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Rohrabacher:

October 19, 1996 Response

P. 20

Answer: If two panels are established, and if each panel numbers between 10 and 20 members, it is likely that the United States, which is currently one of 148 Parties to the convention, would be able to name at least one expert to one of the two panels.

12D. THE US SAID THAT EXPERTS SHOULD BE NOMINATED BY GOVERNMENTS, BUT THEY COULD COME FROM INSIDE OR OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT. AS YOU KNOW, "EXPERTS" OFTEN HAVE DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW ON "SCIENTIFIC", "TECHNICAL", OR "ECONOMIC" ISSUES, AND MOST HAVE POLICY PREFERENCES.

12D(i) WHAT IS THE DEFINITION OF AN "EXPERT" FOR THE PANELS AND ANY SUBSTRUCTURE?

Answer: An expert would bring specific technical skills, knowledge and experience to the work of the panel and any substructure.

12D(ii) WHAT CRITERIA WOULD BE USED BY THE US IN SELECTING SUCH EXPERTS TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE QUALIFIED, TO ENSURE A BALANCE OF VIEWS ON ISSUES AND POLICIES, AND TO AVOID POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROBLEMS?

Answer: To establish their qualifications, we would consider the background (academic and work-related) of candidates; to establish points of view, we would consider their reputations among their peers; to avoid conflicts of interest, we would inform interested candidates of their responsibilities if selected; and urge them to consider any potential conflicts when allowing their names to be put forward.

12D(iii) WHAT IS, IN YOUR VIEW, THE FUNCTION OF THE SUBSTRUCTURE PANELS?

Answer: A substructure under the panel on technologies would enable the panel itself to serve as a kind of steering group, while providing it the ability to consult a necessarily broad spectrum of experts with specific knowledge of technologies in particular fields of endeavor.

12D(iv) WHAT IS YOUR VIEW OF THE SUBSTRUCTURE, THE NUMBER OF EXPERTS REQUIRED, AND THE CRITERIA FOR SELECTION?

Answer: Whether a specific substructure is established or

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to consult a very large number of experts across many sectors. We would rather not restrict the number of experts whose advice is sought with respect to technologies in any particular sector; instead, we would like to encourage as many experts as possible to participate in the work of the convention. The criteria for selection should be "proven technical expertise", as well as willingness and ability to

serve.

13. AN INSIDE EPA ARTICLE OF SEPTEMBER 29, 1995 QUOTES AN
ENVIRONMENTALIST AS SAYING THAT "GLOBAL WARMING WILL CONTINUE
UNTIL LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ALSO TAKE STEPS TO REDUCE
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS." HOWEVER, THE BERLIN MANDATE DOES
NOT ADDRESS THE EXPECTED GROWTH IN GREENHOUSE GASES FROM THESE
COUNTRIES. IT MERELY REAFFIRMS THAT THESE COUNTRIES ARE
OBLIGATED TO CARRY OUT COMMITMENTS THEY PLEDGED TO IMPLEMENT
WHEN THEY RATIFIED THE CONVENTION, WHILE EXPRESSLY STATING THAT
THE AGBM PROCESS MAY NOT INTRODUCE ANY NEW COMMITMENTS FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

13A. WHY DID THE US AGREE TO AN AGBM PROCESS THAT FAILS TO PROVIDE FOR DISCUSSION AND NEGOTIATION OF NEW COMMITMENTS AT ANY TIME BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO DEAL WITH THIS GROWTH?

Answer: The AGBM process is designed to produce a next step under the convention that will lead to progress toward its ultimate objective; reaching that objective is likely to require quite a number of steps over time. Under the present convention, developing countries have at least three years longer to produce their first national communications concerning the actions that they are taking to mitigate and adapt to climate change than developed countries. The earliest of these developing country communications will thus not be available until 1997. On the other hand, the initial "aim" accepted by developed countries in Article 4.2(a) and (b) extends only to the year 2000, and these countries, in particular, which now account for nearly 60 percent of current global emissions of greenhouse gases, believed it was necessary to begin considering how to deal with their own emissions in the years post 2000. Finally, the language of the Berlin Mandate indicates that developing countries must continue to advance the implementation of their commitments. Inasmuch as these commitments include obligations to take policies and measures, to report on actions and to take climate change considerations into account, where feasible, in their relevant social, economic and environmental policies and actions, the United States assumes that significant advances will be made by all Parties

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including developing country Parties

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in next

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October 19, 1996 Response

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13B. WHAT STEPS,

IF ANY, ARE THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES COMMITTED TO TAKE UNDER THE CONVENTION TO REDUCE EMISSIONS AND IN WHAT TIMEFRAME?

Answer:

Developing countries, like all countries that are party to the convention, are committed to taking all of the actions envisioned by Article 4.1 of the convention. In addition, developing countries are also committed to taking the actions envisioned by Article 12.1 of the convention. (A copy of each is attached.)

13C. ARE THOSE COMMITMENTS CONTINGENT UNDER THE CONVENTION ON ANNEX I COUNTRIES PROVIDING MONEY AND TECHNOLOGIES AS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SEEM TO CONTEND?

Answer: Article 4.7 of the convention provides, "The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties." The United States regards Article 4.7 as a statement of fact, not as a condition precedent.

