courses, hold conferences, and sponsor research on defense procedures and organization appropriate to democratic states with free market economies. Special emphasis will be placed on human rights and civilian control of the military. It will also analyze how regional conflicts might be avoided, contained and resolved by peaceful means. It is a very cost effective means of influencing the future generation of regional defense leaders. USEUCOM's strategy for Africa provides military support for U.S. policy in Africa and supports the goals and objectives of U.S. country teams. The focus is on humanitarian, nation-assistance activities of a non-lethal nature. Some of our key initiatives include senior officer visits, medical training exercises, training cruises, and civil affairs training. Through professional interaction between United States and host nation forces, forward presence operations contribute to the promotion of the ideals of democracy and a professional military ethic. These actions, if continued, should help reduce the need for U.S. military responses like noncombatant_evacuation operations, but should contingency operations to protect U.S. interests become necessary, this exposure of U.S. forces to Africa will increase their effectiveness. Our program of joint and combined exercises is active, peaceful military engagement at its finest; not only does it enhance readiness and interoperability between allies, it allows us to display cooperation and support to former enemies in a visible way. And it is one of our most visible tools for presence in Africa, yielding considerable long-term benefits. The Partnership for Peace offers a unique opportunity, through NATO, to widen the opportunity for multinational exercises and operations. Countries whose militaries train and participate in combined peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations together are much less likely to fight each other. Deterrence through active peacetime engagement-that is what multinational exercises and operations under the Partnership for Peace offer us. Our effort to promote democracy and stability peacefully is and should be the cornerstone of our strategy; to deter war is, of course, always infinitely preferable to fighting one. But we must be prepared to fight and win if deterrence fails. We must provide adequate resources to maintain readiness or we face a very real risk of returning to the hollow force. Readiness in USEUCOM is currently at a high level, as proven by the continuing magnificent performance of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Their morale remains high under very difficult conditions. They are meeting the challenge, but we are stretching our people and our resources to the limit. I am particularly concerned about the impact of unplanned and unbudgeted contingency operations on operating accounts, training, and the quality of life for our troops and their families. The real cost of an operation, however, is not always readily apparent. In Operation Sharp Guard, for instance, there is little or no extra cost in dollars, but there is a possible cost to readiness because a ship engaged in maritime interdiction operations may lose training and exercise opportunities and may be unavailable for other tasking. In Deny Flight, we see a similar loss of training opportunities for air crews. The impact on morale of increased OPTEMPO and deployment away from home, especially if it continues indefinitely, is a serious readiness concern. We have adjusted rotation schedules to minimize adverse impacts on readiness. Also, we are successfully using Reserve component units to help share the load in these operations. We will continue to make necessary adjustments to meet these peacetime operational requirements with the goal of preserving our readiness for larger conflicts. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Of all of the dangers, this one has the most potential for disaster. Of greatest immediate concern is whether the nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union, given recent instabilities in several of the nuclear states, are under positive control. We can best preclude the possibility of a loss of control by doing what we can to support these nations in their struggle toward democracy and a market economy. Initiatives such as the George C. Marshall Center I've already mentioned can go a long way in this regard. Also important is the former Soviet Union Threat Reduction program to dismantle nuclear weapons. Of equal if not greater concern for the future is the possibility of weapons of mass destruction and the technology to deliver them falling into the wrong hands-rogue states or terrorists. This holds the possibility for a truly nightmare scenario. We should bring all available instruments of national and Alliance power to bear on this problem, from diplomatic pressure to the monitoring of non-proliferation treaty compliance and export controls to the development of a viable theater missile defense system. Initiatives to build mutual trust and cooperation with former adversaries such as military-to-military contacts and the Partnership for Peace offer fundamental ways to deter this and other dangers by helping to create conditions that favor success— stability, democracy, economic prosperity. ECONOMIC DANGERS Economic stability in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East is an important U.S. national interest. A stagnating economy sharpens the difference between haves and have nots, promotes social discontent, and causes mass migrations-all of which threaten stability. We have already seen the disastrous effects communism ravages on a nation's economy. It will also close the door on the tremendous market opportunities that exist for our businesses in these countries. U.S. businesses will not trade and invest in an unstable environment. I've already mentioned the economic interconnectivity between the United States and Europe. In Europe, we protect our vital economic interests in a very real way by creating a condition for stability where trade and investment can thrive, a conditíon made possible by our leadership of the NATO Alliance and the peaceful promotion of democracy. To be effective, we need congressional support for the required resources. RESOURCE PRIORITIES My number one resource priority is maintaining a ready, active forward presence in this theater. To do this we must adequately fund our people and our operations. We have obligation, as a nation, to provide our men and women-the volunteers whose dedication brought an end to the Cold War—a reasonable quality of life. This includes the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) and Military Construction (MILCON) funding for adequate theater health care, living and working environments, and community support facilities and