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Mr. OTTINGER. All right. I thank the gentleman, and thank him for his fine efforts again. He has really labored assiduously on this, and I know it is a matter of great concern to all of us, particularly to the people who live in that area who have already suffered a great deal of apprehension, and I thank the Chair.

Mr. SWIFT. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The Chair recognizes counsel.

Mr. WARD. What is the basis for the 10-percent State contribution?

Mr. LUNDINE. As I said, the Federal study done by DOE, without any input, without any direction on this point from Congress, came up with degrees of responsibility for the different problems. At West Valley they said the most urgent problem was the high level liquid wastes. They said that had a high degree of Federal responsibility, which range from 80 to 100 percent in their analysis. That is No. 1, I would say.

No. 2 is that when we first were looking at the provisions of this bill, of course, when I first put it in, I made it all Federal responsibility, and when last year the various committees were negotiating over the terms of this bill, Interior as well as Science, and this committee, all agreed on provisions to go into the fiscal year 1980 DOE authorization bill. The 90-10 cost share is how those negotiations came out.

I was certainly consulted about those negotiations. I didn't directly participate but I guess you would call it something of a congressional determination between the three committees that we all agreed on, and it was passed by the House as a part of the DOE authorization bill last year.

Mr. WARD. Under your bill, who would make the final decisions as to what actions are to be taken at the site?


Mr. WARD. What role would the State of New York have in that? Mr. LUNDINE. They have the final responsibility. They would retain legal responsibility for the rest of the site not covered by the project. I assume that they would be consulted to some degree, but given that they don't have the necessary technical competence, I would not foresee that they would have any direct part in making the determinations as to what the project should entail.

Mr. WARD. So they would not have the right to veto any actions of the State or of the Department of Energy?

Mr. LUNDINE. That is correct. That would be my interpretation. Mr. WARD. And the Department would not have to obtain their prior approval before initiating any actions?

Mr. LUNDINE. That would be my interpretation.

Mr. WARD. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SwIPT. I want to point out just for the record, that the 10percent figure which was negotiated between the three committees was at really the staff level, it was not the considered judgment of the committee members

Mr. LUNDINE. Mr. Chairman, while that is true ha negotiated at the staff level, we then adopted a a which was cosponsored by the chairman of the sub Udall of Arizona, and I don't recall whether it was

or Mr. Fuqua from the Science Committee, which became the House-passed Department of Energy authorization bill last year. It was subject to some debate by Mr. Fithian of Indiana, although I don't think there was any amendment where the House had to take a record position on it. By the approval of the entire bill, the House did approve the West Valley project as part of the 1980 Department of Energy authorization bill.

Mr. SWIFT. Mr. Lundine, the subcommittee thanks you very much for your testimony. We would like for you to join us at the rostrum for the remainder of the hearing.

The Chair would now like to call as our next witness, the Honorable Hugh Carey, Governor of the State of New York. He is a former Member of the House whom I know well, though he doesn't know me. I was here in a different capacity prior to 1974 when he ran for Governor and know him well by watching him and by reputation, and he is certainly most welcome here in the capacity of Governor of New York. The subcommittee welcomes you.


Governor CAREY. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I ask that the subcommittee allow James Larocca, who is commissioner of the Energy Office of New York State to join me at the witness table. Jim is most knowledgeable on the West Valley situation.

I thank the Chair for the opportunity to appear before you today and express my admiration for the leadership of the committee, particularly that of Harley Staggers of West Virginia, the chairman of the full committee, and my colleague John Dingell, with whom I served many long, effective years in the field of energy and matters that deal with vexing problems we face in the nuclear fuel cycle including the back end of the cycle.

We in New York are determined to work effectively with the Federal Government, and the Department of Energy, to resolve the critical condition at West Valley. I urge and support the passage of the Lundine bill and second everything that Congressman Lundine has said here on behalf of the State and district he represents and the people of our country.

This legislation, which begins the important task of cleaning up West Valley, serves the interests of the Nation, the interests of the State of New York, and the interests of the citizens of western New York who live within the vicinity of the site. For too long, their concerns have been aroused by the uncertainty and the controversy surrounding this facility.

The failure of the United States to develop a comprehensive program for dealing with nuclear wastes-from the routine low level wastes to high level liquid wastes and spent fuel-has become a major impediment to the further development of nuclear power throughout the country.

The national interest requires that we act to resolve the problems of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, in order that we may again consider additional nuclear power generating facilities

as part of the national energy plan for reducing our destructive dependence on OPEC oil.

Î might say parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, we have five working nuclear generating sites on line in New York, and one to come into operation within the 1981-82 time frame.

The West Valley solidification project can be a key element of a comprehensive national program. The United States has never demonstrated the solidification of alkaline wastes on the scale proposed for West Valley. Substantial, needed knowledge can be obtained from this project. It can provide valuable information not now attainable from small-scale or limited radioactive tests, nor from full-scale cold tests.

The West Valley project represents the next logical step toward the larger facility which the Federal Government is planning I understand, for immobilizing the defense wastes at Savannah River.

Moreover, successful accomplishment of this project as part of a national program can help maintain the United States as the premier provider of commercial nuclear technology for the world. I cannot help but wonder if failure to fully develop back end technology now will make it necessary for us to purchase such technology from abroad in the years ahead, particularly with what is going on in France. We should not surrender our technological future to others.

In addition to the engineering value of the project to the country as a whole, the proposed West Valley solidification project would provide information valuable to the national waste management program in a different regard. Because the project would be a visible, independent, nondefense project, it could also provide DOE and Congress with practical institutional experience for proceeding with the much larger task of solidifying the high-level defense wastes in this country. As a Federal, State, commercial effort, much would be learned about the respective roles of each.