13D. WHAT SPECIFIC DECISION SHOULD THE AGBM TAKE THAT WOULD RESULT IN ADVANCING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY COMMITMENTS?

Answer: This issue is under active consideration within the AGBM. A copy of the U.S. intervention on this issue from AGBM-3 in Geneva in March 1996 is attached; it provides our most recent position on this issue.

13E. PLEASE PROVIDE A TABLE IN MILLION METRIC TONS COMPARING ESTIMATES IN WHICH THE US HAS CONFIDENCE, BASED ON ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION AND OTHER REPORTS, OF TOTAL WORLD GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS WITH EMISSIONS FROM THE FORMER SOVIET BLOC, THE US, AND OTHER OECD COUNTRIES, CHINA, INDIA, AND OTHER DEVELOPING NATIONS FOR THE YEARS 1990, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2025 AND 2100.

Answer: Numerous estimates or scenarios of future emissions of greenhouse gases over various time horizons have been developed in recent years. While many of these estimates have provided important insights to those concerned with the

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October 19, 1996 Response

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threat of climate change, the phrase "estimates in which the U.S. has confidence" is open to varying interpretations.

All estimates of future emissions depend upon a series of assumptions. For example, future energy related emissions will be influenced by overall economic growth, energy price trends, technology developments, and future behavior. Our past experience with energy forecasts shows that these drivers are difficult to predict over decades, let alone a over a century. No forecast or scenario can be viewed as

being dependable in the sense that all of the key assumptions made will be replicated as the future unfolds. The IPCC 1992 scenarios provide a reasonable illustration of the wide range of possible long-run futures for greenhouse gas emissions under business as usual conditions. The very wide ranges (for example, scenarios for emissions in 2100 differ by a factor of 6) are similar to those identified in independent academic studies of emissions uncertainty, such as Nordhaus and Yohe and Edmonds et al. The IPCC 1992 scenarios suggest that the developing countries, most notably China and India, will dominate both emissions and total contributions to enhanced radiative forcing over the next century.

The long run focus of the 1992 scenarios is complemented by short- to medium-run estimates of energy related greenhouse gas emissions. Such estimates are implicit in the energy forecasts and scenarios produced by private and governmental forecasters. The U.S. delegation presentation made at the second meeting of the (Ad-hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate) AGBM on October 30, 1995, reviewed a variety of forecasts, scenarios and projections (a copy of the U.S. AGBM presentation and the 1992 scenario tables are attached for your information). While forecasts differ among themselves, the review suggested several conclusions.

World emissions are projected to rise, with emissions in the developing world growing fastest, emissions in the OECD growing moderately, and emissions in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Eastern European countries transitioning to a market economy remaining below the 1990 level through 2000 and possibly through 2010.

Within the OECD, emissions are projected to grow more rapidly in the Pacific and in North America than in Europe from the present to 2010 or 2020.

14.

A STATEMENT OF THE US DELEGATION IN GENEVA IN AUGUST NOTED THAT THE AGBM REQUESTED FOR ITS MARCH 1996 SESSION THAT

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STATE-OF-THE-ART TECHNOLOGIES AND KNOW-HOW THAT COULD ADVANCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BERLIN MANDATE" AND SUGGESTED THAT SUCH AN INVENTORY SHOULD BE PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT.

14A. WAS THAT SUGGESTION ADOPTED?

Answer: Yes. For the SBSTA's February session, the FCCC Secretariat prepared a first draft of such a document which essentially tracks a request made in a decision of the first Conference of the Parties to the FCCC in Berlin, in March 1995. A copy is attached for your reference.

14B. WHAT IS THE CAPABILITY OF EITHER ORGANIZATION TO PROVIDE SUCH A REPORT OR INVENTORY FOR NEXT MARCH OR ANYTIME NEXT YEAR?

Answer: The report is limited by the material the Secretariat had available -- which includes extensive documentation on technologies from the IPCC (in its working Group II), as well as individual submissions by countries, including those in national communications. It is expected that updates to this document and to its underlying database will be regularly provided .

14C. HOW WOULD EITHER ORGANIZATION DECIDE WHETHER SUCH TECHNOLOGIES OR KNOW-HOW ARE EITHER INNOVATIVE OR EFFICIENT OR THAT THEY COULD ADVANCE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MANDATE?

Answer: Clearly, the concepts of "innovativeness" or "efficiency" are relative terms. However, it is possible to set some parameters within the broad range of options, and state whether an individual technology is more or less efficient than the average technology considered. Furthermore, almost all options that reduce emissions of greenhouse gases even if the option is not necessarily applicable to all parties may be used in fulfillment of the Berlin Mandate.

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14D.

JUST AS IMPORTANT, IS THE COST, COST-EFFECTIVENESS, MARKETABILITY, AND USEFULNESS OF SUCH TECHNOLOGIES OR KNOW-HOW, BUT THOSE CRITERIA DO NOT APPEAR TO BE PART OF THE AGBM OR US CRITERIA. WHY NOT?

Answer: The United States fully supports the notion that cost-effectiveness and cost must be considered as we consider technologies and know-how alternatives. In fact, these items are enshrined in the principles in the

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