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Scientific-Technical Analyses of Impacts, Adaptations, and Mitigation of Climate Change

coastal defense systems are less well-established. Countries with higher population densities would be more vulnerable. For these countries, sea-level rise could force internal or international migration of populations.

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could economically weaken other sectors, such as banking. The insurance industry currently is under stress from a series of "billion dollar" storms since 1987, resulting in dramatic increases in losses, reduced availability of insurance, and higher costs. Some in the insurance industry perceive a current trend toward increased frequency and severity of extreme climate events. Examination of the meteorological data fails to support this perception in the context of a long-term change, although a shift within the limits of natural variability may have occurred. Higher losses strongly reflect increases in infrastructure and economic worth in vulnerable areas as well as a possible shift in the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events.

A number of studies have evaluated sensitivity to a 1-m sea-
level rise. This increase is at the top of the range of IPCC
Working Group I estimates for 2100, it should be noted, how-
ever, that sea level is actually projected to continue to rise
beyond 2100. Studies using this 1-m projection show a partic-
ular risk for small islands and deltas. Estimated land losses
range from 0.05% for Uruguay, 1% for Egypt, 6% for the
Netherlands, and 17.5% for Bangladesh to about 80% for the
Majuro Atoll in the Marshall Islands, given the present state of
protection systems. Large numbers of people also are affect- 3.5.
ed-for example, about 70 million each in China and
Bangladesh. Many nations face lost capital value in excess of
10% of their gross domestic product (GDP). Although annual
protection costs for many nations are relatively modest (about
0.1% of GDP), the average annual costs to many small island
states total several percent of GDP. For some island nations,
the high cost of providing storm-surge protection would make
it essentially infeasible, especially given the limited availabili-
ty of capital for investment.

The most vulnerable human settlements are located in damage-prone areas of the developing world that do not have the resources to cope with impacts. Effective coastal-zone management and land-use regulation can help direct population shifts away from vulnerable locations such as flood plains, steep hillsides, and lowlying coastlines. One of the potentially unique and destructive effects on human settlements is forced internal or international migration of popalations. Programs of disaster assistance can offset some of the more serious negative consequences of climate change and reduce the number of ecological refugees.

Property insurance is vulnerable to extreme climate events. A higher risk of extreme events due to climate change could lead to higher insurance premiums or the withdrawal of coverage for property in some vulnerable areas. Changes in climate variability and the risk for extreme events may be difficult to detect or predict, thus making it difficult for insurance companies to adjust premiums appropriately. If such difficulty leads to insolvency, companies may not be able to

CLIMATE
CHANGE:
TEMPERATURE,
PRECIPITATION,
AND WEATHER

Human Health

Climate change is likely to have wide-ranging and mostly adverse impacts on human health, with significant loss of life. These impacts would arise by both direct and indirect pathways (Figure 3), and it is likely that the indirect impacts would, in the longer term, predominate.

Direct health effects include increases in (predominantly cardiorespiratory) mortality and illness due to an anticipated increase

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honor insurance contracts, which Figure 3: Ways in which climate change can affect human health.

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Scientific-Technical Analyses of Impacts, Adaptations, and Mitigation of Climate Change

in the intensity and duration of heat waves. Temperature increases in colder regions should result in fewer cold-related deaths. An increase in extreme weather would cause a higher incidence of death, injury, psychological disorders, and exposure to contaminated water supplies.

Indirect effects of climate change include increases in the potential transmission of vector-borne infectious diseases (e.g., malaria, dengue, yellow fever, and some viral encephalitis) resulting from extensions of the geographical range and season for vector organisms. Projections by models (that entail necessary simplifying assumptions) indicate that the geographical zone of potential malaria transmission in response to world temperature increases at the upper part of the IPCC-projected range (3-5°C by 2100) would increase from approximately 45% of the world population to approximately 60% by the latter half of the next century. This could lead to potential increases in malaria incidence (on the order of 50-80 million additional annual cases, relative to an assumed global background total of 500 million cases), primarily in tropical, subtropical, and less well-protected temperate-zone populations. Some increases in non-vector-borne infectious diseases such as salmonellosis, cholera, and giardiasis—also could occur as a result of elevated temperatures and increased flooding.

