tial joint operation. Although there is no single-Service solution, each Service has unique capabilities that must be brought together by the Joint Force Commander to optimize the overall joint TMD warfighting effort. USACOM is now leading and facilitating a process to improve Joint TMD Operations. Under the Theater Missile Defense Initiative, USACOM is collecting and coordinating TMD operational requirements identified by the other Combatant CINCs and developing a document listing Joint TMD-related tasks, with associated conditions and standards, to guide joint training in TMD. USACOM will conduct a TMD wargame (Coherent Defense 97) to demonstrate and highlight Service capabilities and contributions to joint TMD operations. USACOM's TMĎ initiative is intended to provide a more structured approach to this key warfighting area. USACOM began the Theater Missile Defense Initiative to analyze current approaches to TMD operations to include joint command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C41) architecture. Exercises Coherent Defense (CD) 97 and CD 98 will serve as the means to fully develop this architecture. Additionally, procedures to enable cooperation between the component commanders serving in a joint force are being identified. Another area that USACOM is furthering joint and interagency integration is Information Operations. With the prospect of increasingly asymmetric threats and non-traditional regional challenges, the need and ability to provide effective means to influence and shape potential conflict and to prevent war is stronger than ever. Also, our increasing dependence on information-based technology requires an effective strategy to defend our critical systems and supporting infrastructure from attack. The combination of opportunity and need argue convincingly for our development of information operations both within DOD and at the National level. Therefore, USACOM has taken the initiative in helping define the concept and develop the potential of information operations as a new warfare area. Working closely with the intelligence community and key members of the Defense establishment, an IO exercise was designed and conducted last year to identify hindering issues and recommend fixes at the strategic and operational level for planning, coordinating, and executing information operations. A follow on exercise will be conducted this spring to further develop this important capability. In addition to these exercises, we have engaged with both the Defense Science Board's study of Information Warfare Defense and the ongoing President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection to share our lessons learned. The clear signs and evidence of an emerging threat demand that we lead the world in making Information Operations effective. USACOM is committed to helping define and enable IO as an integrating strategy for the Nation. JOINT TRAINING As a result of taskings following the Khobar Towers bombing, USACOM with the support of the other CINCS and Services, is developing a standardized pre-deployment anti-terrorism (AT) training program. We have established a consensus baseline standard for AT training, and the Secretary of Defense has directed that the program be implemented. We will continue to work with the other CINCs and Services, while coordinating closely with the Joint Staff, to ensure training is standardized and receives the appropriate priority. This is an area that demands our continued attention and focus. PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE We have a robust schedule of PfP exercises in 1997. The first will be Cooperative Zenith, to be held 18-30 May in Ottawa, Canada. It will be followed by Eloquent Nugget 15-27 June in Norfolk; Cooperative Nugget 15 June to 4 July at Fort Polk; Cooperative Safeguard 22-31 July in Reykjavik, Iceland; Cooperative Osprey 28 July to 8 August at Camp Lejeune; and, Cooperative Telos 18-29 September in Corpus Christi. Additionally, we are providing a battalion from the 82nd Airborne Division to participate in a "in-the-spirit-of-PfP" exercise in the Central Asian nations of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan in September. All of these exercises are tremendous opportunities to witness the genesis of potential coalition teams for new security challenges, and I encourage the members of this committee to visit as many as possible. TOTAL FORCE POLICY Since the end of the Cold War, our military has conducted many operations that demonstrate that now, more than ever before, we need a viable Total Force Policy. Recent operations have show cased the Reserve Component's (RC) tremendous capabilities, but they have also pointed out the need for increased active component/RC integration. Now that USACOM exercises Training and Readiness Oversight (TRO) over assigned CONUS general purpose RC forces, we will ensure that they are correctly aligned with appropriate operations and contingency plans. Based on wartime missions, we will ensure that RC units train to joint mission essential tasks. CHALLENGES The United States is the preeminent military power in the world today. But there are warning signs that we must address if we intend to retain our position. There are a number of areas that deserve greater attention on our part. The following are some of the areas that I believe require immediate attention: CAPABILITIES The United States spends more on command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) systems than the total defense budgets of most NATO nations. Unfortunately, this technology is procured by many independent actors. We have not fielded significant improvements in the Combat Identification area, especially air-to-ground, since