Iowa.) MEMORANDUM DECISIONS. duced evidence to show that, when the offense was committed, he was absent, and so could not have done that with which he is charged. No juror is so obtuse as to be unable to understand that, when a person is accused of shooting another on the street, proof that the accused was at the time in a house at such distance that he could not have done the act charged constitutes a complete defense; in other words, that, if he could not have done the act, it must be presumed that he did not do it. There was offered on behalf of the accused an instruction that, if the proof with reference to an alibi left a reasonable doubt in the judgment of the jury as to the guilt of the accused, there should be an acquittal. The instruction was refused, and properly so, for on its own motion the court had given an instruction to the same effect. It is urged that there was error in the refusal to give the third instruction asked on behalf of the accused. It was as follows: "In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes every one charged with the commission of a crime to be innocent; and this legal presumption of innocence is a matter of evidence, to the benefit of which the defendants are entitled in this case." In its second instruction the court used this language: "You are instructed that the defendants have been arraigned on said information, and have pleaded not guilty, and the plea of not guilty by the defendants casts upon the state the burden of establishing by evidence all the material allegations in said information, as hereinafter explained to you, beyond a reasonable doubt, before you would be warranted in returning a verdict of guilty against them. The law presumes the defendants innocent, and this presumption continues throughout the trial until they are proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." In respect to an instruction which embodied the same principle as that found in the one requested and refused, this court, in Bartley v. State, supra, said: "The request is in accord with the holding in Long v. State, 23 Neb. 33, 36 N. W. 310, where it was stated, following Garrison v. People, 6 Neb. 285, that the legal presumption of innocence was a matter of evidence, to the benefit of which the accused was entitled. same principle embraced in this request was laid down in the sixth instruction given in the case at bar by the court on its own motion, which reads thus: "The law raises no presumption against the defendant. On the contrary, the presumption of law is in favor of his innocence. This presumption of innocence continues through the trial until every material allegation in the information is established by the evidence, to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt.' The Garrison v. People, supra. The instruction in that case to which it will be your duty, as no doubt it will be held that the language quoted fully recogniz- It is complained, finally, that the judge did not embody certain affidavits proposed as a part of the bill of exceptions. Without considering whether, in any case, such a question could be decided by this court, it must subserve every present purpose to say that the proposed amendments could have cut no figure in this case; for, in the view which we have taken, the question sought to be presented is immaterial. There are no other questions argued in the brief, and the judgment of the district court is affirmed. MEMORANDUM DECISIONS. CLARK v. SCOTT et al. (Supreme Court of Appeal from district Iowa. Dec. 17, 1898.) court, Lyon county; William Hutchinson, Judge. L. F. Scott was the owner of lot 4, block 20, Bower's addition to Doon, Iowa. He conveyed the same to his co-defendant, C. P. Scott. The plaintiff holds a judgment against L. F. Scott, and this action is to subject the lot in question to the payment of the judgment. The district court granted the relief prayed, and the defendants appealed. Affirmed. Parsons & Riniker, for appellants. M. W. Herrick and Greenleaf & Greenleaf, for appellee. It is not contended in this PER CURIAM. court but that L. F. Scott has an interest in the real estate, and that, to the extent of his interest, there should be a decree subjecting it to the payment of the judgment. It is, however, insisted that the conveyance was made to C. P. Scott as security for money advanced by him to L. F. Scott, and that such interest of C. P. Scott It is probably true that should be protected. money was so advanced or loaned by C. P. Scott to L. F. Scott; but it is quite apparent that the conveyance of the lot was without reference to such indebtedness, and to be conveyed back at the instance of L. F. Scott, and that a deed was made to convey back, in pursuance of such understanding, but not recorded, if even delivered. The fact of fraud in the transaction, to keep the property from the payment of the debt of plaintiff, is made clear. The judgment is affirmed. EVANS v. DAVENPORT CONSOL. GAS, ELECTRIC LIGHT & STEAM-HEATING CO. (Supreme Court of Iowa. Dec. 17, 1898.) Appeal from district court, Scott county; C. M. Waterman, Judge. The defendant company was engaged in blasting rock. The plaintiff was on a load of baled hay, and was thrown therefrom, and injured, by his team taking fright because of a blast of rock by defendant, claimed to have been negligently made. The cause was tried to a jury, who returned a verdict for plaintiff. The defendant appealed. Affirmed. E. M. Sharon, for appellant. Heintz & Fisher, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The case involves no question of law not settled in this state. The evidence sustains the verdict. The motion for a new trial was properly overruled. Affirmed. HYMAN et al. v. ARENBURG (twelve cases). (Supreme Court of Iowa. Dec. 17, 1898.) Appeal from district court, Webster county; D. R. Hindman, Judge. H. J. Clark and Carr & Parker, for appellant. Wright & Nugent and Botsford, Healy & Healy, for appellees. PER CURIAM. Plaintiff, Hyman, brought this action, aided by attachment, against 'S. L. Arenburg, to recover $4,443.78, paid by him as surety for defendant. The attachment was levied upon a stock of merchandise held by the defendant. P. Arenburg intervened, claiming the entire stock by virtue of a chattel mortgage executed to him to secure the payment of $6,000 borrowed money. A. Abraham & Co. also brought their action, aided by attachment, against S. L. Arenburg, to recover for goods sold and delivered, and this attachment was levied upon the same stock. The other parties to this action severally commenced actions in replevin, to recover parts of said stock of merchandise sold by them, respectively, to S. L. Arenburg, alleging that the purchase had been so fraudulently procured that no title had passed to S. L. Arenburg. P. Arenburg intervened in each of these cases, claiming the goods under his mortgage, and all of said cases were consolidated with the case of Joseph Hyman against S. L. Arenburg, and tried as in equity. Pending these proceedings, J. D. Hair, Esq., was appointed receiver, and disposed of the goods, retaining the proceeds, subject to the order and judgment of the courts. Judgments and decrees were entered in favor of the several plaintiffs, substantially as prayed. Decree was also rendered holding the mortgage of P. Arenburg "good against the said S. L. Arenburg, and as against him alone," without prejudice to claims not herein adjudicated. Judgment was rendered against P. Arenburg for costs, and from this judgment and decree he appeals. The only question presented on this appeal is whether the mortgage given by S. L. Arenburg to his father, P. Arenburg, was given without consideration, and to hinder, delay, and defraud the creditors of S. L. Arenburg. It would serve no good purpose to set out or discuss the evidence on this issue. It is sufficient to say that it fairly establishes the fraud alleged. It is quite clear that P. Arenburg did not possess anything like the sum of money it is claimed he loaned, and equally clear that S. L. Arenburg largely increased the stock of merchandise by purchases from the plaintiffs other than Mr. Hyman, in contemplation of the giving of this mortgage. It is seldom that an intent on the part of mortgagor and mortgagee to hinder, delay, and defraud creditors is more satisfactorily established. Affirmed. as SEBRING v. DES MOINES N. & W. RY. CO. (Supreme Court of Iowa. Dec. 17, 1898.. Appeal from district court, Boone county; D. R. Henderson, Judge. Plaintiff was the owner of some horses that passed through an open gate onto defendant's track, and were killed and injured by a passing train, and this action is for double their value. There is a judgment for plaintiff for $185, and the defendant appealed. Affirmed. Dyer & Stevens and Cummins, Hewitt & Wright, for appellant. Baker & Baker and Whitaker & Dale, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The legal propositions in this case have been frequently considered, and are well settled in favor of the court's action below. The only disputed question of fact is as to the gate, through which the horses went onto the track, being open in a way to render the company negligent because of it. The evidence is in plain and substantial conflict, so that the finding of the jury is conclusive. There is no question in the case that merits consideration in an opinion. The judgment is affirmed. STATE v. FOUST. (Supreme Court of Iowa. Dec. 17, 1898.) Appeal from district court. Linn county; H. M. Remley, Judge. The indictment charged the crime of breaking and entering. From a judgment entered upon a verdict of guilty, the defendant appeals. Affirmed. Clark & Clark, for appellant. Milton Remley, Atty. Gen., and J. M. Grimm, for the State. PER CURIAM. This case is submitted upon a printed abstract, prepared by appellant, without arguments for either party. We have carefully gone through the record, and discover no error that affords any substantial ground