These particular scientific programs then develop the basic information necessary upon which conservation regulations might later be put into effect.

So first, of course, there is the matter of investigation and a collection of both biological as well as statistical information on these fisheries. Then second, the assessment of this information to see what effect the fisheries are having on the stocks of fish. And third, if these studies show that the effects of the fishery are severe and conservation regulations are needed, why, then, obviously a bilateral agreement or multilateral agreement, as the case may be, would be considered and would be urged by the United States.

"YOU

DO

NOT KNOW WHETHER KOREAN BOTTOM FISHING IS
DEPLETING THE RESOURCE OR NOT?"

Mr. BEASER. In other words, at the present moment, you or the Department of the Interior do not know whether Korean bottom fishing is depleting the resource or not?

Mr. MCKERNAN. We are certain it is not at the present time, because they do not have a bottom fish fishery. They have not started one. Mr. BEASER. But when they do?

Mr. McKERNAN. When they do, of course, we will be quite certain that they will not be depleting it at that particular time. This will be the moment of their entry into the fishery on the stocks.

We will be able to measure to some degree immediately the effect of their fishery on these stocks, because we have agreements with both the Japanese and the Soviet Union. So the measures of abundance of these stocks that we are developing with these other two countries will give us a measure almost immediately of the effect of any new effort by ourselves and the Koreans or any expansion by these other two countries, what effect that is having on the stocks of fish.

Then, of course, the matter of sorting it out, the effects of each of the fisheries will have to be determined by the scientists, and the governments will have to be informed about that at a later date and decisions taken at that time.

Mr. BEASER. The eight trawlers that came into our waters in the North Pacific in the late summer of 1967, were they licensed by the Korean Government to fish?

Mr. McKERNAN. To the best of my knowledge, they were licensed to fish ground fish, bottom fish. This would include ocean perch, Alaskan pollock, I suppose black cod, and flounders of various kinds. Mr. BEASER. Not salmon?

Mr. McKERNAN. Not salmon, and they were not equipped to fish salmon, either.

Mr. BEASER. King crab?

Mr. McKERNAN. No; they were not equipped to fish king crab. They may have incidentally taken a few king crab, but when they came into Alaskan ports they were observed and for all practical purposes they were not very successful in catching anything.

M'KERNAN STATES

EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AND SCIENTISTS IS
USUAL PLAN

Senator GRUENING. If Korean fishermen come in there and do not have access to an Alaskan port and have to take whatever they catch

back to Korea, how will we find out whether they are adhering to conservation regulations and not taking species other than bottom fish or fish which the State Department feels it would be undesirable for them to take? How do you control that?

Mr. McKERNAN. Our plan would be, and it has been with both Japan and the Soviet Union, to arrange for an exchange of observers and scientists aboard their vessels, and ours. This exchange of observers gives us an opportunity to see what the catch is.

...

PLUS CATCH RECORDS AS REPORTED IN HOME PORTS

And furthermore, of course, we watch very carefully the catch records of these countries back home. For example, we have done this with both Japan and the Soviet Unoin, and it is pretty hard for them to fix the statistics for any length of time, because if there is an increase-well, for example-in Korea, of course, we know how very small the catch of salmon has been in Korea in the last few years. If any increase in salmon, of course, showed up in their catch statistics, we know they would have to come from the North Pacific salmon stocks.

"HOW DO WE PROTECT OUR ALASKAN FISHERMEN AGAINST .

CATCHING OTHER THAN BOTTOM FISH?

So the answer is that we would get the information both by observers on their boats fishing off our coast and also by observing the catch records of the Korean Government.

Senator GRUENING. What would be the procedure on board a fishing vessel, a Korean fishing vessel, if in the course of fishing for bottom fish, other species were caught in their nets or whatever gear they used? And do we protect our Alaskan fishermen against this?

