Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American CapabilityDIANE Publishing, 1995 |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 5
Page v
... costs/benefits calculus that undergirded Cold War-era strategy and doctrine. During the current period of remission in insurgency, the Army should use its intellectual resources to analyze ongoing mutations in insurgency and to open a ...
... costs/benefits calculus that undergirded Cold War-era strategy and doctrine. During the current period of remission in insurgency, the Army should use its intellectual resources to analyze ongoing mutations in insurgency and to open a ...
Page 8
... cost and risks of American engagement in counterinsurgency such as the strengthening of corrupt , illegitimate , and repressive regimes outweighed the risks of insurgent victory . future . 135 appearance -- that Marxism in the Soviet. 11 ...
... cost and risks of American engagement in counterinsurgency such as the strengthening of corrupt , illegitimate , and repressive regimes outweighed the risks of insurgent victory . future . 135 appearance -- that Marxism in the Soviet. 11 ...
Page 14
... costs are immense . El Salvador is a small country close to the United States , but the United States spent nearly $ 6 billion in assistance plus a tremendous amount of political capital , time , and attention.73 Put simply , the extent ...
... costs are immense . El Salvador is a small country close to the United States , but the United States spent nearly $ 6 billion in assistance plus a tremendous amount of political capital , time , and attention.73 Put simply , the extent ...
Page 19
... costs of not acting when a friendly government faced a Marxist insurgency outweighed the potential risks and costs of engagement. In the post-Cold War strategic environment, this may not hold except when insurgents intend to destabilize ...
... costs of not acting when a friendly government faced a Marxist insurgency outweighed the potential risks and costs of engagement. In the post-Cold War strategic environment, this may not hold except when insurgents intend to destabilize ...
Page 20
... costs of engagement or the political costs of disengagement. Put simply, a government in serious danger of defeat by an insurgency is often a bad ally. Hypothetically, the United States could only engage in counterinsurgencies where the ...
... costs of engagement or the political costs of disengagement. Put simply, a government in serious danger of defeat by an insurgency is often a bad ally. Hypothetically, the United States could only engage in counterinsurgencies where the ...
Other editions - View all
Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability Steven Metz No preview available - 2012 |
Common terms and phrases
American counterinsurgency strategy American Military American policymakers approach to counterinsurgency armed Army’s assistance Central America Cold Cold War commercial insurgencies counterinsurgency capability counterinsurgency support defeat defense community democracy Department of Defense economic El Salvador engagement in counterinsurgency ESAF FMLN forces forms of insurgency Global South Guerrilla Warfare Hans Magnus Enzensberger human rights Intensity Conflict Internal Defense Policy involvement in counterinsurgency Kennedy Larry Cable legitimacy low-intensity conflict Manwaring and Prisk Maoist people's Military Review National Security Strategy Overseas Internal Defense political post-Cold War security post-Cold War strategic Ralph Peters Reagan regime reprinted in Department revolutionary insurgency Rosello Salvador Salvadoran Secretary Haig security environment Small Wars Small Wars Manual Southeast Asia Special Operations Steven Metz strategic calculus strategic environment strategic rationale Strategic Studies Institute strategy and doctrine subversive insurgency terrorism Third World threats U.S. Army U.S. counterinsurgency strategy U.S. engagement U.S. military United University Press Vietnam Washington York
Popular passages
Page 16 - West Africa and much of the underdeveloped world: the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war.
Page 24 - To this end, the study is sponsored jointly by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OASD/SO/LIC) and the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (DOS/R).
Page 25 - Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957.
Page 25 - Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), p.
Page 28 - Supporting US Strategy for Third World Conflict," Report by the Regional Conflict Working Group submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, June 1988. 15. BG Edward G. Lansdale,, "Civic Action Helps Counter the Guerrilla Threat," Army Information Digest, June 1962, p.
Page 22 - What gives today's civil wars a new and terrifying slant is the fact that they are waged without stakes on either side, that they are wars about nothing at all ... there is no longer any need to legitimise your actions.
Page iv - Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Troubled Outlook for US Policy Toward Haiti and The United States, Honduras and the Crisis in Central America and coeditor of Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean; Cuba and the Future; Political Participation...
Page 12 - our problem with El Salvador is external intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation in this hemisphere, nothing more, nothing...
Page 28 - Max G. Manwaring, ed., Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low Intensity Conflict, Boulder...
Page 8 - ... come into being. History is a better guide than good intentions. A realistic policy which aims at protecting our own interest and assisting the capacities for self-determination of less developed nations will need to face the unpleasant fact that, if victorious, violent insurgency headed by Marxist revolutionaries is unlikely to lead to anything but totalitarian tyranny.