of complaint. Affirmed. STATE v. KENNEDY. (Supreme Court of Iowa. Dec. 14, 1898.) Appeal from district court, Polk county; W. F. Conrad, Judge. PER CURIAM. Defendant was convicted of an assault with intent to kill and murder Mrs. James Kennedy, and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment in the penitentiary, from which he appeals. Defendant insists that there is no evidence connecting him with the crime. The injured party, being defendant's wife, did not testify on the trial. No person testifies to witnessing the assault. Therefore the evidence on this point is circumstantial, yet sufficient to sustain the verdict. Objection is made to certain rulings on taking the testimony, but they were without prejudice to the defendant. Affirmed. BIRDSALL v. BIRDSALL. (Supreme Court of Michigan. Dec. 6, 1898.) Appeal from circuit court, Kent county, in chancery; William E. Grove, Judge. Bill by William H. Birdsall against Selina Birdsall to enforce the specific performance of a parol contract for a lease of land. William Birdsall died, testate, February 22, 1891, leaving a widow, the defendant, and five sons, including the complainant. He had made advances to all his sons, and, by his will, bequeathed the personal property to his wife, and the land, a farm of 80 acres, to her in trust. to have the use, income, and profit thereof for life. and also giving her the power to sell it if necessary for her support, and use the proceeds for that purpose. At her death, the farm, or, if sold, all the proceeds thereof unused, were to be divided among his five sons, in equal parts, except to one who, on account of the advancement to him, was to receive $1,000 less than each of the othPrevious to his death, he had leased the farm for two years to complainant, at a rental of $300 per year. After his death, and on April 1, 1891, defendant executed a new lease to complainant for three years for the same rental, ers. Mich.) MEMORANDUM DECISIONS. "That on which he was to be allowed three dollars a week for his mother's support. Plaintiff alleges that he was running behind, and in 1893 informed defendant that he should leave the farm, and that thereupon he made with her the agreement which he now seeks to enforce. This agreement is set forth in the bill of complaint in the following language: "Said Selina Birdsall proposed to your orator that he try the experiment of raising fruit upon a portion of said farm, and did then and there orally agree with your orator that in case he would remain on said farm, and renew his said lease, and would buy, pay for, plant, and care for, until their bearing period was reached, such a quantity of peach, pear, and cherry trees as he, your orator, saw fit to, that the same might be set out on the said farm, and should belong to, and be the absolute property of, your orator, and that she would renew her said lease to your orator from time to time during her natural life, for the same rental and on the same terms as the first lease so made from her to him as aforesaid, and that upon her death the said orchard should be the property Complainant alleges that he of your orator." performed the agreement, and set out some 982 fruit trees, which cost $166, and took care of them until he was ejected from the premises, in 1897. He alleges that this agreement was made in the fall of 1893. The defendant answered, denying all the material allegations of the bill, except that she ordered herself 100 cherry trees to be delivered in the spring of 1894, and asserts that she objected to the planting of the peach Proofs were taken in open and pear trees. court, and the learned circuit judge found the facts and entered a decree as follows: the complainant did, in the spring of 1894 and spring of 1895, set out upon the land of said defendant, Selina Birdsall, described in the bill of complaint filed herein, a cherry, peach, and pear orchard, of which there are now living and growing upon said premises 158 pear, 105 cherry, and 667 peach trees, of which peach trees 420 were set out in the spring of 1894, and 247 in the spring of 1895. That the value of said orchard is from $600 to $1,000. That in the spring of 1893 there were some peach trees heeled in upon the premises of said defendant, which said defendant supposed said complainant intended to set out upon her said place; and that, so supposing, she did at that time serve written notice upon said complainant, forbidding him from setting out said peach trees upon her said premises; and that the said complainant did thereafter set the same out upon a farm of his own, in the town of Walker, and disclaimed having any intention of setting the same out upon the premises of said defendant. That in the fall of 1893 the said defendant, at the suggestion of a fruittree agent, who was then at her house, ordered 100 cherry trees to be delivered in the spring of 1894; and that at the same time, but without the knowledge of said defendant, said complainant ordered the