as against the one who is? Why should we have the provision in at all? Is there a 30-day limitation?

Secretary BARD. No, sir; it does not apply to this issue. It is a limitation of the period corresponding between the period of order of induction and actual induction. It was not the period between order into service and actual entry into service.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no need for a provision about people who have lived there right along; it is the person who is lifted from one community to another who is the one to protect.

Secretary BARD. That part of the bill was not suggested by the Navy; I think it was put in by a congressional committee. I think it is a very sound question that Senator Burton has raised.

Senator KILGORE. This matter you are putting in the record, does that contain any study on shortages-manpower shortages; in other words, does your department have a study of the manpower shortages by areas, industries, and plants?

Secretary BARD. Yes, sir.

Senator KILGORE. Does that also contain any statement as to what corrective measures had been taken; whether you had labor utilization studies made in those areas and whether labor has been utilized as ordered?

Secretary BARD. No.

Senator KILGORE. Have you made labor utilization studies of these plants, regions, and areas where they complain of manpower shortages? Secretary BARD. We are doing that constantly.

Senator KILGORE. In 24 cases in my home State-the last one being a Navy plant at Huntington which had reported a shortage-they were behind schedule because of manpower shortage, and an investigation of each plant showed that some other things applied in each case. It showed there was plenty of manpower. Of course, it is too easy to blame a break-down of equipment or plant on manpower reserve; it is easy for the manager to do that. It was said there was manpower shortage, but when you broke it down you found it was material flow or something else. I wonder if the Navy has conducted such investigations?

Secretary BARD. I was pointing out before you came in, Senator, that one of the things that would be helpful about this bill was that it would permit us to keep these people on the job long enough to teach them and kill the turn-over.

Senator KILGORE. But is it not a question also of freezing? In other words, if you have an overmanned factory, when you freeze men into that factory you are wasting manpower in the plant.

Secretary BARD. Natural accretions will take care of that. In a lot of plants the manpower will go down, and they will not be frozen as long as we need them.

(Discussion was had outside the record.)

Senator KILGORE. At the Bethlehem or Sparrows Point, with 16,000 people on their pay roll, they asked 1,700 additional employees. They compromised for 500.

Secretary FORRESTAL. It is a constant dustpan job to keep down. all requests, but those are caused mainly by fear of large numbers of withdrawals.

Senator KILGORE. But this bill does not give anybody the real power to do that. There is no power vested in any Government

agency, except in you as contracting agency for the Navy Department, through your various bureaus, to cancel contracts if they will not comply. That is the only kind of enforcement you have; you cannot tell them to lay people off unless you accompany it with a threat of cancelation.

Secretary BARD. The Manpower Commission puts ceilings on these different jobs, and the different plants advise what they think they should have. Everybody knows there has been hoarding by various plants because they cannot tell what people they have there. If they get a law like this it may solve the whole manpower problem, because they will not have to hoard people because they think they are going to lose them too rapidly.

Senator KILGORE. Some of these plants are giving certificates of availability to their leadmen and top-flight mechanics and welders and are employing apprentices to take their places.

Secretary BARD. What plants?

Senator KILGORE. Bethlehem, Fairfield.

Secretary BARD. I do not know what their program is because they operate entirely under the Maritime Commission.

Senator KILGORE. Neither do I, but a lot of experienced West Virginians have started coming to me for references to other places to go and have shown me a perfectly clean bill of health, a certificate of availability, granted by the plant. They were all skilled men. They had been leadmen and various other high-class jobs. They told me they were hiring people there every day but they were letting them off and taking on others. A former naval officer was offered a job as mechanic, but he is going to the C. & O. Railroad as a transportation expert.

Secretary FORRESTAL. That is the Bethlehem Fairfield yard?
Senator KII GORE. Yes.

Secretary FORRESTAL. Their contract may be running out. Senator KILGORE. No; they are hiring men all of the time. Secretary FORRESTAL. I would like to get the facts on that. Secretary BARD. I had not heard of anything like that before. We don't have the facts because the Navy has nothing to do with that yard.

Senator KILGORE. It was an astounding thing for me to be told that. Each man exhibited his certificate of availability given by the plant, and it stated their classification and showed some of them had been working there for 2 or 3 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(Discussion was had outside the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

(Statement submitted by Mr. Bard follows:)

WHY THIS NATION NEEDS THE BAILEY-MAY BILL

PART I. OUR OBLIGATION TO OUR FIGHTING MEN

It is

It is our belief that this statute is essential to support our fighting men. our further belief that the men at the front are entitled to the utmost from all. This war is a war of men and matériel-or perhaps of matériel and men. We have the men in the field. We have to date, had enough matériel. We are, however, threatened with a let-down in matériel because of the shortage of manpower. None of us could face our fighters again-if that should happen.

