To conserve the time of the committee, I will not attempt detailed suggestions regarding the several titles of H. R. 7839. We have read with interest and concur in the constructive recommendations presented in excellent testimony by the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations and the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials.

We of the National Housing Conference were encouraged by the overall approach of the report of the President's Advisory Committee on Government Housing Policies and Programs. The President's message on housing submitted to the Congress on January 25 was received with general enthusiasm. It struck an affirmative note in describing our national housing policy. We are, however, disappointed in the legislative recommendations that would carry out the President's policies.

Housing Administrator Albert M. Cole dwelt at some length in his testimony concerning the intensive study of the President's Advisory Committee, and of his own excellent "shirt sleeve" conferences with people representing many points of view, all interested in the housing problem.

In his first "shirt-sleeve" conference held in Washington last summer, the National Housing Conference participated. Our first questions of Mr. Cole was this:

Do you have in mind assembling all data, published and unpublished, on housing needs existing throughout the Government, and putting them in such form as to permit the President's Committee to measure whatever it recommends against the known housing needs of our country?

We repeated that question at subsequent conferences.

It seemed to us then, as it does now, that no program can be prepared to do a total job, no matter how long it may take to do it, until the job itself is defined. We did not suggest that new research be undertaken because we are fully aware that funds for gathering, sifting, and publishing basic data have been steadily curtailed. But we urged that known data be brought into focus so that the best job could be accomplished on the basis of the best information presently available.

When the administration's housing program was announced, no evidence was presented as to how large a housing program it would help to sustain. There was nothing to indicate that it had been created against a blueprint of housing needs. It was like building a house without knowledge of the site on which it was to go, the neighborhood in which it was to be built, and without clearly defined plans. If we, outside of Government, were to comment intelligently on the recommendations of the administration, it was necessary that we do our own digging for facts so that we could judge the proposed program against the known housing needs of the American people. The National Housing Conference undertook that assignment. We obtained the services of Dr. William L. C. Wheaton, a well-known authority in the housing and planning fields and presently professor of city planning at the University of Pennsylvania, to make an analysis of housing needs which we might present to the Congress and to all of those interested in this problem. Needless to say, we had neither the time nor the resources to do original research. What we were able to do was to go to the records of the Bureau of the Census, the Housing

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and Home Finance Agency, and all of its constituents and to other public and private groups, pulling together all of the data that we could assemble. We believe that this study will prove of value to the committee. I have it here for inclusion in the record, if the committee approves.

I might say, Mr. Chairman, the title is "American Housing Needs,

1955 to 1970," and I would like to leave it for inclusion in the record, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it voluminous?

Mr. ROBBINS. It is 16 pages with some tables.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it may be inserted in the record. (The information referred to is as follows:)

A PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF HOUSING NEEDS, 1955-1970

(Prepared by Dr. William L. C. Wheaton, professor of city planning, University of Pennsylvania, for the National Housing Conference, Inc., Washington, D. C., March 11, 1954)

Acknowledgments: The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance provided by the Housing and Home Finance Agency, Office of the Administrator, Federal Housing Administration and Public Housing Administration, the Bureau of the Census, the Twentieth Century Fund, the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the National Association of Real Estate Boards, and the National Association of Home Builders in supplying data for this study. He is especially indebted to several of the directors of research of these organizations for critical comments and suggestions. The conclusions are, of course, those of the author.

EARLIER ESTIMATES OF HOUSING NEED

Estimates of housing need have been prepared by a large number of organizations and individuals in recent years. During the debates which preceded the adoption of the Housing Act of 1949, leaders of the home building industry or their spokesmen generally adopted the view that the sustained construction of more than 900,000 units a year was impossible or in any event undesirable. A number of estimates in the range of 600,000 to 900,000 units per year were proposed to congressional committees considering housing policy. The subsequent achievements of the industry in producing nearly twice the volume suggested by these leaders is evidence of the inadequacy of their estimates.

On

In 1944 the National Housing Agency estimated postwar housing needs at 1,200,000 units per year. This estimate, called fantastic by some business leaders at the time, has proven to be much closer to subsequently attained levels. the other hand, even this estimate appears to have understated the potentials of the economy, for it assumed that a very large share of the estimated needs could be met only by the replacement of existing housing. Later and higher estimates by the Housing and Home Finance Agency are based upon similar assumptions.3 Perhaps the dominant characteristic of these estimates is their pessimism concerning the ecomonic future of the country. This was most succinctly stated by one distinguished housing expert in a report prepared for an industry group which suggested that production levels of more than 900,000 units a year would be undesirable because they could not be sustained for more than a short period of time. This expert predicted that the construction of 1.5 million homes would produce "immense and immediate" instability. These dire consequences have not appeared in the boom building years 1950-53.*

1 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Redevelopment of the Special Committee on Postwar Economic Policy and Planning, pp. 1658-1675 ff., p. 1841, p. 1986, p. 2078, p. 2171 ff., p. 2210, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946.