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that accelerate technology development, diffusion, and transfer in all sectors including the energy, industry, transportation, residential/commercial, and agricultural/forestry sectors. By the year 2100, the world's commercial energy system in effect will be replaced at least twice, offering opportunities to change the energy system without premature retirement of capital stock; significant amounts of capital stock in the industrial, commercial, residential, and agricultural/forestry sectors will also be replaced. These cycles of capital replacement provide opportunities to use new, better performing technologies. It should be noted that the analyses of Working Group II do not attempt to quantify potential macroeconomic consequences that may be associated with mitigation measures. Discussion of macroeconomic analyses is found in the IPCC Working Group III contribution to the Second Assessment Report. The degree to which technical potential and cost-effectiveness are realized is dependent on initiatives to counter lack of information and overcome cultural, institutional, legal, financial and economic barriers that can hinder diffusion of technology or behavioral changes. The pursuit of mitigation options can be carried out within the limits of sustainable development criteria. Social and environmental criteria not related to greenhouse gas emissions abatement could, however, restrict the ultimate potential of each of the options.

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Global energy demand has grown at an average annual rate of approximately 2% for almost 2 centuries, although energy demand growth varies considerably over time and between different regions. In the published literature, different methods and conventions are used to characterize energy consumption. These conventions differ, for example, according to their definition of sectors and their treatment of energy forms. Based on aggregated national energy balances, 385 EJ of primary energy was consumed in the world in 1990, resulting in the release of 6 Gt C as CO2. Of this, 279 EJ was delivered to end users, accounting for 3.7 Gt C emissions as CO2 at the point of consumption. The remaining 106 EJ was used in energy conversion and distribution, accounting for 2.3 Gt C emissions as CO,. In 1990, the three largest sectors of energy consumption were industry (43% of total CO2 releases), residential/commercial buildings (28%), and transport (22%). Of these, transport sector energy use and related CO2 emissions have been the most rapidly growing over the past 2 decades. For the detailed sectoral mitigation option assessment in this report, 1990 energy consumption estimates are based on a range of literature sources; a variety of conventions are used to define these sectors and their energy use, which is estimated to amount to a total of 259-282 EJ.

Figure 4 depicts total energy-related emissions by major world region. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations have been and remain major energy users and fossil fuel CO2 emitters, although their share of global fossil fuel carbon emissions has been declining.

Scientific-Technical Analyses of Impacts, Adaptations, and Mitigation of Climate Change

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Figure 4: Global energy-related CO2 emissions by major world region in Gt C/yr (Marland et al., 1994; Grübler and Nakicenovic, 1992; Eremand and Luciani, 1991; Fujii, 1990; UN, 1952). Note that CPA = Centrally Planned Asia and PAO = Pacific and Oceania.

Developing nations, taken as a group, still account for a smaller portion of total global CO2 emissions than industrialized nations OECD and former Soviet Union/Eastern Europe (FSU/EE) but most projections indicate that with forecast rates of economic and population growth, the future share of developing countries will increase. Future energy demand is anticipated to continue to grow, at least through the first half of the next century. The IPCC (1992, 1994) projects that without policy intervention, there could be significant growth in emissions from the industrial, transportation, and commercial/residential buildings sectors.

4.1.1. Energy Demand

Numerous studies have indicated that 10-30% energy-efficiency gains above present levels are feasible at little or no net cost in many parts of the world through technical conservation measures and improved management practices over the next 2 to 3 decades. Using technologies that presently yield the highest output of energy services for a given input of energy, efficiency gains of 50-60% would be technically feasible in many countries over the same time period. Achieving these potentials will depend on future cost reductions, financing, and technology

transfer, as well as measures to overcome a variety of non-technical barriers. The potential for greenhouse gas emission reductions exceeds the potential for energy use efficiency because of the possibility of switching fuels and energy sources. Because energy use is growing world-wide, even replacing current technology with more efficient technology could still lead to an absolute increase in CO2 emissions in the future.

In 1992, the IPCC produced six scenarios (IS92a-f) of future energy use and associated greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC, 1992, 1995). These scenarios provide a wide range of possible future greenhouse gas emission levels, without mitigation measures.

In the Second Assessment Report, future energy use has been reexamined on a more detailed sectoral basis, both with and without new mitigation measures, based on existing studies. Despite different assessment approaches, the resulting ranges of energy consumption increases to 2025 without new measures are broadly consistent with those of IS92. If past trends continue, greenhouse gas emissions will grow more slowly than energy use, except in the transport sector.

The following paragraphs summarize energy-efficiency improvement potentials estimated in the IPCC Second

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Scientific-Technical Analyses of Impacts, Adaptations, and Mitigation of Climate Change

Assessment Report. Strong policy measures would be required to achieve these potentials. Energy-related greenhouse gas emission reductions depend on the source of the energy, but reductions in energy use will in general lead to reduced greenhouse gas emissions.

those obtained through reduced energy use could be achieved
through changes in energy sources.

