serve any good purpose nor form any precedent in other cases. We think the judge reached the correct conclusion, and the decree is affirmed, with costs. The other justices concurred.

bringing into court $701.75 for Mr. Chope; and, after a full hearing in open court, the circuit judge decreed as follows: (1) Complainant's bill was dismissed, with costs; (2) awarded to Chope the $701.75, paid into court, and $12.25, interest on same, which was made a lieu on complainant's interest; (3) decreed Chope to be the owner of an equal undivided half of the contract property, and Bolton the owner of the otber hall; (4) decreed that a physical division of the property cannot be bad; (5) appointed complainant and defendant joint receivers of the property, and directed a sale thereof to the highest bidder for cash, after twenty days' notice. The questions involved are purely ques. tions of fact. A careful reading of the entire record and briefs of counsel shows an utter failure on the part of the complainant to establish a case for relief. It discloses that he understood fully the arrangement of January 22, 1837, when it was made, and desired to make it. It is urged that, as no proof was offered that a physical division of the property cannot be had, the decree in that respect was wrong. It is true, no testimony was offered for that specific purpose, but the record is full of proof tending to establish that fact. A discussion of these ques. tions of fact would not profit any one.

The decree is affirmed, with costs. The other justices concurred.

BOLTON V. CHOPE. (Supreme Court of Michigan. Dec. 13, 1898.) Appeal from circuit court, Wayne county, in chancery; Sherman B. Daboli, Judge. Bill in chancery by Frederick H. Bolton against Robert L. Chope. From a decree dismissing the bill, and granting the relief prayed for in defendant's cross bill, complainant appeals. Afhrined. George W. Radiord, for appellant. Alfred Lucking, for appellee.

MOORE, J. Complainant filed a bill in this case asking for an accounting and for specific performance. Defendant answered complainant's bill, denying the allegations therein contained, and asked that his answer be treated as a cross bill, and prayed for affirmative relief. The circuit judge dismissed the bill of complaint, and granted the relief prayed for in the cross bill. From this decree, complainant has appealed. In November, 1891, the complainant and one Alvord formed a partnership under the firm name of Alvord & Co. for the purpose of buying, selling, and manufacturing office supplies. This partnership was to continue five years. After the expiration of the five years, the firm continued to do business, though the articles of partnership were not renewed. In 1894, the defendant, who was the owner and inventor of machines for making coin cases, was engaged in business under the name of the Bankers’ Coin Case Company. In May, 1894, an arrangement was made by which Chope sold to Alvord & Bolton the business of the Bankers' Coin Case Company, its plant, stock, and good will, and all inventions and patents owned by it, for $10,000; $500 to be paid upon the making of the contract, and $200 or more each month thereafter, with interest until all was paid. The payments were made until January, 1897, when $6,700 had been paid upon the contract. At this time, Alvord had furnished $755, and the balauce had nearly all been paid out of the business. The active partner was Mr. Bolton. Mr. Alvord was a photographer, and did not spend much time with the business, but he made no charge for his services, while Mr. Bolton drew out of the concern, first, his expenses, and then $50 a month. The articles of partnership treated the members of the firm as equal partners, and the record discloses they so treated each other. In January, 1897, Mr. Chope bought Mr. Alvord's interest in the business, for which he paid $2,500. At the same time, the following writing was executed: “Detroit, Mich., Jan'y 22, 1897. For a valuable consideration, and under mutual agreement, between the parties to the foregoing contract, we hereby release Charles E. Alvord from the terms and obligations of the foregoing contract; and I, Frederick II. Bolton, hereby agree to carry out and assume the obligations of said contract, and to receive a one-half interest in said contract for my interest therein, and all rights, patents, and claims covered thereby when said contract is fully completed; and I, Robert L. (hope, hereby agree that said Frederick H. Bolton shall so assume said contract, and said Alvord he released as above stated. [Signed] Frederick H. Bolton. Robert L. Chope. Charles E. Alvord.” After this paper was executed, Mr. Bolton continued to manage the business, and made payments upon the conte tract, until all but $700 of the principal was paid. He then tendered to Mr. Chope the $700 and interest, and demanded from him a receipt in full of the balance due on the contract made by him with Alvord & Bolton, and a conveyance to Bolton of the entire business, plant, stock, and patents. Mr. Chope, claiming to own a half interest therein, offered to convey one half interest, but declined to convey the whole interest. The complainant then filed this bill,

CHICAGO & W. M. RY. CO. 7. COMMISSIONER OF RAILROADS. (Supreme Court of Michigan. Dec. 28, 1898.) Original mandamus proceeding by the Chicago & West Michigan Railway Company against Sy brant Wesselius, the commissioner of railroads. Denied. Smith, Nims, Hoyt & Erwin, for relator. Fred A. Maynard, Atty. Gen., for respondent.