said pear trees and the greater part of the said peach trees; and said trees, including said cherry trees, were delivered to said complainant in the spring of 1894, and were brought by him to the premises of said defendant, and there heeled in, and the said complainant thereupon commenced to plow and prepare the ground for the setting of said trees. That the first notice or knowledge that said defendant had of the purchase of said trees by said complainant was when they were so hecled in, and the first notice or knowledge that said defendant had that said complainant intended to set said trees, other than said cherry trees, upon her said premises, was when he began to plow and prepare the ground therefor. That she at that time, and before he had set any of said trees, inquired of him, and was informed by him that he was going to set said peach and pear trees upon her land; and she thereupon forbade him from so doing, and told him not to do so. He at the same time asked her to sign a paper saying the trees should be his, which she refused to do, years of age, and testified that she did not an- serve any good purpose nor form any precedent in other cases. We think the judge reached the correct conclusion, and the decree is affirmed. with costs. The other justices concurred. BOLTON v. CHOPE. (Supreme Court of Michigan. Dec. 13, 1898.) Appeal from circuit court, Wayne county, in chancery; Sherman B. Daboll, Judge. Bill in chancery by Frederick H. Bolton against Robert L. Chope. From a decree dismissing the bill, and granting the relief prayed for in defendant's cross bill, complainant appeals. Affirmed. George W. Radford, for appellant. Alfred Lucking, for appellee. MOORE, J. Complainant filed a bill in this case asking for an accounting and for specific performance. Defendant answered complainant's bill, denying the allegations therein contained, and asked that his answer be treated as a cross bill, and prayed for affirmative relief. The circuit judge dismissed the bill of complaint, and granted the relief prayed for in the cross bill. From this decree, complainant has appealed. In November, 1891, the complainant and one Alvord formed a partnership under the firm name of Alvord & Co. for the purpose of buying, selling, and manufacturing office supplies. This partnership was to continue five years. After the expiration of the five years, the firm continued to do business, though the articles of partnership were not renewed. In 1894, the defendant, who was the owner and inventor of machines for making coin cases, was engaged in business under the name of the Bankers' Coin Case Company. In May, 1894, an arrangement was made by which Chope sold to Alvord & Bolton the business of the Bankers' Coin Case Company, its plant, stock, and good will, and all inventions and patents owned by it, for $10,000; $500 to be paid upon the making of the contract, and $200 or more each month thereafter, with interest until all was paid. The payments were made until January, 1897, when $6,700 had been paid upon the contract. At this time, Alvord had furnished $755, and the balance had nearly all been paid out of the business. The active partner was Mr. Bolton. Mr. Alvord was a photographer, and did not spend much time with the business, but he made no charge for his services, while Mr. Bolton drew out of the concern, first, his expenses, and then $50 a month. The articles of partnership treated the members of the firm as equal partners, and the record discloses they so treated each other. January, 1897, Mr. Chope bought Mr. Alvord's interest in the business, for which he paid $2,500. At the same time, the following writing was executed: "Detroit, Mich., Jan'y 22, 1897. For a valuable consideration, and under mutual agreement, between the parties to the foregoing contract, we hereby release Charles E. Alvord from the terms and obligations of the foregoing contract; and I, Frederick H. Bolton, hereby agree to carry out and assume the obligations of said contract, and to receive a one-half interest in said contract for my interest therein, and all rights, patents, and claims covered thereby when said contract is fully completed; and I, Robert L. Chope, hereby agree that said Frederick H. Bolton shall so assume said contract, and said Alvord be released as above stated. [Signed] Frederick H. Bolton. Robert L. Chope. Charles E. Alvord." After this paper was executed, Mr. Bolton continued to manage the business, and made payments upon the contract, until all but $700 of the principal was paid. He then tendered to Mr. Chope the $700 and interest, and demanded from him a receipt in full of the balance due on the contract made by him with Alvord & Bolton, and a conveyance to Bolton of the entire business, plant, stock, and patents. Mr. Chope, claiming to own a half interest therein, offered to convey one half interest, but declined to convey the whole interest. The complainant then filed this bill, In bringing into court $701.75 for