to our office which were notable only in their lack of substance, depth, and consisted largely of Xeroxed newspaper articles. We continued to communicate in writing, by telephone and in person with the FBI in Houston urging them to give us something to work on and my then assistant chief of criminal matters spoke in blunt English to the lone agent assigned to this matter. In June 1974, a new special agent in charge had taken over in the Houston office of the FBI. Our letters, memos and phone calls to the FBI in Houston continued unabated, with copies to Washington, through December

1974. There was no noticeable increase in quantity or quality of the FBI reports received by us. In the latter part of 1974, the new police chief, Carroll Lynn, gave us additional information about allegations of the Houston Police Department's illegal electronic surveillance, about allegations that the FBI and DEA had participated in illegal electronic surveillance and that the FBI and DEA had known about these illegal activities and had done nothing about them. We passed these allegations on to an FBI inspector visiting in Houston în late October or early November 1974 and to the General Crime Section of the Department of Justice.

Finally, in December 1974, unable to get cooperation from the FBI in Houston, I wrote a lengthy letter to Attorney General Saxbe with copies to the Deputy Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, and to the General Crime Section recapitulating every point I could think of and sending as exhibits copies of all the correspondence with the FBI, copies of the transcripts of the Dudley Bell hearings and copies of the transcripts of the recordings made by Chief Lynn of his own men.

I know of my own knowledge that the investigation of the Houston Police Department matters, as conducted by the FBI through 1974, would rate 1 on a scale of 10. I know of my own knowledge that when there were hijacking and kidnapping cases in Houston, the FBI had brought in many agents from other offices and I know of no FBI policy that would forbid bringing in agents from other FBI offices to help out in the Houston Police Department case. I know of no internal investigation having been conducted by the FBI of either the type of investigation conducted by the FBI of the Houston Police Department or of allegations of illegal electronic surveillance by Federal officers. I do know personally that through December 30, 1974, the General Crime Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice showed very little interest in the investigation of this country's fifth largest police department or of the allegations that Federal agents had actually witnessed illegal electronic surveillance activities and had done nothing about them.

In closing, I would once again bring up a suggestion that the FBI bring in agents from other offices to investigate allegations of illegal activities by local law enforcement officers. This was first suggested by five U.S. attorneys, in Arizona in 1973, while meeting with Bill Cleveland of the FBI. Mr. Cleveland indicated to us that he interpreted our suggestion as an affront to the integrity of the FBI. We repeated this suggestion in a report to the Attorney General early in 1974, and two of us repeated it to Clarence Kelley in New Orleans in September 1974 at the U.S. Attorneys' Conference. I personally repeated it to two committees here in Washington this year and am repeating it once again

now.

Chairman PIKE. Thank you very much.

Our next witness will be Anthony Zavala, a former officer of the narcotics division of the Houston Police Department, who has a unique and interesting tale to tell us.

Go ahead, Mr. Zavala.

STATEMENT OF ANTHONY ZAVALA, FORMER OFFICER, HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, ACCOMPANIED BY PHILIP S. GREENE, ATTORNEY

Mr. ZAVALA. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Tony Zavala. I want to thank the committee for giving me this chance to testify today, and I hope I can help in your investigation. I also hope that by telling you what I know, I can help other police officers from falling into the same trap that I did learning to break laws, and winding up on my way to prison.

I am a former police officer with the Houston Police Department, narcotics division. I joined the department in 1965. I started in narcotics in 1967, where I stayed until 1973, when I was suspended preceding my indictment in 1974 on wiretapping charges. In June of 1975, I pled guilty to one count of wiretapping. Three weeks ago I was sentenced to 3 years in Federal prison. I begin my prison term 1 week from next Tuesday.

During my work with narcotics at the Houston Police Department I became more and more involved with wiretapping. The first time was in early 1968, when one of my supervisors ordered me to monitor a conversation from an empty building in downtown Houston. The last time was in 1972, when I monitored conversations in a narcotics case, where because of the wiretapping involved, all charges against the suspect were dismissed. In between, from 1968 to 1972, I was personally involved in about 35 illegal wiretaps.

