ins & Farrell, for appellant. Mathews & Murphy, for respondents.

CORSON, P. J. This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court of Brookings county denying plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal taken from the judgment rendered by the justice of the peace. The same question is involved as in the appeal of Aultman, Miller & Co. v. Same Defendants, decided at this term, and reported in 77 N. W. 584; the only difference in the two cases being that the judgment rendered by the justice in this case was for $114.84, and the undertaking was in double that amount, instead of $220 in the former. This case was, by stipulation, submitted upon the same abstract and briefs as the former, and must therefore be ruled by that decision. The order of the circuit court is affirmed.

PILLAR v. RUNKEL, ROWLEY & CO. (Supreme Court of South Dakota. Dec. 17, 1898.) Appeal from circuit court, Meade county; A. J. Plowman, Judge. Attachment by Dexter Pillar against Runkel, Rowley & Co., a corporation organized and existing under the laws of South Dakota. From an order overruling a motion to discharge the attachment, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Rice & Polley and Burke & Goodner, for appellant. Smith & Brown, for respondent.

FULLER, J. As the record now before us presents questions of law and fact identical with the case of Chaffee v. This Defendant (S. D.) 77 N. W. 583, an opinion would be but a needless repetition. Controlled by the conclusion there reached, the order overruling a motion to discharge the attachment is affirmed.

WINONA MILL CO. v. STATE. (Supreme Court of South Dakota. Nov. 18, 1898.) Original action by the Union Mill Company against the state of South Dakota. Judgment for plaintiff. Horner & Stewart and A. W. Burtt, for plaintiff. The Attorney General, for the State.

HANEY, J. This action was submitted upon the pleadings and an agreed statement of facts, and argued in connection with the case of Van Dusen v. State (decided at this term) 77 N. W. 201. The questions of law involved are the same. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment for $340.75, with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent. per annum from August 15, 1893, together with the usual costs and disbursements.

BROWN v. HOPKINS et al. (Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Feb. 7, 1899.) For majority opinion, see 77 N. W. 899. MARSHALL, J. (dissenting). I think the limitation statutes mean that no proceedings of any kind, by execution or otherwise, shall be taken to enforce a judgment after the expiration of 20 years from its rendition; that the expiration of the limitation period extinguishes the judgment the same as a payment of it, leaving no foundation upon which an execution thereon can rest. The idea that an execution, a mere means for collecting a judgment, can have life after the judgment itself shall have been destroyed, is to the writer a most novel and unreasonable proposition.

The necessity usually existing in writing a dissenting opinion, of attempting to clear away the case made by authorities on the other side of the controversy, does not exist here. That lightens our labor. It will be observed that my brethren do not ground their position on authorities. None were cited by the appellant. None were discovered by the learned judge who wrote the opinion of the court. None by those who concur therein. The writer has not been able to discover any. That all probably results

from the fact that no authorities exist. In that situation, the decision of the court has the merit of meeting the question fairly and deciding it on the language of the statute, supported only by reasoning from seemingly false premises.

Section 4220, Rev. St., limits actions upon judgments to 20 years, and section 2968. Id., provides that, "in no case shall an execution be issued on any proceedings had upon any judg ment after twenty years from the time of the rendition thereof." As indicated above, the expiration of the period of limitation extinguishes. and for all purposes ends, the life of the obligation affected by it. That is the settled rule of this court. Brown v. Parker, 28 Wis. 21; Sprecker v. Wakeley. 11 Wis. 432: Knox v. Cleveland, 13 Wis. 245: Freem. Judgm. § 27a. That of itself would seem decisive of this case.

The court reasons that the issuance of the execution and proceedings thereon are independent of proceedings on the judgment strictly so called; that when an execution shall have issued, the enforcement of it is a proceeding on the execution, not on the judgment. That seems unreasonable in view of the fact that no proceedings upon a judgment could have been in legislative contemplation other than by execution, except an action upon the judgment, and that is covered by seetion 4220, Rev. St., limiting such an action to 20 years. The two sections of the statutes make a complete scheme of limitations as to judg ments, framed with scrupulous care to effectually destroy and end a judgment after the creditor shall have had a period of 20 years to enforce it. Freem. Ex'n, § 19.

