California.-Hellman v. McWilliams (1886) 70 Cal. 449, 11 Pac. 659; Scrivner v. Dietz (1890) 84 Cal. 297, 24 Pac. 171; Kopp v. Gunther (1892) 95 Cal. 63, 30 Pac. 301; Gray v. Union Trust Co. (1915) 171 Cal. 637, 154 Pac. 306. Hawaii. Kellett v. Sumner (1903) 15 Haw. 76; Love v. Love (1905) 17 Haw. 206.

Gaylord V.

Lafayette

Illinois. Light v. Scott (1878) 88 Ill. 239. Indiana. (1888) 115 Ind. 423, 17 N. E. 899; Ewing v. Jones (1892) 130 Ind. 247, 15 L.R.A. 75, 29 N. E. 1057; Ewing v. Carson (1892) 130 Ind. 597,. 29 N. E. 1061; Ewing v. Lemcke (1892) 130 Ind. 600, 29 N. E. 1061; Ewing v. Torian (1892) 130 Ind. 600, 29 N. E. 1061; Copeland v. Summers (1893) 138 Ind. 219, 35 N. E. 514, 37 N. E. 971; Grant Trust & Sav. Co. v. Tucker (1911) 49 Ind. App. 345, 96 N. E. 487; Ralph v. George (1922) 78 Ind. App. 491, 136 N. E. 44.

Iowa. Re Podhajsky (1908) 137 Iowa, 742, 115 N. W. 590; Jones v. Nicholas (1911) 151 Iowa, 362, 130 N. W. 125; McCash v. Derby (1913) 158 Iowa, 371, 139 N. W. 881; Haulman v. Haulman (1914) 164 Iowa, 471, 145 N. W. 930; Re Tolerton (1915) 168 Iowa, 677, 150 N. W. 1051.

Kansas.-Reddy v. Graham (1922) 110 Kan. 753, 205 Pac. 362. Kentucky. Williamson v. Yager (1891) 91 Ky. 282, 34 Am. St. Rep. 184, 15 S. W. 660; Anderson v. Kemper (1903) 116 Ky. 339, 76 S. W. 122; Beard v. Beard (1917) 173 Ky. 131, 190 S. W. 703, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 832; Murphy v. Haynes (1923) 197 Ky. 444, 247 S. W. 362; Burton v. Burton (1923) 198 Ky. 429, 248 S. W. 1031.

Maine. Cobb v. Knight (1882) 74 Me. 253; Cazallis v. Ingraham (1920) 119 Me. 240, 110 Atl. 359. See Spring v. Hight (1843) 22 Me. 408, 39 Am. Dec. 587.

374, 11 N. E. 562; Lovett v. Farnham (1897) 169 Mass. 1, 47 N. E. 246; Thorp v. Lund (1917) 227 Mass. 474, 116 N. E. 946, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 1204; Coolidge v. Loring (1920) 235 Mass. 220, 126 N. E. 276.

Minnesota. Ewing v. Warner (1891) 47 Minn. 446, 50 N. W. 603. Mississippi. Nelson V. Ratliff (1895) 72 Miss. 656, 18 So. 487.

Missouri. Aubuchon v. Bender (1869) 44 Mo. 565; Ewing v. Shannahan (1892) 113 Mo. 188, 20 S. W. 1065; Ottomeyer v. Pritchett (1903) 178 Mo. 160, 77 S. W. 62; Harding v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. (1918) 276 Mo. 136, 207 S. W. 68; State ex rel. Kansas City Theological Seminary v. Ellison (1919)

Mo., 216 S. W. 967; Watson v. Hardwick (1921) - Mo., 231 S. W. 964; Melvin v. Hoffman (1921) 290 Mo. 464, 235 S. W. 107; Stephens v. Moore (1923) 298 Mo. 215, 249 S. W. 601; Frank v. Heimann (1924) 302 Mo. 334, 258 S. W. 1000; Watson v. Payne (1910) 143 Mo. App. 721, 128 S. W. 238.

New Hampshire.-Minot v. Tilton (1887) 64 N. H. 371, 10 Atl. 682.

