Compared to the three basic issues outlined above, the pure nationalist and pure ideological questions dividing the Soviet Union and Communist China are strictly secondary and derivative. That does not imply, of course, that such issues are trivial and unimportant. The quarrel over boundary questions, for example, is very serious at present. Indeed, in August 1964, Ch'en Yi, Chinese Foreign Minister, appeared to admit that the Russians might even aid the Americans in the event of a future war between the United States and China. Speaking to Asian and African delegates returning home from the Tokyo Anti-bomb Conference, he asserted, "Let us take the worst. The Americans might occupy our southern provinces, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Even suppose Khrushchev seized Sinkiang and the northeast (Manchuria) and occupied Peking. Much of China remains where millions of people will resist invaders. I personally come from Szechuan; I would continue to fight from the hills of Szechuan. The boundary issue, however, could only have become serious in the context of a previously existing cleavage. It was not a primary causative factor. The purely ideological issues are similar in character. In recent years, the Chinese have developed the argument that under Khrushchev, the Soviet Union began to revert to capitalism, as had Yugoslavia under Tito. They also insisted that the Soviet abandonment of the cherished Marxian principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat for a concept of a government of the whole people constituted another evidence of the basic revisionist tendencies of the Khrushchev clique. Such issues, however, were merely a means of garnishing the anti-Soviet dish. Ideology was critically involved in the main stream arguments on a substantive basis only in connection with the war/peace issue. The evidence thus suggests that the current dispute between Russia and China, in terms of its root causes, does not differ in any major respects from many of the inter-state quarrels that have been contemporary to our times. The fundamental issues in such conflicts relate to different concepts of national interest as fashioned by competitive elites and underwritten by the differences in culture, economic development, political institutions and values, and status in the world. In some cases, these latter factors work to contain disputes; in others, to exacerbate them. In any case, each state tends to define its own interests as the interests of the larger community, and to solicit supra-national support for them. In the case of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic, as we have noted, the substantial differences in culture, economic development, and international status definitely complicated relations, but ironically, the close similarities in political institutions and values added even greater complications. It is in this latter factor that the Sino-Soviet dispute takes on certain unique qualities. Ideology, as we have seen, cannot in itself be considered a major issue in the quarrel. But in certain very fundamental terms, ideology plays a major role in the dispute 1Anna Louise Strong, Letters from China, Numbers 11-20, Peking, 1964, P. 172. nevertheless. The Communist bloc at present is caught in an exceedingly difficult paradox: a pluralistic communist world system is serviced by a monolithic ideology. A number of communist states have emerged in the last twenty years very different in their character and needs, yet each must pay homage to an ideology that is extremely demanding, and permits only a single truth. In comparison with Western liberalism, which currently places few restraints upon inter-state relations and shows great flexibility, Marxism-Leninism represents a highly rigid and constricting doctrine that insistently demands a separation between the orthodox and the heretical, truth and falsity. In these terms, Marxism-Leninism exacerbates any quarrel over national interests by immediately broadening and deepening the conflict. It requires that a total judgment be made with respect to the contestants, a judgment that must encompass the full range of their policies and values. Communist ideology also has a direct impact upon the tactics of dispute. To appreciate this fact, let us review very briefly the five stages through which the Sino-Soviet quarrel has passed up to date.2 The first stage was characterized by primary reliance upon secret bilateral discussions between high Soviet and Chinese officials in the 1956-57 period. These discussions, couched in moderate language and shared with few if any comrades outside top Soviet-Chinese circles, were conducted on a strictly party-to-party basis. The second stage began in the fall of 1957, when the debate was carried into the main stream of the international communist movement as a result of the Moscow Conference. This stage ended in the explosive interparty and interpersonal attacks that took place in Bucharest and Moscow in 1960. By this time, state-tostate relations were involved, because the Soviet Union had begun punative actions at the state level against both Albania and China. Both major parties, moreover, were involved in internal interference in the affairs of the other; and this was having repercussions upon every communist party in the world. The public attack upon Albania by Khrushchev in October 1961 inaugurated the third stage and marked the official entry of the dispute into the public arena. Verbal symbolisms now began to play an important role in the global communications sent out by each side. Yugoslavia was used to represent the Soviet Union; Albania served as the stand-in for the People's Republic. The controversy was now garbed in appropriate ideological coating so as to make it a legitimate Marxist-Leninist dispute, and every word was carefully weighed and measured. The pressure upon all communist parties to declare themselves sharply increased, since none could be neutral when issues of truth and error were involved. State-tostate relations between the Soviet Union and China sharply deteriorated, with each side accusing the other of subversive activities and interference in internal affairs. A fourth stage developed in the fall of 1962, at the time of the crises over Yugoslavia, Cuba and India. Terms like "some people" and "some parties" gradually replaced the use of Yugoslavia and Albania as targets. The main contestants, still cicaked in anonymity, were now being 2This section is adapted from my article, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict in Perspective," in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 351, January 1964, pp. 1-14. brought to the front. Open criticism of the Chinese Communist Party, moreover, issued from the various party congresses held in Eastern Europe during the winter of 1962-63, and the Chinese quickly retaliated by publishing a series of pamphlets setting forth their position in comprehensive fashion and excoriating their opponents. The fifth and present stage was opened by the famous June 14 letter from Peking and the abortive Moscow meeting of July 1963 which followed less than one month later. For the first time, the Chinese openly and vehemently attacked Khrushchev by name, and denounced him and his party as leaders of the revisionist movement of the world. Peking now sought nothing less than the overthrow of Khrushchev and the repudiation of the CPSU by all "true Marxist-Leninist parties." This created a split in many communist parties, with pro-Moscow, pro-Peking and neutralist factions emerging. State-to-state relations between the two primary opponents continued very bad, with minimal economic and political interchange. Indeed, serious border problems and troop build-ups suggested that armed conflict was not beyond the realm of