Mr. Chope; and, after a full hearing in open court, the circuit judge decreed as follows: (1) Complainant's bill was dismissed, with costs; (2) awarded to Chope the $701.75, paid into court, and $12.25, interest on same, which was made a lien on complainant's interest; (3) decreed Chope to be the owner of an equal undivided half of the contract property, and Bolton the owner of the other half; (4) decreed that a physical division of the property cannot be had; (5) appointed complainant and defendant joint receivers of the property, and directed a sale thereof to the highest bidder for cash, after twenty days' notice. The questions involved are purely questions of fact. A careful reading of the entire record and briefs of counsel shows an utter failure on the part of the complainant to establish a case for relief. It discloses that he understood fully the arrangement of January 22, 1897, when it was made, and desired to make it. It is urged that, as no proof was offered that a physical division of the property cannot be had, the decree in that respect was wrong. It is true, no testimony was offered for that specific purpose, but the record is full of proof tending to establish that fact. A discussion of these questions of fact would not profit any one. The decree is affirmed, with costs. The other justices concurred. CHICAGO & W. M. RY. CO. ▾. COMMISSIONER OF RAILROADS. (Supreme Court of Michigan. Dec. 28, 1898.) Original mandamus proceeding by the Chicago & West Michigan Railway Company against Sybrant Wesselius, the commissioner of railroads. Denied. Smith, Nims, Hoyt & Erwin, for relator. Fred A. Maynard, Atty. Gen., for respondent. PER CURIAM. This case presents the general question as to whether the sum received by a railroad company for switching cars should be treated by the railroad commissioner as a part of its gross earnings. The case is ruled by Detroit, G. R. & W. R. Co. v. Commissioner of Railroads (rendered herewith) 77 N. W. 631. RICHARDS v. McCORMICK et al. (Supreme Court of Michigan. Dec. 13, 1898.) Appeal from circuit court, Wayne county, in chancery; Sherman B. Daboll, Judge. This is a suit in equity by Frank E. Richards, a judgment creditor, against James C. McCormick and others, to reach property claimed to have been fraudulently transferred. Complainant recovered judgment for $208.70 against the defendants James and Hugh McCormick, Jr., who were engaged in the grocery and meat business. They failed, and transferred the goods to defendant Hugh McCormick, Sr., their father, for the consideration of $1,100. It appears to be conceded that he advanced $500 for the purchase of the stock, and that he paid $600 in cash at the time of the transfer. It is conceded that $1,100 was the fair value of the stock. Complainant's indebtedness was incurred before the transfer, but was not due until some time afterwards. It is contended by complainant that the $500 was not a loan, but a gift, and that the father is liable as trustee of the same to the sons' creditors. The case was heard on pleadings and proofs, and decree rendered for the defendants. Complainant appeals. Reversed. Henry B. Graves, for appellant. John J. Jackson, for appellees. GRANT, C. J. (after stating the facts as above). Upon the hearing, complainant introduced the testimony of defendant Hugh McCormick, Sr., taken in another case, in December, 1895, in which it is claimed he testified that this $500 was a gift to his son, and not a loan, and rested. The defendant was then sworn in his own behalf, and testified that the $500 was loaned. The question presented is one entirely of fact, viz. whether the court should have found that the defendant gave his son the money. His former testimony cannot be well construed to mean anything else than that he desired to help his son start in business, and made a gift to him of this $500 for that purpose. The stock to this amount was therefore subject to the claims of creditors. Decree reversed, with costs of both courts, and decree rendered for complainant. The other justices concurred. HEALY v. MANNHEIMER et al. (Supreme Court of Minnesota. Nov. 17, 1898.) Appeal from district court, Ramsey county; Charles E. Otis, Judge. Action by Katherine Healy against Robert Mannheimer and others. Verdict for plaintiff. From an order denying a new trial, defendants appeal. Affirmed. C. D. & Thos. D. O'Brien, for appellants. James J. McCafferty, for respondent. PER CURIAM. This case involves the same questions as the case of Healy v. Mannheimer (decided at the present term) 76 N. W. 1126, and is ruled by it. The order appealed from is therefore affirmed. LYNN v. KING et al. (Supreme Court of Minnesota, Jan. 25, 1899.) Action by Anna V. Lynn against Joseph King and others. