35 (f) United Proposal No. 6 The Carrier seeks to amend Article X(A-2) and (I) to permit the extension from 30 to 90 days of the time limit within which jobs higher "than mechanic can be filled without being bulletined. United argues that fluctuating workloads result in a need to make temporary reassignments for periods in excess of 30 days. To replace a lead for a temporary period, the Carrier contends, creates a chain reaction of vacancies which later must be reversed by layoffs. It is the Union position that the present contract provision requiring the bulleting of vacancies in excess of 30 days is current practice. The Union rejects any change. Provisions that vacancies in excess of 30 days must be bulletined are common in labor agreements generally as well as in this industry. Testimony presented by the Carrier fails to demonstrate any handicap to its operations as a result of the present contract clause which would warrant departure from this widely accepted practice. Recommendation: That the proposal be withdrawn. 2 UNION PROPOSALS (a) District 141 (United) Proposal No. 1 The Union proposes that Articles IV (A) and V(A) be amended to provide that all assignments be made by the lead to his crew except that, when he is not readily available, the foreman or supervisor shall make such assignments. Further, the Union proposes that a lead shall be on duty when 3 or more employees are on duty and no lead shall direct the work of more than 11 employees. The Union agreed that these ratios are generally maintained by United but cited instances where no lead is employed. The Carrier contends that flexibility is necessary in permitting supervisors to give assignments and in determining whether there is need for a lead. The Board believes that the Union proposal could lead to restrictions. on the Carrier's operations which would handicap efficiency. Moreover, such a clause in the contract places an unwarranted limitation on the Carrier's prerogative to manage its operations. Recommendation: That the proposal be withdrawn. (b) District 141 (United) Proposal No. 2 The Union proposes that Article IV (B) be amended to restore the right of mechanics to receive and dispatch aircraft at the four stations where, by agreement in 1961, the work was assigned to ramp servicemen. 36 The Carrier contends that such a restriction would require assignment of mechanics to work in which their skills could not be utilized. For the same reasons given in its decision to permit the use of ramp serviceman to perform this function at other stations (United Pro-* posal No. 2), the Board finds no basis to limit assignment of this function to mechanics. Recommendation: That the proposal be withdrawn. (c) District 141 (United) Proposal No. 3 The Union proposes that system overtime rules be adopted which would include provision for equalization of overtime and pay for bypass. It contends that local agreements which govern the distribution of overtime have functioned unsatisfactorily and that many grievances have resulted from overtime bypass. The Union insists on pay for bypass and on assignment on the second day off if the same employee is still the low man. The Carrier has agreed to a uniform set of system overtime rules. It opposes bypass pay, contending that existence of the penalty does not eliminate errors. Overtime assignment on the second day off is opposed because pay would be at double time rather than time and one-half as it would be if assigned to another employee. The Board finds that the parties are in substantial agreement with respect to new system overtime rules, except for bypass pay and second-day-off assignment. The purpose of an equilization of overtime provision is to insure all employees a fair opportunity to work at premium rates. Generally, such clauses provide that the opportunity should be equalized over a specific period such as 30 or 90 days. An opportunity missed is not lost; it may be deferred. But if an employee is consistently bypassed he has a remedy through grievance machinery. Moreover, the obligation of the employer under an equilization of overtime clause is normally not as restrictive as under seniority clause. The Board, therefore, finds no basis to recommend instituting bypass pay where it does not now exist. As to the second day off at double pay, the same arguments generally apply. Labor organizations typically have sought an increased overtime penalty to discourage 7 day assignments. It cannot then be argued that having achieved inclusion of the penalty rate in the contracts, employees must be assigned on the seventh day. There is no basis for imposing a penalty on the employer because the same employee is still low man on the overtime list. The employee is not thereby entitled to extra premium pay, or the employer subject to 37 the extra penalty, so long as over a fixed span of time overtime work opportunities are offered as equally as possible to all employees. The Board finds no support in general industry practice for this penalty -provision. Recommendation: That the system overtime rules proposed by the Union on which general agreement has been reached be adopted, but that the rules should not include bypass pay or assignment on the second day off if the same employee is still low man. (d) District 141 (United) Proposal No. 4 The Union proposes that the present point seniority provision be replaced by system seniority. The Carrier has agreed to the Union proposal except that it includes two conditions which are unsatisfactory to the Union. The Union insists that every vacancy be bulletined as it occurs, while the Carrier desires permanent bids. The second condition that the Union rejects is a provision that the Carrier would not be required to accept bids for vacancies created by employees voluntarily transferring by bid. The Union contends that both of the Carrier's conditions would prevent reasonable application of seniority preference. The Carrier supports its first condition by pointing out that the Ramp and Stores agreements now have permanent bid procedures which