Where, by amendment in the senate, an article, which was placed on the free list in the bill passed by the house, was also placed in the dutiable list, and remained in both places as the act was finally passed, held, that the case was one of patent ambiguity arising on the face of the act, which ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the importer, and the goods admitted free. U. S. v. Merck (C. C. N. Y. 1899) 91 F. 639, affirmed (1899) 97 F. 989.

Statutes levying duties are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used. Adams v. Bancroft (C. C. Mass. 1838) Fed. Cas. No. 44; U. S. v. Wigglesworth (C. C. Mass. 1842) Fed. Cas. No. 16,690. But an importer is entitled to the benefit of the rule that revenue laws imposing taxes and like burdens should receive a reasonably strict construction. U. S. v. Matagrin (1911) 1 Ct. Cust. App. 309.

30. Intent of importer.-Intent is not an element in determining the proper classification of imported articles, and merchants are at liberty so to manufacture and so to import their goods as to subject them to the least possible duties under the tariff laws. Johnson v. U. S. (C. C. N. Y. 1901) 123 F. 997; Stone & Downer Co. v. U. S. (C. C. Mass. 1906) 147 F. 603.

The law has not resented bona fide efforts of manufacturers to so fashion their goods that they will be assessed a lower, rather than a higher, rate of duty. Tower & Sons v. U. S. (1921) 11 Ct. Cust. App.

157.

In the classification of imported articles it is immaterial that they were put in an unfinished condition to escape a higher rate of duty. Hunter v. U. S. (C. C. N. Y. 1906) 143 F. 914.

An importer has the right to fashion his merchandise so that it shall be assessed with duty at the lowest rate. Lang v. U. S. (1920) 10 Ct. Cust. App. 228. It is well settled that, in the absence of deception, disguise, or artifice resorted to for the purpose of perpetrating a fraud upon the revenue, imported merchandise must be classified with reference to its condition when imported. Indeed this rule applies in cases where merchandise has been manufactured or prepared for the express purpose of being imported at a lower rate of duty. If the collector may review the entries of one importer for many months covering standardized engine parts in order to determine for clas

sification purposes how many complete engines were imported, it is difficult to see how this rule is not violated. U. S. v. Hannevig (1920) 10 Ct. Cust. App. 124.

31. Use of article.-The use of an article does not necessarily control its classification for tariff purposes. U. S. v. Nichols (C. C. Mass. 1891) 46 F. 359. Contra, Hagedon v. Seeberger (C. C. Ill. 1889) 38 F. 401, writ of error dismissed (1893) 13 S. Ct. 1047, 149 U. S. 775, 37 L. Ed. 962.

Where a tariff enumeration is descriptive of the use of imported merchandise, the chief or predominant use of an article should control in determining whether or not it comes within that enumeration. U. S. v. Lehn (C. C. N. Y. 1901) 124

F. 87.

The chief or predominant use to which an article is applied determines its classification, although it may be commonly, generally, and practically, and not merely exceptionally, used for other purposes. The chief or predominant use meant is that which, in ordinary language, is so called. Meyer v. Cadwalader (Pa. 1898) 89 F. 963, 32 C. C. A. 456, certiorari granted Cadwalder v. Meyer (1899) 19 S. Ct. 883, 172 U. S. 648 and certiorari dismissed (1901) 22 S. Ct. 932, 46 L. Ed. 1263. The name of an imported article is not the sole guide by which to classify it for duty. Its uses, especially when it is new, and a substitute for other articles, should be 'considered. Koch v. Seeberger (C. C. Ill. 1887) 30 F. 424. It is the duty of the jury to give more attention to the course of trade in the original distribution of the goods among those who import them than to the guesses of individuals as to the various uses to which the articles may be put by individual consumers. Meyer v. Cadwalader (C. C. Pa. 1891) 49 F. 26. The test of the "suitableness" of an article for a certain purpose is not whether it is commonly used therefor, but whether it possesses actual, practical, commercial fitness for that purpose. White v. U. S. (C. C. N. Y. 1895) 69 F. 93. The test of predominant use is only resorted to where necessary to properly classify an article falling within two or more classifications, either of which, standing alone, would adequately describe it, and where the article is Smith enumerated by reference to its use. v. U. S. (N. Y. 1899) 93 F. 194, 35 C. C. A. 265.

