proposed to keep possession. This testimony was in dispute, the defendants contending that their only claim was the right to take an inventory, and not to hold the goods against the levy. Under these circumstances the court was, we think, in error in directing the verdict for defendants. The levy was made at 8:30 o'clock on the evening of April 28, 1897, the day on which the execution was issued, and the levy was indorsed by the officer on the execution. He took possession of the stock, put it in charge of a custodian, whom defendant Sloan turned out of possession, and at once gave the chattel mortgage to defendant Hamilton, as trustee. The plaintiff, as shown by his testimony, did all in his power to retain possession after the levy was made. He was in possession by the custodian, and the custodian was surreptitiously ejected from the premises by the defendant Sloan. Under these circumstances the levy was a valid one. Roth v. Wells, 29 N. Y. 471; Beekman v. Lansing, 3 Wend. 446; Quackenbush v. Henry, 42 Mich. 75, 3 N. W. 262. The officer very properly put a keeper in charge, and this was a sufficient precaution to preserve his possession under the levy. Stilson v. Gibbs, 46 Mich. 215, 9 N. W. 254. The fact that this store was adjoining the dwelling house could not make the levy invalid. The goods were subject to levy. It was the duty of the officer to make it. It is true that he levied upon a large quantity of goods, but the circumstances under which it was made, and the time of day, we think, warranted the officer in taking possession of the stock until the next morning, when he could make his inventory, and defendant Sloan his selection of exemptions. The officer could not be expected to determine at a glance the exact quantity of goods there. He was not permitted to hold possession, as he claims. Whether there was a waiver of the levy was a question of fact for the determination of the jury. The court was in error in determining it as a question of law. The jury should have been instructed that the levy was valid, and that, if defendants refused to surrender possession on the morning after the levy, the plaintiff's right of action was complete, unless he abandoned his levy by consent of the judgment creditor. Some claim is made that the plaintiff could not maintain trover under the facts shown in this case. If there was no waiver of plaintiff's rights under the levy, we think it clear that the action was properly brought. Witherspoon v. Clegg, 42 Mich. 484, 4 N. W. 209. The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial awarded. The other justices concurred. LAROUE v. CONWAY, County Treasurer. Under How. Ann. St. § 744, providing that township boards shall consist of the supervisor, the clerk, and the two justices of the peace whose terms of office soonest expire, the two oldest justices holding office at the time would be members of such board, without reference to a vacancy in the office of justice. Certiorari to circuit court, Chippewa county; Joseph H. Steere, Judge. Certiorari by Sarah J. Laroue against Edward H. Conway, county treasurer of Chippewa county. There was an order granting the writ, and Sarah J. Laroue appeals. Affirmed. McDonald & Smith, for appellant. Oren & Webster, for respondent. GRANT, C. J. This case involves the right of one Charles W. Caley, a justice of the peace, to act as a member of the township board of the township of Brimley, Chippewa county. At a meeting of said board there were present the supervisor, the clerk, and one Scribner, a justice of the peace, whose term of office expired in 1899. The office of the justice whose term would have expired July 3, 1898, was vacant. Mr. Caley's term expires July 3, 1900. 1 How. Ann. St. § 744, provides that the board shall consist of four members, the supervisor, the clerk, and the two justices of the peace whose terms of office soonest expire. Under the relator's contention the township board would consist of only three members until the vacancy in the senior term was filled. We are of the opinion that the statute means the two oldest justices at the time holding office. The court below so held, and the judgment is affirmed. The other justices concurred. WRIGHT et al. v. AUDITOR GENERAL et al. (Supreme Court of Michigan. Nov. 15, 1898.) TAXATION-BOARDS OF REVIEW-TIME OF MEETING -VALIDITY OF TAX. Under Pub. Acts 1893, No. 206, requiring the township boards of review, for the purpose of reviewing assessments, to meet at the office of the supervisor on the fourth Monday in May, at 9 o'clock in the forenoon, and continue in session during that day and the day following, the failure of the board to meet until the second day fixed by law does not make void the tax, since there is an opportunity for taxpayers to be heard on one of the days fixed by law for the hearing. Appeal from circuit court, Ogemaw county, in chancery; Nelson Sharpe, Judge. Bill in chancery by David Wright and another against the auditor general and others. From a decree for defendants, complainants appeal. Affirmed. McDonell & Hall, for appellants. Albert E. Sharpe, for appellees. MOORE, J. Complainants filed a bill to restrain the collection of certain taxes, and have appealed from a decree made against them by the trial court. The complainants are owners of a good many descriptions of land situated in various townships. For the purpose of having their lands properly assessed, they sent their agents, who were well acquainted with values, to attend the meeting of the board of review, whose duty it was to meet upon the fourth Monday of May at the office of the supervisor. They arrived at the office about 12 o'clock, and remained until about 3 o'clock. No member of the board of review was present during that time, and the