Mr. McKERNAN. It is a possibility. As I mentioned, we have warned the Koreans, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, that an unregulated fishery, a fishery which fished in Alaskan waters without regard to area would have might have very serious effects on our established fisheries. But in general, if the Koreans fished for ground fish, where ground fish are most abundant, these would be areas where, for example, king crab would not be so abundant. So there is some considerable separation in the best fishing grounds for king crab, say, and shrimp on one hand, and on ocean perch and black cod on the other.

Let me give you an example: The Soviets and Japanese fish not exclusively, but to a great degree, on the edge of the Continental Shelf, on about the hundred fathom edge. This is an area where there are few king crabs. They also tend to what in the trade is called "balloon" their nets. Their nets are not solidly on the bottom, but tend to be slightly above the bottom, where they can most effectively catch these species. We would expect the Koreans to do the same if they came in.

M'KERNAN AVERS SHRIMP FISHING ON HIGH SEAS "NOT UNDER QUE DIRECT CONTROL"

Senator GRUENING. You just mentioned shrimp, which is not included in your prepared statement. Is this one of the fisheries to

which the State Department would not object to having the Koreans engage in?

Mr. McKERNAN. We could have no objection if they took shrimp beyond our contiguous zone, beyond 12 miles. But we would not be happy with anybody coming in and fishing shrimp.

There is some catch by Japan and the Soviet Union of shrimp on the high seas. We do not consider shrimp a creature of the Continental Shelf; therefore, it is not under our direct control.

GRUENING THINKS SHRIMP FISHING BY FOREIGN FISHERMEN SHOULD NOT BE ENCOURAGED BY STATE DEPARTMENT

Senator GRUENING. As you know, the shrimp fishery is now being developed in the western part of Alaska, where previously it was largely confined to Southeastern Alaska. This is a new field our fishermen in Western Alaska are entering into. Of course, they would view with a great deal of alarm and be very much opposed to any additional fishing of shrimp by a foreign fleet. I share and support this opposition. I would think that this could very properly be included in the lists of fisheries that the State Department would not be encouraging foreign fishermen to engage in.

Mr. McKERNAN. Well, we are not encouraging foreign fishermen to engage in any fishing off the coast of the United States.

Senator GRUENING. How can you say that when you are subsidizing Koreans to the extent of over $5 million and are continuing much aid? You do not expect that they are going to confine themselves to their own waters, do you?

Mr. McKERNAN. I want to point out that the aid and assistance that we have given them is in areas that are not in conflict with the United States. Let me once again say that we sent a team over to discuss the possibility of developing a salmon hatchery in Korea. That obviously is in the western North Pacific Ocean.

We also sent a team over to consider the development of oyster fisheries. We have a project with them at the present time to develop mackerel and tuna fisheries around Korea. These, then, would keep the development in other parts of the North Pacific Ocean. This is the policy of the United States, to encourage them to develop in those areas where they are not in conflict with us. We cannot prevent them from doing this by international law.

NO FISHING WITHIN AMERICAN WATERS-A QUID PRO QUO FOR AMERICAN DOLLARS?

Senator GRUENING. Why can't the United States, in exchange for its generous aid, prescribe that there will be no fishing of any kind within American waters? It seems to me that would be a quid pro quo for the millions of dollars we give them. Why can't we stipulate that? Mr. McKERNAN. Mr. Poats is better qualified than I to talk about the specific attitudes and policies of AID. But I would point out that it certainly is in our interest to be working with the South Koreans and attempting to encourage the development of their fisheries in areas and along lines which are not in conflict with us. Therefore, it seems to me that the present policy is a good one from the standpoint of protecting the American fisheries.

We have advisers, by the way, Senator, in South Korea, in our embassy under AID, under Mr. Poats. These advisers are experienced fishermen and experienced fisheries experts from the North Pacific. In fact, one of them is a Wakefield, Vern Wakefield, who was raised in Alaska. He knows the problems of Alaska fisheries very well. He is not only reviewing any projects over there, but he is advising the Korean Government to a considerable degree about the advisability and the adverse effects which might occur from any development by the Korean Government.