4.1.2.

Mitigating Industrial Process and Human
Settlement Emissions

Process-related greenhouse gases including CO2, CH, N2O,
halocarbons, and SF, are released during manufacturing and
industrial processes, such as the production of iron, steel, alu-
minum, ammonia, cement, and other materials. Large reduc-
tions are possible in some cases. Measures include modifying
production processes, eliminating solvents, replacing feed-
stocks, materials substitution, increased recycling, and reduced
consumption of greenhouse gas-intensive materials. Capturing
and utilizing CH, from landfills and sewage treatment facilities
and lowering the leakage rate of halocarbon refrigerants from
mobile and stationary sources also can lead to significant
greenhouse gas emission reductions.

Industry. Energy use in 1990 was estimated to be 98-117 EJ,
and is projected to grow to 140-242 EJ in 2025 without new
measures. Countries differ widely in their current industrial ener-
gy use and energy-related greenhouse gas emission trends.
Industrial sector energy-related greenhouse gas emissions in
most industrialized countries are expected to be stable or
decreasing as a result of industrial restructuring and technologi-
cal innovation, whereas industrial emissions in developing coun-
tries are projected to increase mainly as a result of industrial
growth. The short-term potential for energy-efficiency improve-
ments in the manufacturing sector of major industrial countries
is estimated to be 25%. The potential for greenhouse gas emis-
sion reductions is larger. Technologies and measures for reduc-
ing energy-related emissions from this sector include improving
efficiency (e.g., energy and materials savings, cogeneration,
energy cascading, steam recovery, and use of more efficient 4.1.3.
motors and other electrical devices); recycling materials and
switching to those with lower greenhouse gas emissions; and
developing processes that use less energy and materials.

Energy Supply

This assessment focuses on new technologies for capital
investment and not on potential retrofitting of existing capital
stock to use less carbon-intensive forms of primary energy. It
is technically possible to realize deep emissions reductions in
the energy supply sector in step with the normal timing of
investments to replace infrastructure and equipment as it wears
out or becomes obsolete. Many options for achieving these
deep reductions will also decrease the emissions of sulfur diox-
ide, nitrogen oxides, and volatile organic compounds.
Promising approaches, not ordered according to priority, are
described below.

Transportation. Energy use in 1990 was estimated to be
61-65 EJ, and is projected to grow to 90-140 EJ in 2025 with-
out new measures. Projected energy use in 2025 could be
reduced by about a third to 60-100 EJ through vehicles using
very efficient drive-trains, lightweight construction, and low
air-resistance design, without compromising comfort and per-
formance. Further energy-use reductions are possible through
the use of smaller vehicles; altered land-use patterns, transport
systems, mobility patterns, and lifestyles; and shifting to less
energy-intensive transport modes. Greenhouse gas emissions
per unit of energy used could be reduced through the use of 4.1.3.1.
alternative fuels and electricity from renewable sources. These
measures, taken together, provide the opportunity for reducing
global transport energy-related greenhouse gas emissions by
as much as 40% of projected emissions by 2025. Actions to
reduce energy-related greenhouse gas emissions from trans-
port can simultaneously address other problems such as local
air pollution.

Commercial/Residential Sector. Energy use in 1990 was estimated to be about 100 EJ, and is projected to grow to 165-205 EJ in 2025 without new measures. Projected energy use could be reduced by about a quarter to 126–170 EJ by 2025 without diminishing services through the use of energy efficient technology. The potential for greenhouse gas emission reductions is larger. Technical changes might include reduced heat transfers through building structures and more efficient space-conditioning and water supply systems, lighting, and appliances. Ambient temperatures in urban areas can be reduced through increased vegetation and greater reflectivity of building surfaces, reducing the energy required for space conditioning. Energy-related greenhouse gas emission reductions beyond

Greenhouse gas reductions in the use of fossil fuels

More Efficient Conversion of Fossil Fuels. New technology
offers considerably increased conversion efficiencies. For
example, the efficiency of power production can be increased
from the present world average of about 30% to more than
60% in the longer term. Also, the use of combined heat and
power production replacing separate production of power and
heat-whether for process heat or space heating-offers a sig-
nificant rise in fuel conversion efficiency.

