(2) A system to provide him with complete, accurate, and understandable information on which to base decisions; and

(3) An independent audit of programs and of efficiency of performance, by physical inspections where necessary.

With the aid of such tools and with the support of the President and the Congress, the Secretary can carry out the recommendations below.

The purposes of these recommendations are, in summary, as follows: (1) To clarify the authority of the Secretary of Defense; (2) To clarify the command channels within the Department, especially to strengthen the status of the Secretaries of the military departments;

(3) To increase the ability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to serve as the top military planning and advisory group by—

(a) Clarifying the role of their Chairman;

(6) Enabling their other members better to discharge their obligation to the Department as a whole;

(c) Improving the subordinate staff structure;

(d) Clarifying executive responsibility for unified commands. (4) To abolish those statutory boards in the Office of the Secretary of Defense which have proved too unwieldy and rigid for their task, and to give the Secretary of Defense instead an adequate number of Assistant Secretaries to perform his essential staff functions;

(5) To enable the Secretary of Defense to safeguard the promotional prospects of officers who serve in his Office.

1. AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The direction, authority, and control of the Secretary over all agencies of the Department, including the three military departments, which should continue to be separately organized for effective administration, should be confirmed by decisive administrative action, and if necessary by statutory amendment.

Of all those who submitted statements or gave advice to the committee, not one disagreed with the view that the Secretary of Defense should have complete and effective authority over the entire Department of Defense. (In this report the Deputy Secretary of Defense is assumed to be the alter ego of the Secretary.) There is, nevertheless, a long record of challenges based on a legalistic argument that the phrase in the National Security Act which requires that the three military departments be "separately administered" is a limitation on the authority of the Secretary of Defense, especially with respect to functions assigned directly to the military departments by statute. These arguments have been intensified by statutes, enacted since the passage of the National Security Act, which vest powers directly in the military departments. Some officials have contended that such powers are to be administered independently of the Secretary of Defense.

This committee has received an opinion from its counsel and the General Counsel and Assistant General Counsel of the Department of Defense, which states that such challenges have no basis in either the language of the laws in question, or in their legislative history. The

committee believes that this interpretation is correct. The committee further believes that the intent, purpose, and requirements of the National Security Act are fulfilled provided that the three military departments continue to be separately organized and administered by their respective Secretaries subject to the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary of Defense exercises his authority under the National Security Act subject to the overriding authority of the President as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief. The President, as Commander in Chief and as head of the executive branch, is free to deal directly with subordinates of the Secretary of Defense, including the military chiefs of the services. In time of war the President as Čommander in Chief can be expected to assume much more active command over strategic operations, but this is not in any way inconsistent with the National Security Act provision "that the Secretary of Defense shall be the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense."

2. THE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

The Secretaries of the military departments, subject to the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense, should be the operating heads of their respective departments in all aspects, military and civilian alike.

The Secretaries of the military departments occupy positions which carry enormous responsibilities for the security of the Nation. Each military department is far larger than the War and Navy Departments combined in the days before World War II. The administrative operations with which each is charged are more extensive than those of any Cabinet department outside Defense. In addition, the Secretaries are the principal civilian advisers to the Secretary of Defense on the entire range of problems within the Department.

The Secretary of each military department carries full responsibility for the administration of his department. No witness disagreed with the principle that the military chief of each service should be completely subject to the direction of civilian authority.

The Committee believes that, to provide the proper method of enforcing responsibility, it is essential to have a single channel of command or line of administrative responsibility within the Department of Defense and each of the military departments. It does not believe that it is possible (for administrative purposes) to make a sufficiently clear distinction between military affairs, on the one hand, and on the other hand civilian affairs (such as political, economic, and industrial affairs) to serve as a practicable basis for dividing responsibility between military and civilian officers, or for establishing two parallel lines of command.

Except in emergency, the President and Secretary of Defense can be expected to give orders to military officers through the channels of their civilian secretaries. But even in emergency cases, when orders or instructions are sent directly to military officers, such a channel of communication does in no sense take the military chief of a service out from under his responsibility to the Secretary of his

32806-53

military department, or relieve him of the obligation to keep his service Secretary fully informed.

If the Secretaries of the military departments are to discharge fully their responsibilities, it will be necessary to apply to each military department some of the principles recommended in this report regarding the Department of Defense as a whole. The limitations of time have made it impossible for the Committee to deal with the internal problems of the three military departments, but it is vital for the efficient operation of the Department of Defense as a whole that the organization of the military departments be thoroughly reviewed and adjusted in the light of the recommendations of the Committee. The Joint Secretaries

The meetings of the Secretaries of the three military departments, which were instituted informally under the title "the Joint Secretaries," and were followed by the practice of having meetings of the three Secretaries with either the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense presiding, should be continued. The past Secretary of Defense found such meetings useful to help decide policy matters in which all the service Secretaries were concerned.

The Joint Secretaries, under the guidance of the Secretary of Defense, should be in effect a meeting of the general managers of the Department of Defense and the military departments. In these meetings the Secretary of Defense may set policy for the Department as a whole, with particular emphasis on problems relating to improvement in the organization of the Department and simplification of its procedures. Such meetings to which the Secretary could, of course, invite such other advisers as he might wish-should help to provide the Secretary of Defense with the support he requires in solving the administrative problems of the Department, and should enable the service Secretaries to coordinate their thinking with that of the Secretary of Defense.

3. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The country looks to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to see that the military plans of the United States are fully adequate to cope with the challenge of any enemy. While such plans must be based primarily on military factors, they should also take into account a wide range of political and economic factors and should incorporate the most advanced developments of modern science and technology.

JCS plans must provide for the defense of the Nation as a whole. The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although they are also the military chiefs of their services, must rise above the particular views of their respective services and provide the Secretary of Defense with advice which is based on the broadest conception of the national interest. It should be explicitly acknowledged that the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the performance of their duties as such, must not be restricted by service positions or instructions.

It has been proposed that the difficulties inherent in the dual role. of the service members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be removed by the creation of a single Chief of Staff, or a single General Staff, or by giving the present Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff authority

to vote or to settle disagreements. These proposals are advanced particularly by those who believe that the present definition of the roles and missions of the services lacks clarity and invites competition among them. The Committee has considered these proposals carefully. It recognizes the difficulties which are inherent in the present arrangement. Nevertheless, it believes that present conditions do not justify the adoption of any of these proposals. It believes that its own recommendations will provide an effective solution to the current problem.

It is essential to keep in mind that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were established as a planning and advisory group, not to exercise command. The National Security Act emphasized their planning and advisory role. The Committee considers it unfortunate that this concept of the National Security Act has always been obscured in actual practice, even before the meetings in 1948 at Key West and Newport, at which the Secretary of Defense delegated certain command functions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

To clarify the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accord with the basic purposes of the National Security Act, this Committee recommends below that the Key West agreement be revised to remove the command function from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in order to enable them to work more effectively as a unified planning agency.

The Committee believes that the Secretary of Defense has much to gain from receiving the various views of the military chiefs of the services, and that it is desirable for the top planning body to continue to include the responsible military chiefs, who will thus have a voice in the JCS planning as well as implementing such planning in their respective military departments.

If this system is to be made to work effectively, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, without detracting from the function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a group to serve as the principal military advisers to the Secretary of Defense, should be given the authority and responsibility for organizing the subordinate structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Staff in such a way as to help the Secretary of Defense discharge his total responsibilities. This will enable him to bring into Joint Chiefs of Staff planning at all levels a variety of points of view, including those based on scientific and technical background and knowledge.

The Committee emphasizes that it is of the utmost importance that military planning should be strengthened by the consideration, in the early stages of staff work, of the independent points of view of other parts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and of those of various specialists, and that the Secretary of Defense, when making decisions, should have a thorough knowledge of the background of each issue.

By the principles recommended above, the civilian control of the Department of Defense can be made increasingly effective without detracting from the professional status of the military chiefs or from their ability to carry out the assigned roles and missions of their respective services.

(a) The importance of a close relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot be overemphasized The Secretary of Defense, in order to carry out his responsibility effectively, should be kept fully informed of the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of their respective opinions on major issues.

This is necessary in order that he and the President may make major operational and command decisions with the fullest possible understanding of the issues involved. It is also necessary so that the Secretary and the President may, within the framework of the National Security Act, clarify and revise from time to time the assignment of roles and missions to the several services, and thus make the most effective adjustment of our defense organization to new developments in strategy and in weapons and to take maximum advantage of opportunities for economy. This direct relation between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not take the individual military Chiefs out from under the authority of the Secretaries of their respective departments, or relieve them of the obligation to keep those Secretaries fully informed, as explained in section 2 above. While the purpose of the chiefs should be to reach an agreement on what is right and best do to in the national interest, their primary joint role is that of advisers to the Secretary of Defense and the President, and, to both, knowledge of the full reasoning behind unanimous recommendations is as essential as knowledge of the reasoning behind issues on which there may be disagreement.

The primary function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to give advice and to make recommendations. In their deliberations they do not vote, but attempt through a review of the facts to come to agreement regarding their recommendations. Even a unanimous agreement among them on an important matter is subject to review by the Secretary of Defense and the President.

The Committee recommends that the Secretary continue the present practice of attending meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from time to time, alone or with his principal assistants. In addition, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has the responsibility for bringing to the attention of the Secretary the varying points of view of all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

While the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State meet in the National Security Council, it facilitates the work of the National Security Council on major policies to have the State and Defense Departments cooperate closely on current operational problems. For this reason, the present practice of frequent meetings between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the appropriate Assistant Secretaries of State should be continued, and from time to time it may be appropriate for the Secretaries of State and Defense themselves to take part in those meetings.

(b) In order to devote more of their time to their primary duties, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be encouraged to delegate their less important duties both (1) as chiefs of the services, to their deputies in their respective services, and (2) as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to subordinate committees

The tremendous burdens of the military chiefs, both in their respective services and as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, can be carried only if they delegate freely to their subordinates. A superior officer who delegates authority to subordinates to execute the duties for which he is responsible does not lessen, by the act of delegation, his own responsibility for the proper exercise of that authority. Only by adequate delegation can such authority be effectively exercised. This commonly accepted principle should be applied within the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization as well as in the service chain of command.