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easily explain that there is no contradiction between the idea of nationality and socialist values. There is no conflict in logical terms (there is, on the contrary, a unity between the struggle against social and against national oppression), or in the psychological sense (nothing prevents a socialist from loving his country). However, again and again situations arise where people have to choose between what seems to be the general interest of the nation and the particular interest of the exploited classes; and here no abstract principle can provide a solution. The general principle that the 'genuine' needs of all nations are identical has not been of much assistance in conditions where flat empirical reality proves the opposite, and where some nations obviously profit by oppressing others. At moments of crisis--which are spared only to a few historically privileged nations--conflicts are brought to light which general principles cannot predict or resolve.

"Rosa Luxemburg's rigidly orthodox views (Bukharin's were very similar) actually denied the reality of national community, and thereby exhibited what appears to be the most profound meaning of Marxist social philosophy. Society, according to this viewpoint, must be considered in terms of class interests only; the concept of national interest itself arises our of the particular interest of the bourgeoisie. This position was as Marxist as it was politically sterile. As I have suggested, Lenin's revisionism, although incorporating national realities into revolutionary strategy, proved partially successful thanks to its lack of doctrinaire finality and to the fact that Lenin had no hesitation in denying Marx if such a denial would appear to be in the interests of the revolution.

"Let me emphasise the point again. The manner in which we interpret the rationalist illusions of Marxism and its inability to assimilate national reality within its conceptual framework depends on a number of ideological considerations. That the national community does not really fit into Marxist philosophy may be considered either to be a sign of the weakness of this philosophy or a symptom of its strength: this evaluation depends upon the criteria used to evaluate the doctrine's 'success.' It is due to precisely this theoretical denial of national reality that Marxism could so successfully be exploited as the ideological organ of the Russian Empire--since it supplied it with conceptual tools which permitted the chauvinist pursuit of national oppression without necessarily employing nationalist phraseology, but assisted by numerous traditionally Marxist

and internationalist concepts. After stating that the socialist state by definition cannot inflict 'national oppression' (rather as, by definition, it cannot be an aggressor or an exploiter, etc.) the Empire gained a new and more efficacious legitimacy for any policy, including its national policy. In this way the ideological power of Marxism supplied the declining Russian Empire with a new instrument of legitimation and acquired a new and unexpected historical meaning.

"Needless to say, this was not the meaning intentionally produced by Lenin or other revolutionary leaders. But since the time of Marx it has become a banal truth that the historical meaning of human activities may have nothing to do with their original intentions. Certainly, there is nothing new and nothing surprising in the subjection of smaller nationalities by Great Powers or in their using the nationalism of small peoples against great rivals. What is new is to call such a policy 'Marxist dialectics' or 'proletarian internationalism.' Nor is this change of name without deeper meaning. That the rationalist utopia of a unified Mankind has so far succumbed to the might of national divisions testifies to its weakness. But that nationalist forces have been compelled to wear the utopian mask proves that utopia is stronger than it used to be. Perhaps people are unable and never will be able to live without the sense of belonging to 'natural' (or 'irrational,' in Max Weber's sense) communities. But even if this appears to be true it appears to be equally true that they cannot live without the utopia of universal brotherhood."

Reading List

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Boll, Michael M.

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"Soviet Straegy in the Seventies: The

Complex Integration Program for East Europe.
Military Review, April 1974, pp. 59-69.

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Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. 1967.

Fischer-Galati, Stephen F. Man, State, and Society in East
European History. New York: Praeger, 1970.

Hole sonsky, Vaclan. Recent Developments in the Czechoslovak
Financial System. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1971.

Sampson, Anthony. Anatomy of Europe. New York: Harper
and Row, 1969.

Schopflin, George, ed. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
New York: Praeger, 1970.

Starr, Richard F. Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe.
Rev. ed. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Inst. Press, 1971.

Ulman, Adam B. The Destiny of Eastern Europe, January -
February, 1974.

ECONOMICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

The historical development of a country's economic institutions influences the general attitude of its people toward government involvement in economic affairs. In the United States the economic system has been identified with the institutions of private property and the free market system. Before the Great Depression of the 1930's the economy was also characterized by a pattern of sustained growth, interrupted for only short periods by recessions or limited depressions. Given these conditions, it is not surprising that the American people in general came to associate private property and the free market system with economic growth and prosperity.

The Federal Government, however, had intervened in economic affairs in several instances. It adopted trade and tariff acts in the late 1790's and antitrust acts in 1890 and 1914 in the interest of the economy. The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 and the Railroad Labor Act of 1926 had the same common purpose, as did the acts that established the Federal Reserve System in 1913 and the Federal Commission in 1920. These interventions were made on the theory that they would strengthen property rights and the free market. None was designed to make the Federal Government directly responsible for dictating the overall level of productive activity in the economy.

During the 1930's the Federal Government chose to combat the severe conditions of unemployment by programs that did not substantially interfere with free market operations-programs such as the Work Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps. Although the economy experienced a slight upturn toward the end of the 1930's, it was not until the United States began to prepare for a global war that unemployment figures substantially declined. Only with the advent of World War II and the vast Federal expenditures of 1941 to 1946 did the American economy once again grow and prosper.

As World War II came to a close, Government officials and the public began to fear that another depression would ensue. Having witnessed the regenerative economic effects of mass Federal spending

Congress attempted to avoid the haunting specter of depression by passing the Employment Act of 1946 which bestowed upon the Federal Government a major responsibility for maintaining prosperity in the postwar economy. In substance, this act required the Federal Government to promote within the Nation's economy conditions of maximum employment, production, and purchasing power. Thus, the Federal Government was no longer to be concerned merely with individual problems relating to the economy. It was now required to consider and act upon matters designed to influence the overall level of activity within the entire economy.

Even as the Congress assigned this new responsibility and moved the Government into the heart of the American economic system; it reaffirmed the central importance of private property and the free market system. In the Employment Act itself Congress declared that Federal actions must also foster and promote free competitive enterprise. With much the same intent, the Congress began removing many of the direct wartime economic controls-wage and price controls, rent controls, rationing, and so forth.

The practical results of these actions were on the one hand to assign particular economic responsibilities to the Government, and on the other to intimate that certain methods were more desirable for achieving economic goals than were others. In the years following the passage of the Employment Act, Federal monetary, debt management, and fiscal policies, which influence the level of economic activity indirectly by affecting disposable income and the money supply, have been championed as the appropriate tools for promoting economic growth and stability over the more direct economic stabilization devices of wage, price, and rent controls and rationing.

From World War II to the summer of 1971, the American economy made impressive advances without burdensome direct economic controls except for the brief Korean War period. In accordance with the Employment Act of 1946, each succeeding Federal administration has acknowledged the Government's responsibility to maintain maximum employment, production, and purchasing power. The extent of commitment to these objectives, however, has varied from administration to administration, as have the particular policies and techniques used and emphasized by each administration.

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