board were not assembled as a board that day. These men were informed the supervisor was absent from home, and would not return for some days. They examined the assessment roll, and prepared a list, of the lands assessed to the plaintiffs, and set opposite each description what they regarded as its value for assessment purposes, which list they left at the office of the supervisor. Attached to the list was a written protest against any higher assessment than the values which they had put upon the lands. No one appeared at the office of the supervisor on behalf of complainants after this. It was claimed it was necessary for the agents of the complainants to spend all of the remaining portion of the day, and the following day, with other boards of review. The record shows the supervisor was called from home on the preceding week by the illness of his mother. He did not reach home until Monday night. He convened the board of review Tuesday morning, and it remained in session during all that day. It had the list prepared by plaintiffs' agents before it, and passed upon the assessments. It was the opinion of the circuit judge that there was an opportunity for the complainants to appear before the board of review, and that the assessment was not void. The complainants insist the failure of the board of review to meet on the first day fixed by law voids the tax, and cite, in support of that proposition, Caledonia Tp. v. Rose, 94 Mich. 216, 53 N. W. 927; Auditor General v. Chandler, 108 Mich. 569, 66 N. W. 482. There is language used in these opinions which justifies the claim of the solicitors, but the language was not necessary to the disposition of the cases. In the first case the owner of the land appeared at the place of the meeting, on Monday, to protest against his assessment, and was told by the supervisor the board had adjourned. He asked it to be reconvened. This was refused by the supervisor, and the board was not again in session. In Auditor General v. Chandler the landowner appeared at the house of the supervisor on Tuesday, and learned from the supervisor the board had adjourned without day. It will be seen in both of these cases there was no opportunity for the owner of the land to have a hearing before the board of review, though he had been diligent in his effort to have a hearing. In this case there was an opportunity for a hearing upon one of the days fixed by law for the hearing. The legislature undertook to provide for such a contingency as occurred here. Section 28, Act 206, Pub. Acts 1893, provides for a board of review con sisting of three members, a majority of whom shall constitute a quorum. Section 30 provides the board of review shall meet at the office of the supervisor on the fourth Monday in May, at 9 o'clock in the forenoon, and continue in session during the day and the day following. Section 32 provides that if, from any cause, a quorum shall not be present at any meeting of the board of review, it shall be the duty of the supervisor, or, in his absence, any other member of the board, to notify any absent member to attend at once, and makes it the duty of the member so notified to attend without delay. It also provides that if, for any cause, the second meeting of the board shall not be held at the time fixed therefor, it shall meet the following Monday. Would it be claimed that, under these provisions of the statute, if the board, because of the sickness of some of its members, or illness in their families, or for any other cause, did not convene in the forenoon, it would void the tax even though it was in session in the afternoon? We think this is too narrow a construction to put upon the law. The landowner has a right, up to the last moment fixed by law, to be heard in relation to his assessment, and he cannot be deprived of that right; but where the board, though it may be late in convening, meets during the time fixed by law, and remains in session until the time fixed by law is ended, and has been in session long enough to permit all persons desiring to appear before them to be heard, and to pass intelligently upon the protests, it cannot be said the landowner has not had his day in court. The decree is affirmed, with costs. The other justices concurred. HARRIS v. O'GORMAN, Justice of the Peace. (Supreme Court of Michigan. Nov. 15, 1898.) REPLEVIN-RETURN OF PROPERTY-SPECIAL VERDICT. A verdict in replevin, simply that "defendant did not unlawfully detain," based on a plea of the general issue, which puts in issue, not only the detention of the property, but also the property of plaintiff therein, and his right to possession at the time of the commencement of the suit (How. Ann. St. § 8339), does not entitle defendant to a return of the property. Certiorari to circuit court, Saginaw county; Byron A. Snow, Judge. Application by Lovina Harris for a writ of mandamus against John O'Gorman, a justice of the peace, to compel him to issue a writ of retorno habendo. From the ruling of the circuit judge granting the writ, O'Gorman brings certiorari. Reversed. John E. Nolan, for relator. James H. Davitt, for respondent. MONTGOMERY, J. The Singer Manufacturing Company brought replevin before respondent to recover possession of a sewing machine, making one Lovina Harris defendant. On the trial the jury returned as their verdict that "the defendant, Lovina Harris, did not unlawfully detain said sewing machine." The judgment entered on the verdict was that the defendant did not unlawfully detain the said goods and property, and that she recover costs. Subsequently the defendant, Lovina Harris, applied to Judge Snow for a writ of mandamus directed to the justice to compel him to issue a writ of retorno habendo. The circuit judge granted the writ, and this