PER CURIAM. This case presents the general question as to whether the sum received by a railroad company for switching cars should be treated by the railroad commissioner as a part of its gross earnings. The case is ruled by Detroit, G. R. & W. R. Co. r. Commissioner or Railroads (rendered herewith) 77 N. W. 631.

RICHARDS v. McCORMICK et al.

(Supreme Court of Michigan. Dec. 13, 1898.) Appeal from circuit court, Wayne county, in chancery; Sherman B. Daboll, Judge. This is a suit in equity by Frank E. Richards, a judgment creditor, against James C. McCormick and others,

to reach property claimed to have been fraudulently transferred. Complainant recovered judgment for $208.70 against the defendants James and Hugh McCormick, Jr., who were engaged in the grocery and meat business. They failed, and transferred the goods to defendant Hugh McCormick, Sr., their father, for the consideration of $1,100. It appears to be conceded that he advanced $500 for the purchase of the stock, and that he paid $600 in cash at the time of the transfer. It is conceded that $1,100 was the fair value of the stock. Complainant's indebtedness was incurred before the transfer, but was not due until some time afterwards. It is contended by complainant that the $500 was not a loan, but a gift, and that the father is liable as trustee of the same to the sons' creditors. The case was heard on pleadings and proofs, and de. cree rendered for the defendants. Complainant appeals. Reversed. Henry B. Graves, for appellant. John J. Jackson, for appellees.

GRANT, C. J. (after stating the facts as above). Upon the hearing, complainant introduced the testimony of defendant Hugh leCormick, Sr., taken in another case, in December, 1895, in which it is claimed he testified that this $500 was a gift to his son, and not a loan, and rested. The defendant was then sworn in his own behalf, and testified that the $500 was loaned. The question presented is one entirely of fact, viz. whether the court should have found that the defendant gave his son the money.

His former testimony cannot be well construed to mean anything else than that he desired to help his son start in business, and made a gift to him of this $500 for that purpose. The stock to this amount was therefore subject to the claims of creditors. Decree reversed, with costs of both courts, and decree rendered for complainant. The other justices concurred.

HEALY V. MANNHEIMER et al. (Supreme Court of Minnesota. Nov. 17, 1898.) Appeal from district court, Ramsey county; Charles E. Otis, Judge. Action by Katherine Healy against Robert Mannheimer and others. Verdict for plaintiff. From an order denying a new trial, defendants appeal. Affirmed. C. D. & Thos. D. O'Brien, for appellants. James J. McCafferty, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. This case involves the same questions as the case of Healy v. Mannheimer (decided at the present term) 76 N. W. 1126, and is ruled by it. The order appealed from is therefore affirmed.

STATE ex rel. ROSEWATER v. HOLCOMB, Governor. (Supreme Court of Nebraska. Nov. 17, 1898.) Application by the state, on the relation of Victor Rosewater, for a writ of mandamus against Silas A. Holcomb, governor of the state of Nebraska. Writ denied. E. W. Simeral, for relator. C. J. Smyth, Atty. Gen., and Ed. P. Smith, Dep. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

PER CURIAM. This action was to compel the respondent to perform certain duties claimed to devolve upon him by virtue of his office. In State v. Moores (Neb.) 76 N. W. 175, it was held that the act of the legislature of 1897 (Laws 1897, p. 124, c. 10, SS 166-168), in so far as it assumes to confer authority upon the governor to appoint fire and police commissioners in cities of the metropolitan class, is void. The duty of which it is now sought to compel the performance depends for its exercise upon the force of the statute above referred to, and, as the statute is void, no such duty exists, and therefore its performance cannot be controlled by mandamus. The writ is therefore denied.

LYNN V. KING et al. (Supreme Court of Minnesota. Jan. 25, 1899.) Action by Anna V. Lynn against Joseph King and others. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant H. W. Thompson, administrator of the estate of Francis Parks, appeals. Reversed.

BUCK, J. There is but one paper book in this case, and that of Lynn v. Hanson, 77 N. W. 976, herewith decided adversely to the plaintiff. The cases were argued at the same time, and upon substantially the same state of facts. Following the ruling in the Hanson Case, the note in controversy must be deemed paid, and the mortgage satistied, and the judgment reversed, and new trial ordered.

BEST v. BARRETT et al. (Supreme Court of North Dakota. June 2, 1898.)

ELEVATORS-STORAGE RECEIPTS--REPLEVIN. Case governed by decision in Best v. Muir (decided at the same time) 77 N. W. 95.