Switching to Low-Carbon Fossil Fuels and Suppressing
Emissions. Switching from coal to oil or natural gas, and from
oil to natural gas, can reduce emissions. Natural gas has the
lowest CO2 emissions per unit of energy of all fossil fuels at
about 14 kg C/GJ, compared to oil with about 20 kg C/GJ and
coal with about 25 kg C/GJ. The lower carbon-containing fuels
can, in general, be converted with higher efficiency than coal.
Large resources of natural gas exist in many areas. New, low
capital cost, highly efficient combined-cycle technology has
reduced electricity costs considerably in some areas. Natural
gas could potentially replace oil in the transportation sector.

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Scientific-Technical Analyses of Impacts, Adaptations, and Mitigation of Climate Change

Approaches exist to reduce emissions of CH, from natural gas pipelines and emissions of CH, and/or CO2 from oil and gas wells and coal mines.

Decarbonization of Flue Gases and Fuels, and CO, Storage. The removal and storage of CO2 from fossil fuel power-station stack gases is feasible, but reduces the conversion efficiency and significantly increases the production cost of electricity. Another approach to decarbonization uses fossil fuel feedstocks to make hydrogen-rich fuels. Both approaches generate a byproduct stream of CO2 that could be stored, for example, in depleted natural gas fields. The future availability of conversion technologies such as fuel cells that can efficiently use hydrogen would increase the relative attractiveness of the latter approach. For some longer term CO2 storage options, the costs, environmental effects, and efficacy of such options remain largely unknown.

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Switching to Renewable Sources of Energy. Solar, biomass, wind, hydro, and geothermal technologies already are widely used. In 1990, renewable sources of energy contributed about 20% of the world's primary energy consumption, most of it fuelwood and hydropower. Technological advances offer new opportunities and declining costs for energy from these sources. In the longer term, renewable sources of energy could meet a major part of the world's demand for energy. Power systems can easily accommodate limited fractions of intermittent generation, and with the addition of fast-responding backup and storage units, also higher fractions. Where biomass is sustainably regrown and used to displace fossil fuels in energy production, net carbon emissions are avoided as the CO2 released in converting the biomass to energy is again fixed in biomass through photosynthesis. If the development of biomass energy can be carried out in ways that effectively address concerns about other environmental issues and competition with other land uses, biomass could make major contributions in both the electricity and fuels markets, as well as offering prospects of increasing rural employment and income.

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billion by 2100. GDP grows 7-fold by 2050 (5-fold and 14-fold in industrialized and developing countries, respectively) and 25-fold by 2100 (13-fold and 70-fold in industrialized and developing countries, respectively), relative to 1990. Because of emphasis on energy efficiency, primary energy consumption rises much more slowly than GDP. The energy supply constructions were made to meet energy demand in (i) projections developed for the IPCC's First Assessment Report (1990) in a low energy demand variant, where global primary commercial energy use approximately doubles, with no net change for industrialized countries but a 4.4-fold increase for developing countries from 1990 to 2100; and (ii) a higher energy demand variant, developed in the IPCC IS92a scenario where energy demand quadruples from 1990 to 2100. The energy demand levels of the LESS constructions are consistent with the energy demand mitigation chapters of this Second Assessment Report. Figure 5 shows combinations of different energy sources to meet changing levels of demand over the next century. The analysis of these variants leads to the following conclusions:

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Deep reductions of CO2 emissions from energy supply systems are technically possible within 50 to 100 years, using alternative strategies.

Many combinations of the options identified in this assessment could reduce global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels from about 6 Gt C in 1990 to about 4 Gt C/yr by 2050, and to about 2 Gt C/yr by 2100 (see Figure 6). Cumulative CO2 emissions, from 1990 to 2100, would range from about 450 to about 470 Gt C in the alternative LESS constructions. Higher energy efficiency is underscored for achieving deep reductions in CO2 emissions, for increasing the flexibility of supply side combinations, and for reducing overall energy system costs.

Interregional trade in energy grows in the LESS constructions compared to today's levels, expanding sustainable development options for Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East during the next century.

Costs for energy services in each LESS variant relative to costs for conventional energy depend on relative future energy prices, which are uncertain within a wide range, and on the performance and cost characteristics assumed for alternative technologies. However, within the wide range of future energy prices, one or more of the variants would plausibly be capable of providing the demanded energy services at estimated costs that are approximately the same as estimated future costs for current conventional energy. It is not possible to identify a least-cost future energy system for the longer term, as the relative costs of options depend on resource constraints and technological opportunities that are imperfectly known, and on actions by governments and the private sector.

The literature provides strong support for the feasibility of achieving the performance and cost characteristics assumed for energy technologies in the LESS constructions, within the next 2 decades, though it is impossible to be certain until the research

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