ruling is before us for review. The statute (section 8339, How. Ann. St.) provides: "The defendant may plead the general issue to such declaration, which shall be in the same form as in personal actions, and shall put in issue not only the detention of the property, but also the property of the plaintiff therein, and his right to the possession thereof at the time of the commencement of the suit, and under such plea the defendant may give notice of any special matter of defense to the action." The question is whether under such an issue a verdict in the form in which that in question was given entitles the defendant to a judgment for the return of the property. The defendant is not in all cases entitled to a return of the property. It may appear that plaintiff is entitled to possession, and yet that judgment ought to go for defendant for the reason that he has not detained the property from the plaintiff. In such cases the verdict and judgment should be limited to a discharge of defendant and costs in his favor. McGregor v. Cole, 100 Mich. 262, 58 N. W. 1008; Farrah v. Bursley, 100 Mich. 547, 59 N. W. 245; Weber v. Henry, 16 Mich. 399. It has been held that when the plea presents several issues, and the verdict is general, and broad enough to cover all the issues, as, for instance, "We, the jury, find the issues for the defendant," that a return may be adjudged on such a verdict. Wells, Repl. 753. But when there are several pleas, and the verdict is, "Not guilty," the return cannot be adjudged on such verdict. Hanford v. Obrecht, 38 Ill. 493: Ford v. Ford, 3 Wis. 399. It is well settled that at the common law the plea of non cepit does not entitle the defendant to the return of the goods. Pierce v. Van Dyke, 6 Hill, 613. And while, as we have seen, a verdict covering all the issues would entitle the defendant to a return of the property, as would also perhaps a general verdict for the defendant (Baldwin v. Burrows, 95 Ind. 81), in this case the verdict is not general, but limited to finding a single fact, viz. that defendant did not unlawfully detain the property. This verdict did not cover all the issues which defendant might have presented, possibly not all that she did present. She has, however, not appealed; and, unless we are to supply the defects in the verdict, we cannot treat it as a finding that she is entitled to a return of the property. The circuit judge was in error. The order will be reversed. The other justices concurred. BECK et al. v. RAILWAY TEAMSTERS' PROTECTIVE UNION et al. (Supreme Court of Michigan. Nov. 15, 1898.) INJUNCTION EQUITY-BOYCOTT-LIBEL. 1. A court of equity will interfere by injunction to restrain a combination of persons from boycotting complainants' business, by intimidating and coercing their customers to leave, and endeavoring, by abusive and threatening language, to drive away their employés. 2. An agent of a railway teamsters' union presented complainants a contract to sign, providing for the employment of union men, which was refused; whereupon such union undertook to ruin complainants' business by sending out its members to distribute among complainants' customers circulars commencing and ending with the words, "Boycott Jacob Beck & Sons,' and containing statements wholly false, and by establishing in the streets pickets to intercept complainants' teamsters and customers going to their place of business. Held, that complainants were entitled to an injunction to restrain the distribution of such boycotting circulars, and to prevent such picketing, though both were done peaceably, and away from the complainants' premises. 3. A court of equity, in granting an injunction restraining a railway teamsters' union from boycotting a complainants' business, enjoined such boycott by violent means, but permitted the use of peaceable means, or any means short of violence. Held error, since the boycotting condemned by law is not only that accompanied by violence, but that where the means used are threatening, and are intended to overcome the will of others. 4. A court of equity will restrain by injunction the publication of a libel, consisting in a boycotting circular, where the accomplishment of its purpose would result in irreparable injury to, and destruction of, proprietary rights, and the acts are accompanied with threats and intimidation. Appeal from circuit court, Wayne county, in chancery; George S. Hosmer, Judge. Bill by Jacob Beck and others against the Railway Teamsters' Protective Union and others for an injunction to restrain defendants from interfering with complainants' business. There was a decree granting the writ, from which complainants appeal. Modified. In order that there may be no misunderstanding of the issues involved, we give the bill of complaint substantially in full. "(1) Complainants are partners doing business in the city of Detroit, under the name of Jacob Beck & Sons, having their mill and place of business at 245, 247, 249, and 251 West Congress street. At their place of business, on West Congress street, aforesaid, they carry on a general milling business, namely, of manufacturing and milling cereal products. They also deal in oats, grain, meal, and other cereals, and have had for years a large trade established in the city of Detroit and elsewhere. In carrying on such business they always use a number of horses, trucks, and wagons for use in trucking and carrying from the elevators, the cars, and elsewhere the different cereals which they use in the process of manufacture and sale, and also in delivering said cereals, either manufactur ed or unmanufactured, to the elevators, cars, and other customers in the city of Detroit and elsewhere. "(2) Complainants have built up and established a large and valuable city