Appeal from district court, Cass county; William B. McConnell, Judge.

Action by William H. Best against L. C. Barrett and others. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Seth Newman and Newman & Stambaugh, for appellant. Pollock & Scott, for respondents.

CORLISS, C. J. This case is controlled by our decision in Best v. Muir (which has just been decided) 77 N. W. 95. The judgment of the district court is atlirmed. All concur.

CITY OF OMAHA v. FLOOD. (Supreme Court of Nebraska. Dec. 8, 1898.)

Public IMPROVEMENTS-DAMAGES. On the authority of City of Omaha v. Flood (Neb.) 77 N. W. 379, the judgment of the district court in this case is reversed.

Error to district court, Douglas county; Ferguson, Judge.

Action by Andrew Flood against the city of Omaha. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Reversed.

W. J. Connell, for plaintiff in error. F. W. Fitch, for defendant in error.

RAGAN, C. The facts in this case are the same as those in City of Omaha v. Flood, 77 N. W. 379; and, upon the authority of that case, the judgment of the district court in this is reversed. Reversed.

AULTMAN, MILLER & CO. F. NELSON et al. (Supreme Court of South Dakota. Jan. 25, 1899.) Appeal from circuit court, Brookings county; Julian Bennett, Judge. Action in a justice court by Aultman, Miller & Co. against Andrew Nelson and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant Niels Jenson appealed to the circuit court. From an order therein overruling a motion to dismiss the appeal, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Jenkins & Farrell, for appellant. Mathews & Murphy, for respondents.

CORSON, P. J. This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court of Brookings county denying plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal taken from the judgment rendered by the justice of the peace. The same question is involved as in the appeal of Aultman, Miller & Co. v. Same Defendants, decided at this term, and reported in 77 N. W. 584; the only difference in the two cases being that the judgment rendered by the justice in this case was for $ 114.61 and the undertaking was in double that amount, instead of $220 in the former. This case was, by stipulation, submitted upon the same abstract and briefs as the former, and must therefore be ruled by that decision. The order of the circuit court is atlirmed.

FEIL V. STAACK. (Supreme Court of Nebraska. Dec. 22, 1898.) INTOXICATING LIQLOKS-License-APPLICATIOS.

The propositions of law announced in Feil v. Hotel Co. (Web.) 77 N. W. 311, affirmed.

Ippeal from district court, Douglas county; Baker, Judge.

Action by N. P. Feil against F. A. W. Staack. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

E. W. Simeral, for appellant. Hall & McCulloch, for appellee.

NORVAL, J. The questions involved are identical with those determined in Feil v. Hotel Co. (Neb.) 77 N. W. 31; and, for the reasons stated in the opinion filed therein, the judgment of the district court in the present case is attirmed.

AULTMAN, MILLER & CO. V. NELSON et al. (Supreme Court of South Dakota. Jan. 25, 1899.) Appeal from circuit court, Brookings county; Julian Bennett, Judge. Action in a justice court by Aultman, Miller & Co. against Andrew Nelson and another. From a judgment, there was an appeal to the circuit court; and, from an order therein denying plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal, it appeals. Affirmed. Jeukins & Farrell, for appellant. Mathews & Mur. phy, for respondents.

CORSON, P. J. This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court of Brookings county denying plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal taken from the judgment rendered by the justice of the peace. The same question is involved as in the appeal of Aultman, Miller & Co. v. Same Defendants, decided at this term, and reported in 77 N. W. 581; the only difference in the two cases being that the judgment rendered by the justice in this case was for $114.81, and the undertaking was in double that amount, instead of $220 in the former. This case was, by stipulation, submitted upon the same abstract and briefs as the former, and must therefore be ruled by that decision. The order of the circuit court is attirmed.

PILLAR V. RUNKEL, ROWLEY & CO. (Supreme Court of South Dakota. Dec. 17, 1898.) Appeal from circuit court, Meade county; A. J. Plowman, Judge. Attachment by Dexter Pillar against Runkel, Rowley & Co., a corporation organized and existing under the laws of South Dakota. From an order overruling a motion to discharge the attachment, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Rice & Polley and Burke & Goodner, for appellant. Smith & Brown, for respondent.

FULLER, J. As the record now before us presents questions of law and fact identical with the case of Chaffee v. This Defendant (S. D.) 77 N. W. 583, an opinion would be but a needless repetition. Controlled by the conclusion there reached, the order overruling a motion to discharge the attachment is affirmed.

WINONA MILL CO. v. STATE. (Supreme Court of South Dakota. Nov. 18, 1898.) Original action by the Union Mill Company against the state of South Dakota. Judgment for plaintiff. Horner & Stewart and A. W. Burtt, for plaintiff. The Attorney General, for the State.

