standing alone and unqualified, fixed the character of the trust as an irrevocable one, under the rule in the Totten Case. Having thus fixed its character as irrevocable, the dépositor could not thereafter revoke it without the consent of the beneficiary." See also Re Davis (1907) 119 App. Div. 35, 103 N. Y. Supp. 946; Re Rudolph (1915) 92 Misc. 347, 156 N. Y. Supp. 825, 15 Mills, 323; Re Green (1918) 103 Misc. 564, 170 N. Y. Supp. 843.

But compare Re Halligan (1913) 82 Misc. 30, 143 N. Y. Supp. 676, 11 Mills, 34, which involved the question whether a deposit in trust was subject to a transfer tax. It appeared that a decedent had deposited money in savings banks, receiving pass books showing that the deposits were in trust for his wife, to whom he gave the books, which were subsequently kept at their home. The court held that the trust was revocable until the death of the testator, saying: "It is conceded that all the money deposited by the decedent as trustee for his wife belonged to him. The affidavits submitted to the appraiser on behalf of the estate do not allege that the decedent told his wife at the time he made the deposits that he was giving the money to her, nor do they allege that he said anything about a gift when he gave her the bank books. There is no allegation that the decedent gave the money deposited in the various banks as a gift to his wife. The circumstances surrounding the deposit and the possession of the books by the decedent's wife are entirely consistent with the assumption that the deposit was made in the name of decedent in trust for his wife as a matter of convenience, and that the books were given to her for the purpose of safekeeping."

In a case in Maine it has been said, in this connection: "The deposit of money in a bank by one person in trust for another raises a presumption that a trust was intended, and when supported by evidence showing a continuing intent, or when not reputed by the showing of a contrary intent, creates a trust which is completed and irrevocable, unless

the donor reserved the power of revocation." Cazallis v. Ingraham (1920) 119 Me. 240, 110 Atl. 359.

In a case in Rhode Island it appeared that a father had made several deposits in a bank in trust for different children. One of them was for a son, and the entry on the signature book of the bank was as follows: "Willie J. Atkinson, William Atkinson, Trustee." The bank opened an ac

Willie J., were the

Anna L.

count in the following form : "Mechanics Savings Bank in account with Willie J. Atkinson, William Atkinson, Trustee." It gave to William Atkinson a pass book in which the account was entered in the same manner, which book the father retained until October 19, 1886, when he drew the deposit and interest, and invested the same in his individual name. Likewise, on January 15, 1885, he deposited in the same manner $2,000, in the names respectively of Samuel M. and Robert W. Atkinson, and $1,000 in the name of Anna L. Atkinson. Samuel M., and Robert W. sons of William Atkinson. was one of his daughters, and had served him as confidential clerk and bookkeeper for about fourteen years. He drew no part of the principal or interest of either of the last three accounts, but retained the deposit books until he died. He told each of the four, in his lifetime, that he had made the deposits for them, and that the money would be theirs at his death. He neither made nor caused to be made any charge or memorandum of the deposits other than as above stated, and never delivered to either of his children the pass book of the deposit standing in his or her name. The court, in holding that the trust was irrevocable, said: "The said Willie J. is also entitled to the money deposited for him, with the interest which has accrued thereon, both under the original and later form of deposit; for, the deposit having been kept entire, we think it is fair to suppose that the purpose was simply to transfer it from one bank to the other without violating the trust. The trust having once been completely constituted, the trustee had no power to

revoke it." Atkinson's Petition (1889) 16 R. I. 413, 3 L.R.A. 392, 27 Am. St. Rep. 745, 16 Atl. 712.

