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59. As the United States indicated in its national communication, however, energy-related CO2 emissions have increased more rapidly than projected in the CCAP. In particular, the United States has experienced higher economic growth and lower energy prices than had been projected and some programmes referred to in either the CCAP or the baseline scenario have been implemented more slowly than projected as a result of finding shortfalls.

GO. It is possible trat changes in economic growth rate, energy prices and other factors over the next few years could help bring net greenhouse gas emissions back down to the levels projected in the CCAP. The team notcs, however, that there is a real risk that net greenlivuse gas emission levels may turn out to be significantly higher than projected in the CCAP. Indeed, it is reasonable to conclude that net greenhouse gas emissions are now less likely to return to 1990 levels by the year 2000 than was the case when the plan was released.

61. According to the baseline scenario in the CCAP, projected greenhouse gas emissions would be 7 per cent above 1990 levels in the year 2000. This scenario was based on, and is similar to, the 1993 annual Energy Outlook published by the DOB Energy Information Administration. · A-new-annual Energy Outlook was produced in January 1995. While it only includes policies already-implcmcntod by the United States, its projection that energy related.CO, emissions will be 11 per cent above 1990 levels in the year 2000-would-socm-to-indicate that the United States will have to implement further actions to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions-if these emissions are to be returned to 1990 levels by the year 2000- The October 1993 CCAP had anticipated that energy-related carbon emissions would increase by approximately 3 per cent between 1900 and 2000 under full plan implementation, with this small increase offset by absolute reductions in emissions of other greenouse gases. From today's perspective, it appears that there is a higher growth potential for energy-related carbon dioxide emissions and chlorofluorocarbon replacements than had been anticipated in the original plan. These factors. together with only partial funding of CCAP programmes by the Congress, would seem to ✈ indicate that the United States would have to take additional stops to return nct greenhouse gas emissions to their 1990 level by the year 2000.

62. The national communication indicates that, regardless of whether the CCAP is successful in meeting the year 2000 target, and despite the fact that the CCAP will affect net greenhouse gas emissions well beyond that date, emissions are expected to be at least 10 per cent above 2000 levels in the year 2010. The learn notes that the October 1995 review of the CCAP will likely provide some initial guidance as to the approach the United States plans to take to control net greenhouse gas emissions in the post-2000 period.

63. The review team noted that greenhouse gas sink capacity in the United States is likely to remain constant or to increase for the foreseeable future. While total forest area is not expected to change significantly, the varying age distribution and productivity of forests across the United States should continue to create an anthropogenic forest sink. After declining significantly over the last 100 years, soil carbon in agricultural soils is also expected to remain stable or increase in the future.

64.

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The United States will produce new baseline and combined policy scenarios, extending to the year 2010, for the October-1995 CCAP review. CCAP measures are expected to be included in the combined policy scenario, not the baseline. Indeed, it is likely that two. combined policy scenarios will he prepared to reflect what would happen under fullfunding and partialfunding for CCAP measures.

65. The United States has provided estimates of the effects of most CCAP measures on an individual basis, as well as the effects of the measures outlined in the CCAP taken as a package. The United States has provided great detail of the estimated effects of the measures in the CCAP in a transparent manner that closely follows the reporting guidelines. A genuine effort appears to have been made to generate realistic and sober estimates of the effects of measures and the experience of the United States in this area could be a source of ideas for other countries.

66. Accurately estimating the effects of measures is a challenging exercise and the team recognized that greenhouse gas emission reductions can easily be double-counted. The fact that the CCAP is largely composed of voluntary measures makes the situation even more challenging for the United States. For example, there is a possibility that emission reductions claimed under foundation programmes such as "Climate Wisc" may already be accounted for in the emission reductions credited to specific voluntary programmes such as "Green Lights". The United States, well aware of this possibility, chose not to attribute any emission reductions to their "foundation" voluntary programmes. The United States has indicated however that it will make a cautious attempt to calculate the emission reductions associated with these programmes in the October-1995 review of the CCAP.

67. There is also a possibility that emission reductions claimed under voluntary programmes may already be reflected in the baseline scenario. In other words, it is often difficult to determine if a greenhouse gas emission reduction action would have occurred with or without a voluntary CCAP programme. Industry representatives indicated that CCAP voluntary programmes accelerate the implementation of voluntary actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions but are not the factor determining whether or not the actions would be taken in the longer term. In their view, the key deciding factor is cost-effectiveness, which implies that most of these actions would eventually be taken with or without a CCAP.

68. The review team notes that the United States is clearly aware of these difficulties and is investing significant resources to ensure that the estimated effects of measures outlined in the CCAP are as reasonable as possible. The October 1995 review of the CCAP will likely prcscnt the expected effects of measures under both full-funding and partial-funding scenarios.

