dent as the operating head of the company, depending on the circumstances; it may leave the entire area of career development and training in the hands of the personnel vice president, or it may take that responsibility unto itself until the program is set up as it desires. And, of course, it always is the ultimate authority in terms of personnel and budget, especially the hiring and firing of top management.

If there is any legal question about the Commission's right to delegate, I do heartily agree that it should be clarified, by statute if necessary.

This approach is neither anarchy, the result of six Commissioners running off in all directions, nor an effort to make what was established as a multi-headed agency into something approximating a single-headed one. Rather, it is an attempt to make the most out of the competence and skill of a group of people. It is not an easy thing to do. Nor is it impossible. It has its disadvantages and problems, but it is more in harmony with the Commission form than any other organization structure which has come to my attention.

Thank you for the opportunity to present my views to you this morning.

Mr. FENN. I indicated in that statement that the facts of life at the Tariff Commission are such that we are less likely to face up to what I see as the fundamental management problems of the agency under the proposed system than under the present one. With such matters as the "executive and administrative functions of the Commission," the "appointment and removal of personnel *** the distribution of business among such personnel *** the direction of personnel *** and the overall management, functioning and organization of the Commission *** the allocation, use, and expenditure of funds" transferred from the Commission as a whole to the Chairman, the natural tendency of Commissioners to dismiss such central considerations as the determination of the job of the agency, how it is to carry out that job, and how the Commission is to implement its will is going to be reinforced. We can brush them aside by saying they are the Chairman's chores.

And the Chairman-present company excepted, and I mean that with all sincerity at my command-is going to tend to divert Commissioners who raise such matters with the comment that "This is management, and not your concern.”

These issues should be distinguished from routine housekeeping tasks like regular purchases of supplies and the appointment of lower grade nonprofessional personnel. Most of these functions, especially since the Robinson report, we have already delegated to appropriate staff. Let me clarify my point with an example.

We have been recently discussing the question of whether or not we should undertake some basic studies in international trade. This is for us a significant policy matter. But because a policy is just words unless it is implemented, the question of how we set up the staff to do the studies, what kind of people we recruit, how much money we allocate, is just as important in terms of results as the initial policy decision itself. We have learned that we cannot just make policy and expect things to happen. We have to organize to make the policy come alive.

What we do in this area determines whether in fact we ever produce any studies, how extensive they are, how good they are, how often they

come out.

Making policy and implementing it is a single task. To cut it in two, calling one "general policy," and the other "routine management," assigning one to one office and the other to another, seems unrealistic to me and rather like telling a jet pilot to fly his plane, but prohibiting him from touching the controls.

In the House hearings, there were some discussions about whether or not, given the "general policy" clause of the plan, the Commission could, if it wished, address itself to such questions. Theoretically, the answer is "Yes;" my concern, however, is with the realities and not the theory, and I am convinced that in fact, it would not. Further, the authority transferred to the Chairman goes far beyond minor housekeeping and administrative functions and is broad enough to support him in almost any conceivable situation where he would determine that a matter was in his domain and not that of the Commission.

I also expressed concern with the possible impact upon the objectivity of the Commission's reports and, in cases like dumping, escape clause, adjustment assistance and unfair trade practices, upon its decicions. Again, theoretically, there would be no impact, but the realities of the way people act under differing circumstances are much more subtle than the theory and it is my view that organizations should be set up in accord with those realities.

No single Commissioner now has any special leverage over another. Under the proposed arrangement, the Chairman could withhold or release funds for my travel, for my office furniture, for my participation in a professional conference. This Chairman would not. Others might. He decides whether my pet project for a staff orientation program or an increase in a group of economists will be implemented or to what extent. Does it seem unrealistic to believe that I am going to be especially sensitive to his thinking on some particular pending case?

It is true that the plan excludes my own staff from his control, but in our agency, that consists of one GS-9 girl.

I would like to clarify the matter of the Robinson report and its recommendations. The Commission itself, participating intensively in, the progress of the study, early came to the conclusion that it did not support the so-called strong Chairman idea. Its views in this regard were the same as those of the consultants. The matter was considered in some detail by both the Commission and the consultants on the basis of what we knew of the particular nature of this agency; discussion of this possibility was not foreclosed by the conditions of the contract. And, as a matter of fact, the matter was discussed in some detail. This decision of the Commission in which the consultants concurred and, as a matter of fact, they have reached the same conclusions themselves, was accurately reflected in the minutes which Mr. Kaplowitz submitted to the House subcommittee.

As an alternative to Reorganization Plan No. 2, I would like to see the Commission permitted to function as does the board of directors of a company. The board decides; given the needs and the personnel at any given time, to whom to delegate which responsibilities. It may hold to itself the right to allocate funds and select key people in the research and development area while totally delegating authority in the production end of the business to a vice president; it may designate the chairman of the board, or the president, or executive vice president as the operating head of the company, depending on the circumstances at the time; it may leave the entire area of career development and training in the hands of the personnel vice president, or it may take that responsibility unto itself until the program is set up as it desires. And, of course, it always is the ultimate authority in terms of personnel and budget, especially the hiring and firing of top management.