New Jersey.-Isham v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. (1856) 11 N. J. Eq. 227; Gulick v. Gulick (1885) 39 N. J. Eq. 401; Crue v. Caldwell (1889) 52 N. J. L. 215, 19 Atl. 188; Beekman v. Hendrickson (1891) — N. J. ——, 21 Atl. 567 ; Filley v. Fownes (1913) 81 N. J. Eq. 498, 87 Atl. 439; New Jersey Title Guarantee & T. Co. v. Parker (1915) 84 N. J. Eq. 351, 93 Atl. 196, affirmed in (1915) 85 N. J. Eq. 557, 96 Atl. 574. New York. Collins v. Collins (1874) 56 N. Y. 668; Mabie v. Bailey (1884) 95 N. Y. 206; Wallace v. Berdell (1884) 97 N. Y. 13; Gilman v. McArdle (1885) 99 N. Y. 451, 52 Am. Rep. 41, 2 N. E. 464; McPherson v. Rollins (1887) 107 N. Y. 316, 1 Am. St. Rep. 826, 14 N. E. 411; Garner v. Germania L. Ins Co. (1888) 110 N. Y. 266, 1 L.R.A. 256, 18 N. E. 130; Genet v. Hunt (1889) 113 N. Y. 158, 21 N. E. 91; Re Davis (1907) 119 App. Div. 35, 103 N. Y. Supp. 946; Stockert v. Dry Dock Sav. Inst. (1913) 155 App. Div. 123, 139 N. Y. Supp. 986; Hammerstein v. Equitable Trust Co. (1913) 156 App. Div. 644, 141 N. Y. Supp. 1065, affirmed

in (1913) 209 N. Y. 429, 103 N. E. 706, motion to amend remittitur granted in (1914) 211 N. Y. 611, 105 N. E. 1085; Crackanthorpe v. Sickles (1913) 156 App. Div. 753, 141 N. Y. Supp. 370; Cazzani v. Title Guarantee & T. Co. (1916) 175 App. Div. 369, 161 N. Y. Supp. 884, affirmed in (1917) 220 N. Y. 683, 116 N. E. 1040; Williams v. Sage (1917) 180 App. Div. 1, 167 N. Y. Supp. 179; Ludlam Ludlam (1920) 194 App. Div. 411, 185 N. Y. Supp. 343, affirmed without opinion in (1922) 232 N. Y. 615, 134 N. E. 594; Re Rudolph (1915) 92 Misc. 347, 156 N. Y. Supp. 825, 15 Mills, 323; Re Merritt (1916) 94 Misc. 425, 159 N. Y. Supp. 558; Re Green (1918) 103 Misc. 564, 170 N. Y. Supp. 843; Meiggs v. Meiggs (1878) 15 Hun. 453; Foster v. Coe (1871) 4 Lans. 53; Parker v. Allen (1890) 36 N. Y. S. R. 671, 14 N. Y. Supp. 265; Court v. Bankers' Trust Co. (1915) 160 N. Y. Supp. 477; Re Carnegie (1922) 203 App. Div. 91, 196 N. Y. Supp. 502, affirming (1921) 117 Misc. 806, 191 N. Y. Supp. 753.

North Dakota. Reel v. Hansboro State Bank (1924) - N. D. 201 N. W. 861.

-

Ohio. See Redkey v. Worthington (1909) 32 Ohio C. C. 63.

Pennsylvania. Greenfield's Estate (1850) 14 Pa. 489; Fellows's Appeal (1880) 93 Pa. 470; Neal v. Black (1896) 177 Pa. 83, 34 L.R.A. 707, 35 Atl. 561; Wilson v. Anderson (1898) 186 Pa. 531, 44 L.R.A. 542, 40 Atl. 1096; Rynd v. Baker (1899) 193 Pa. 486, 44 Atl. 551; Kraft v. Neuffer (1902) 202 Pa. 558, 52 Atl. 100; Fishblate v. Fishblate (1913) 238 Pa. 450, 86 Atl. 469; Owen's Petition (1894) 3 Pa. Dist. R. 328; Murphy v. Solms (1888) 6 Pa. Co. Ct. 264; House's Estate (1894) 14 Pa. Co. Ct. 654.

Rhode Island-Stone v. King (1863) 7 R. I. 358, 84 Am. Dec. 557; Atkinson's Petition (1889) 16 R. I. 413, 3 L.R.A. 392, 27 Am. St. Rep. 745, 16 Atl. 712; Neisler v. Pearsall (1901) 22 R. I. 367, 52 L.R.A. 874, 48 Atl. 8; Gobeille v. Allison (1910) 30 R. I. 525, 76 Atl. 354.

South Carolina.-Brunson v. King (1836) 11 S. C. Eq. (2 Hill) 483; Strong v. Weir (1896) 47 S. C. 307, 25

S. E. 157; McElveen v. Adams (1917) 108 S. C. 437, 94 S. E. 733.

Tennessee.-Harris v. Union Bank (1860) 1 Coldw. 152.

Texas.-Monday v. Vance (1899) 92 Tex. 428, 49 S. W. 516.