In another case in Rhode Island involving the right of one who had made a deposit in a bank in trust for a married daughter, it appeared that the deposit in question was entered on a deposit book as follows: "Mechanics Savings Bank in account with Mabel B. Gobeille, Emma Barth, Trustee." Mabel B. Gobeille died leaving a last will and testament in which she left everything to her husband, Henri E. Gobeille, the complainant. Eleven days before the death of Mabel B. Gobeille, this account, standing to the credit of Mabel B. Gobeille, Emma Barth, trustee, was withdrawn and redeposited by Mrs. Barth to the credit of the respondent, Anna E. Allison, Emma Barth, trustee. Further facts appear in the following extract from the opinion of the court: "When the trust is completely constituted, the power in the settlor to revoke ceases. Whatever may have been Mrs. Barth's intention at the time she made this deposit, we must find that afterwards she informed her daughter, Mrs. Gobeille, of the trust in her favor, and delivered to Mrs. Gobeille the savingsbank book. This conduct amounts to a declaration on the part of Mrs. Barth that she held the fund deposited in præsenti in trust for Mrs. Gobeille, Mrs. Gobeille accepted the trust created for her benefit, and thereafter, up to the time of her death, treated the deposit as a fund to which she was entitled and which she desired to bequeath to her husband. Mrs. Gobeille died of a malignant disease, and for a considerable time before her death it was certain that she could not recover and would soon die. Mrs. Gobeille had no children. The bank book again came into the possession of Mrs. Barth. What induced Mrs. Barth to act as she did we do not know; but it is not unlikely that, failing to understand the full legal effect of this transaction, and wishing to have this fund pass to her other daughter rather than to the husband of the daughter who was then dying, she withdrew the money from

the bank and attempted to create a new trust in favor of her other daughter. This she could not be permitted to do." Gobeille v. Allison (1910) 30 R. I. 525, 76 Atl. 354.

b. Illustrative cases.

In each of the following cases the right to revoke a trust was denied:

In Gray v. Union Trust Co. (1915) 171 Cal. 637, 154 Pac. 306, it appeared that the plaintiff, by two instruments of the same date and forming "parts of the same transaction," made by one of them a transfer to the defendant, absolute in form, of certain property, real and personal. By the second; contemporaneous therewith, she declared the trusts on which the defendant, as trustee, was to hold the property. The conveyance was made to the defendant "to manage said trust property as hereinafter provided." The trustee was empowered "thereafter from time to time to make investments and reinvestments as in its discretion may seem necessary and proper, without consulting the trustor." It was also provided that "the net income and revenue and profit, less the charge for services of the trustee, shall be paid by the said trustee to said trustor," and finally the trust instrument declared. "This trust shall be irrevocable and shall last during the lifetime of said trustor, and upon her death the trust property shall go to and vest as she shall provide in her last will and testament, and leaving no last will and testament, said property shall go to and vest in her heirs at law, according to the laws of succession of the state of California as such laws now exist." It was held that as no power of revocation had been reserved the trust was irrevocable by any act of the plaintiff.

In Security Trust & S. D. Co. v. Farrady (1912) 9 Del. Ch. 306, 82 Atl. 24, which was a bill for instructions to a trustee and executor, it appeared that the settlor, in April, 1909, being then about seventy years of age and seriously ill with an incurable and painful disease, but being then in the possession of her mental faculties, expressed a desire to make some dis

position of her property in trust, and by advice of her physician the trust officer of the Security Trust & Safe Deposit Company was consulted in an interview had at her house. At that interview the settlor stated to the trust officer, in substance, as he testified, and without giving her exact words, "that she desired to arrange for the protection of some funds that she had; to place them where they would be of benefit to her grandson, Samuel Farrady,-especially for his benefit,

and also for the benefit of her daughter, Mrs. Farrady, and another grandson, Charles Farrady." It was shown that the trust officer a day or two later drew not only a declaration of trust respecting the sum of $2,500, but also a will disposing of all the rest of her property, and on April 27, 1909, returned to the settlor's house with the two instruments and two persons, clerks in the employ of the trust company, to act as attesting witnesses. The evidence showed that the papers were read and explained to her and that she apparently understood the contents. Subsequently, in December, 1909, she consulted the same person, and executed a paper revoking the trust and making a different disposition of the fund. The court regarded the absence of the power of revocation as immaterial under the circumstances of the case, and sustained the trust as against the attempted revocation, saying: "Was the irrevocable gift made by Elizabeth Campbell improvident or unreasonable? This is not clearly shown. When made she was seriously ill of an incurable disease, which by the evidence was likely to terminate her life within a short time, and she may have had other property or resources than those mentioned in the case. However this may be, the settlor does not need the protection of this court, and the usual justification to annul a perfected gift, in order to relieve the settlor of the consequences of improvidence, does not here exist, for the settlor died within a few days after the attempted revocation. The caution and reserve of a court to exercise its great powers to undo what is

solemnly done should deter it from so acting in this case, particularly where, as here, the expressed intention of the settlor to protect some money for an improvident grandson will be so effectually carried out. A decree will be made validating the trust established by Elizabeth Campbell as to the sum of $2,500, and directing the trustee company to hold it subject to the trust created concerning it by her declaration dated April 27, 1909."

