Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and ActionsIan Bannon, Paul Collier World Bank Publications, 2003 M01 1 - 409 pages Violent conflict can spell catastrophe for developing countries and their neighbors, stunting and even reversing the course of economic growth. Recent World Bank research on the causes of conflict and civil war finds that the countries most likely to be blighted by conflict are those whose economies depend heavily on natural resources. 'Natural Resources and Violent Conflict' first explains the links between resource dependence conflict and then considers what can be done to help reduce the risk of civil war in these nations. In this collection of previously unpublished essays by experts in the field, contributors consider the risks of corruption, secessionist movements, and rebel financing. They also consider the roles played by government, the development community, and the country's population and propose an agenda for global action. Focusing on what we can do collectively to diminish the likelihood of civil war, contributors to this volume suggest practical approaches and policies that could be adopted by the international community - from financial and resource reporting procedures to commodity tracking systems and enforcement techniques, including sanctions, certification requirements, and aid conditionality. A fascinating look at the results of important new World Bank research, this book represents an important addition to the dialogue on development. |
From inside the book
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Page vii
... Scheme during Peace Processes 253 TABLES 2.1 Civil Wars Linked to Resource Wealth , 1990-2002 2.2 Armed Conflicts in Africa and the Rest of the World , 1989-2001 18 18 2.3 Civil Violence in Africa by Decade , 1970-99 2.4 Resource ...
... Scheme during Peace Processes 253 TABLES 2.1 Civil Wars Linked to Resource Wealth , 1990-2002 2.2 Armed Conflicts in Africa and the Rest of the World , 1989-2001 18 18 2.3 Civil Violence in Africa by Decade , 1970-99 2.4 Resource ...
Page 13
... Scheme is designed to make it increasingly difficult for rebel organiza- tions to sell rough diamonds in global ... schemes discussed in chapter 4 can be effective even if rebels are still able to sell the com- modities they extort from ...
... Scheme is designed to make it increasingly difficult for rebel organiza- tions to sell rough diamonds in global ... schemes discussed in chapter 4 can be effective even if rebels are still able to sell the com- modities they extort from ...
Page 14
... schemes for other commodities . Going after the Money : The Finance of Illicit Commodities . A prac- tice that financed several rebel organizations in the 1990s is the sale of booty futures , whereby a rebel organization receives ...
... schemes for other commodities . Going after the Money : The Finance of Illicit Commodities . A prac- tice that financed several rebel organizations in the 1990s is the sale of booty futures , whereby a rebel organization receives ...
Page 34
... Scheme entails an agreement by the diamond industry to trade only diamonds that can be certified as originating from legitimate sources.18 It is too early to know how well this process will work . Even if it works as planned , the ...
... Scheme entails an agreement by the diamond industry to trade only diamonds that can be certified as originating from legitimate sources.18 It is too early to know how well this process will work . Even if it works as planned , the ...
Page 66
... scheme's greatest sanction , essentially " naming and shaming . " In principle , this could be an important deter- rent for companies . In practice , however , the scheme suffers from a lack of will on the part of most home governments ...
... scheme's greatest sanction , essentially " naming and shaming . " In principle , this could be an important deter- rent for companies . In practice , however , the scheme suffers from a lack of will on the part of most home governments ...
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Common terms and phrases
activities Africa agencies agreement Angola assessment Basel convention certification civil coltan compliance conflict diamonds conflict trade Control Risks Group convention corporate corruption criminal Democratic Republic developing countries economic effective enforcement ensure environmental example exploitation export financial institutions forest funds Global Compact Global Reporting Initiative Global Witness guidelines host governments human rights illegal logging illicit commodities impact implementation important industry initiatives instruments investment involved issues jurisdiction Kimberley process mechanisms ment mineral mining money laundering monitoring multilateral Myanmar natural resources nongovernmental organizations OECD operations participants payments percent Petroleum potential programs rebel groups regime regional regulation relevant reporting Republic of Congo requirements resource curse resource extraction resource revenues role ROSC sanctions scheme Security Council social specific standards Sudan sustainable targeted timber tion tional tracking UN Global Compact United Nations voluntary World Bank