Utah.-Skeen v. Marriott (1900) 22 Utah, 73, 61 Pac. 296.

Vermont. Barber v. Thompson (1876) 49 Vt. 213; Sargent v. Baldwin (1887) 60 Vt. 17, 13 Atl. 854; Howard v. Howard (1888) 60 Vt. 362, 14 Atl. 702.

Virginia. Skipwith v. Cunningham (1837) 8 Leigh, 271, 31 Am. Dec. 642; Sterling v. Wilkinson (1887) 83 Va. 791, 3 S. E. 533; Riggan v. Riggan (1896) 93 Va. 78, 24 S. E. 920; Russell v. Passmore (1920) 127 Va. 475, 103 S. E. 652.

Washington. Holmes v. Holmes (1911) 65 Wash. 572, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 645, 118 Pac. 733, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1021.

England. Villers V. Beaumont (1682) 1 Vern. 100, 23 Eng. Reprint, 342; Bale v. Newton (1687) 1 Vern. 464, 23 Eng. Reprint, 589; Clavering v. Clavering (1704) 2 Vern. 473, 23 Eng. Reprint, 904, 8 Eng. Rul. Cas. 577; Ellison v. Ellison (1802) 6 Ves. Jr. 656, 31 Eng. Reprint, 1243; Smith v. Garland (1817) 2 Meriv. 125, 35 Eng. Reprint, 887. See Worrall v. Jacob (1817) 3 Meriv. 256, 36 Eng. Reprint, 98; Petre v. Espinasse (1834) 2 Myl. & K. 496, 39 Eng. Reprint, 1034; Bill v. Cureton (1835) 2 Myl. & K. 503, 39 Eng. Reprint, 1036; Rycroft v. Christy (1840) 3 Beav. 238, 49 Eng. Reprint, 93. See Beatson v. Beatson (1841) 12 Sim. 294, 59 Eng. Reprint, 1139; Newton v. Askew (1848) 11 Beav. 145, 50 Eng. Reprint, 772; Kekewich v. Manning (1851) 1 De G. M. & G. 176, 42 Eng. Reprint, 519; Paterson v. Murphy (1853) 11 Hare, 88, 68 Eng. Reprint, 1198; Phillips v. Mullings (1871) L. R. 7 Ch. 244; Henry v. Armstrong (1881) L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 668; Godfrey v. Poole (1888) L. R. 13 App. Cas. 497, P. C.; Mallott v. Wilson (1903) 2 Ch. 494; Re Daw (1917) 118 L. T. N. S. 151. See Smith v. Lyne (1843) 2 Younge & C. Ch. Cas. 345, 63 Eng. Reprint, 152.

So, it has been declared that it

must appear from the instrument that there was an intention on the part of the grantor to reserve the right of revocation, and that a secret or unexpressed intention is of no avail. Re Tolerton (1915) 168 Iowa, 677, 150 N. W. 1051, holding such to be the rule under the statute and decisions in Iowa. See also Wallace v. Berdell (1884) 97 N. Y. 13.

In Potter v. Fidelity Ins. Trust & S. D. Co. (1901) 199 Pa. 360, 49 Atl. 85, it was said: "Generally the cases in which voluntary settlements have been set aside have been: Where there had been fraud or imposition in their procurement; where the design had been to give the settlor full enjoyment of his property for life, with power of testamentary disposition, and at the same time to protect it from his creditors; where the instrument was in itself, or in connection with other instruments, testamentary in character; where the intention to make the instrument revocable clearly appeared; where the purpose of settlement had failed; or where the trust created was merely a naked one. The rule is that a voluntary settlement will be sustained and enforced in favor of the beneficiaries, unless it is shown that it was procured by fraud or imposition, or executed under a misapprehension of the facts or of the law." See also Kraft V. Neuffer (1902) 202 Pa. 558, 52 Atl. 100.

Again, in Kraft v. Neuffer (Pa.) supra, the court said: "It is a general rule of law that the title of beneficiaries under a deed of trust is complete, and irrevocable by the settlor, although the transaction be purely voluntary. Nor does the fact that the grantor reserved an interest during life in the proceeds of the property, and gave a future benefit to other persons named, give an implied right of revocation. It contravenes no rule or policy of law, but executes the intention of the grantor."

Also, in an early case in England the Lord Chancellor declared: "If a man will improvidently bind himself up by a voluntary deed, and not reserve a liberty to himself by a power of revocation, this court will not loose

the fetters he hath put upon himself, but he must lie down under his own folly; for if you would relieve in such a case, you must consequently establish this proposition, viz.: that a man can make no voluntary disposition of his estate, but by his will only, which would be absurd." Villers v. Beaumont (1682) 1 Vern. 100, 23 Eng. Reprint, 342.