If there is any legal question about the Commission's right to delegate, and to so origanize itself I do heartily agree that it should be clarified, by statute if necessary.

This approach is neither anarchy, the result of six Commissioners running off in all directions, nor an effort to make what was established as a multiheaded agency into something approximating a singleheaded one. Rather, it is an attempt to make the most out of the competence and skill of a group of people. It is not an easy thing to do. Nor is it impossible. It has its advantages and problems, but it is more in harmony with the Commission form than any other organization structure which has come to my attention.

Thank you for the opportunity to present my views to you this morning.

Senator RIBICOFF. Mr. Culliton.

STATEMENT OF JAMES W. CULLITON, COMMISSIONER, U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION

Mr. CULLITON. Mr. Chairman, Senator Baker. I submitted copies of a prepared statement to the staff of the subcommittee on Monday afternoon. I have no uncontrollable urge to read this into the record. If you would rather put it in the record and let me make a few other remarks, I would be happy to do so.

Senator RIBICOFF. That would be fine, Mr. Commissioner.

The statement of Commissioner Culliton will go into the record as if read in its entirety.

(The statement is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER JAMES W. CULLITON, U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION

The problems of running a multiheaded agency are, indeed, important and difficult and, as this committee knows, they certainly are not new.

Even though I point out that I have had over 25 years' experience practicing and studying administration before becoming a member of a multiheaded agency, I do not wish to appear before you in the role of an expert. The experts have been working on this problem for a long time and haven't come up with a foolproof answer. I believe the evidence is quite clear that there is no, one right answer to the problem; that those who claim a particular system is the right one, or even the best possible one, are misinformed; and that the best way to find a workable answer is to look at the facts.

I'd like to try to highlight a few facts which I think are important: The Tariff Commission is a small agency with fewer than 300 people and a current budget of about $32 million; over 90 percent of its expenditures are personnel related; it does almost no repetitive, large-volume routine work; its staff is 50 percent professional, and another 32 percent supports the professionals; its primary responsibility-starting with the 1930 Tariff Act—and augmented by other trade legislation is to investigate. The Commission is to investigate a wide range of tariff matters to know what is going on; it is to be ready to tell Congress and the President what it knows; it is to conduct specific investigations when requested by the Congress, the President, and upon petition of representatives of industry or labor.

I can testify from my own experience that as a Commissioner I have not been burdened in the least with routine, administrative tasks-so an attempt to relieve me in order to give me time for substantive work is misdirected.

The problem comes from the fact that-especially in the Tariff Commissionthe management of personnel and the assignment of resources CANNOT be separated from the substantive work. Calling such responsibilities routine does not make them routine. In fact, whomsoever makes the personnel and resource allocation decisions runs the Commission and colors, if not actually dominates, its substantive work.

I am emphatically NOT primarily concerned with the most obvious possibility of a single man abusing that power by stacking the answers in particular cases although this could be done, and done very subtly, by the assignment of personnel. More important than this is the question of what the Commission does in its broader areas of responsibility-where, within its legislative charter, it has discretion and where the wisdom of a six-man rather than a one-man Commission has been the desire of Congress.

How to balance the benefits of the experience and judgment of six individuals against the messiness which the resulting difference of opinion produces is the real problem. The proposed plan faces it-or rather dodges it-in a doctrinaire fashion citing the gospel of efficiency and the cult of management.

The proposed plan is not fitted to the Tariff Commission. It is admittedly a copy of others only the names have been changed. What it purports to correct is not a problem; and what it proposes to do is not addressed to the real problem but to theoretical neatness. The Tariff Commission, being small, is among the last agencies to be brought into the fold and it is now time to neaten up the temple.

Frankly, I must admit that I am personally concerned, not so much as a Commissioner, but as someone interested in good government. Proponents of the plan have claimed it is the product of "the best brains"-so I guess that must exclude me from that category. But, I have found my four and one-half years as a Tariff Commissioner the most fascinating of my life in the study of management problems. There really hasn't been anything I hadn't seen before in one form or another. Only the cast of characters, some of the scenery, and exact setting of the story are different-the basic plot is the same.

I had really hoped that the Tariff Commission might make some contribution to the pervasive problem of running multiheaded agencies. We are small enough so even the risk of a little inefficiency isn't too expensive (our total budget is less than the amounts which get statistically rounded out of consideration in other agencies); we are small enough, compact enough, and observable enough to do some experimentation. We could, I think, make a contribution to government far beyond our area of substantive responsibilities.