The reasons given by my brethren for the conclusions reached are inexplicable to me. It is said that unless such conclusion be correct, no execution against real estate can be made effective unless issued nearly a year and a half before the expiration of the 20 years, because the sheriff must advertise the sale for 6 weeks, and then there is the 15 months allowed for redemption which must expire before the sale can be fully consummated by deed to the purchaser or his assignee. That suggestion shows, we assume, the principal reason for the decision of the court. The assumed result of a construction of the statute contrary to that reached by the court, was deemed so out of harmony with good reason as to warrant a conclusion that the legislature did not intend it. and it was considered that the language of the section admits of a different and more reasonable construction. Remove the premises upon which the reasoning referred to is based and the decision must necessarily fall as a result. Now it is not true that there must be a subsisting judgment during the period of redemption. Further, it is not possible that there should be such a subsisting judgment. The sale to satisfy the judgment is inconsistent with its remaining unsatisfied for any length of time after the sale. A sale of real estate on an execution, for the amount called for by it, satisfies it and satisfies the judgment as well. This court has decided that question and it is elementary. Ingraham v. Champion, 84 Wis. 235. 54 N. W. 398. There it will appear that the court held that no proceedings were proper to revive or renew a judgment after a sale to satisfy it, because there was nothing left for the proceedings to rest upon. There was no longer any judgment or any basis for a judgment. The deed that follows the sale on execution is based on the sale, not in any sense on the judgment. except as of the time of the sale itself. The sale and issuance of the certificate fix absolutely the rights of the purchaser. That we deem to be elementary, and to have been overlooked. A judgment can no more exist after a sale for enough to pay it, than the execution can exist after the satisfaction of the judgment. They are mutually dependent upon each other. Benj. Sales, 478. Further on the subject before treated, that no proceeding to collect a judgment can be had on execution after the judgment shall have been extinguished, see Kennedy v. Dunck

lee, 1 Gray, 65; Laval v. Rowley, 17 Ind. 36; State v. Salyers, 19 Ind. 432; Wood v. Colvin, 2 Hill, 566.

Thus, it will be seen that it is only necessary that a judgment should live for a period of about six weeks after the issuance of an execution in order to allow a valid sale to be made within the life of the judgment-not a year and a half, so the significant reason advanced by my brethren, for the construction of the statute adopted, disappears.

Having now shown that the running of the statute of limitations upon a judgment extinguishes it, that there can be no proceeding on an execution issued on a judgment after it shall have been extinguished, and met successfully the chief and only reason for the decision dissented from, we will review briefly authorities elsewhere on the general and kindred subjects, and let that close this opinion.

In the first place we will refer to Ingraham v. Champion, supra. That is of far greater significance, it would seem, than my brethren attribute to it. The sale there was made just before the expiration of the 20 years. There was a question as to whether the land was subject to sale for the payment of the judgment. The purchaser desired to test that question within the life of the judgment, so that if the sale should prove fruitless the judgment might still stand as a valid indebtedness. There is where the idea is suggested, of the necessity of a judgment being kept alive during the period of redemption, because, as it was said, the purchaser at the execution sale could not be in a position to test the question of whether he really obtained anything or not by the sale till the expiration of the period of redemption, and the obtaining of a deed upon which proceedings could be instituted. The idea was advanced by the parties who wished to keep the judgment alive, and in reply to that the court said that the sale extinguished the judgment; it left nothing to be kept alive; the execution did not continue the judgment beyond the period of 20 years from its rendition. True, my brethren are not affected by that, necessarily, because they say that though the judgment be necessary to the issuance of an execution, it is not necessary to the continuance of the life of the execution; that having been given life it continues notwithstanding that upon which its validity depends has been removed. But as we have shown, the settled law is that an existing judgment is absolutely necessary to a sale on execution, hence when the court decided that an execution cannot extend a judgment beyond the 20-year limitation of its life, it decided just as clearly that a sale of real estate under an execution must take place within the statutory period if at all. That rule would not necessarily apply to a levy upon personal property made within the 20-year period. but not realized on till afterwards, because in that case, by the weight of authority, it is the levy that satisfies the judgment, conditionally, not the sale. In case of real estate there is no levy. Everything after the period of 10 years from the date of the judgment, that being the time when the lien judgment itself terminates, depends on the sale and nothing passes, except the interest of the judgment debtor, to which the judgment itself can attach at the instant of the sale. Then there must exist-First, a valid subsisting judg ment; second, an interest of the debtor in the land which is the proposed subject of sale; third, a valid execution and valid proceedings thereunder. Collins v. Smith, 75 Wis. 392. 44 N. W. 510; Shafer v. Insurance Co., 53 Wis. 361, 10 N. W. 381; Hammel v. Insurance Co., 54 Wis. 72, 11 N. W. 349.