So, in the absence of a power of revocation, where the conveyance is fully executed and the trust perfectly created, the settlement cannot be revoked by a second settlement of the same property. Sewall v. Roberts (1874) 115 Mass. 262.

On the question whether the grantor in a trust deed intended to reserve the power to revoke it, evidence that a considerable time after the execution of the deed he made a will, in which he attempted to dispose of the property conveyed by the deed, is immaterial. Re Tolerton (Iowa) supra.

It has been held, however, that a grantor may revoke a trust deed where he is the sole beneficiary of the trust, and no other person has any present interest in the estate, contingent or otherwise.

Kentucky. See the reported case (FIDELITY & C. TRUST Co. v. Gwynn, ante, 937), which refers to earlier cases in Kentucky, namely, Downs v. Security Trust Co. (1917) 175 Ky. 789, 194 S. W. 1041, Middleton v. Shelby County Trust Co. (1899) 21 Ky. L. Rep. 183, 51 S. W. 156, and Coleman v. Fidelity Trust & S. V. Co. (1906) 28 Ky. L. Rep. 1263, 91 S. W. 716, as denying the right of a trustor who is the sole beneficiary of the trust to revoke it, but says that the courts, in these cases, seem to have been actuated by the particular facts presented. Missouri.

Stephens V. Moore (1923) 298 Mo. 215, 249 S. W. 601.

Nevada. Cole v. Nickel (1919) 43 Nev. 12, 177 Pac. 109, writ of certiorari denied in (1921) 256 U. S. 222, 65 L. ed. 900, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 467.

New York. - Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co. (1914) 162 App. Div. 607, 147 N. Y. Supp. 1058; Cram v. Walker (1922) 173 App. Div. 804, 160 N. Y. Supp. 486; Cruger v. Union

Trust Co. (1916) 173 App. Div. 797, 160 N. Y. Supp. 480; Aranyi v. Bankers' Trust Co. (1922) 201 App. Div. 706, 194 N. Y. Supp. 614; Goodwin v. Broadway Trust Co. (1914) 87 Misc. 130, 149 N. Y. Supp. 1033; Schwartz v. Fulton Trust Co. (1922) 119 Misc. 831, 198 N. Y. Supp. 275; Phelps V. Thompson (1922) 119 Misc. 875, 198 N. Y. Supp. 320; Boucicault v. Leubuscher (1924) 124 Misc. 232, 207 N. Y. Supp. 1.

Pennsylvania. Frederick's Appeal (1866) 52 Pa. 338, 91 Am. Dec. 159; Rick's Appeal (1884) 105 Pa. 528; Bristor v. Tasker (1890) 135 Pa. 110, 20 Am. St. Rep. 853, 19 Atl. 853, 851; Chestnut Street Nat. Bank v. Fidelity Ins. & Trust & S. D. Co. (1898) 186 Pa. 333, 65 Am. St. Rep. 860, 40 Atl. 486; Sturgeon v. Stevens (1898) 186 Pa. 350, 40 Atl. 488.

Rhode Island.-Eaton v. Tillinghast (1856) 4 R. I. 276.

England.-Maber v. Hobbs (1836) 2 Younge & C. Exch. 326, 160 Eng. Reprint, 421; Hastings v. Orde (1840) 11 Sim. 205, 59 Eng. Reprint, 853; Beatson v. Beatson (1841) 12 Sim. 294, 59 Eng. Reprint, 1139.

Canada. Poirier v. Brulé (1891) 20 Can. S. C. 97.

In the case of a transfer of stock for the purpose of creating a trust, it has been held that if by such transfer no beneficiary or third person has been given any present interest therein, the trustor may revoke the trust. Cole v. Nickel (Nev.) supra.

