| United States. Congress. House. Committee on the Budget - 2002 - 68 pages
...realistic costing ($7.4 billion); inflation ($6.7 billion); and the war on terror ($19.4 billion). Added together, these bills come to $47.6 billion....face us and also be able to invest for the future. Second, to confront a world marked by surprise and substantial uncertainty, we agreed that we needed... | |
| Lawrence J. Korb, Council on Foreign Relations - 2002 - 112 pages
...simultaneously marching on and occupying the capitals of two adversaries and changing their regimes. The new approach instead places greater emphasis on...second occupation force, we can free up resources both for various, lesser contingencies that might face us and also for investment in the future. Second,... | |
| United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services - 2003 - 1036 pages
...assessment of our near-term war fighting needs. Instead of maintaining two occupation forces, we will place greater emphasis on deterrence in four critical theaters,...offensive to occupy an aggressor's capital and replace his regime. Since neither aggressor would know which conflict would be selected for regime change,... | |
| United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services - 2002 - 140 pages
...four critical theaters, backed by the ability to swiftly defeat two aggressors in the same timeframe, while preserving the option for one major offensive...requirement to maintain a second occupation force, we gain more flexibility in planning for a wider array of contingencies, and we gain more flexibility... | |
| United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services - 2002 - 764 pages
...aggressor would know which conflict would be selected for regime change, the deterrent is undiminished. But by removing the requirement to maintain a second occupation force, we can free up resources for the various lesser contingencies that face us and be able to invest for the future. Second, to prepare... | |
| United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services - 2003 - 676 pages
...assessment of our near-term war fighting needs. Instead of maintaining two occupation forces, we will place greater emphasis on deterrence in four critical theaters,...offensive to occupy an aggressor's capital and replace his regime. Since neither aggressor would know which conflict would be selected for regime change,... | |
| Seyom Brown - 2004 - 228 pages
...four critical theaters, backed by the ability to swiftly defeat two aggressors in the same timeframe, while preserving the option for one major offensive...requirement to maintain a second occupation force, we gain more flexibility in planning for a wider array of contingencies, and we gain more flexibility... | |
| United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services - 2003 - 128 pages
...four critical theaters, backed by the ability to swiftly defeat two aggressors in the same timeframe, while preserving the option for one major offensive...occupy an aggressor's capital and replace the regime. It calls for the ability to execute several lesser contingencies as well. By making this adjustment,... | |
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