possibility. What should interest us in connection with these five stages is the degree to which ideology and the problem of dual relations (party-to-party/ state-to-state) affected the evolution of the conflict. What role did ideology play? First, as soon as the controversy shifted from secret bilateral Soviet-Chinese discussions, and particularly when it reached the public arena, each party became extremely conscious of the need to legitimize its position in ideological terms. Thus, the attention paid to what constituted "ccrrect Marxism-Leninism" became far more extensive than such ideological justification would have been in a similar dispute between noncommunist states, although not necessarily more oritical to the actual issues involved. The historic tactics of dispute developed by the Marxist-Leninists, moreover, were now brought into play against communists by each other. Words, phrases, and special terms were created and used in such a fashion as to make possible intricate signalling and innumerable forms of escalation and deescalation. The subtleties involved in the carefully measured increments of M-L language are infinitely greater than those that have evolved in the normal language of international dispute. For this reason, incidentally, content analysis, properly utilized, can be an excellent method of approaching the conflict. Marxian tactics of dispute have always involved more than words, of course, and the blending of "legal" and "illegal" tactics has been characteristic of this dispute since its outset. Once again, since there is ideological justification for such actions, the communists are in the curious position of turning their ideology in against themselves. Inevitably, therefore, the dispute must finally center upon who is the true Marxist-Leninist and therefore, who has the right to command Marxist tactics in the name of truth. The hybrid character of communist relations greatly complicates all of the se questions. The evidence clearly indicates that it has been impossible to separate party-to-party and state-to-state relations, although both sides made some attempt to do so. As we have suggested, the procedures involved in party-to-party relations had a very different tradition than those normally associated with state-to-state relations, and despite the attempt to alter that tradition, bringing it into greater conformity with state-to-state norms, party relations, by their very nature, must remain different. Many communist parties, for example, lack any real power base, and do not have the authority to honor agreements, or realize programs. Party relations in some degree at least must be characterized by a level of intimacy and a range of techniques that place them apart from, and often, in contradiction to state-to-state relations. The international communist movement must still face the difficult task of reconciling its commitments to revolution and subversion with its commitments to peaceful coexistence and legitimacy. The evolution of the Sino-Soviet conflict demonstrates clearly that even within the communist camp--or should one say, especially within the communist camp--no such reconciliation has taken place. In summary, both ideology and the hybrid nature of communist political relations have contributed certain important special qualities to the SinoSoviet dispute. These special qualities must be taken into consideration when selecting the methods to be used in studying this conflict and the types of analysis best suited to its understanding. In its broadest dimensions, however, the struggle between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic partakes of most of the same ingredients as compose disputes among and between non-communist states. Issues of national interest and sovereign rights, betraying the powerful force of nationalism in our times, project themselves forcefully into all efforts to create meaningful supranational organizations. Meanwhile, the diffusion of military and political power in the world continues, adding new centrifugal elements to the contemporary political scene. A common ideology has never been sufficient to bridge these types of chasms, and in the case of the communist world, ideology serves to widen the gap. If the Sino-Soviet alliance is to be rebuilt, it will have to rest upon more traditional, prosaic foundations than the possession of a common dream for mankind. In the pursuit of dreams, leaders suddenly find those paths that are dictated by immediate needs and interests. The requirements for any meaningful alliance today lie more in the development of common levels of development and common institutions --hence meaningful interaction and accepted procedures. It is barely possible that in these terms, the People's Republic is correct in turning away from the Soviet Union and casting out its line in the Asian-African world. AGGREGATION OF POWER- AN APPROACH TO POLITICS IN EMERGING COUNTRIES by W. Howard Wriggins, Research Associate, Washington I have become increasingly impressed with the political difficulties facing the leaders of newly independent countries. These difficulties have turned out to be much greater than the new leaders bargained for. The present situation, it seems to me, is one of increasing disappointment, in many cases bordering on despair. The followers who cheered during the independence struggle have not automatically supported new leaders in the years since. During the effort to obtain independence, there was an illusion of national unity transcending traditional differences. This illusion has long ago been shattered as linguistic, regional, religious, ethnic and other differences have thrust themselves forward. Moreover, the traditionalists who had close followings on the basis of primordial, traditional loyalties have been much more entrenched and indeed respected by the bulk of the population than the independence leadership expected. In Africa, particularly, there has been a continued, intimate dependence on former metropolitan countries for such support as special trade arrangements and bureaucratic advisors. Bureaucratic performance has been much harder to sustain than was expected. In addition, of course, there are all the special difficulties associated with economic development. For purposes of this evening's discussion, I would like to be rather old-fashioned. I would like to put the struggle for political power in newly independent countries at the center of our attention tonight. I say, old-fashioned, because it is my impression that our comparative politics literature has become overly subtle, has slipped so far toward social systems analysis that we have forgotten what worries the man in top responsibility most acutely. He must ask himself all the time--do I have sufficient power to accomplish the ends I seek? Do I have sufficient power to survive beyond next week? Who can I count on for support? How do I extend my backing? Who will oppose mo? How do I ensure that my opponents do not sweep me away? These are the central concerns of men-in-government in underdeveloped countries--as in developed countries. But the questions are posed with peculiar urgency in underdeveloped countries because those now in power do not profit from a long inherited institutional framework, political values and rules of the game which set limits to and restrain their political opponents. There are fewor restraints on those not in office; there is less legitimacy to induce acceptance of their will. Leaders in new countries are perforce more preoccupied with the problem of power aggregation than our leaders need to be. Our diplomats must contend with this preoccupation of the leadors of the governments to which they are accredited. And so should those of us who are scholars concerned with diplomacy and international politics. |