trade, and have a large number of regular customers throughout the city, who buy almost daily of complainants some of their products, sometimes sending their own wagons and teams for the merchandise so purchased, and at other times relying on complainants to deliver the same. The trade so built up they have had, until very recently, for a number of years, and is to quite a large extent a cash trade and a valuable one. "(3) Complainants further aver that in July, 1897, they had in their employ five teamsters, named Michael Walpole, H. McHugh, C. Fox, W. Pfoff, and Edward Hupp. These teamsters had been in the employ of the complainants for some time. Early in July, 1897, the above-named teamsters came to the office of complainants, and requested that they be paid higher wages. Complainants. in answer to such request, asked the said teamsters how much they wanted, to which they replied that they wanted $9 a week for single wagons, and $10.50 for double wagons. Thereupon complainant George Beck asked said Walpole, McHugh, and others. last named, whether they would be satisfied if they were given those wages; whereupon said Walpole replied, in effect, as follows: "The wages do not cut any figure, but it is the scale we want you to sign.' Said Walpole and others were then told that they could have a reply that same evening, said conversation being in the morning. In the evening of the same day, shortly after six o'clock, said Walpole, McHugh, and others came with another person, whom they said was the delegate of the Railway Teamsters' Protective Union. They were asked what was meant by the scale which they demanded should be signed, whereupon they produced a written agreement which they had already prepared. A copy of this agreement is hereto attached, and made a part of this bill. Complainants not having examined said written agreement called the 'Scale,' it was agreed that the complainants should have a week to examine and consider the same. Subsequently complainants examined the agreement, and on or about the 1st day of August informed the executive committee of the Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, who seemed to have the matter in charge, and particularly one George Innis, representing said union, that they (the complainants) had decided not to sign the scale, and refused to sign the same. In the meantime complainants' horses had all been sent to their farm in the country, near Plymouth, and all of the trucking and teaming of the business of complainants had been turned over temporarily to the Shedden Cartage Company, Limited, and to Ferguson & Co. At the time said executive committee called, being on or about the 1st of August. complainants informed them of the lastnamed facts; also that they, the complainants, would bring their teams back from the farm in the fall, and that they would inform them when their teams would be put at work again. About the time that the complainants' teams were sent out into the country, and having no further use then for said teamsters Walpole, McHugh, Fox, Pfoff, and Hupp, they were so notified and quit working for complainants. In the meantime the said Walpole, McHugh, Fox, Pfoff, and Hupp, as complainants are informed and believe, and so allege, had joined the association called the Railway Teamsters' Protective Union. Some time after they had been discharged, and after they had joined said union, said Walpole, Pfoff, and Hupp came to complainants, and informed them that they had been out of employment ever since they had left the employment of complainants, represented that they were without means to support their families, and that their families were in want; and thereupon complainants, although their teams were still in the country and having no use for their teamsters, employed said Walpole, Pfoff, and Hupp for work in their mill as extra men. They continued to employ said men in their mill until October 25, 1897. At the time said men returned to the complainants' employ they informed complainants they had withdrawn from the Railway Teamsters' Protective Union. "(4) Complainants further allege that on Saturday, October 23, 1897, they informed George Innis, a resident of Detroit, who belongs to the Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, and who is the walking or traveling delegate of the Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, that they intended putting on their own teams again on Monday, October 25th. and that the three men who went out and joined their union, namely, Walpole, Pfoff, and Hupp, before mentioned, would on the 25th day of October again start driving for complainants. Complainants so informed Innis simply because they had agreed to so inform him, and as he represented the Railway Teamsters' Protective Union. Complainants further allege that on the morning of the 27th of October said George Innis, with a large number of others, whom said Innis represented belonged to the Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, and were members of committees thereof, numbering in all from fifteen to twenty, appeared in the street in front of the mill of said complainants, on Congress street. Your orators are unable at the time of filing this bill to ascertain the names of all of the parties who accompanied said Innis, but they were informed by said Innis, and also by a number of the other men, that they belonged to the Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, and they were also then informed by said Innis that the purpose of said Innis and his associates there, and the purpose of said Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, was, by threat and by organized effort and by boycotting, to prevent and persuade and compel people from having any business