I might add, Mr. Chairman, that wiretapping was the most effective law enforcement tool that we had.

And there were other divisions using wiretaps: Intelligence, vice, homicide, burglary and theft. Again, I know this only through the casual talk of many fellow officers at headquarters. But we all talked, every day. We would talk about our cases-the names, who we were tapping, what we were hearing, how it was working out.

And while we talked, members of other agencies-Federal agencies, like BNDD and the FBI-would walk in and walk out, and participate in the conversations.

While I cannot point to any one specific conversation with any one particular FBI agent, for example, I know that it was all discussed freely, and that everyone knew what was going on. Wiretapping, in fact, became second nature to us all.

So that the committee may have some idea of the modus operandi of tapping in Houston, I will describe our procedures. When one of us wanted a tap, we would ask one of our supervisors-a sergeant, a lieutenant, or a captain. If the supervisor approved, and he always did, he would telephone someone I happen to know at Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. for the particular "cable and pair information" we needed for the tap. The individual at the phone company routinely supplied what we needed a short time later. He would call the supervisor usually; but sometimes he would call back directly to officers. like me.

The "cable and pair" information would include a specific location where the tap was to be installed. That information would be given

to another officer who was assigned to actually install the tapusually on a telephone pole. Later, the field officer, like me, was told he could go ahead and monitor, and that's what he did.

Sometimes we would lose a tap. That is, telephone company workmen would discover a tapping device. They would call us, ask if we had lost the device, and return it without another word.

The telephone company was involved in other ways, too. We used to attend narcotics training seminars. I did not think it was strange at the time, but there was always a Southwestern Bell representative there. He would offer complete cooperation in our enforcement efforts. Any information we needed, he said, we could have.

The equipment for these taps was produced by our own police department. It was manufactured, as a matter of fact, on the sixth Hoor of headquarters. That also was common knowledge among us all, and the Federal men who frequented our headquarters.

I myself have been in that sixth floor facility many times.

The guys who actually installed the taps were well trained, and the training was always being updated. The supervisors wanted everybody to be able to install a tap, but that meant climbing poles, and some of us were afraid of heights. I remember a sergeant announcing that a pole-climbing school would be started in the department to take care of that. But it never got going.

Mr. Chairman, I understand the committee is interested in Federal officers' direct participation in wiretaps. I heard about many cases from fellow police officers. But that is hearsay. I have more direct knowledge.

On one occasion-in 1969-I was assigned by a captain to monitor a drug case. It was a lengthy tap. My job was to monitor on nights and weekends. One night a fellow police officer introduced me to several narcotics agents, two of whom I got to know pretty well, as they kept coming and going, and listening with me to the conversations of the target. Some weeks later the suspect in the case was arrested by the Federal agents, incidentally-and afterward the three of us were discussing the wiretap at police headquarters. My two Federal friends were disturbed because the entire conversation took place in front of a high-ranking BNDD supervisor. They said I shouldn't talk about wiretapping in front of him that way. The supervisor was smiling the whole time.

In 1971. I conducted a wiretap on a narcotics suspect for about 2 months. During the whole 2-month period I supplied the content of the tap to a U.S. Customs agent.

In 1972 and 1973, I worked as a DALE task force officer, during which time my paycheck came from LEAA. In one case I remember I attempted to obtain legal wiretap authorizations, through the Federal authorities I was working with. After awhile, I was told in effect that the "title III procedures were too much of a hassle" and that I would have to "do it in another way." I definitely understood the word "it" to mean the wiretap I wanted. Later, I did conduct a wiretap in that case, without going through any title III procedures. I would like to say also, while I was working with DALE's Federal men, there were many conversations about my DALE cases. It was never said in so many words, but I am sure it was understood that wiretaps were being conducted.