Here is our problem: In the first 6 months of 1945 the armed forces will require 900,000 men. In the same period, 700,000 additional workers will be required for war production. In other words, we have a manpower problem of 1,600,000 men in the next 6 months. Where will they come from? We cannot afford to take chances. We cannot afford to make any mistakes.

In 1942 and 1943 our most urgent problem was the shortage of matériel. overcame it.

Today our most grave problem is the crisis in manpower.

We

Our problem is to divide all available manpower between the fighting fronts and the production fronts so that both will be manned to the best of our ability. We have already taken two of the three essential steps to an all-out national effort. We enacted laws to draft men and property to fight. We had to draft men to fight. We had to draft property to fight. Now we need a statute to authorize us to draft manpower to make the matériel to fight. This legislation is the third step, the natural complement of the other two. Whether we will use the statute remains to be seen-but we need it on the books ready for use at a minute's notice.

THE NAVY'S MANPOWER PROBLEM

Matériel is a most important part of the Navy. Large combatant ships are cities afloat with all the usual public utilities-light, power, water, fire department, etc.-packed in a small space. Big guns are intricate mechanisms. Radar-the electronic eye-is more than intricate. Communications systems, fuzes, aircraft, and projectiles are all products of highly skilled trades.

The Navy cannot use just any man on the production line. It needs a particular man-a particular skill. The power to pick out the needed man is essential. Makeshifts and expedients have run their course. Only through ingenious management of the available labor supply has the fleet so far lacked for nothing. But a crisis lies ahead. During the last 6 months men fell away from war production. The pressure of the draft and increased demands for war production lie ahead. As we approach the crisis, our operating manpower margin has become progressively slimmer.

By May 1945 the Navy must secure the following additional men to meet schedules in the critical Navy programs listed below:

Additional men
needed in
3 months

11, 515

9, 397

3, 369

32, 828

1, 579

9, 714

3, 534

These are some of the critical programs-the absolutely essential, no-excuse programs. The over-all program is much larger. To summarize, we need this legislation specifically

1. To meet existing critical Navy-production programs. Ships under construction are behind schedule-still out of service months after they should have been completed. Ships do not fight in the shipyards or on drafting boards.

2. To sustain future war production. The inescapable demands of the draft for fighting men will dig still deeper into the Nation's reservoir of skills. The usable reservoir must be increased.

3. To bolster the morale of our fighting men. They already feel that the sacrifices demanded of them are not being shared at home.

4. To speed victory. The sooner we win these wars, the fewer will be our dead and wounded.

The manpower shortage is not something for the future. It is here today-in combatant ships, hospital ships, and other auxiliaries. In 1944 we had to lengthen the building time 9 months on four cruisers and 4 to 5 months on six others. Twelve destroyers were delayed from 98 to 151 days. Six hospital shipsdesperately needed-have been delayed 3 to 6 months.

Those delays, those failures, have happened. The future will be worseunless we act. Part II is a more detailed statement of the delays and crises faced because of the manpower shortages now existing.

68966-45-7

ENACTMENT OF THIS BILL WILL MEET THE CRISIS

Here is why we believe enactment of this bill will solve our manpower shortages: 1. Employees will be prevented from leaving essential war jobs-whether in Navy establishments or plants of Navy contractors, the race for post-war jobs can be stopped.

2. The mere enactment of the bill may solve the problem. In England compulsion was found necessary in only a few cases. Mere discussion of the bill has increased employment applications at navy yards-100 percent at Portsmouth and Norfolk.

3. The necessary flexibility and mobility in the labor force will be provided. In other words, the effectiveness of our existing labor force will be increased. Duplicate plants cannot follow the labor supply. Just as we move fighting men to the fighting fronts, we will be able to move supporting men to the production fronts.

4. The load on present workers will be reduced. Men will be able to take needed rests. At Mare Island some men in critical trades have accumulated $10,000,000 in leave-which they have been compelled to forego.

5. Men at sea will be given rest when in port instead of being forced to work to get the ships ready for future combat. The unfortunate experiences of the men on the cruisers New Orleans and Birmingham (see pt. II) will be avoided.

If the legislation is promptly enacted, then we can be confident that no fighting man will suffer because of unmanned battle stations at home.

We must each ask ourselves, Can we take any risk, even a slight risk, of letting our fighting men down?

PART II. SOME DETAILS

Here are some of the details of the manpower problems faced by the Navy:

LABOR TURN-OVER

Labor turn-over has become uncontrollable. At our navy yards in 1944. Two out of every five workers voluntarily quit their jobs.

If persons discharged or drafted be included, the figure would be three out of every five.

In the past 18 months, the Navy has hired 270,000 workmen, to end up with a net loss of 11,000 workers. War Manpower Commission statistics show the turnover rate in private shipyards was even greater.

Why did they quit?

One machinist quit to open a second-hand automobile shop.