Operation Desert Storm. We have yet to reach full UHF demand assigned multiple access (DAMA) implementation which is crucial to the efficient use of satellite communications. Likewise, because of insufficient procurement funding for counter-mine technologies, we are "marking time" in an area that most of our potential adversaries have invested heavily. This does not mean that the problems have been ignored. On the contrary, there are many dedicated people working on solutions. Unfortunately, because the technologies involved do not belong to a single Service, there is often a lack of clear support for the program. JOINT READINESS As the Joint Force Provider, we are often forced to deploy cross-leveled units. This is because we have reached the limit in combat and combat service support force structure. As we debate the proper size and structure of the armed forces, we must understand that force structure is not the same as endstrength. Rather, it is one of the four components that constitute military capability. Modernization, Readiness, Sustainability and Force Structure accounts are the basis for endstrength numbers. Divisions, battle groups and air wings are the primary elements of force structure. These formations include: close combat units, tactical intelligence and communications organizations, and the full range of other combat support and service support functions. Because fewer operational units are available to respond to increased contingency operations, they are employed more frequently. This affects other elements of the military capability equation, and adversely affects the overall quality of life of service members. Conclusion When I joined the Marine Corps almost 35 years ago, our definition of security was much simpler. Today, the change from a bipolar to a more complex multi-polar world has forced us to change the way we view national security and employ military forces. The increased importance of political, economic and cultural aspects of security, combined with the information-age technologies available, make the application of military force more complex. The lessons we have learned from Bosnia, Kuwait, Haiti and Guantanamo all reveal that if we are going to maintain America's commitment to global security-and do it with reduced defense resources-we must relook at the way we do business. We are fortunate in that the United States has no peer competitor on the horizon. We must take advantage of this moment in history to reassess the tasks, conditions and standards we expect of our armed forces. The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act is an excellent foundation to build on as we adapt our forces to this changing world. The Quadrennial Defense Review and the Alternative Force Structure Analysis may provide some of the answers we need to shape our military for the 21st Century. But we must not lose sight that at the end of the day, young soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines will risk their lives based on our decisions on how to organize, train and equip them. Providing for "the common defense" now, and in the next century, requires our best team effort. Thank you. I am now prepared to address any questions you may have. STATEMENT OF GEN. EUGENE E. HABIGER, U.S. AIR FORCE, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND General HABIGER. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is again a pleasure to be here today to testify on the posture of the United States Strategic Command. You have my written statement, which, with your approval, I submit for the record. In the interest of time, I would like to offer just a few points. When I appeared before this committee 1 year ago, I had set four principal goals. First, keeping an effective and credible deterrent. Next, shaping a stable foundation for arms control and ensuring a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile. Finally, taking care of our people. In each of these areas, the command and the Nation are in good shape. Nonetheless, challenges remain, and each of these areas will require sustained attention and investment over the long haul. I am not here to advocate additional strategic forces or more weapons. Instead, I look forward to a continued, stable drawdown of our nuclear forces in accordance with treaty obligations. I do advocate a commitment to sustained, safe, reliable, and ready forces-forces to support a credible deterrent and an effective warfighting posture, and to provide a stable foundation for future. arms control efforts. Mr. Chairman, thanks for letting me appear again this year. [The prepared statement of General Habiger follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. EUGENE E. HABIGER, USAF Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: It is a distinct pleasure to be here today to testify again on the posture of United States Strategic Command. When I appeared before this committee one year ago, I had set four principal goals: (1) keeping an effective and credible deterrent; (2) actively shaping a solid and stable foundation for implementation of arms control agreements; (3) ensuring a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile; and (4) taking care of our people. In each of these areas, the Command and the Nation are in good shape. Nonetheless, we cannot and will not rest on our laurels; challenges remain; and each of these areas will require sustained attention and investment over the long haul. When the U.S. Strategic Command was created in June 1992, its Commander in Chief was tasked "to be a four-star advocate for strategic nuclear forces." In that capacity, appear before you now, but not to advocate additional force structure or more weapons. Indeed, I