are less time consuming and costly than the current Mechanics agreement procedure of bulletining each bid. With system seniority, transfers would be likely to increase and to cause new problems unless a permanent bid procedure is adopted. Because the Carrier anticipates a substantial increase in transfers with an accompanying high cost of training on different equipment, it has proposed the second condition as a deterrent to an excessive number of transfers. The testimony indicates that permanent bids are now the accepted practice for other United employees organized by IAM. It is in accord with the parties' general approach toward greater uniformity of working conditions that the same practice should be incorporated in the proposed system overtime rules for mechanics. The Board finds, further, that the effect of widespread chain-bumping, which could occur under system seniority, would be to impose a burden of high costs on the Carrier. The Carrier has agreed to the Union's proposal on seniority; that their agreement should also require the assumption of unnecessary costs appears to be unreasonable. Recommendation: That the Union's proposal be adopted and that the two conditions of permanent bids and no requirement to accept 38 bids on vacanies created by voluntary transfers be included in the contract provision. VI. CONCLUSION The Board is grateful to the representatives of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers and the five Carriers for their diligence, good will, candor, and objectivity. The Board is impressed with the obvious sincerity of the parties and with their desire to present the facts as they saw them; this they have done without the bitterness or resentment which might unduly delay eventual agreements. Their cooperation has assisted the Board in the performance of its duties; we in turn sincerely hope that the Board's recommendations will help them to reach prompt settlements. With 60 percent of our air transport industry involved, any delays would threaten the welfare of the country and the convenience of many Americans. The parties have provided the Board with a good record to which the Board has given full consideration. The Board strongly believes that in the public interest the disputes submitted to it should be settled in accordance with its recommendations. Respectfully submitted. (S) Wayne Morse, WAYNE MORSE, Chairman. (S) David Ginsburg, DAVID GINSBURG, Member. (S) Richard E. Neustadt, RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, Member. Senator MORSE. Also, because it bears on the first point I shall make, I ask that the editorial in this morning's Washington Post concerning the emergency, which disagrees, as I disagree, with the position of the administration, taken in this case, which amounts, really, to a postponement of congressional action, and the editorial in this morning's New York Times, "Politics Versus Public Interest." I ask to have those inserted as introductions to my testimony. [From the Washington (D.C.) Post, July 28, 1966] WOODSHED, BUT NO EMERGENCY It is difficult to follow the reasoning behind Labor Secretary Wirtz's opposition to congressional action in the 20-day-old airline strike. The Secretary does not regard the situation created by the strike as an emergency, although he readily admitted that it may soon reach the emergency stage. His current estimate is that "We are confronted with a serious, substantial, adverse impact on the national interest." Well, if this does not amount to an emergency, how serious does this "adverse impact on the national interest" have to become before it will produce action in Administration circles? The remedy offered by Mr. Wirtz seems to us equally inconsistent. He suggested to the Senate Labor Committee that Congress send the deadlocked negotiators "back to the woodshed" of collective bargaining with a threat to use a "paddle" if they do not reach a settlement. In the first place, a congressional committee has no authority in this sphere. And how could Congress itself pass a law telling the parties that they must agree, or else? To our way of thinking, any such attempt at intimidation would be far more troublesome from the viewpoints of both labor, management and government than the kind of emergency act proposed by Senator Morse. Secretary Wirtz acknowledged that he had received more than 2000 telegrams and letters from members of Congress, officials, businessmen and others expressing grave concern over this dispute. Yet all he has to suggest by way of governmental action is an empty threat to crack down on the parties if they fail to agree. This negativism in high places after nearly three weeks of paralysis on five airlines is in itself disturbing. One of our greatest statesmen, James Madison, once said in a letter to Edward Everett : "A political system does not provide for a peaceable and authoritative termination of occurring controversies, would not be more than the shadow of a government . . ." It is a mistake to suppose that the Government must wait, in critical situations of this kind, until the national defense has been impaired or until the public health or safety have been gravely undermined. Congress has complete authority to regulate interstate commerce in the national interest. It has an obligation to the public to keep essential transportation services running, and this authority ought to be exercised in an orderly way without meaningless threats of taking anyone "to the woodshed." After a visit to the White House, Senator Morse revised his bill calling for a 180-day suspension of the strike by eliminating any suggestion that it might be contingent on a presidential finding of a national emergency. He would justify congressional action by a finding that the tie-up threatens to interrupt commerce and deprive regional areas of vital services. This is all that is necessary to justify the mild action proposed to the Senate Labor Committee. If the emergency continues, we think the Committee and Congress will have no alternative to proceeding along this line. |