This opinion might well rest alone on Ingraham v. Champion and Collins v. Smith, supra. If they decide anything at all they decide that it takes an existing valid judgment to support an execution sale, and that by the sale the judgment is extinguished. Necessarily, if such be the case there can be no sale to extinguish

the judgment, already extinguished by some oth

er means.

Attention to the holdings elsewhere shows that the rule is universally recognized that an execution neither extends nor revives a judgment. There are many such cases. We refer to a few of them: Mullikin v. Duvall, 7 Gill & J. 355; Johnson v. Hines, 61 Md. 122; Davis v. Ehrman, 20 Pa. St. 256; Isaac v. Swift, 10 Cal. 71; Bagley v. Ward, 37 Cal. 121; Rogers v. Druffel, 46 Cal. 654. Such cases are all to the effect that an execution is a mere means of collecting the judgment, or enforcing the judgment lien, and that a sale passes only such interest as attaches to the subject of the sale under the judgment at the time of the sale; that the execution of itself does not create a lien, or extend a lien, or support a sale. In Bagley v. Ward, supra, the court said, in substance, that the issuance of an execution and levy thereunder, neither extends an old lien nor acquires a new one; that the sale carries to the purchaser just such interest as may be represented by a then-existing judgment. It is held that an execution does not affect the judgment, basing the doctrine on the ground that the opposite rule would operate to extend the judgment lien beyond the statutory period. That same reasoning applies very forcibly to the idea that an execution can extend the judgment itself beyond the statutory period.

To recapitulate: First, the expiration of the limitation, upon proceedings to enforce a judg ment or to renew it, extinguishes it; second, an execution dies with the extinguishment of the judgment upon which it was issued; third, a subsisting judgment is necessary at the instant of the sale of realty upon an execution, but is extinguished by the sale; fourth, after the sale of realty upon execution, the right of the purchaser is referable to the certificate of sale, not to a subsisting judgment after the sale; fifth. as there can be no sale after the judgment shall have been extinguished, the sale in question was void as held by the circuit court, and the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.

GLOVER v. HYNES LUMBER CO. et al. (Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Nov. 22, 1898.) Appeal from circuit court, Portage county: Charles M. Webb, Judge. Action by William F. Glover against the Hynes Lumber Company and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed. Tomkins & Merrill, for appellants. Cate, Sanborn, Lamoreux & Park. for respondent.

BARDEEN, J. A former judgment in this action was reversed because the evidence failed to show how much of plaintiff's time and labor were spent in manufacturing the lumber upon which he claims a lien. 94 Wis. 457, 69 N. W. 62. The case has been retried, and the jury's verdict is for plaintiff, for $813.84 and interest. $642.38 of which, besides interest, is declared to be a lien upon the lumber described in the complaint. The defendants have appealed from the judgment, and claim that the verdict is not supported by the evidence. It would serve no useful purpose to state or discuss the evidence. The plaintiff was employed to do certain work as millwright in making permanent repairs on the mill, and afterwards as mill foreman and millwright. In the latter capacity, he rendered services in the manufacture of the lumber in question, and made repairs on the mill to keep it in running order. The time spent by him in the different kinds of work is sufficiently shown by the evidence to warrant the conclusion arrived at by the jury. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

LATIMER v. ANDRAE et al. (Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Nov. 22, 1898.) Appeal from circuit court, Dane county. Action by Harry D. Latimer against Julius Andrae and

Turnquist against Frank Hayes. From an or der overruling a demurrer to the complaint, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Ross, Dwyer & Hanitch and George B. Hudnall, for appellant. O'Brien & Vaughn, for respondent.