A welder quit to go back into the garage business.

A machinist quit to return to a grocery store.

An engineman quit to work in a filling station.

An electrician quit to return to a job in a cafe.

Every trained man who quit further diluted our skilled manpower.

Another worker had to be recruited and trained to take his place, at the cost of invaluable time.

BUILDING

1. Comparison of the predictions of deliveries of ships for January 1, 1944, and January 1, 1945, shows an alarming rate of slippage. At the New York Shipbuilding Corporation, engaged in the construction of light carriers and heavy and light cruisers, the over-all slippage amounted to 68 cruiser-months-sufficient time to have built 3 cruisers, 4 carriers, or nearly 10 submarines.

2. During the past year we had to push back, by 38 ship-months, the high priority program of escort carriers at the Todd Pacific Shipyards, Tacoma, Wash. Despite all efforts to recruit additional labor, the Todd yards in 1944 had a net loss of 4,000 workers.

3. Manpower shortages are forcing the Navy to neglect necessary new construction. For example, workmen at one navy yard-especially electricians and outside machinists-have had to be shifted to repair work. One result:

The aircraft carrier, U. S. S. Tarawa, one of our largest carriers, and kingpin of a potential task force, will not be completed for several months beyond the scheduled date.

4. Manpower shortages have forced the Navy to accept loss of time in shifting construction work from one area to another. Five vessels originally scheduled to be finished at Tacoma had to be towed away, after launching, to another area, for completion of more than 50 percent of the contract.

In every instance of this nature, the yards did not lack capacity. Capacity, building capacity, lay idle, because workmen could not be obtained locally. 5. Other delays:

Charlestown Navy Yard: Six high-speed transports delayed from 99 to 119

days.

Boston Navy Yard: Six destroyer escorts delayed more than 170 days. Bethlehem, San Francisco: 12 destroyers delayed from 98 to 151 days. Light cruiser 33 days.

Philadelphia Navy Yard: A heavy cruiser delayed a month.

Puget Sound Navy Yard: Barracks ships delayed from 167 to 259 days. Commercial Iron Works: Six net-laying ships delayed from 123 to 149 days.

6. At no time has the Navy been able to construct combatant ships in the number that available facilities would have permitted. Since 1943 manpower shortages have been largely responsible.

CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR

1. The Navy faces a repair situation that is increasingly grave. As we approach nearer and nearer to enemy land bases in the Pacific, it is inevitable that our vessels will sustain more battle damage. Already, there are all too many examples of invaluable fleet units being held up by lack of manpower, in the face of urgent requests from fleet commanders to return them to the firing line.

2. Fleet Admiral King has already reported as delayed certain warships, in cluding vessels being constructed and repaired even though they are needed for planned operations in the Pacific. Completion dates on the following cruisers have been delayed 9 months: U. S. S. Toledo, U. S. S. Newark, U. S. S. New Haven, and the U. S. S. Buffalo.

In 1944 we have also had to lengthen from 4 to 5 months the building periods on the following cruisers: U. S. S. Atlanta, U. S. S. Dayton, U. S. S. Fargo, U. S. S. Huntington, U. S. S. Fall River, and U. S. S. Macon.

3. Lack of manpower has restricted repairs to essentials.

Maintenance work and repairs that should have been done to prevent future break-downs had to be deferred.

This serves only to aggravate our future repair problem. It puts off, but does not avert, the evil day.

SUBMARINES

1. One navy yard recently required 8 weeks to complete work on a group of submarines which would have required 11,200 men. The yard could find only 6,000 men available. Had not other men been diverted from other important work the Chief of Naval Operations would have been confronted with an additional delay of 3 months in meeting an inflexible combat demand.

2. Within the past few weeks, shortage of manpower on the west coast has made it impossible for repair activities there to ready certain battle-damaged submarines for service in a reasonable period of time.

Therefore, it was necessary to recommend that these vessels be brought clear around the country to the east coast for necessary repairs.

AIRCRAFT

1. Serious manpower tangles have developed in the aircraft industry in the past few months, but by extraordinary efforts the situation, with a few exceptions, has been met without costing the Navy airplane deliveries.

However, there is no backlog of manpower to take care of emergencies.

Chief concern is continued ability to meet demands for rapidly changing types of aircraft to keep ahead of the enemy.

An inescapable increase in the draft would hit this industry harder than others, because it has attracted young men.

Draft of men in the 26-29 age bracket without exception may seriously cut plane production.

Such a condition, imposed on present manpower problems, might seriousty affect our technical superiority over the enemy.

2. While the over-all aircraft picture has been good, manpower shortages have created many problems:

A considerable number of Lockheed Ventura patrol bombers stood complete, except for outer wing panels, because of an inadequate supply of trained manpower at the Goodyear Phoenix, Ariz., plant where these assemblies are made.