HANEY, J. This action was submitted upon the pleadings and an agreed statement of facts, and argued in connection with the case of Van Dusen v. State (decided at this term) 77 N. W. 201. The questions of law involved are the same. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment for $310.75, with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent. per annum from August 15, 1893, together with the usual costs and disbursements.

from the fact that no authorities exist. In that situation, the decision of the court has the merit of meeting the question fairly and deciding it on the language of the statute, supported only by reasoning from seemingly false premises.

Section 4220, Rev. St., limits actions upon judgments to 20 years, and section 2968, Id., provides that, "in no case shall an execution be issued on any proceedings had upon any judgment after twenty years from the time of the rendition thereof." As indicated above, the er piration of the period of limitation extinguishes, and for all purposes ends, the life of the obligation affected by it. That is the settled rule of this court. Brown v. Parker, 28 Wis. 21; Sprecker v. Wakeley, 11 Wis. 432; Knox v. Cleveland, 13 Wis. 245; Freem. Judgm. $ 27a. That of itself would seem decisive of this case.

The court reasons that the issuance of the execution and proceedings thereon are independent of proceedings on the judgment strictly so called; that when an execution shall have issued, the enforcement of it is a proceeding on the execution, not on the judgment. That seems unreasonable in view of the fact that no proceedings upon a judgment could have been in legislative contemplation other than by execution, except an action upon the judgment, and that is covered by seetion 4220. Rev. St., limiting such an action to 20 years. The two sections of the statutes make a complete scheme of limitations as to judg. ments, framed with scrupulous care to effectually destroy and end a judgment after the creditor shall have had a period of 20 years to enforce it. Freem. Ex'ı, $ 19.

The reasons given by my brethren for the conclusions reached are inexplicable to me. It is said that unless such conclusion be correct, no execution against real estate can be made effective unless issued nearly a year and a half before the expiration of the 20 years. because the sheriff must advertise the sale for 6 weeks, and then there is the 15 months allowed for pe. demption which must expire before the sale can be fully consummated by deed to the purchaser or his assignee. That suggestion shows, we assume, the principal reason for the decision of the court. The assumed result of a construction of the statute contrary to that reached by the court, was deemed so out of harmony with good reason as to warrant a conclusion that the legislature did not intend it. and it was considered that the language of the section admits of a different and more reasonable construction. Re move the premises upon which the reasoning referred to is based and the decision must necessarily fall as a result. Now it is not true that there must be a subsisting judgment during the period of redemption. Further, it is not possible that there should be such a subsisting judgment. The sale to satisfy the judgment is inconsistent with its remaining unsatisfied for any length of time after the sale. A sale of real estate on an execution, for the amount called for by it, satisfies it and satisfies the judgment as well. This court has decided that question and it is ele. mentary. Ingraham v. Champion, 81 Wis. 235. 54 N. W. 398. There it will appear that the court held that no proceedings were proper to revive or renew a judgment after a sale to satisfy it, because there was nothing left for the proceedings to rest upon. There was no longer auy judgment or any basis for a judgment. The deed that follows the sale on execution is based on the sale, not in any sense on the judgment, except as of the time of the sale itself. The sale and issuance of the certificate fix absolutely the rights of the purchaser. That we deem to be elementary, and to have been overlooked. A judgment can no more exist after a sale for enough to pay it, than the execution can exist after the satisfaction of the judgment. They are mutually dependent upon each other. Benj. Sales, $ 478. Further on the subject before treated, that no proceeding to collect a judgment can be had on execution after the judgment shall have been extinguished, see Kennedy v. Dunck.

BROWN v. HOPKINS et al. (Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Feb. 7, 1899.) For majority opinion, see 77 N. W. 899.

MARSHALL, J. (dissenting). I think the limitation statutes mean that no proceedings of any kind, by execution or otherwise, shall be taken to enforce a judgment after the expiration of 20 years from its rendition; that the expiration of the limitation period extinguishes the judgment the same as a payment of it, leaving no foundation upon which an execution thereon can rest. The idea that an execution, a mere means for collecting a judgment, can have life after the judgment itself shall have been destroyed, is to the writer a most novel and unreasonable proposition.

The necessity usually existing in writing a dissenting opinion, of attempting to clear away the case made by authorities on the other side of the controversy, does not exist here. That lightens our labor. It will be observed that my brethren do not ground their position on authorities. None were cited by the appellant. None were discovered by the learned judge who wrote the opinion of the court. None by those who concur therein. The writer has not been able to discover any. That all probably results