CASSODAY, C. J. This is an appeal from an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint for personal injury, alleging substantially the same facts as the complaint in the case of Anderson v. Hayes (decided herewith) 77 N. W. 891. For the reasons given in the opinion in that case, the order of the superior court for Douglas county is affirmed.

ABANDONMENT.

Of particular persons or personal relations. See "Husband and Wife," § 3.

Of particular species of property or rights. See "Highways," § 1.

ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL. Substitution of parties, see "Parties," § 2. § 1. Another action pending.

Replevin pending against a carrier by one claiming property shipped held no cause for abatement of action against carrier by another party not in privity with plaintiff in the first action.-Roberts v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (Wis.) 151.

§ 2. Revival of action.

Service of a conditional order of revivor must be in the same manner as a summons, and it seems that service on the attorney of record is insufficient unless a summons may be so served.—Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Fox (Neb.) 130. When revivor is sought by conditional order, the hearing in pursuance thereof is the proper occasion to try the right of the successor.-Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Fox (Neb.)

130.

ABUTTING OWNERS.

Assessments for expenses of public improvements, see "Municipal Corporations," $$ 5-10. Compensation for taking of or injury to lands or easements for public use, see "Eminent Domain," § 3.

ACCEPTANCE.

Of goods sold within statute of frauds, see "Frauds, Statute of," § 2.

Of order as requisite to validity, see "Bills and Notes," § 1.

ACCESSION.

Annexation of personal to real property, see "Fixtures."

ACCESSORIES.

Criminal responsibility, see "Criminal Law," § 1. 77 N.W.-71

Pendency of action, see "Lis Pendens." Restraining action at law, see "Injunction," § 1.

Set-off, see "Set-Off and Counterclaim."
Actions between parties in particular relations.
See "Master and Servant," § 8; "Partnership,"

§ 2.

Actions by or against particular classes of parties.

See "Corporations," § 4; "Counties," § 3; "Executors and Administrators,' § 6; "Infants," § 1; "Partnership," § 3; "Principal and Agent,' § 3; "Receivers," § 6; "Schools and School Districts," § 1; "States," § 3. Stockholders, see "Corporations," § 2. Taxpayers, see "Municipal Corporations," § 12. Trustees, see "Trusts," § 2.

Particular causes or grounds of action. See "Assault and Battery," § 1; "Bills and Notes," §7; "Bonds," § 3; "Forcible Entry and Detainer," § 1; "Insurance," § 15; "Malicious Prosecution." § 1; "Money Received"; "Taxation," § 4; "Torts."

Breach of contract, see "Sales," §§ 5, 6.

of covenant, see "Covenants," § 2.
of warranty, see "Sales," § 6.

Civil damages for sale of liquors, see "Intoxicating Liquors," § 6.

Discharge from employment, see "Master and Servant," § 1.

Personal injuries, see "Carriers," § 2; "Master and Servant," § 8; "Railroads," § 1. Price of goods, see "Sales," § 5.

of land, see "Vendor and Purchaser," § 4. Recovery of payment, see "Payment." § 3.

of tax paid, see "Taxation," § 3. Taking of or injury to property in exercise of power of eminent domain, see "Eminent DoWrongful attachment, see "Attachment," § 9.

main," § 3.

Particular forms of action.

See "Assumpsit, Action of"; "Ejectment"; "Real Actions"; "Replevin"; "Trover and Conversion."