A law imposing a duty on articles used for a particular purpose should not be

construed to cover articles not so used at the date of the act, unless expressly so provided. Rossman v. Hedden (N. Y. 1892) 145 U. S. 561, 12 S. Ct. 925, 36 L. Ed. 817, affirming (C. C. 1888) 37 F. 99; Martin v. Curtis (C. C. N. Y. 1842) Fed. Cas. No. 9,160, affirmed (1845) 44 U. S. (3 How.) 106, 11 L. Ed. 516.

that Congress so intended. Roger & Gallet v. U. S. (1916) 7 Ct. Cust. App. 89.

A designation according to a specific use prevails over a competing description, of a general character, without special limitation as to use or other qualification. Drakenfeld & Co. v. U. S. (1919) 9 Ct. Cust. App. 124.

Where Congress has provided for an article eo nomine in one paragraph of a tariff act, and in another paragraph of the same act employs language comprehensive of the other designation, and rates it for duty according to use or when used for a certain purpose, there is manifested a strong evidence of an intention upon the part of Congress to make that use controlling and to make the designation by use operate as an exception to the eo nomine designation. U. S. v. Snow's U. S Sample Express Co. (1918) 8 Ct. Cust. App. 351.

To bring a manufacturing material within a particular designation in a tariff law that covers one of the ultimate uses of that material, it should be found to be so far advanced by the processes applied to it in fitting it for that ultimate use that either on an examination per se its ultimate use is clear or it is found so far advanced that its utility for another possible use has been destroyed. Athenia Steel & Wire Co. v. U. S. (1911) 1 Ct. Cust. App. 494.

An article imported may not be confined in use exclusively to the purpose for which it is imported, and, if sold to persons who use it for other purposes, its classification is not thereby changed and the rate of duty should be assessed for its general and commonly known use. Vandiver v. U. S. (1911) 1 Ct. Cust. App. 194.

32.- Protective policy as controlling construction.-In construing tariff acts based on the fundamental idea of protection to domestic manufactures, and in which the duties are uniformly increased to correspond with the advanced state of manufacture of the article, where a material used in making manufactured articles has been subjected to further treatment than that of a class specifically enumerated, it should be classified with a higher rather than a lower, class. U. S. v. Eschwege (N. Y. 1899) 98 F. 600, 39 C. C. A. 169. In such case, it is proper to take into consideration, in construing the law, the fact that certain grades of an imported commodity are the only ones that come into competition with domestic products. Heide v. U. S. (C. C. N. Y. 1909) 175 F. 316.

In construing the tariff act of 1890, the court would, in a proper case, as an aid to interpretation, consider the fact that the general idea of the statute was that of protection to American manufactures, and an article which has been subjected to an additional process of manufacture was therefore subject to a

higher, rather than an equal or lower, rate of duty. Arnold v. U. S. (N. Y. 1893) 147 U. S. 494, 13 S. Ct. 406, 37 L. Ed. 253; affirming, In re Arnold (C. C. 1891) 46 F. 510. The general purpose of such act to protect and foster American industries, could not, however, override a plain provision contained therein, which, in a particular instance, failed to carry out such purpose, or operated in contravention of it. In re Schallenberger (C. C. Cal. 1895) 72 F. 491.

The schedules of the tariff acts of 1890 and 1897 were based on the principle of protection to American industry, and in the construction of their provisions no inference could be drawn against a particular construction, because it would result in imposing double or treble duties on an article by adding duties for each stage it was advanced in manufacture. Burditt & Williams Co. v. U. S. (Mass. 1907) 153 F. 67, 82 C. C. A. 201, reversing (C. C. 1906) 147 F. 892.

