conformity with United States Government policy, which permits the sale of civilian aircraft for civilian use in the Portuguese Territories. Prior to approving the issuance of licenses in such transactions, we satisfy ourselves in each case that aircraft are destined for legitimate civilian use and are not likely to be diverted for military purposes. Some of the purposes for which we have licensed aircraft are telephone line repair, harbor supervision, and ambulance service.

Interested aircraft manufacturers are advised by the Department of Commerce that the export of light aircraft for possible military use would not be approved, but that favorable considerations would likely be given to export license. applications for a reasonable number of executive-type transport aircraft to the South African defense forces if the end use is assured to be for executive transport only. To date, no such applications have been filed. .

The United States maintains two types of controls over the export of herbicides. Those substances which are preferred for defoliant use in military operations are under the licensing control of the Office of Munitions Control of the Department of State. In addition, two substances commonly called 2, 4-d and 2, 4, 5-t are on the validated license list maintained by the Department of Commerce. Applications for licenses to export these substances would be subjected to scrutiny under the terms of the arms embargoes. There has been no export of these substances to Southern Africa for military purposes. There are a wide variety of agricultural herbicides which are not under specific controls. These are substances which are manufactured by a large number of countries, are available from diverse sources, and are in common agricultural use throughout the world. Portugal itself, for instance, manufactures a wide range of herbicides, including 2, 4-d.

Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 6, 1973, pp. 143–147; also Department of State Press Release, No. 104, Apr. 6, 1973, pp. 1-3; and the Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXVIII, No. 1767, May 7, 1973, pp. 581-584. For the full text of Ambassador Stevenson's statement to the United Nations Security Council, referred to above, see Security Council Official Records: 18th year, 1052nd Mtg., Aug. 2, 1963, paras. 59-66. See also the Whiteman Digest of International Law, Vol. 12, pp. 423–425.

On March 14, 1973, the Department of State announced that the embargo imposed on shipments of military equipment to India and Pakistan in December 1971 was lifted. Under the new policy, similar to that in effect from 1967 to 1971, the United States will sell to India and Pakistan nonlethal equipment plus spare parts for previously supplied U.S.-origin equipment.

See the Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXVIII, No. 1763, Apr. 9, 1973, p. 417; also Department of State News Briefing, DPC 46, Mar. 14, 1973.

§ 7

Arms Control and Disarmament

Strategic Offensive Arms

The United States and the Soviet Union, on June 21, 1973, signed an agreement on Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (TIAS 7653; 24 UST 1472; entered into force June 21, 1973). The agreement commits both parties to "continue active negotiations in order to work out a permanent agreement on more complete measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, as well as their subsequent reduction," proceeding from the 1972 Basic Principles of Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union (the Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXVI, No. 1722, June 26, 1972, pp. 898-899; enter into force May 29, 1972), and from the Interim Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (TIAS 7504; 23 UST 3462; entered into force October 3, 1972). The Agreement provides that "Over the course of the next year the two Sides will make serious efforts to work out the provisions of the permanent agreement on more complete measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms with the objective of signing it in 1974."

Both parties are to be guided by the recognition of each other's security interests and by the recognition that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage, directly or indirectly, would be inconsistent with the strengthening of peaceful relations between the two sides.

The Agreement stipulates that the limitations placed on strategic offensive weapons can apply both to their quantitative aspects as well as to their qualitative improvement. Limitations are to be subject to "adequate verification by national technical means." Modernization and replacement would be permitted under conditions to be formulated in the agreements to be concluded. Pending the completion of a permanent agreement on more complete measures, both sides agreed they were prepared to reach agreements on separate measures to supplement the existing Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972. Each side is to continue to take the necessary organizational and technical measures for the prevention of accicental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under its control, in accordance with the 1971 Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War (TIAS 7186; 22 UST 1590; entered into force September 30, 1971).

Comprehensive Test Ban

On February 20, 1973, Senate Resolution 67 was introduced by Senator Edward M. Kennedy and co-sponsored by several Senators. The Resolution recommends that the President (1) propose an immediate suspension of underground nuclear tests to remain in effect so long as the Soviet Union abstains from underground testing, and (2) set forth promptly a new proposal to the Soviet Union and other nations for a permanent treaty to ban all nuclear tests.

Marshall Wright, Acting Assistant Secretary of State of Congressional Relations, submitted coordinated Executive Branch comments on S. Res. 67 in a letter dated April 30, 1973, to J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Mr. Wright noted that "this Administration, like its three predecessors, favors the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban," and said that "we believe that the best way to make progress toward a test ban is through resolution of the verification problem." He said that "A mutual moratorium would lack many of the safeguards of a formal international agreement, and therefore, we do not believe it would be a prudent step at the present time." With respect to verification, Mr. Wright said:

Mindful that serious issues remain regarding verification of a comprehensive test ban treaty, the United States has been making determined efforts to resolve the verification problem. Last summer at the CCD, the United States tabled a working paper which reviewed progress and problems in seismic verification. Research on these problems is continuing. Progress is being made in developing techniques to improve identification of low magnitude seismic events, "anomalous" events, and “mixed" events, in clarifying the possible utility of unmanned seismic observatories, and in improving understanding of methods of clandestine testing that might be used to evade a comprehensive test ban. As a part of the research effort, improved seismic instrumentation and data transmission systems are to be made operational in the near future.