Particular forms of special relief. See "Account"; "Creditors' Suit"; "Divorce"; "Injunction"; "Quieting Title"; "Specific Performance."

Alimony, see "Divorce," § 4.
Cancellation of written instrument, see "Cancel-

lation of Instruments."

Confirmation of tax title, see "Taxation," § 7.
Construction of will, see "Wills," § 4.

Determination of adverse claims to real properey, see "Quieting Title."

Enforcement or foreclosure of lien, see "Mechanics' Liens," § 4.

Establishment and enforcement of right of homestead, see "Homestead," § 4.

and enforcement of trust, see "Trusts," § 2. of boundaries, see "Boundaries," § 2. Removal of cloud on title, see "Quieting Title." Setting aside assignment for benefit of creditors, see "Assignments for Benefit of Creditors," $3.

Trial of tax title, see "Taxation," § 7.

Particular proceedings in actions. See "Appearance"; "Costs"; "Damages"; "Depositions"; "Dismissal and Nonsuit"; "Evidence"; "Execution"; "Judgment"; "Judicial Sales"; "Jury"; "Limitation of Actions"; "Motions"; "Parties"; "Pleading"; "Process"; "Reference"; "Stipulations"; "Trial"; "Venue."

Nonsuit, see "Trial," § 4.

Revival, see "Abatement and Revival," § 2.

Particular remedies in or incident to actions. See "Attachment"; "Garnishment"; "Injunction"; "Receivers"; "Tender."

Notice of pendency of action, see "Lis Pendens." Stay of proceedings, see "Appeal and Error," 8 7.

Proceedings in exercise of special jurisdictions. Courts of limited jurisdiction in general, see "Courts," § 4.

Criminal prosecutions, see "Criminal Law."
Suits in equity, see "Equity."

Distinction between law and equity is not one form of action in which rights under law abolished by Code Civ. Proc. § 2, providing for and equity may both be enforced.-Hopkins v. Washington County (Neb.) 53.

An action for double rent, under Rev. St. § 2185, held an action on implied contract, and not in tort.-State v. Helms (Wis.) 194.

§ 3. Joinder, splitting, consolidation, and severance.

ties on separate bonds in an action against their Facts held not to authorize the joining of sureprincipal.-People v. Sheehan (Mich.) 88.

Where, on appeal from judgment against joint defendants in justice court, there is found to be no joint liability, action should abate.-Wright v. Reinelt (Mich.) 246.

Two causes of action on separate contracts cannot be united unless each affects all parties made. defendant.-Barry v. Wachosky (Neb.) 1080.

ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW. Effect on jurisdiction of equity, see "Equity," § 1.

ADJOINING LANDOWNERS.

See "Fences"; "Party Walls."

ADJUDICATION.

Of courts in general, see "Courts," § 2.

ADJUSTMENT.

Of loss within insurance policy, see "Insurance,” § 12.

ADMINISTRATION.

Of estate assigned for benefit of creditors, see "Assignments for Benefit of Creditors," § 2. of decedent, see "Executors and Administrators."

ADOPTION.

After adoption proceedings have been submitted to by petitioners as valid, they are estopped from changing their position to the prejudice of the child.-Parsons v. Parsons (Wis.)

147.

In adoption proceedings, notice to parent who has abandoned his child is unnecessary to confer jurisdiction.-Parsons v. Parsons (Wis.) 147.

On filing a statutory petition to adopt child. the county judge acquires jurisdiction, and a determination on insufficient evidence will not affect such jurisdiction.-Parsons v. Parsons (Wis.) 147.

Peace," § 2.

Review of proceedings.

ADULTERATION.

ADVANCEMENTS.

of the Peace," § 3; "New Trial."

§ 1. Grounds and conditions precedent.

ADVERSE CLAIM.

§ 2. Nature and form.

Where possession of property is obtained under contract, and a refusal to deliver amounts to a conversion, held, that the tort might be

ADVERSE POSSESSION.

See, also, "Limitation of Actions."

§ 1. Nature and requisites.

Where land was conveyed to a husband and wife, who occupied it together and jointly shar