A construction of the tariff law which produces unjust and unconscionable duIt ties should be avoided, if possible. is to be assumed that Congress did not Its intend to make duties prohibitive. purpose in enacting the tariff act of 1897 was to protect and not to prohibit, to raise, and not cut off revenue, to promote and not to destroy, legitimate competition, and such construction would be adopted as would give effect to that purpose. Shallus v. U. S. (Md. 1908) 162 F. 653, 89 C. C. A. 445, reversing (C. C. 1907) 155 F. 213.

33.

Date as of which classification determined.-Goods are classified with reference to their condition at the time of importation. Heyliger & Raubitschek v. U. S. (1921) 11 Ct. Cust. App. 90.

Although the rate of duty applicable to imported goods at the time they come into customs may or may not be the rate lawfully assessed against them (United States v. Cronkhite Co. (1919) 9 Ct. Cust. App. 129; T. D. 37980), their classification for duty is determined by their condition at that time. Minneapolis Cold Storage Co. v. U. S. (1919) 9 Ct. Cust. App. 225.

34. Manufactured articles.-An article which has been advanced through one or more processes into a completed commercial article, known and recognized in trade by a specific and distinctive name other than the name of the material from which it is made, and is put into a completed shape, designed and adapted for a particular use to which the material in its original form is not adapted, is to be deemed a manufacture, although its component materials are unchanged. U. S. v. Meier (N. Y. 1905) 136 F. 764, 69 C. C. A. 421, affirming Geo. Meier & Co. v. U. S. (C. C. 1904) 128 F. 472; Erhardt v. Hahn (1893) 55 F. 273, 275, 5 C. C. A. 99. See, also, Shallus v. U. S. (Md. 1908) 162 F. 653,

89 C. C. A. 445, reversing (C. C. 1907) 155 F. 213.

Ordinarily a manufactured article takes a different form, or at least subserves a purpose different from that of the original materials out of which it is made and usually takes a different name. That does not mean, however, that its usefulness as a material has necessarily ended and that as a manufacture it cannot serve the purpose of material for some other manufacture. U. S. v. Richter (1911) 2 Ct. Cust. App. 167.

The mere fact of the application of labor to an article, either by hand or by mechanism, does not make it necessarily a "manufactured article," within the meaning of the tariff laws, unless the labor has been carried to such an extent that the article suffers a species of transformation, and is changed into a new and different article, having a distinctive name, character, or use. Baumgarten v. Magone (C. C. N. Y. 1890) 50 F. 69 (following U. S. v. Semmer [C. C. N. Y. 1890] 41 F. 324); In re Herter Bros. (C. C. N. Y. 1891) 50 F. 72 (reversed on another ground [1892] 53 F. 913, 4 C. C. A. 107).

Cleaning and drying, and splitting for the purpose of cleaning or drying, are not processes of manufacture, and do not into ordinarily carry merchandise the category of "prepared," as that term is used in tariff nomenclature generally and in paragraph 34, tariff act of 1913, particularly. U. S. v. Brown & Co. (1920) 10 Ct. Cust. App. 47.

As a general rule, the mere cleansing of an article is not regarded as a partial manufacture of it into a new or different article. Smilie & Co. v. U. S. (1921) 11 Ct. Cust. App. 199.

The tariff act distinguishes between a mere advancement and a manufacture. An importation cannot be assumed to be a manufacture merely because, shown to be advanced. Ishimitsu v. U. S. (1921) 11 Ct. Cust. App. 186.

A finished part is such a part as will perform its proper function when in place. Lubrication of working surfaces of a machine or any part of it cannot be regarded as a manufacturing process; nor can correction of defects or irregularities; nor can painting, where designed wholly to preserve from rust and to impart an attractive appearance. Carr v. U. S. (1921) 11 Ct. Cust. App. 1.

A resultant of a number of processes applied to an ore, differing greatly from the ore, is not to be classified as the ore. Tower & Sons v. U. S. (1921) 11 Ct. Cust. App. 155.

A by-product, obtained by a process of distillation, not undertaken with the intention thereby to obtain such product, is not necessarily "waste," but may be dutiable as a manufactured article. Stearine: (now apparently provided for in par. 701). Standard Varnish Works v. U. S. (N. Y. 1894) 59 F. 456, 8 C. C. A. 178.

