friendly with the county agents and the Extension Service and have cooperated with vocational teachers and others under the SmithHughes Act. I might say some years I was asked to address a Grange picnic on the lower Potomac. We have a form of award known as the silver-star certificate, which is given to those who have been members for 25 years or longer, and I was asked to hand these out. One of those who received the certificate was Dr. Albert F. Woods, former president of the University of Maryland and at that time director of the scientific work of the Department of Agriculture. Dr. Woods paid high tribute to the Grange for the splendid educational work it had done all during the years. I appreciated that tribute coming from a man of his type.

The CHAIRMAN. Does anyone else have any questions?

Mr. OGG. Lest there be any misunderstanding of anything I said this morning in reference to the regulations General Hershey sent out with respect to the Tydings amendment, since I mentioned the directive of Justice Byrnes, I would not want anyone to draw the inference from anything I said that I was accusing them of deliberately trying to evade the Tydings amendment. I am sure there was no such intent as that. I was merely trying to point out how it was operating and how it was being misinterpreted, as we believe, and applied in a manner which we do not think was the intention of Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tydings has said there was no trouble in his State, that there was cooperation between the farm agents in each county and Selective Service, and if that kind of cooperation would develop in all the States,, the trouble which Senator Reed was complaining about would pretty well be over. That last sentence is mine, but that was the implication.

Mr. OGG. We have had reports from our people in Maryland which would confirm that.

Senator AUSTIN. They have State sanctions; they have a war service act.

Mr. OGG. Yes; they have a very efficient man as chairman of the State labor committee who has done a good job. So it is a rather exceptional situation and not at all typical of the situation over the country, and the only purpose of bringing this to your attention was that we would like very much to see you give your approval, as part of this legislation, to the clarification that Senator Tydings has suggested. We think that would be very helpful in clearing up this misunderstanding.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not ask Senator Tydings yesterday whether he wanted us to consider his amendment in the committee or not, because he said when the bill reached the floor, if it did reach the floor, he was going to offer it as an amendment. I am pretty sure he has not formally sent it here. Now, if you, as a witness and as a sponsor of that amendment, want to ask us formally to consider it, I see no reason for your not doing so.

Mr. OGG. I would certainly like you to consider it and hope you will include it in whatever legislation is enacted. Time is of the essence, and it may be necessary, if this legislation is delayed too long, through no intent of yours, of course-but if that should be done, it might be too late. In other words, if this legislation is not going through soon, we hope that Congress, by special resolution, would act on this matter, because in a few weeks it will be too late.

Senator AUSTIN. That same sentiment was expressed by Mr. Krug, who has the other end of production to take care of. He said this bill is needed so much that he earnestly urged us not to waste time on the mechanics of the thing but to report it out as speedily as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be an advantage in conference if we reported the later amendment out with our bill. It would not be handled in conference in the same way as an amendment offered from the floor.

If you have an additional copy, I suggest it be inserted at this point.

Mr. OGG. I believe I have.

(Amendment intended to be proposed by Mr. Tydings to S. 36 follows:)

[S. 36, 79th Cong., 1st sess.]
AMENDMENT

Intended to be proposed by Mr. TYDINGS to the bill (S. 36) to amend section 5 (k) of the Selective Training and Service Act, 1940, as amended, viz: At the end of the bill add the following:

In carrying out the provisions of this subsection the local selective-service board in classifying the registrant shall base its findings solely and exclusively on whether the registrant is necessary to and regularly engaged in an agricultural occupation or endeavor essential to the war effort and whether a satisfactory replacement can be obtained without reference to the relative essentiality of the registrant to an agricultural occupation or endeavor or service as compared with any other occupation or endeavor. It shall be the duty of any such registrant who is also found by his local selective-service board to be physically or otherwise unfit for military training and service to remain in such agricultural occupation or endeavor unless and until released from said agricultural occupation or endeavor by his local selective-service board, and violations of this provision shall be considered an evasion of service in the land or naval forces.

Mr. OGG. Thank you very much, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I hand to the reporter three letters and enclosures pertaining to this specific subject matter, which I ask be incorporated in the record.

(The letters and enclosures referred to appear below.)

The CHAIRMAN. If there is nothing further at this time, the committee will stand in recess until 10:30 tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 2:45 p. m., a recess was taken until 10:30 a. m., Wednesday, February 14, 1945.)

(Letters and enclosures inserted by the chairman follow:)

Hon. ELBERT D. THOMAS,

WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION, Washington, D. C., February 12, 1945.