relations or dealings with the said complainants, Jacob Beck & Sons, and to prevent, if possible, any teams of customers from visiting complainants' mill and place of business, and also to prevent any teamsters continuing in or entering the employment of said Jacob Beck & Sons until said Jacob Beck & Sons had signed the 'Scale' heretofore referred to. And your orators allege and charge that said George Innis, as walking or traveling delegate or representative of the Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, and the Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, acting through its representatives and members, and its committees or walking delegates, so called, are unlawfully and wrongfully combining and confederating together to prevent, by intimidation and threats, all persons from patronizing complainants, or buying merchandise from them, or visiting their mill premises for business purposes; and that the said Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, the said George Innis, and his associates and confederates, whose names are at this moment unknown to these complainants, began, and have since constantly pursued, a course of threats and intimidation and persuasion for the purpose, by means of such intimidation and threats and fear, not only to prevent customers from buying of complainants, but also to intimidate and prevent the employés of complainants from continuing in their employ, and from peaceably or otherwise pursuing their work in complainants' mill. And your orators show that the said George Innis, the said Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, and its members, and also the members of the Detroit Council of Trades and Labor Unions, hereinafter mentioned, have intruded into the mill premises and buildings where the men employed by your orators were at work, and have solicited men who were peaceably pursuing their avocations, and who were satisfied to remain in the employment of your orators, and also have threatened and attempted to intimidate them to quit the employment of your orators, with the purpose and intent, as your orators charge, of preventing your orators from continuing their said business, and thus to force your orators to submit to the terms proposed in said scale. That said solicitation of the employés of your orators, and said intrusion into the places where said men were at work, and into the mill of your orators, constituted an unlawful interference with the business of your orators, and that the persons who have been soliciting the employés of your orators, and who have been guilty of such intrusion and interference with the business of your orators, are, with few exceptions, unknown to your orators. "(5) Your orators further allege that about eleven o'clock, on the 27th day of October, John Strigel, who your orators allege is presi dent of the executive board of the Detroit Council of Trades and Labor Unions, and William Campbell, who complainants understand is a patternmaker, and W. Goar, who complainants understand is a machinist, all officers of the Detroit Council of Trades and Labor Unions or of the Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, came to the office of complainants, and after a few minutes' discussion they were told that the complainants would not sign their scale nor their agreement, and would insist upon their right to continue to carry on their work and their business in their own way, so long as the same was done legally, and that they would continue to carry on their work with their own teams and teamsters; that they were paying their teamsters all that said teamsters asked or demanded; that said teamsters were satisfied with their work and with their employment, and were not complaining. Thereupon, and after said complainants had so informed the last-named defendants, to wit, said Strigel, Campbell, and Goar, said Campbell gave complainants to understand and notified complainants that they, the said Detroit Council of Trades and Labor Unions and the Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, their officers and members, would ruin the business of Jacob Beck & Sons. They further stated that they had already financially ruined a cooper in the city of Detroit, who a few years ago was worth $50,000, and who would not pay or join their union, that they had boycotted him, and they had ruined him by said boycott, and that he had been compelled to mortgage his property. This statement was so made, as complainants allege, for the purpose of intimidating, and by such intimidation compelling complainants to sign what is known as the 'Scale'; and complainants allege that at this time there was no one in their employ, either teamster or laborer, who was asking any raise in their wages, and that, so far as complainants know, all of their employés were satisfied with the terms of their employment, and are still. "(6) And your orators show that the Railway Teamsters' Protective Union is an organization existing in this state, and other states, having in this state, in the city of Detroit, a local subdivision called the Railway Teamsters' Protective Union No. 5,872; that such organizations are voluntary associations, whose proceedings are secret. Your orators allege that the present officers of the Railway Teamsters' Protective Union are as follows: President, William Thoms; secretary, Robert B. Camp; and that George Innis, the person referred to in this bill, is the traveling delegate of said Railway Teamsters' Protective Union. Your orators further show that the Detroit Council of Trades and Labor Unions is the Detroit branch of a national association, and that its officers are John Davidson, president; Herbert Greville, vice president; Alex H. Smith, recording and cor |