National Housing Agency, Housing Needs, National Housing Bulletin No. 1, Washington,

1944.

3 Housing and Home Finance Agency, How Big Is the Housing Job?, Washington, 1951. Miles L. Colean, Future Housing Demand, the Producers Council, Washington, 1948.

If the estimates of business leaders and official agencies have underestimated our capacity to produce and consume housing, other estimates of higher requirements have failed to be realized. Thus the National Housing Conference and the American Federation of Labor estimates of the same period, calling for the construction of 1,800,000 units or more per year assumed very high levels of replacement of existing units, and substantial programs of slum clearance and public housing. Although the Congress authorized such programs, these authorizations were subsequently reduced and have never been carried forward at the levels intended. It is now evident that all of these estimates have underestimated the market demand for new housing under conditions of full employment and high output, and have overestimated the willingness or capacity of the country to replace substandard housing through slum clearance and public housing programs.

ASSUMPTIONS OF THIS STUDY

The major weaknesses of many earlier studies derive from the assumptions, stated and unstated, which underlay them. They have assumed a stable or declining national output while the postwar economy has been characterized by steadily rising employment and productivity. They were based upon population forecasts which have proven to be consistently below subsequent population growth. Estimates of family formation, too, have been substantially below ultimate levels. In their analysis of the housing market itself many of these studies have apparently underestimated the willingness of families to purchase homes, the influence of liberalized federally aided credit upon the market, and the vast extent of suburban building.

The assumptions upon which this study is based are as follows:

1. Continued expansion of our economy at a steady rate, full employment, and continuing increases in productivity.

2. Expenditures for national defense no greater than those of 1953-54. 3. Continued high increases in population and family formation in keeping with a prosperous economy.

4. An active desire on the part of the American people for higher standards of living, including higher housing standards, but not at the expense of other essential expenditures.

5. Extension and expansion of Federal and local aids to housing to assist in achieving these goals.

These assumptions will be adhered to in the estimates of this study. It is further assumed that housing will be utilized to the fullest extent possible to stabilize economic trends and to assure continued economic expansion, in short that hous ing production wil be maintained or increased in the event of marked downturns in economic activity.

FACTORS AFFECTING HOUSING REQUIREMENTS

Future housing requirements are a function of population growth, family formation, migration, losses of housing units, obsolescence and deterioration, undoubling of families, and vacancy and occupancy rates. These factors are influenced to a considerable extent by changing housing standards, changing market preferences, by general economic conditions, and by market demands in the light of available credit. The most important of the above-named factors are discussed in the following sections and are summarized in table 1.

Family formation

Estimates of family formation have been developed from marriage rates, less allowances for divorce, death, and other dissolutions. When so developed the estimates considerably understate housing requirements. While most, but not all marriages result in additional requirements for separate housing accommodations, few dissolutions of families result in reduced housing requirements. The

Estimates by 14 organizations and persons are summarized in U. S. Congress, 80th Cong., 1st sess., hearings of the Joint Committee on Housing, September 10-19, 1947, pp. 49-55.

For other estimates of. J. Frederick Dewhirst & Associates, America's Needs and Resources, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1947; Charles Abrams, The Future of Housing, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1945; and XII, Law and Contemporary Problems 1,

1947.

widow, widower, or divorced person with children will usually give up separate housing accommodations only under strong economic compulsion. An increasing number of aged persons appear to prefer to maintain separate accommodations after the death of the spouse, and this is particularly true where the accommodation is suited to the need of aged persons. Old-age and survivors insurance, private pension plans, aid for dependent children, and veterans benefits for widows and orphans, are steadily raising the ability of these classes of families to maintain separate households.

Current estimates of future family formation range from as low as 275,000 per year for the remaining years of this decade to the 2 million per year estimate of the National Association of Homes Builders for the later years of the next decade. The marriage rate has fluctuated from under 1 million to over 2.2 million in the last 20 years. The range of net new social family formation shown is from 6 million to 10 million per decade. This does not include single-person families which are discussed below in connection with undoubling. If these were to be included in the estimate, the high estimate should be increased. Migration

The migration of people from one area to another may result in increased housing requirements where in-migration is not balanced by out-migration. Those moving into the country from other countries, and those moving from areas of stable or declining population to areas of rapidly growing population create such needs. From 25 to 30 million persons move annually, and about a third of these, 8 to 10 millions, move across county lines. There is a steady movement of persons into the country, and of the rural or farm population to urban areas. Of the 10 million persons who moved across county lines in 1950, 9 million were members of families who presumably created demands for about 3 million dwellings. Since a considerable part of this movement is to urban communities in the South and West where it results in net in-migration, it must be presumed that at least between 10 and 25 percent of this movement creates new housing requirements.