If the plain and necessary construction of a tariff paragraph should lead to the incongruous result of taxing the material for a manufacture at a higher rate than the manufacture itself, the remedy is legislative and not judicial. Ringk & Co. v. U. S. (1920) 10 Ct. Cust. App. 107. 35.

Crude article.-An article may be crude for the purposes of classification under the tariff laws, by reason of the use to which it is applied, where it is crude in the sense that it is unrefined. Roessler & Hasslacher Chemical Co. v. U. S. (C. C. N. Y. 1899) 94 F. 822, affirmed U. S. v. Roessler & Hasslacher Chemical Co. (1900) 99 F. 552.

"Crude" refers commonly to substances or articles in a condition unfit for the ultimate purpose or use for which they are intended. Newhall & Co. v. U. s. (1913) 4 Ct. Cust. App. 134.

36. "Fit" or "suitable" for designated use. The term "fit only" implies that the article to which it applies has no practical commercial fitness for uses other than those designated. Stone & Downer Co. v. U. S. (1913) 4 Ct. Cust. App. 47.

The phrase "fit only for such use" means fit in a commercial sense; but whether an article must be held fit for a certain use, if when blended with other articles it becomes so fit, is a question now reserved. Stone & Downer Co. v. U. S. (1911) 1 Ct. Cust. App. 513.

A thing to be "suitable" as that term is commonly understood must be fit and appropriate for the end to which it is to be devoted. In the Tariff Law the term "suitable" means actually, practically and commercially fit. U. S. v. Amerman & Patterson (1919) 9 Ct. Cust. App. 244. 37. "Colored."-The word "colored" is a participial adjective used generally with the meaning of "having a color." The color's origin does not enter into the essential meaning of the word. Davison v. U. S. (1911) 2 Ct. Cust. App. 78.

38. "Composed of."-A tariff provision for a manufactured article "composed of" a certain material applies, in the absence of other controlling rules of construction, to the appropriate article if composed in chief value of the given material. Hensel, Bruckmann & Lorbacher v. U. S. (1915) 6 Ct. Cust. App. 162. While great confusion exists subject among the authorities, nevertheless the rule appears to be fairly settled that in general the phrase "composed of" a given material bears the same meaning as "composed in chief value" of that material. U. S. v. Ascher & Co. (1923) 11 Ct. Cust. App. 453.

on

the

It is the general rule that a tariff classification by material refers to the component material of chief value. U. S. v. Buss & Co. (1917) 8 Ct. Cust. App. 5.

39. "Derived from."-The term "derived from," used in a tariff act to de

scribe a product, has its ordinary meaning of "produced from," and relates to the physical substance from which such product is obtained, and not to its chemical relationship. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld & Co. v. U. S. (N. Y. 1900) 102 F. 603, 42 C. C. A. 525, affirming (C. C. 1900) 99 F. 553, 554, 719.

40. "not otherwise provided for" or "not specially provided for."-In enacting tariff laws it has evidently been the intention of Congress that the enumeration of dutiable articles should be as nearly exhaustive as possible; and imported articles should therefore not be classified under clauses for articles "not otherwise provided for," if by fair construction they can be embraced within a specific enumeration of dutiable articles. O. G. Hempstead & Son v. U. S. (Pa. 1907) 158 F. 586, 86 C. C. A. 42.

The expression "not otherwise provided for," or "not specially provided for," in a tariff provision, does not deprive the general rule as to classification by specific designation of its ordinary application, so that a provision which specifically designates goods, but which is so qualified, shall not prevail over words of a general description in another provision containing no such qualification. U. S. v. Schwarz (C. C. Pa. 1905) 140 F. 302, affirmed Thomas v. Same (1906) 140 F. 989, 71 C. C. A. 401.

as

The presence of the n. s. p. f. clause in each of two competing paragraphs leaves their relative applicability the same if these words had not been employed. U. S. v. McKesson & Robbins (1916) 7 Ct. Cust. App. 13.