The interests of New York are served as well by this legislation. While we were a participant in this commercialization venture, it must be recognized that the technical and financial requirements of this project are well beyond our resources and ability and outside our regulatory authority.

This is not to say we are not prepared to do our part. We will meet our responsibilities and play our appropriate role, including cost sharing. But we cannot carry this alone. It was never contemplated by any of the parties, including the United States, that the State alone would bear the costs and burdens of a failure in this risky adventure. Clearly, overall support, direction and management resonsibility must be housed with the only original partnerthe Federal Government-capable of carrying and managing a successful demonstration project. New York will benefit from having the problem resolved, but its benefits will be concurrent with those of the Nation.

The people of the West Valley area and western New York will benefit as well. They will have the benefit of having a potential threat to their health and safety reduced and ultimately eliminated. Their homes and farms and businesses will cease to suffer threats to their value as a result of uncertainty surrounding this

nuclear waste issue, and the community will enjoy the benefit of having government provide a timely and appropriate remedy to a very real and troubling problem.

The program embodied in this legislation is an appropriate response to the most urgent aspects of the situation which exists at West Valley today. In the late 1950's the Federal Government, through the Atomic Energy Commission, vigorously promoted commercialization of the nuclear fuel cycle. The nuclear industry was relatively new and held great promise. A number of States, including New York, competed actively for the first commercially owned reprocessing facility in the country and the prospect it held for economic growth for the State.

Major business corporations were attracted by the potential for profit and competed for a chance to operate such a facility. Unfortunately, all of the early promise of the nuclear age was not fulfilled. Certainly the effort to commercialize the waste cycle did not succeed as so many hoped it would.

The reasons why it did not succeed are subject to considerable debate. I shall not review them here. In any event, it falls to us to deal with this one failed effort, and get on with the work of immobilizing the wastes which have accumulated at the West Valley site.

While the wastes at West Valley, including the liquid wastes, spent fuel, and buried high- and low-level wastes, appear to be secure for the present, posing no immediate threat to health or safety, I nevertheless feel a strong sense of urgency. The right time to initiate an immobilization project for that waste is now before we are faced with a crisis. Like Mount St. Helens, we cannot know when the present status could change.

Prudence requires responses to potential dangers to prevent potentially tragic consequences. The legislation before you is a timely response to a real problem.

As an example of potential hazards is provided by the safety pan under the main tank at West Valley. A test has revealed that this pan, which is designed to contain a leak from the tank itself, will not serve that purpose. Simply stated, the pan which is there to serve as a barrier and to catch a leak, does not hold water. We could prevent a secondary danger from happening by removing it now. This is not a problem now because the tank does not leakand let me emphasize that-the tank does not leak. However, should the tank leak, the loss of this barrier could be significant. Let us never find how significant.

In 1970, the Atomic Energy Commission stated that it did not consider storage of high-level liquid wastes in tanks, like the West Valley tanks, to be an acceptable method of long-term storage.

Based on extensive experience with tank storage of high-level liquid wastes, the Commission found that while tank design, construction, and maintenance had improved, the fact remained that tanks could deteriorate and leak and that wastes in liquid form offer a far more serious potential for dispersal in the environment. Moreover, in the event of an accident, no matter how unlikely such an accident might be, liquid wastes present far more difficulty for recovery and decontamination than solidified wastes.

The desum Life of the West Viller this stres They have been fled for 11 years or more. The project will the at 838 more years to complete. It is clearly not the airy wat e years since ABC poocy pronouncement has been an acetate period of time for story and deliberatio Nows the IRRAT The technology ensts and West Tiler gres as an appropriat opportunity to demonstrate both the engineering and our abuŲ N undertake projects of this nature in a way


The call for prompt action to immobilize the bieber wats £ West Valley has been expressed many times it's one scat in New York on which you find no dispute. Delay will on) provoke greater anxiety for local residents.

The DOE West Valley Tank Decontamination and Decres sioning Task Group, which was convened by DOE and comprised of members of the public, as well as local, State, and Federal organi zations, said in a 1978 report to DOE:

Our strongest recommendation which we intend to any to the highest priority and urgency, is that development of the technology for ineng de de em liquid wastes at West Vagy be started immediately and work æge i sve s technology is developed.

In ranking the various accumulations of radioactive materials at West Valley, the task force found the high-level liquid wastes to be the most hazardous, considering their form, quantity, and potential adverse consequences.

An analysis of this project by the League of Women Voters Education Fund found "overwhelming agreement that steps should be taken as early as practicable to resolve the onsite high-level liquid wastes problem at West Valley."

A policy of doing nothing, or waiting until the first Federal repository is chosen, was found to be unacceptable to the people in the area surronding West Valley. It should be unacceptable to


Let us take action now, Mr. Chairman, to blot out this dangerous stain on our environment, and at the same time, to move foward with the development of a comprehensive program for nuclear waste disposal. All our futures depend on it.

Mr. Chairman, I provide written answers to the specific questions propounded in your letter of invitation. I provide them here for the record and would be pleased to answer any further questions, or those which you may address to Mr. Larocca from our State office of energy.

Thank you.

Mr. SWIFT. Thank you very much, Governor Carey.

They will be included in the record, without objection.

[The attachments to Mr. Carey's prepared statement follow:]


Question. What is the present status of the State of New York's negotiations with the Department of Energy regarding the assignment of responsibility for performing remedial actions at the West Valley site?

We have been speaking with officials at various levels within the Department of Energy and its predecessor agencies about problems at West Valley for at least five years. For the last three years, responsibility for developing a program at West Valley has been with my Energy Commissioner, James L. Larocca. His primary

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