In Williamson v. Yager (1891) 91 Ky. 282, 34 Am. St. Rep. 184, 15 S. W. 660, the facts were as follows: One who, in his lifetime, was indebted to his brother in a large sum, and after the death of the latter, his wife, the appellant, being entitled to the indebtedness by the devise of her husband, on the 1st day of June of 1880, executed new notes to her for the amount thereof, seven of which were executed for the respective sums indicated. On the same day the appellant, by written assignment on the back of each note, assigned one to each of the seven appellees. The notes were not delivered to the appellees, but were retained by the appellant, who thereafter erased the assignment on each note, and brought suit thereon against the maker, together with three other notes taken from him at the same time, and obtained judgment by default; but the judgment was not collected, except a part of the interest on the three notes last mentioned. The maker having died, the seven children, appellees, brought this action to have the notes declared to be theirs, by reason, first, of said assignment for a valuable consideration, or, second, by reason of a declaration of trust by the appellant. The court, after declaring that there was sufficient consideration, further said: "But, if we are mistaken about the transfer having been made upon a valuable consideration, we are clear that the title to these notes passed to the appellees by a declaration of trust. . Her con

duct, after obtaining judgment, in not claiming interest on these notes, but claiming and collecting interest on the three other notes, on which she, at the

same time, had obtained judgment, and only claiming this part of the judgment as belonging to her, but the other part as belonging to the appellees, as well as the interest thereon, shows that she never recalled the gift, even if she could, but held it in trust for appellees. But conceding that she, by said act, did undertake to recede from the gift and assert her right to the notes, she could not do so after having declared a perfect trust in favor of the appellees. The title to the notes, by that act, passed to them, which the appellant could not thereafter recall without the appellees' consent, which they never gave."

In Gulick v. Gulick (1885) 39 N. J. Eq. 401, it appeared that a husband had conveyed lands to his wife, on his death to sell and divide the net proceeds between her and their children. Subsequently, on the loss of the first deed, a new one was executed, containing provisions more favorable to the wife. Afterwards the first deed was found. The court held the first deed to be in force, and said, as to the right to revoke: "If the first declaration was a valid instrument, and was intended to operate, it was beyond the power of the complainant and defendant to alter it. They, of course, could, by agreement between them, make any alteration in its terms, so far as their own interests under it were concerned, but they could not affect the rights which their children (and perhaps grandchildren) had acquired under it.

The instrument being a valid declaration of the trust, it was not in the power of the complainant and defendant, by their own consent alone, to revoke or alter it to the prejudice of the other cestui que trust. The children had acquired rights under it of which the complainant and defendant could not deprive them by revoking or altering the instrument. The grandchildren had also acquired contingent rights under it. If a voluntary trust, in which the settlor has reserved no power of revocation, is once perfectly created, and the relation of trustee and cestui que trust is once established, it will be enforced, though the settlor has destroyed the

deed, or has attempted to revoke it by making a second voluntary settlement of the same property, or if the estate, by some accident, becomes revested in the settlor. In all these cases, the first perfectly created trust will be upheld with all its consequences, and the settlor will be declared to be a trustee."

In New Jersey Title Guarantee & T. Co. v. Parker (1915) 84 N. J. Eq. 351, 93 Atl. 196, affirmed in (1915) 85 N. J. Eq. 557, 96 Atl. 574, the court, in holding a trust to be irrevocable, said: "When, therefore, Mr. Parker executed the original instrument, he created a life estate in himself with remainder to such persons

as he should by his last will appoint, and, in default of such appointment, to his heirs at law and next of kin under the intestate laws of the state of New York, and, having executed a last will in pursuance of the power and reservation contained in the trust deed, by which he gave the residuum of his estate, including the trust fund in question, to the children of his brother, he thereby created remaindermen who, under the provisions of the trust instrument, become entitled, under the rules of law above stated, to the capital of the fund. Having thus irrevocably disposed of the remainder, he could make no further or other disposition of it without the consent of the remaindermen whom he had so created, and, inasmuch as such consent cannot be had, the fund goes irrevocably to them."

