Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and ActionsIan Bannon, Paul Collier World Bank Publications, 2003 M01 1 - 409 pages Violent conflict can spell catastrophe for developing countries and their neighbors, stunting and even reversing the course of economic growth. Recent World Bank research on the causes of conflict and civil war finds that the countries most likely to be blighted by conflict are those whose economies depend heavily on natural resources. 'Natural Resources and Violent Conflict' first explains the links between resource dependence conflict and then considers what can be done to help reduce the risk of civil war in these nations. In this collection of previously unpublished essays by experts in the field, contributors consider the risks of corruption, secessionist movements, and rebel financing. They also consider the roles played by government, the development community, and the country's population and propose an agenda for global action. Focusing on what we can do collectively to diminish the likelihood of civil war, contributors to this volume suggest practical approaches and policies that could be adopted by the international community - from financial and resource reporting procedures to commodity tracking systems and enforcement techniques, including sanctions, certification requirements, and aid conditionality. A fascinating look at the results of important new World Bank research, this book represents an important addition to the dialogue on development. |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 98
Page 10
... mechanisms to reduce the impact of price shocks . Beyond cushioning price shocks , there is also reason to reduce them where possible . Attempts to control commodity prices have failed repeatedly , and there seems to be little reason to ...
... mechanisms to reduce the impact of price shocks . Beyond cushioning price shocks , there is also reason to reduce them where possible . Attempts to control commodity prices have failed repeatedly , and there seems to be little reason to ...
Page 24
... mechanisms : corruption , state weakness , and reduced accountability . Corruption The first mechanism is government corruption . There is strong evi- dence that , when a government gets more of its revenue from oil , minerals , and ...
... mechanisms : corruption , state weakness , and reduced accountability . Corruption The first mechanism is government corruption . There is strong evi- dence that , when a government gets more of its revenue from oil , minerals , and ...
Page 50
... mechanism is for developed - country govern- ments to require their stock exchanges to demand regular issuance of such information as a condition for listing . According to Global Witness , the Publish What You Pay campaign has focused ...
... mechanism is for developed - country govern- ments to require their stock exchanges to demand regular issuance of such information as a condition for listing . According to Global Witness , the Publish What You Pay campaign has focused ...
Page 63
... the incentives for corrup- tion . Furthermore , the declaration covers numerous aspects that are interlinked , such as property rights . There appear to be no control mechanisms for enforcement or WHO GETS THE MONEY ? 63 XVII.
... the incentives for corrup- tion . Furthermore , the declaration covers numerous aspects that are interlinked , such as property rights . There appear to be no control mechanisms for enforcement or WHO GETS THE MONEY ? 63 XVII.
Page 64
... mechanisms for monitoring implementation . • The issue of revenue disclosure is not specifically addressed . Caspian Revenue Watch . The Caspian Revenue Watch policy program is a relatively new initiative of the Open Society Institute ...
... mechanisms for monitoring implementation . • The issue of revenue disclosure is not specifically addressed . Caspian Revenue Watch . The Caspian Revenue Watch policy program is a relatively new initiative of the Open Society Institute ...
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Common terms and phrases
activities Africa agencies agreement Angola assessment Basel convention certification civil coltan compliance conflict diamonds conflict trade Control Risks Group convention corporate corruption criminal Democratic Republic developing countries economic effective enforcement ensure environmental example exploitation export financial institutions forest funds Global Compact Global Reporting Initiative Global Witness guidelines host governments human rights illegal logging illicit commodities impact implementation important industry initiatives instruments investment involved issues jurisdiction Kimberley process mechanisms ment mineral mining money laundering monitoring multilateral Myanmar natural resources nongovernmental organizations OECD operations participants payments percent Petroleum potential programs rebel groups regime regional regulation relevant reporting Republic of Congo requirements resource curse resource extraction resource revenues role ROSC sanctions scheme Security Council social specific standards Sudan sustainable targeted timber tion tional tracking UN Global Compact United Nations voluntary World Bank