Chairman, Senate Committee on Military Affairs,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR THOMAS: Enclosed is a statement on the effect of the War Manpower Commission's minimum wartime workweek regulation, which has been prepared at the request of Mr. Rasmussen.

If you wish any additional material, please do not hesitate to let us know. Sincerely yours,

PAUL V. MCNUTT, Chairman.

EFFECT OF THE MINIMUM WARTIME WORKWEEK REGULATION

On February 9, 1943, the President issued Executive Order No. 9301 establishing a minimum wartime workweek of 48 hours so as to aid in meeting the manpower requirements of our armed forces and the expanding war-production program by a fuller utilization of the available manpower. By extending the workweek it is possible for employers to meet their manpower needs by a fuller utilization of

their current labor force rather than by an increase in the number of workers. Increased hours of work in a plant means increased use of experienced people already on the job and avoids the difficulties and the problems in hiring new people and training them for the job.

To effectuate this Presidential order the War Manpower Commission issued Regulation No. 3. Under this regulation a 48-hour workweek is required in all areas classified as group I and may also be required in group II areas when it is deemed advisable.1 In addition, all establishments in three industries-iron and steel, cotton textiles, and logging and lumbering, regardless of their geographic location, were covered by this regulation. By January 31, 1945, 135 labormarket areas were operating under the 48-hour workweek order. It is estimated that this program now covers about 17,000,000 workers.

Some measure of the effectiveness of the regulation is obtained when the average workweek in January 1943 prior to the institution of the 48-hour order is compared with that of January 1944 in munitions and nonmunitions manufacturing industries in areas covered by Regulation No. 3. No significant changes in the length of the workweek have occurred since January 1944. In the nonmunitions manufacturing industries the average weekly hours of work on January 1943 were 41.9, while by January 1944 they had risen to 44.2, an increase of approximately 51⁄2 percent. As would be expected, the impact of the regulation was greater upon the nonmunitions industries than upon the munitions industries, because there were other incentives already operating on the establishments producing munitions to bring about an increase in the hours of work. For example, the pressure of the war requirements alone would tend to bring about an increase in the hours of work in such establishments. Thus, in January 1943, the average workweek in the munitions industries within areas covered by Regulation No. 3 was already 46.3 hours per week, indicating that most of the munitions industries in these areas were on a scheduled 48-hour week, since an actual workweek of 46 hours is assumed to roughly represent a scheduled workweek of 48 hours. However, even in these industries some increase in the average hours of work is shown by January 1944-hours rose to 46.6 or approximately 1 percent above January 1943.

A special study made by the War Manpower Commission on the effect of the 48-hour workweek in the iron and steel industry shows that a fairly substantial saving in workers was made possible because of this program. In April 1943, prior to the inception of the program, the average weekly hours in the iron and steel industry were 43.5. By December 1943, the average weekly hours rose to 46.6. If the 43.5-hour average had persisted in December, 48,000 more workers than were then employed would have been needed to work the number of manhours put in that month.

(Source: War Manpower Commission, Reports and Analysis Service, February 10, 1945.)

OFFICE OF WAR MOBILIZATION,

Washington, D. C., February 12, 1945.

Hon. ELBERT D. THOMAS,

Chairman, Senate Military Affairs Committee, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR THOMAS: Attached is a statement which is being issued at the White House this morning as a result of the story appearing in the New York Herald Tribune indicating that the Voorhis bill is acceptable to this Office. We wanted you and your committee to have this information.

Yours sincerely,

WALTER BROWN, Assistant to the Director.

The Office of War Mobilzation and Reconversion has advised me that an article in the New York Herald Tribune today indicating that the Voorhis bill is acceptable to it as a substitute for the May bill is without foundation in fact.

The Director holds firmly to the belief that manpower legislation should recognize that there is an obligation for men eligible for the draft who are not called into the armed service to render their war service wherever it is most needed. The views of this Office have been expressed in its report on the May bill to Senator Thomas, chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee.

1 Group I areas are areas in which acute labor shortages exist. Group II areas are areas in which labor shortages exist which may endanger essential production.

MOBILIZATION OF CIVILIAN MANPOWER

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1945

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,

Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:30 a. m., in the committee room of the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Capitol, Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado, presiding.

Present: Senators Johnson of Colorado, Chandler, O'Mahoney, Maybank, Gurney, and Burton.

Senator JOHNSON. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Golden, are you ready to testify, sir?

Mr. GOLDEN. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Will you state your name and your position for the record?

STATEMENT OF CLINTON S. GOLDEN, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT, UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA; VICE CHAIRMAN, WAR PRODUCTION BOARD, OFFICE OF MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS; AND VICE CHAIRMAN, WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION Mr. GOLDEN. Clinton S. Golden. I am assistant to the president of the United Steelworkers of America. I am here speaking in behalf of President Murray, of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, who is also president of the United Steelworkers of America, and who was not able to get here today.