The presence of n. s. p. f. in a paragraph advises customs authorities that merchandise otherwise within it may be classified under some other paragraph, and if the other paragraph contains an eo nomine provision, and the paragraph in which n. s. p. f. is found is general, and not eo nomine, the former controls. An eo nomine provision is not necessarily shorn of its controlling force because coupled with n. s. p. f. Where one of two competing paragraphs contains n. s. p. f., and the other does not, the description in each being in other respects equally specific, the presence in the one and the absence from the other of such provision determines the classification of merchandise equally within either paragraph. Bischoff & Co. v. U. S. (1916) 7 Ct. Cust. App. 138.

Where two provisions of the tariff act apply to an imported article, the first of which provisions is qualified by the phrase, "not otherwise provided for," while the second contains no such qualifying phrase, the article is properly dutiable under the second provision, and must be held to be therein "otherwise provided for," so as to take it out of the operation of the first provision. Zucker

& Levett Chemical Co. v. Magone (C. C. N. Y. 1889) 37 F. 776.

The effect of the term "not specially provided for," although serving to direct attention to the fact that other paragraphs may cover the merchandise the provision for which is modified by this term, is not such as to lessen the specificity of the language it modifies. U. S. v. Meyer & Lange (1917) 8 Ct. Cust. App. 27.

The cases in which an interpretation of two conflicting paragraphs of a tariff act may be controlled by the not otherwise provided for clause are restricted to those in which the two paragraphs apply with equal specificity to the article in question. Calhoun, Robbins & Co. v. U. S. (1918) 8 Ct. Cust. App. 360.

The presence of the "not specially provided for" clause in one provision and its absence from another affects classification only when the merchandise is equally within both. U. S. v. European Watch & Clock Co. (1922) 11 Ct. Cust. App. 363; Drakenfeld & Co. v. U. S. (1919) 9 Ct. Cust. App. 124.

The limitation "not specially provided for" affects a tariff designation only when such designation is brought into competition with another one of equal specificity. Altman & Co. v. U. S. (1921) 11 Ct. Cust. App. 102, affirmed on rehearing (1921) 11 Ct. Cust. App. 174.

41.- "Such."-The word "such" ordinarily refers to the next immediate antecedent, but not necessarily; never when the purpose of the section in which it is used would thereby be impaired. (1897) 21 Op. Atty. Gen. 551.

42.- Change of article.-A change which renders an article substantially different as an article of commerce, and adapts it to all the uses of another article, on which a higher rate of duty is levied, destroys its legal identity, and is a material change, under the revenue law. Wilkinson v. Greely (C. C. Mass. 1853) Fed. Cas. No. 17,672.

Merchandise which may at one time have had a braid or plait, but which at the time of importation, is not, can not be so classified, since the condition of the merchandise at the time of importation determines its classification. Ringk & Co. v. U. S. (1920) 10 Ct. Cust. App. 107.

43. Titles prefixed to schedules.The titles of the various schedules in tariff acts are not intended to be perfectly accurate, but furnish general information only of the articles enumerated in the paragraphs therein. Hollender v. Magone (N. Y. 1893) 13 S. Ct. 932, 933, 149 U. S. 586, 37 L. Ed. 860, reversing (C. C. 1889) 38 F. 912; U. S. v. Brown & Eadie (N. Y. 1905) 136 F. 550, 69 C. C. A. 260; (1894) 21 Op. Atty. Gen. 66. But it is well settled that the tariff entitlement of

the schedule may be considered as throwing light upon the subject-matter of the schedule. Veith v. U. S. (1920) 10 Ct. Cust. App. 201.

44. Segregation or separation of articles into parts. In applying a tariff law, a single article may be constructively separated into parts subject to different classifications. Hillhouse v. U. S. (N. Y. 1907) 152 F. 163, 81 C. C. A. 415, reversing (C. C. N. Y. 1906) 142 F. 303, certiorari denied U. S. v. Hillhouse (1908) 28 S. Ct. 568, 208 U. S. 615, 52 L. Ed. 646.

The fact that articles in separate parts are invoiced as entireties is not controlling, and will not prevent a separate classification, when such classification is otherwise proper. In re Crowley (N. Y. 1893) 55 F. 288, 5 C. C. A. 109, affirming In re Crowly (C. C. 1892) 50 F. 465.