TABLE 1.-Factors affecting nonfarm housing requirements per decade1

1 See text for basis. Low may be low estimate or early in the 1955-65 period. or late in 1955–60 period.

High may be high estimate

United States Census Series P-20, No. 42, 1952, high. The census low of 2.75 could arise only under conditions of disastrous economic depression.

Cf. U. S. Census Series P-20, No. 42, 1952; NAHB Correlator, February 1954, pp. 4, 5. The National Association of Real Estate Boards estimates these at 700,000 per year currently Cf. address of Charles B. Shattuck, president, 46th annual convention, November 10, 1953.

Cf. E. E. Ashley, Mobility and Migration as Factors in Housing Demand, Housing Research, October 1953. U. S. Census Series P-20, No. 39, 1952.

Replacement of current losses

The National Housing Agency and the Housing and Home Finance Agency estimate that 40,000 homes are lost each year as a result of fire, windstorm and other types of demolition. To these annual losses there is usually added 300,000 temporary war and veterans units required to be removed during the current decade if only by their physical deterioration. Thus it is customary to estimate 70,000 units per year as current losses requiring replacement.

These estimates require radical revision if only in the light of current urban highway construction. A modern urban superhighway built through developed areas will require clearance of from 250 to as high as 1,000 homes per lineal mile. If each metropolitan area built only 1 mile of such highway each year, and if the demolition requirements in the 5 largest cities were at the upper limit and all others at the lower limit suggested above, the total would be in excess of 40,000 homes per year. In some of our largest cities, demolitions resulting from highway construction have greatly exceeded demolitions from all other causes throughout the postwar period. With urgent highway needs measured in tens of thousands of miles, and current Federal aid programs including approximately 30,000 miles, it is clear that losses from this source alone will be exceedingly high for the next two decades. For current purposes it is assumed that losses from all causes will be 1,100,000 per decade in the 1950's and 1,600,000 during the 1960's equivalent to previous estimates of loss plus 1 mile per metropolitan area in the former period and 2 miles per area in the latter.

Other losses not accounted for here include abandonments and conversions to nonresidential use. One expert estimates that the latter alone exceed all extra units gained by conversion. One group of Government officials concerned with housing statistics has reached the tentative conclusion that 200,000 units are lost each year through demolition, abandonment, and conversion, and that 100,000 are gained each year through conversion, for a net loss of 100,000 units. This estimate accords with the estimate above arrived at on other grounds.

Obsolescence and deterioration

More than 6 million of our present housing units were built before the beginning of this century, and will be 60 or more years old by the end of this decade. Many of these are now dilapidated and should be replaced immediately, but many of them are merely old, obsolete, and now deteriorating and at a rate reflecting their age. Some 1,400,000 of these units, now standard but becoming 75 years of age or older by 1960, should be replaced during the next decade.

With our present housing stock of over 50 million homes, it will be necessary to replace 500,000 units per year in order to replace homes at 100 years of age. Many hundreds of thousands of fine old homes will doubtless continue to be well maintained, and will retain historical, architectural and other qualities worth preserving. But the speculative homes of the Gothic period, and millions of drab shacks built since 1900 lack these fine qualities. Their useful life as structures, and the useful life of the neighborhoods they comprise, will be long past at 60 years. Applying this standard would necessitate the replacement of 2.8 million homes during the 1960's and 4.8 millions in the succeeding decade." Substandard housing in 1950

Housing standards are not fixed and invariable. A wide range of judgment is involved in determinations of substandardness. What is standard for a primitive economy (mud huts) will be substandard for a more advanced economy. Standards are therefore in part determined by resources. In a society of abundant resources and high output, standards should rise steadily. There is no apparent reason why all American families should not have good homes within the next generation. This was particularly apparent during the 1930's when idle labor and unused materials led to the adoption of Federal aids to housing. The Congress has subsequently adopted a national goal of “a decent home in a suitable living environment for every American family."

Table 2 reveals the most serious inadequacies of our housing supply in 1950. For many years official agencies have used the standards of structural soundness and lack of plumbing facilities as measures of substandardness. Opinion has varied as to whether farm or country homes which lacked running water

10 The NAREB estimate of demolition requirements is 300,000 to 400,000 per year. Cf. Shattuck, op. cit.