programs. Our troops and their families have endured many hardships while carrying out the highest operations tempo ever in the midst of the largest military drawdown since World War II. They have and will make tremendous sacrifices for their country. We should not take advantage of their commitment or there could come a time when we will not be able to keep top-notch people in the Armed Forces. People are our most valuable resource. If we are to continue our busy pace of operations in places like the Balkans, northern Iraq, and Africa, we must fund those operations. O&M dollars keep our ships steaming, our aircraft flying, our combat vehicles rolling, our bases operating. For unplanned operations we need to make sure the service components are reimbursed for additional costs in a timely manner. Otherwise, they will have to absorb the O&M costs by shifting money from other programs. This can mean canceled exercises, deferred equipment and facility maintenance, delayed or canceled contracts, all of which directly impact combat readiness. Because O&M funding is fundamental to taking care of our people and the readiness of our forces, I am concerned about the burdensharing legislation we've seen in recent years. Forgetting for a moment that burdensharing is a complex, multifaceted issue with many intangibles; that burdensharing bills and amendments that focus on stationing costs ignore more important issues such as shared contributions to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in the former Yugoslavia. What worries me most about the most extreme burdensharing legislation is that it often takes the form of O&M cuts directed specifically at our forward forces, cuts which can strain already austere O&M accounts and directly impact readiness and quality of life. This burden will not be borne by our allies, but by American men and women in Europe. Mobility and reinforcement from CONUS have taken on increasing importance with the drawdown in Europe. Strategic lift, combined with prepositioned material such as POMCUS and TRU-ARPs, will be critical to any major regional contingency in the EUCOM AOR. The C-17, together with commercial aircraft and our aging C-5, C-141 and C-130 fleet, will be needed to provide airlift for initial reaction forces and will provide follow-on reinforcement and logistical sustainment required until sealift support is established. Likewise, we need to improve our strategic sealift capability to provide heavy reinforcement from CONUS and theater logistical sustainment. We also need sufficient amphibious lift to support a forced entry capability. Modernization of certain systems will ensure our warfighters have the hardware tools they need to accomplish the mission. Of particular importance to USEUCOM are satellite communication systems to enhance command and control, and theater missile defense systems to counter the ever-growing threat from the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. I am also keenly interested in modernization programs for stand-off precision munitions, tactical reconnaissance systems, combat identification systems, JSTARS, and a medium lift replacement helicopter for the Marines. As I have mentioned, a cornerstone of our strategy in Europe and Africa is the strengthening of democratic ideals. Our Military-to-Military Contact Program, the George C. Marshall Center, our strategy for Africa, and our joint and combined exercise program are high-payoff, low-investment programs. Sharing experiences, exchanging ideas, building mutual trust and respect these are the best ways I know to increase our chance of enhancing stability and deterring costly, tragic conflict. Finally, I place a high priority on fully funding one of the most successful burdensharing arrangements in the Alliance-the NATO Infrastructure program. Commonly-funded by participating nations, it provides facilities, bases, and C3 systems for all NATO-assigned forces. Cuts to this program, like we have seen in the past few years, undermine our leadership of the Alliance and make our allies wonder about our commitment, not to mention their long-range impact on force capabilities. CONCLUSION Our active involvement in the USEUCOM AOR offers the very real possibility of preventing the need to engage in more costly operations. We have two choices-we can retreat from Europe, abandon our role as NATO's leader, and hope history doesn't repeat itself, or we can remain engaged to help shape events to fit our national purpose. I recommend the latter course. In closing, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today. On behalf of the men and women under my command, thank you for the support this committee has consistently provided our Armed Forces and USEUCOM. I look forward to your questions. Chairman NUNN. Thank you, General Joulwan. Admiral Miller? STATEMENT OF ADM. PAUL D. MILLER, USN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND Admiral MILLER. Senator Nunn, Senator Thurmond, distinguished members, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee, and today I will provide you a brief status report on the U.S. Atlantic Command's AOR and, importantly, its new role as Joint Force Capabilities Integrator. Please recall that as part of last year's roles and missions review, the U.S. Atlantic Command, now referred to as USACOM, assumed combatant command for nearly all the forces based in the United States. The Command's new strategic plan for joint force integration is well on track. We have refined the Command's organizational structure, and we are working with the components in developing joint methodologies for training and exercising. My written statement, which is provided for the record, looks at the global security environment, America's position, and certain themes that emerge. First, I believe that we face an irreversibly changed security picture. Second, as we adapt to this new environment, past experiences should serve as a guide, not as a constraint. Third, America has tremendous capabilities for deterrence and defense. Fourth, our men and women in uniform are the most professional fighting force in the world today. And finally, in the future, America will surely have a smaller military, but we will not need our military any less. In USAČOM's AOR our responsibilities have not changed. We patrol from the Arctic to the South Atlantic. We are assessing activities from Iceland to likely drug trafficking routes and potential trouble spots in the Caribbean. We are patrolling the waters of Haiti in support of U.N. sanctions. ་ We are now training America's armed forces for joint operations in support of the requirements of General Joulwan and General Hoar, as well as the other combatant commanders. As we adapt, the past is serving as a guide, not as a sanctuary from the forces of change. In USACOM we are developing new