look forward to a continued stable drawdown of our nuclear forces in accordance with treaty obligations. What I do advocate is a commitment to sustain safe, reliable, and ready forces to support a credible deterrent and an effective warfighting posture, as well as a stable foundation for future arms control efforts consistent with national security interests. KEEPING DETERRENCE STRONG The world has become in many respects a much safer place than during the Cold War. Unfortunately, it is also still a dangerous place, fraught with uncertainty. The United States bears the responsibility of leadership in shaping a more secure world amid cascading revolutionary changes. Our national strategy of engagement requires unquestioned military strength, including credible security assurances which we extend to our allies. Deterrence is in the eye of the beholder. America does not have the luxury of failure our leadership directly hinges on others' expectation of our success and their confidence in the fidelity of our commitments. Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World The role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy has been in the headlines lately. The issues are much more complex than the public debate suggests. What the Department of Defense concluded in the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review remains true today: "as long as nuclear weapons remain a factor in international life, deterrence of attack on the United States and our allies must be our objective." The mission of United States Strategic Command-"to deter . . . and, if deterrence fails, to employ forces"-is fundamentally the same as that of other combatant commands. This young, post-Cold War Command boasts no battle streamers. Instead, we boast flexible, survivable, and responsive strategic forces, with safe and reliable nuclear weapons, appropriate plans for their use if directed by the President, and an underpinning of positive command and control and world class communications and intelligence capabilities. The end of the Cold War has enabled substantial reductions in our nuclear forces and associated infrastructure. Since the mid-1980s, the number of people involved in our strategic forces has diminished by approximately one-half, and the number of military bases supporting those forces has been reduced by approximately 60 percent. Over the same period, strategic offensive forces-bombers, missiles, and submarines have been reduced by some 45 percent and once START II reductions are completed-by almost 60 percent. I do not quarrel with those who seek the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, provided necessary preconditions are met. Today, those preconditions do not exist, nor are they likely to exist any time soon. In the meantime, my responsibility is to preserve a stable and effective deterrent, which in turn rests on the credible ability to employ forces in a purposeful way as directed by the President. This deterrent, as General Shalikashvili once noted, is America's "ultimate insurance policy." Management of our strategic relationship with Russia remains a singularly important national security objective. Russia is not an enemy. Nonetheless, Russia remains capable of destroying America's way of life. By most estimates, Russia retains some 20,000-25,000 nuclear weapons, and Russian political and military leaders repeatedly stress their reliance on nuclear weapons for their own security. We continue to hope that Russia will develop into a strong democracy as well as a constructive partner in international security affairs. At the same time, Russia's future is uncertain. Many in Russia remain unconvinced that cooperation with the West is in Russia's national interest. China is another country with a substantial nuclear capability. Significant economic growth as well as a sizable defense modernization program suggest that our relationship with China-like that with Russia-is an important long-term variable on our security horizon. This Command looks forward to beginning a conversation with the Chinese on questions related to nuclear weapons, much as we have already established strong military-to-military contacts with our counterparts in the Russian military. We also need to pay close attention as the Chinese continue their transition into the 21st Century. While the end of the Cold War saw the end of decades of East-West confrontation, the restructuring of international_relationships has enabled a number of regional powers to expand their ability to threaten their neighbors as well as U.S. and allied interests. In the future, deployed U.S. and allied forces will be more likely to face threats posed by biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, as some regional powers look to such weapons to leverage their relationships. Moreover, some who possess such weapons may actually be inclined to use them. In this environment, the United States must be prepared to pose unacceptable risks to any potential adversary seeking to gain advantage from the possession of weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weapons offer one means of doing that, although certainly not the only or necessarily even the preferred means. Nevertheless, in the words of NATO's Strategic Concept, adopted in 1991 and still relevant here, "Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable." Strategic Force Structure In the long run, our strategic nuclear force structure will be largely driven by restrictions established in strategic arms control agreements. The shared determination of both the Congress and the administration to maintain START I forces until the START II Treaty enters into force is important in signaling to Russia