Despite this progress, not all of the difficulties with respect to effective verification of a comprehensive test ban have been resolved. We are continuing to devote substantial resources to achieving resolution of the difficulties that remain.

To Promote Negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., May 1, 1973, p. 2. The full text of the proposed S. Res. 67 is at pp. 1-2. The text of the U.S.

Working Paper, referred to in Mr. Wright's letter is at pp. 27-63, and is in U.N. Doc. CCD/388, Aug. 24, 1972. A further statement to the Subcommittee by Philip J. Farley, Acting Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, is at Hearing, op. cit., pp. 19–22.

A subsequent Working Paper on a program of research related to problems in seismic verification was submitted to the CCD by the United States on July 5, 1973 (CCD/404, July 5, 1973; also printed in CCD/418, Aug. 30, 1973, and U.N. Doc. A/9141, DC/236, Annex B. Sept. 7, 1973).

Geophysical Modification

On July 11, 1973, the Senate passed Resolution 71, expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States Government should seek the agreement of other governments, including the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, to a proposed treaty prohibiting the use of any environmental or geophysical modification activity as a weapon of war, or the carrying out of any research or experimentation directed to that end.

Under the proposed treaty, as recommended by the Senate, the States Parties would undertake to prohibit and prevent, at any place, any environmental or geophysical modification activity as a weapon of war, and not to assist, encourage or induce other States to carry out such activities. The prohibition would not apply to any research, experimentation, or use for peaceful purposes. The term "environmental or geophysical modification activity" would include any of the following:

(1) any weather modification activity which has a purpose, or has as one of its principal effects, a change in the atmospheric conditions over any part of the earth's surface, including, but not limited to, any activity designed to increase or decrease precipitation, increase or suppress, hail, lightning, or fog, and direct or divert storm systems;

(2) any climate modification activity which has a purpose, or has as one of its principal effects, a change in the long-term atmospheric conditions over any part of the earth's surface; (3) any earthquake modification activity which has as a purpose, or has as one of its principal effects, the release of the strain layers beneath the earth's crust;

(4) any ocean modification activity which has as a purpose, or has as one of its principal effects, a change in the ocean currents or the creation of a seismic disturbance of the ocean (tidal wave).

There is also a clause calling for a review conference after five years, as well as provisions for amendment, withdrawal, and the final clauses.

The Senate vote on Resolution 71 was 82 in favor, 10 opposed, and 8 not voting. For the full text of the Resolution, which includes the recommended treaty, see the Congressional Record, Vol. 119, No. 107, July 11, 1973, pp. S13101-S13102.

Military Expenditures

The Department of State Appropriations Authorization Act of 1973, approved October 18, 1973, (P.L. 93-126, 87 Stat. 451), includes in Section 16 a sense-of-the-Congress plea for mutual restraint on military expenditures by the United States and the Soviet Union. Section 16 provides:

It is the sense of the Congress that the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should, on an urgent basis and in their mutual interests, seek agreement on specific mutual reductions in their respective expenditures for military purposes so that both nations can devote a greater proportion of their available resources to the domestic needs of their respective peoples; and, the President of the United States is requested to seek such agreements for the mutual reduction of armament and other military expenditures in the course of all discussions and negotiations in extending guaranties, credits, or other forms of direct or indirect assistance to the Soviet Union.

The United Nations General Assembly, on December 7, 1973, adopted by a vote of 83-2-38 resolution 3093 (XXVIII), proposed by the Soviet Union, calling for a 10 percent reduction in the military budgets of the five permanent members of the Security Council and the use of part of the funds thus saved to increase development assistance. The United States abstained on the vote. In explanation of vote, Ambassador William E. Schaufele, Jr. said, in part:

After careful consideration we have concluded that a resolution that would tie additional development aid to reductions in defense budgets is neither a practical, equitable nor promising way to proceed towards the development goals to which we all subscribe. First, we do not believe that the proposal is a practical one. Its application would require some common standard for measuring the military budgets of the various States concerned. No such standard exists. Countries differ significantly in their concepts of what constitutes a military budget. Those countries whose military budget covers only a part of their defense-associated expenditures would, under this proposal, have the advantage of undertaking a relatively smaller reduction in their military strength. By the same token, their development assistance contribution would be relatively less than if common, objective standards for definition of a military budget existed. Even assuming that we could all agree on such standards, there is no assurance that all the States concerned would be willing to submit their military budgets to the sort of international scrutiny necessary to see that the standards were applied fairly.

Moreover, the Soviet proposal suggests no system for