V. VULNERABILITY AND ADAPTATION

69. The team noted that substantial work has been done to assess the potential impacts of climate change in the United States and that responsibilities for such issues are well reflected in the steering committees on science programmes. Most of this work concludes that the

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United States is for the most part scnsitive, but not vulncrabic, to the impacts of climate change. This implics that adaptation is a concern in the United States climate change strategy. In an assessment of 11 sectors with regard to the sensitivity and adaptability of both human activities and natural resources, two (industry and health) were identified as less sensitive (even though health was reconsidered recently), seven sensitive and two problematic.

70. While the United States is a world leader in adaptation research, few studies have attempted to compare the costs of adaptation strategics with the cost of greenhouse gas mitigation strategies because it is difficult to assess adaptation costs accurately when the regional impacts of climate change are highly uncertain. Consequently, priorities have bccn given to shorter term strategics.

71. At this time, the United States Coastal Zone Management Act is the only pece of federal legislation that specifically includes provisions to facilitate climate change adaptation. Nonetheless, the potential impacts of climate change are being considered in a number of other areas. For example, hydroelectric planners must now take into account the potential impact of climate change on future water levels. There are proposals for changes in the Clean Water Act to improve water use efficiency, and initiatives to accommodate environmental changes in the agricultural sector.

VI. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

72. The United States did not directly fund the pilot phase of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) but it did provide parallel financing. After the restructuring of the GEF, the United States pledged $430 million to its first official phrase. United States official development assistance represented 0.15 per cent of its GDP in 1993 according to OECD statistics.

73. The team considers that the national communication went well beyond the reporting guidelines in this area and found the detailed description of bilateral United States programmes that are helping to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries particularly informative and useful.

14. The team was particularly impressed with the United States Country Studies Program. This bilateral initiative assists developing countries and countries with economies in transition in the development of greenhouse gas inventories, the preparation of greenhouse gas emission projections, and the identification of actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or enhance sinks. Fifty-six countrics arc now involved in the Programme and the carliest initiatives will reach completion in 1996.

75. The United States has clearly made climate change considerations an important component of its international assistance programmes and funding for initiatives related to climate change mitigation has increased in recent years. For 1995, the United States Agency for International Development is seeking $660 million for its energy and environment programmes,

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$280 million of which is related to climate change. The United States is also encouraging multilateral lending institutions to incorporate the same concerns into their lending practices.

76. The team noted, however, that it is not at all clear whether the United States Congress will provide the funding required to allow the United States to maintain its current level of official development assistance and mect its financial commitments to multilateral institutions associated with the climate change issue.

Joint implementation Activities implemented jointly under the pilot phase)

77.

Since the national communication was released, the United States Initiative on Joint Implementation (USU) selected its first seven private sector joint implementation projects from 30 applications. A second round of project applications was due to close in July 1995, with more projects being approved in November December 1995. His not yet clear how the United States private sector will respond-to-the-socond-call-for-projects after the Conference of the Parties at its first session decision on activities-implemented jointly under the pilot phase.

78. While the United States has not taken the effects of any joint-implementation initiatives inte-account-in-connection with its UNFEEA commitments, it The United States has established a mechanism to monitor and record the greenhouse gas emission reductions achieved through joint implementation. The team noted that the time required to implement these projects means that it is likely that most USUI projects will not reduce greenhouse gas emissions until 1997 or 1998 and will not have anywhere near their full impact on such emissions before the year 2000.

VII. RESEARCH AND SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATION

79. The United States provided a detailed overview of its support for basic and applied research on climate change in its national communication and the team considers that the United States respected the reporting guidelines in this area.

The United States is clearly a major contributor to international efforts on basic climate change science and applied technological rescarch and development. Significant resources are being put into diese efforts. The United States government is providing $1.8 billion a year for basic climate research and $2 billion a year for applied research. It should be noted that while the United States Government accounts for 80 per cent of hasic research on the climate change issuc, 75 per cent of the applied research is done in the private sector.

81. The United States overnment's role in short-term applied research is likely to decline in the future as there is a growing sentiment within the United States Congress that such research should he left to private industry. Funding for more basic research related to climate change may also be cut.

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EDUCATION, TRAINING AND PUBLIC AWARENESS

82. State and local governments are responsible for most formal education programmes in the United States. Nonetheless, the national communication describes several programmes that the federal Government is implementing to increase public awareness and provide education about the climate change issue and the team felt that the national communication did respect the reporting guidelines in this area.

83.

Many of the educational programmes described in the national communication are closely linkod with scientific research programmes on climate change. This linkage has been developed out of necessity. While the United States Government can produce and distribute seientifie information that can be used by advocates, The United States government produces and distributes scientific and technical information that can be used in the public sector, although it is prohibited by law fro acting as an advocate for a particular goal. United States law does not permit the Government to be a public advocate on the climate change issuc. The team noted that this situation does not prevail in all OECD countries.

84. During its visit the team was told that one of the major educational initiatives described in the national communication, the GLOBE programme (Global Learning and Observations to Benefit the Environment), was likely to have, its funding significantly cut back by the United States Congress.