Goods claimed and invoiced as entireties may, for dutiable purposes, be segregated, and the different parts rated for duty under separate provisions of the law applicable to such parts. U. S. v. Borgfeldt & Co. (1916) 7 Ct. Cust. App. 367.

Where an importation consists of two disitnct and segregable tariff entities, which, however, are attached to one another or commingled together, they should nevertheless be separately treated in the assessment; each accordingly bearing the rate of duty applicable to it, or admitted free of duty if entitled thereto. U. S. v. Myers & Co. (1922) 11 Ct. Cust. App. 409.

Dutiable goods imported mixed with other goods subject to another rate of duty or none at all, if practicably separable or if determinable in quantity may, on a levy of duties, be segregated for that purpose. U. S. v. Waterhouse (1911) 1 Ct. Cust. App. 353. See, also, U. S. v. Ranlett (1898) 19 S. Ct. 114, 172 U. S. 133, 43 L. Ed. 393.

Statuettes of the Buddha and sticks of incense were imported together. The statuettes may be used to burn the incense sticks or incense in other forms or may be used simply as ornaments, while the incense sticks may be used without the statuettes. The two classes of merchandise are not entireties because imported together and adapted to be used together. Dow Co. v. U. S. (1922) 11 Ct. Cust. App. 249.

Application of Act Jan. 29, 1795, § 2, providing that parts of article imported separately should be subject to duty at the same rate, see U. S. v. Schoverling (N. Y. 1892) 13 S. Ct. 24, 26, 146 U. S. 76, 36 L. Ed. 893.

as under all the circumstances of the case it deemed safe and proper. U. S. v. Merck & Co. (1917) 8 Ct. Cust. App. 171.

The court may take judicial notice of advancement in methods of agricultural pursuits. It judicially knows that slowtraveling, heavy-duty tractors are everywhere to a great degree supplanting the horse as motive power on the farm, and that these machines are so constructed that they travel too slowly and are too heavy for hauling on the modern roadway, their construction fitting them only for slow travel and field work on a more yielding surface. Richardson Co. v. U. S. (1917) 8 Ct. Cust. App. 179.

The court may, in the absence of testimony, know that yarn is spun and that a piece of cloth is composed of warp and filling threads, and that there is a process of manufacture of pile fabrics and that Wilton velvet carpets are made by this process. The court judicially knows that Wilton velvet carpets are machine made. U. S. v. Carson, Pirie, Scott & Co. (1918) 8 Ct. Cust. App. 240.

The court judicially knows that common black iron hairpins, plain bone, celluloid, or gallilith women's side and back combs, and vinaigrette bottles with metal trimmings, memorandum pads with metal backs, ordinary cigarette cases, match boxes, and similar articles designed to be carried in the pocket or hand bag for utilitarian purposes only and not for wear or as part of the attire are in no sense articles of personal adornment. Bloomingdale Bros. v. U. S. (1918) 8 Ct. Cust. App. 314.

The court takes judicial notice that certain exhibits made of straw are dyed. Johnson & Co. v. U. S. (1920) 10 Ct. Cust. App. 54.

Commercial designation is a matter of fact, not within the judicial knowledge. The interpretation of words of common speech, however, seems to be a matter of law and within the judicial knowledge. American Bead Co. v. U. S. (1916) 7 Ct. Cust. App. 18.

46.

burden Presumptions and of proof. The presumption that, if a special meaning is attached to certain words in a prior tariff act, Congress intended that they should have the same signification when used in a subsequent act in relation to the same subject-matter, is not conclusive. Maddock v. Magone (N. Y. 1894) 14 S. Ct. 588, 589, 152 U. S. 368, 38 L. Ed. 482.

It is to be presumed that every provision of a customs act classifying merchandise has relation to some existing course of business. Loggie v. U. S. (Me. 1905) 137 F. 813, 70 C. C. A. 433.

All doubts arising under paragraph 297 of the tariff act of 1894 (28 Stat. 66) were presumptively to be resolved in favor of the lower rate of duty, save where the act mentioned or described the same