I have prepared statement that I would like to present on President Murray's behalf; and then I would like to step out of my role as a private citizen into that of a Government employee, and speak in my capacity as Vice Chairman of the War Production Board, Office of Manpower Requirements, and Vice Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.

Senator JOHNSON. We should be glad to have you proceed in any manner suitable to you.

Mr. GOLDEN. I would like, then, to read President Murray's statement, because to some extent it dovetails into some of the things that I want to say in my Government capacity. [Reading:]

STATEMENT OF PHILIP MURRAY, PRESIDENT, CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, PRESENTED BY MR. GOLDEN

The Congress of Industrial Organizations endorses the bill introduced by Senators Kilgore, Wagner, and others [amendments in the nature of a substitute for S. 36 were submitted to the Senate by Senators Kilgore, Wagner, and Ferguson on the next day after this hearing], and urges the Senate Military Affairs Committee to report the bill favorably instead of the May-Bailey bill. It is our

belief that this bill will effectively meet the current demand in Congress and the executive agencies for a piece of legislation to mobilize America's manpower for the job ahead.

Any day now America's productive machine must shift to the most complicated job of the war. During the past month, since Congress began to consider manpower legislation, events have completely altered the world outlook, and the war in Europe approaches a climax. When VE-day comes, we must concentrate on the defeat of Japan, while we are simultaneously establishing a lasting peace in Europe and maintaining full employment and full use of our productive capacity here at home.

The Kilgore-Wagner bill will help the Nation to move rapidly ahead on the road we can already see we must travel. No other bill now before Congress fits the foreseeable needs. This bill reinforces the methods and machinery which have proven effective during the war, and proposes means for strengthening them. The Kilgore-Wagner bill is designed to mobilize the entire civilian manpower and womanpower of the United States immediately, and not merely males between the ages of 18 and 45.

In the Kilgore-Wagner bill,the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion and the Office of War Manpower are granted ample power: (1) To control employment in both essential and nonessential industries; (2) to make labor utilization surveys both in private plants and in War and Navy Department installations; (3) to provide transportation to essential war jobs; (4) to safeguard seniority and other previous and accrued rights of workers in their former jobs; (5) to utilize the cooperative efforts of management, labor, and agriculture; (6) to call upon the Advisory Board established by the War Mobilization and Reconversion Act of 1944.

This bill is a long step in the right direction. Strengthening of manpower mobilization alone cannot provide maximum war output, or maintain our war economy in balance when cut-backs come after VE-day. For these objectives we shall need a general improvement in the operations of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion and its constituent agencies, including the procurement, production, and manpower agencies. But this bill is so drafted as to fit within the framework of these agencies, to assist in their further coordination, and to set an example for further tightening up of the relationships between these various agencies.

To further assist in the necessary steps which must be taken by the Executive after VE-day, Congress should urge the Executive to convene a conference of industry, labor, agriculture, and Government to prepare a program to carry us from VE-day to the defeat of Japan.

As soon as the Senate Military Affairs Committee has disposed of this legislation it should encourage the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion to make good use of its powers. In this connection we respectfully submit that this Senate committee should inquire why the Advisory Committee to the Director of the Office was not consulted in advance of the presentation to a congressional committee of the May-Bailey bill. We believe that if the matter had been presented to the Advisory Committee at the proper time, that Committee would then have endorsed a bill similar to the Kilgore-Wagner bill, which several members of the Advisory Committee now support. If we are to make rapid progress between now and VE-day there must be the closest consultation between these representative members of the Advisory Committee and the Director, and between the chiefs of the several agencies charged with mobilizing war manpower, production, and procurement.

The cornerstones of a sound transition program are these:

(1) The calling of a national conference of industry, labor, agriculture, and Government to prepare a program which will go into effect at once to coordinate all national efforts between VE-day and the defeat of Japan.

(2) Accurate scheduling of war production programs, including the allocation of contracts, the control of materials, and the mobilization of manpower. This requires better coordination of manpower, war production, and procurement by the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion.

(3) The elimination of competition and conflicts between procurement agencies. (4) The development by the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion of a definite and well-integrated program for orderly resumption of civilian production as war production is cut back. This means an end to the present hush-hush policy regarding reconversion.

(5) Integration of wage and manpower policies. This calls for an early revision of the Little Steel formula to permit the recruitment of needed workers in critical industries and to prevent the onset of serious deflation on VE-day.