In Garner v. Germania L. Ins. Co. (1888) 110 N. Y. 266, 1 L.R.A. 256, 18 N. E. 130, it appeared that one, as trustee for his children, made and signed an application for insurance on his life, and that a policy was issued which described the premium as paid by him "in trust for his children," naming them. It was held that the trust was one which he had voluntarily created for their benefit, and that he could not deal with it in contravention of their rights. As to the power to revoke the trust, it was said: "Assuming that by the policy John Lindemann contracted, as trustee, for the children, it is insisted that the trust

was revocable at the option of the trustee, and was so far executory as to be capable of revocation. But I think it is a mistake to assume that the trust was wholly executory. It had been to a large extent executed. Every payment of premium for fifteen years had steadily added to the value of the policy as the property of the beneficiaries. The day of final payment grew nearer and the burden of premiums decreased steadily in number. Each payment made added to the surrender value and fully executed the gift to the extent of that value. What the insured had done for the benefit of the assured he could not undo without their assent, nor take from them what was already theirs and destroy the trust so far executed. The question here does not reach the inquiry what might be the rule in a case where the insured contracted in his own name, though for the ultimate benefit of others, for here he contracted explicitly as trustee, and, so far as the trust was executed, neither he alone, nor he and the insurer together, could wrest from the beneficiaries the product of the trust and divert it into other channels."

In Dickey v. Goldschmidt (1908) 60 Misc. 258, 111 N. Y. Supp. 1025, which was a suit to cancel a deed of trust made by the plaintiff, it appeared that under the deed the plaintiff had conveyed certain property "in trust during the lifetime of her the said Celestine A. Burchell, the party of the first part, to collect and receive the rents, issues, income and profits thereof and after payments of all taxes, water rates, assessments, repairs, insurance, interest on mortgages or other charges and expenses to pay over and apply the net rents, issues, income and interest arising therefrom to her the said party of the first part, and at and after the death of the party of the first part, to pay over, divide and convey the principal of the trust estate hereby created to and among such persons and to and for such objects as the said party of the first part shall in and by her last will and testament direct, nominate and appoint, and in default of such last will and testa

ment, then to pay over, convey and divide the same to and among the heirs at law and next of kin of the said party of the first part in the same manner and in the same proportions as if she, the said party of the first part, had died seised and possessed thereof and intestate." At the time when the plaintiff made this trust deed, she had two children. Subsequently she remarried and had another, all of whom were living at the time of the suit, but were not made parties thereto. The surviving trustees were the uncles of the settlor. Judgment was awarded to defendants, dismissing the complaint. The court said: "The trust was made for the purpose of preventing the settlor from being influenced to apply her property in settlement of her husband's debts. There was no fraud, mistake, or undue influence attendant upon the making of the trust deed. The plaintiff served notice upon the trustees that she elected to terminate the trust. This notice was without any legal effect whatever. The trust was not terminable at the option of the settlor. Nor is any right to terminate or change it during her lifetime reserved to the settlor in the deed of trust. The only right of control of the principal which is reserved in the deed of trust is the right to dispose of it by will. The children of the settlor have, therefore, a vested interest in this principal, which is subject to being devested by the will of the settlor. The court is without power to devest these infant children of their interest in this future estate."

In Frederick's Appeal (1866) 52 Pa. 338, 91 Am. Dec. 159, it appeared that the preamble of a deed was as follows: "Whereas, I, Philip Nace, Sr., in consequence of certain disadvantageous bargains and undertakings, and being old and feeble, have met with considerable losses, and being now indebted to a considerable amount, have become so much troubled in mind as to be incapable of attending properly to business, and having reason to fear, if this state of things should continue any length of time, that my affairs would not only fall into confusion,