that START II is the essential foundation for an affordable and stable strategic relationship and the possibility of further reductions. Today, the United States has no new strategic weapons systems in design. With appropriate investments to sustain them for the long haul, our existing strategic systems should last well into the first quarter of the next century. The next generation of strategic systems need not look anything like our current systems. At the same time, we must take care to ensure our industrial base has the technological and physical capabilities needed to sustain today's systems and develop follow-on systems. As the United States draws down its strategic nuclear forces, the strategic Triad consisting of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and strategic bombers-will continue to be important in ensuring a stable deterrent. Each of these weapons platforms contributes unique benefits to our overall deterrent posture. For the foreseeable future, we should preserve the contributions of each of these legs as much as possible. Ballistic missile submarines will continue to carry the largest portion of our strategic forces, regardless whether we are subject to START I or START II ceilings. With approximately eight submarines at sea at any time, our SSBN force is the most survivable leg of the Triad, providing the United States with a powerful assured retaliatory capability against any adversary. Submarines on alert, at sea, are stabilizing; by contrast, submarines in port could offer an extremely lucrative and destabilizing target in a crisis. Thus, in any foreseeable arms control scenario, the United States must preserve a large enough SSBN force to enable two-ocean operations with sufficient assets at sea to ensure a retaliatory force capable of dissuading any potential adversary in a crisis. In this regard, the Congress' continued support for the D-5 missile backfit program remains essential under any circumstances. The C-4 missile is already beyond its design service life and will be sustainable only at substantial cost and considerable risk by the middle of the next decade. Backfit of these submarines to carry the D-5 missile is the most cost-effective means to ensure a reliable missile for the life of the submarine. Intercontinental ballistic missiles continue to provide a reliable, relatively low cost, prompt response capability with a high alert rate. They also contribute substantially to a stable deterrent by ensuring that any potential adversary take them into serious account if contemplating a disarming first strike against the United States. Without a capable ICBM force, the prospect of destroying the bulk of America's strategic infrastructure with a handful of weapons might be too tempting to a potential adversary in a crisis. Once the START II Treaty takes effect, the ten-warhead Peacekeeper ICBM will be retired and the three-warhead Minuteman III will be converted to a single warhead missile. This will also allow us to shift the W-87 warhead with its greater effectiveness and enhanced safety features-from the Peacekeeper to the Minuteman III. With continued support from the Congress for the Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program (GRP) and Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP), the United States will have an affordable, effective and reliable ICBM for another quarter century. Strategic bombers provide the greatest flexibility within the Triad. The B-52H force with cruise missiles provides a broad range of capabilities against both strategic and theater targets. We are confident this venerable aircraft will be around for many decades to come, with only modest investments in sustainment. We are also studying what will be necessary to extend the service life of our cruise missiles. Next month, the B-2 will become operational. We look forward to incorporating this highly capable weapons system into our warplans. This will also allow the B1 to be re-roled to assume only conventional missions. The B-2 will provide an unparalleled capability to penetrate enemy airspace and hold at risk a variety of strategic targets. The B-2 will also be equipped to carry the B61-11 nuclear bomb, giving us an effective capability against very difficult targets with less explosive force and better safety features than the B53 nuclear bomb which will be retired. The programmed B-52 and B-2 forces continue to be adequate to accomplish our mission regardless whether we are subject to START I or START II force levels, provided that a minimum of 56 B-52s and 16 B-2s are maintained as Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA). Providing the President with Options Deterrence requires that the United States maintain the perceived capability to serve a political purpose with military effect, with a range of credible options that can be controlled in their use and tailored to meet the objective. Ultimately, the President alone decides on the use of nuclear weapons, and one must expect thatin any crisis-the President will seek the widest possible range of options and the clearest understanding of the political and military consequences of each. In the post-Cold War period, this requires not simply a range of weapons, but also strong operational, planning, and intelligence capabilities and the command and control infrastructure to support employment of forces. We continue to improve our ability to meet those requirements by developing tools that increase our planning speed and flexibility; by leveraging our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; and by working within the Department of Defense to ensure connectivity with political decision makers and regional warfighters. In a crisis, |