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant H. W. Thompson, administrator of the estate of Francis Parks, appeals. Reversed. BUCK, J. There is but one paper book in this case, and that of Lynn v. Hanson, 77 N. W. 976, herewith decided adversely to the plaintiff. The cases were argued at the same time, and upon substantially the same state of facts. Following the ruling in the Hanson Case, the note in controversy must be deemed paid, and the mortgage satisfied, and the judgment reversed, and new trial ordered. CITY OF OMAHA v. FLOOD. (Supreme Court of Nebraska. Dec. 8, 1898.) PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS-DAMAGES. On the authority of City of Omaha v. Flood (Neb.) 77 N. W. 379, the judgment of the district court in this case is reversed. Error to district court, Douglas county; Ferguson, Judge. Action by Andrew Flood against the city of Omaha. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Reversed. W. J. Connell, for plaintiff in error. F. W. Fitch, for defendant in error. RAGAN, C. The facts in this case are the same as those in City of Omaha v. Flood, 77 N. W. 379; and, upon the authority of that case, the judgment of the district court in this is reversed. Reversed. FEIL v. STAACK. (Supreme Court of Nebraska. Dec. 22, 1898.) INTOXICATING LIQUORS-LICENSE-APPLICATION. The propositions of law announced in Feil v. Hotel Co. (Neb.) 77 N. W. 344, affirmed. Appeal from district court, Douglas county; Baker, Judge. Action by N. P. Feil against F. A. W. Staack. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. E. W. Simeral, for appellant. Hall & McCulloch, for appellee. NORVAL, J. The questions involved are identical with those determined in Feil v. Hotel Co. (Neb.) 77 N. W. 344; and, for the reasons stated in the opinion filed therein, the judgment of the district court in the present case is aflirmed. STATE ex rel. ROSEWATER V. HOLCOMB, Governor. (Supreme Court of Nebraska. Nov. 17, 1898.) Application by the state, on the relation of Victor Rosewater, for a writ of mandamus against Silas A. Holcomb, governor of the state of Nebraska. Writ denied. E. W. Simeral, for relator. C. J. Smyth, Atty. Gen., and Ed. P. Smith, Dep. Atty. Gen., for respondent. PER CURIAM. This action was to compel the respondent to perform certain duties claimed to devolve upon him by virtue of his office. In State v. Moores (Neb.) 76 N. W. 175, it was held that the act of the legislature of 1897 (Laws 1897, p. 124, c. 10, §§ 166-168), in so far as it assumes to confer authority upon the governor to appoint fire and police commissioners in cities of the metropolitan class, is void. The duty of which it is now sought to compel the performance depends for its exercise upon the force of the statute above referred to, and, as the statute is void, no such duty exists, and therefore its performance cannot be controlled by mandamus. The writ is therefore denied. BEST v. BARRETT et al. (Supreme Court of North Dakota. June 2, 1898.) ELEVATORS-STORAGE RECEIPTS-REPLEVIN. Case governed by decision in Best v. Muir (decided at the same time) 77 N. W. 95. Appeal from district court, Cass county; William B. McConnell, Judge. Action by William H. Best against L. C. Barrett and others. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Seth Newman and Newman & Stambaugh, for appellant. Pollock & Scott, for respondents. CORLISS, C. J. This case is controlled by our decision in Best v. Muir (which has just been decided) 77 N. W. 95. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. All concur. AULTMAN, MILLER & CO. v. NELSON et al. (Supreme Court of South Dakota. Jan. 25, 1899.) Appeal from circuit court, Brookings county; Julian Bennett, Judge. Action in a justice court by Aultman, Miller & Co. against Andrew Nelson and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant Niels Jenson appealed to the circuit court. From an order therein overruling a motion to dismiss the appeal, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Jenkins & Farrell, for appellant. Mathews & Murphy, for respondents. CORSON, P. J. This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court of Brookings county denying plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal taken from the judgment rendered by the justice of the peace. The same question is involved as in the appeal of Aultman, Miller & Co. v. Same Defendants, decided at this term, and reported in 77 N. W. 584; the only difference in the two cases being that the judgment rendered by the justice in this case was for $114.61 and the undertaking was in double that amount, instead of $220 in the former. This case was, by stipulation, submitted upon the same abstract and briefs as the former, and must therefore be ruled by that decision. The order of the circuit court is affirmed. AULTMAN, MILLER & CO. v. NELSON et al. (Supreme Court of South Dakota. Jan. 25, 1899.) Appeal from circuit court, Brookings county; Julian Bennett, Judge. Action in a justice court by Aultman, Miller & Co. against Andrew Nelson and another. From a judgment, there was an appeal to the circuit court; and, from an order therein denying plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal, it appeals. Affirmed. Jeuk |