deployment options, grooming infrastructure, and examining ways to reengineer our organizational network. In this approach we are working to balance resources and requirements to develop a tailored joint force package which trains at an advanced level, which deploys for a given period, and which is supported by designated surge units from CONUS. Now I believe is the correct time to account for more efficient ways of operating, and to look for new synergisms and patterns that play to our national capabilities and our security require ments. In responding to the smaller-scale contingency and geographically dispersed challenges, the emphasis will be on speed, mobility, flexibility, and adaptability-familiar words. These characteristics, I believe, are appropriate measures of joint readiness. In the current fluid environment, readiness should not be characterized solely by static measurements of on-shelf supplies. Readiness should be determined also by the ability to effectively assemble, train, and employ the capabilities of units and subunits of potential joint task force configurations. Our national investment for defense has provided America tremendous capabilities. In reviewing the 1995 defense budget_and the out-year programs, I echo General Shalikashvili's general assessment that we believe it is about right. As a Nation, we can be confident because of America's competitive edge in technology, and by applying this edge, we can help ensure that the current, cutting edge capabilities contribute to security even as the numbers of our forces grow smaller. But there is a cautionary note, an alert flag that we all recognize. Technology serves as a force multiplier. It cannot substitute for forces. Meeting the demands of future operations still requires the capabilities inherent in our performance platforms, our fleets, our air wings, our amphibious and land maneuver forces, and the manpower needed to operate these performance platforms. In the final analysis, America's security is based on the quality of our Armed Forces, keeping ships at sea, planes in the air, and troops mission ready. It requires regular maintenance and the purchase of spare parts. But just as important as providing resources to equip, train, and employ these forces is providing the quality of life programs and some measure of career stability. The current uncertainty of the world shows we must be prepared to operate in a continuum of operations that include major regional conflict, forward presence, crisis response, humanitarian assistance, and peace operations. The nature of contingency operations now and in the future will likely require us to be both flexible and adaptable with a larger percentage of our force positioned here in the continental United States. Our goal at USACOM, as with all unified commanders, is to employ our forces effectively and efficiently, maintain the high quality of our men and women in uniform, and to explore multiagency, multinational, multisector approaches which allow the United States to respond to the world of continued disorder. I close with this observation. The challenges and dangers facing our Nation may be different, the consequences of our Nation's security less readily apparent, but the requirement for our national preparedness has not been diminished. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Admiral Miller follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADM. PAUL DAVID MILLER, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES ATLANTIC COMMAND I appreciate this opportunity to testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Today, I will provide you a status report on the U.S. Atlantic Command's new role as Joint Force Capabilities Integrator. Recall that as part of a reorganization of the military, the U.S. Atlantic Command-referred to as USACOM-now bridges the entire continental United States. On October 1, the Atlantic Command assumed responsibility for nearly all the forces based in the United States ground, air, and naval forces that may be called upon to respond around the world. This role complemented by my role as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic-serves both as a bridge to NATO and Europe, as well as to other theaters of operation. USACOM's mission is to train forces as joint units and provide joint forces to the warfighting CINCS. USACOM's responsibilities include: Atlantic Area of Responsibility operations • Joint Force Packaging • Joint Force Training • Assist in Joint Doctrine Development Counter Drug Operations • MSCA/MACDIS CONUS Operations • Land Defense of CONUS/CANUS The Command's strategic plan is well on track. Within USACOM headquarters we have refined the command's organizational structure to meet the tasks at hand while pursuing a balance of service representation. As an example, the Command has instituted an Executive Board composed of the Component Commanders (COMFOR, COMACC, CINCLANTFLT, COMMARFORLANT)—which capitalizes on a horizontal cross-flow of inputs from the services. We are working with existing doctrine centers to develop and foster jointness as we prepare our men and women for a range of missions from disaster assistance to peace support operations to major regional conflicts. We are developing the joint methodologies for training and exercising forces provided to the supported Unified Commanders. Within NATO, we are working with SHAPE to advance the Partnership for Peace initiative with the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the successor states of the former Soviet Union. We are also developing, within the NATO alliance, the organizational structure for a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) capability to better integrate and coordinate responses. Looking at the global security environment and America's position within that environment, five basic themes emerge. From my perspective as Joint Force Integrator, a Unified Commander, and a Major NĂTO Commander, I'll address these themes: First, we face a challenging security environment. Second, as we adapt to this new environment, past experiences should serve as a guide not a constraint. Third, America has tremendous capabilities for deterrence defense. Fourth, our men and women in uniform are the most professional fighting force in the world today. Fifth, in the future America will surely have a smaller military, but we won't need our military any less. THE CHANGED SECURITY ENVIRONMENT We are in the midst of three simultaneous revolutionary trends-political, societal, and military. The political revolution is an emerging framework where geographic borders are becoming transparent to the flow of ideas, commerce, people, and turmoil. The societal revolution is the impact of advances in science, communication, and information exchange on society as a whole. This revolution affects |