Senator GRUENING. Thank you very much, Mr. McKernan. I would appreciate it if you would stay on during the rest of this hearing so we might be able to ask you further questions.

Now, we will be very glad to hear from Mr. Rutherford M. Poats, who is Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development.

Mr. Poats, we are glad to have you here. You may proceed in your

own way.

STATEMENT OF RUTHERFORD M. POATS, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. POATS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to be here to describe AID's role in the development of international fisheries. I propose to make only a brief introductory statement responding to the questions indicated in your call for this hearing, but will be glad to respond to questions.

BROAD EFFORT REQUIRED TO EASE WAR ON HUNGER

The main thrust of AID's work today is the War on Hunger. As you well know, Mr. Chairman, the world faces a grave threat of massive, widespread malnutrition today, and ultimately famine, unless unprecedented and sustained efforts are made to increase food production, enlarge the protein content of diets, and sharply reduce the rate of population growth. To achieve continuing victory in the War on Hunger will require enormous capital investment, not only in agriculture, but in education, industry, health services, and many other fields. Comprehensive balanced development is required to provide the jobs and the buying power to achieve improvement in diets. Farmers and other producers will not make the large investment in fertilizer and other improvements required unless assured of strong market demand for their increased production.

The capital required for this more intensive-development effort must come largely from the savings of the people in these poor countries. The foreign exchange required to finance imports of industrial goods and food and to build the plants, roads, and other infrastructure can be provided only in small measure through foreign aid programs. It must come largely from expanded export earnings by the developing

nations.

The development of their fisheries, both marine and inland, fulfills two essential aspects of this complex requirement: expansion of protein food supplies and export earnings.

POATS CLAIMS FEW COUNTRIES ORGANIZED FOR AID'S CAPITAL PROJECT LOANS

In view of the great potential of fisheries in preventing malnutrition and in general economic development, I must acknowledge that AID's assistance programs in the fisheries field has been strikingly small. Typically, we have provided in a country program a few technical assistance advisors, occasional loans or counterpart allocations to finance fisheries cooperatives and, in some countries general importfinancing that included fisheries equipment. In most countries this assistance has been directed at coastal and inland fishing and processing. In only a few countries has there been sufficient organization of institutions for financing or managing fishing operations to make possible AID capital project loans.

In fiscal year 1967 AID technical and capital project assistance to developing countries for commercial, salt water fisheries totaled $2 million. This consisted of $600,000 in technical assistance and $1.4 million in capital assistance. In addition, we made one local currency "Cooley" loan to an American company in the fisheries field of about $400,000.

In fiscal year 1968 we expect to furnish about last year's level of bilateral technical assistance and to make new development loans of about $2.5 million.

Our assistance to inland fisheries is more difficult to report accurately because it often is included in broad rural development projects. Our rough estimate is that it totaled $600,000 in fiscal year 1966 and $700,000 in fiscal year 1967.

In addition to this project assistance, imports of fishboat motors, nylon cord, and other fishery-industry supplies-but not oceangoing vessels may be financed under our development program (production) assistance. The importer in this case makes a down payment, and pays the remainder on commercial terms to a local bank. Large quantities of small fishboat motors for river and coastal fishing are imported by Vietnamese under the AID commercial import program, for example.

DEVELOPMENT LOANS COVENANT ASSURES NO MORE THAN 20 PERCENT OF ASSISTED FISH-FACILITIES PRODUCTION BE SHIPPED TO

THE UNITED STATES

In assistance to fisheries, as in any other industry, AID attempts to avoid participation in the development of production in world surplus or likely to be directed in large part at the U.S. market. Our development loans contain a covenant assuring that no more than 20 percent of the production of the assisted facilities will be exported to the United States. Similar safeguards are provided in the local currency "Cooley" loans. All our capital project loan proposals are referred to the U.S. Commerce Department to assure that the production will not seriously damage U.S. trade interests. Furthermore, we consult specialized agencies of the Government in particular fields. For example, we are in continuous touch with the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries of the Department of Interior and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Fisheries and Wildlife on our fisheries assistance plans.