In fact we were experimenting-and, I think, making progress. Our progress was getting to the heart of the matter-how do six independent persons work together for the common good of the agency and the government? And we were facing this problem in a truly democratic way. The new plan tries to impose a way from the outside (just as if we insisted that the U.S. Constitution be adopted by each emerging nation); our plan was to have the responsible people work out a way. Such a plan is flexible, it is adaptable, it can be experimented with, it can evolve.

One of the objectives of the management theorists seems to be neatness, logic, and systematic handling of every problem. They claim the present system is troublesome, a can of worms, disturbing. Precisely! Who ever said that putting six, competent, successful, independent people to work on any problem wouldn't be troublesome and disturbing? The main objective of organization, as I see it, is results, not sweetness and light. A few weeks ago, a newspaper columnist reported some examples of fractured English. One fits this plan quite well: “It fills a necessary void."

From time to time the argument has been brought forth that this system has worked in some 14 other cases. The evidence cited is that there haven't been any complaints. It is my experience that the absence of complaints does not neces sarily prove anything. Men of goodwill will go to great extremes to keep their problems within the family. There are two good reasons for this. The first is idealistic: We would rather prove that we can work together and resolve our differences as honorable men and women than parade them in public. The second is pragmatic: Official-or even unofficial-appeal to the outside (be it to Congress or to the White House, or even to the public) is really not very effective. And this kind of maneuver, either to score a point or to right a wrong, can get pretty messy and bloody. Things have to be quite wrong before a prudent person will deliberately take that road.

Commissioner Fenn has made an excellent point. The question is not whether a one-man agency would be more efficient-because Congress has decided on a multiman agency. You can't make the problem of a multiheaded agency go away by saying that this is not one, when it is. And, so long as individual commissioners continue to believe that they were chosen by the President and approved by the Senate because they had something to contribute-and act accordingly—

no amount of management theory can make the operation match the theorists' ideals of a smooth-running, efficient, nontroublesome machine.

Along these lines I might observe that the analogy of the Commission-Chairman relationships under the new plan to a corporate board of directors-executive vice president, is sheer nonsense. Almost every corporation law provides that "the Board of Directors shall manage the corporation." One of the most important ways in which the Board fulfills this responsibility is by the Board's selection of the administrative personnel. If such personnel does not do what the board wants or even does what it wants but is not successful-the common cure is to get someone else. This turns out to be a rather powerful sanction and one not available to a Commission.

Finally, it appears to me that the apparently neat, yet fuzzy, distinction in the plan between routine administrative responsibility and the substantive work of the Commission suggests that a Commissioner's main job is to be wise when, and only when, some important substantive decision is about to be made; and that a Commissioner's opportunity to demonstrate his or her wisdom is eroded by worrying about the allocation of funds, the selection and rewarding of personnel, and anything more than a veto power over the appointment of division chiefs. I know from experience that this is a naive view of the Tariff Commissioner's job. If, however, this is what Congress wants of a Tariff Commissioner, I would hope it would repeal that part of the section of the 1930 Tariff Act (Sec. 330) which provides, "No Commissioner shall actively engage in other business, vocation, or employment than that of serving as Commissioner." My experience on the Commission has convinced me that being wise, under the proposed plan, would not constitute a full-time job.

I'd like to conclude with another appropriate quote from the anthology of fractured English: This plan "presents an insurmountable opportunity." I appreciate the opporunity to present my dissenting views.

Mr. CULLITON. The problems of running a multiheaded agency are, indeed, important and difficult and, as this committee knows, they certainly are not new.

Even though I point out that I have had over 25 years' experience practicing and studying administration before becoming a member of a multiheaded agency, I do not wish to appear before you in the role of an expert. The experts have been working on this problem for a long time and haven't come up with a foolproof answer. I believe the evidence it quite clear that there is no one right answer to the problem; that those who claim a particular system is the right one, or even the best possible one, are misinformed; and that the best way to find a workable answer is to look at the facts.

I'd like to try to highlight a few facts which I think are important: The Tariff Commission is a small agency with fewer than 300 people and a current budget of about $31 million; over 90 percent of its expenditures are personnel related; it does almost no repetitive, largevolume routine work; its staff is 50-percent professional, and another 32 percent supports the professionals; its primary responsibilitystarting with the 1930 Tariff Act and augmented by other trade legislation is to investigate. The Commission is to investigate a wide range of tariff matters to know what is going on; it is to be ready to tell Congress and the President what it knows; it is to conduct specific investigations when requested by the Congress, the President, and upon petition of representatives of industry or labor.

I can testify from my own experience that as a Commissioner I have not been burdened in the least with routine, administrative tasks-so an attempt to relieve me in order to give me time for substantive work is misdirected.

The problem comes from the fact that-especially in the Tariff Commission-the management of personnel and the assignment of resources cannot be separated from the substantive work. Calling such