In Aranyi v. Bankers Trust Co. (1922) 201 App. Div. 706, 194 N. Y. Supp. 614, it appeared that the plaintiff had entered into a trust agreement with the defendant, whereby she transferred to the defendant all right, title, and interest which she then had, or might at any time thereafter have, in the corpus of a trust fund established under the will of the plaintiff's grandfather, for the benefit of the plaintiff's mother during her lifetime, with remainder over to her issue. The trust provided, in substance, that when said distributive share was received by the defendant it should be held by it in trust, the net income to be paid over to the plaintiff from time

38 A.L.R.--60.

to time, she having the privilege of withdrawing certain instalments of principal at various times therein. specified, the trust to terminate on the plaintiff arriving at the age of thirtyfive years, at which time the defendant was to convey and pay over the balance of the principal of the said trust fund to the plaintiff for her own use and benefit forever. In case of the death of the plaintiff before arriving at the age of thirty-five years, then the defendant was to convey, transfer, and pay over the principal of the trust fund, or such portion thereof as might remain in its hands, in equal shares to the children of the plaintiff then living; and if the plaintiff should die before attaining the age of thirty-five years, without leaving children her surviving, then on her death the defendant was to convey, transfer, and pay over the said fund to such person or corporation as the plaintiff should appoint by her last will and testament. The plaintiff in the agreement declared the same to be irrevocable. The court said: "In the case under consideration the trust was created for the sole benefit of the creator, to hold her property in trust for her benefit until she should arrive at the age of thirty-five years, when it was to be paid over to her. Her children were not in any sense to be beneficiaries of the trust. Their only possibility of interest would be in case she should die prior to the termination of the trust period, leaving such children. The trust deed as to them was testamentary in character. The learned counsel for the appellant has failed to distinguish, in his citation of authorities, between trusts created in real estate and those where the corpus is personalty. While in this case the trust deed refers to both real and personal property, it is only as to the trust in the personalty that revocation sought. I am of opinion that where the corpus of the trust is personal property, and the trust is a voluntary one made by the creator for her own benefit, and she is the only person in being having a vested or contingent interest therein, she has the right to revoke the same."

is

With regard to what are sometimes called savings bank trusts the rule has been stated in a New York case as follows: "After much reflection upon the subject, guided by the principles established by our former decisions, we announce the following as our conclusion: A deposit by one person of his own money, in his own name as trustee for another, standing alone, does not establish an irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act or declaration, such as delivery of the pass book or notice to the beneficiary. In case the depositor dies before the beneficiary without revocation, or some decisive act or declaration or disaffirmance, the presumption arises that an absolute trust was created as to the balance on hand at the death of the depositor." Re Totten (1904) 179 N. Y. 112, 70 L.R.A. 711, 71 N. E. 748, 1 Ann. Cas. 900, reversing (1903) 89 App. Div. 368, 85 N. Y. Supp. 928.

And see Lattan v. Van Ness (1906) 184 N. Y. 601, 77 N. E. 1190, affirming (1905) 107 App. Div. 393, 95 N. Y. Supp. 97, which reversed (1904) 44 Misc. 116, 89 N. Y. Supp. 761. In the opinion rendered by the appellate division it was said: "This case is distinguishable from the Totten Case in that the deposit in the latter was made in the name of the depositor, who retained the bank book; but if this was not sufficient to create even a presumption of an intention to establish an irrevocable trust, it would seem that the mere deposit in the name of a third person as trustee, though accompanied by a delivery of the pass book to the trustee, was not conclusive. As the evidence seems to me to compel the conclusion that a tentative and not an irrevocable trust was intended, I advise that the judgment be reversed upon the law and the facts, and a new trial granted, costs to abide the final award of costs." See also Matthews v. Brooklyn Sav. Bank (1913) 208 N. Y. 508, 102 N. E. 520, reversing (1912) 151 App. Div. 527, 136 N. Y. Supp. 110; Re Davis (1907) 119 App. Div. 35, 103

N. Y. Supp. 946; Hessen v. McKinley (1913) 155 App. Div. 496, 140 N. Y. Supp. 724, affirmed in (1913) 209 N. Y. 532, 102 N. E. 1104; Duryea v. Knapp (1916) 174 App. Div. 131, 160 N. Y. Supp. 553, affirmed without opinion in (1918) 223 N. Y. 643, 119 N. E. 1040, which was affirmed on rehearing in

N. Y., 120 N. E. 861; Jennings v. Hennessy (1899) 26 Misc. 265, 55 N. Y. Supp. 833, affirmed in (1899) 40 App. Div. 633, 58 N. Y. Supp. 1142; Walsh v. Emigrant Industrial Sav. Bank (1919) 106 Misc. 628, 176 N. Y. Supp. 418, affirmed without opinion in (1922) 233 N. Y. 512, 135 N. E. 897; Re Wille (1920) 111 Misc. 61, 182 N. Y. Supp. 366; Morris v. Sheehan (1920) 112 Misc. 222, 184 N. Y. Supp. 121, affirmed without opinion in (1921) 199 App. Div. 968, 191 N. Y. Supp. 939, which is affirmed with opinion in (1922) 234 N. Y. 366, 138 N. E. 23.

As to the rule established by the decision in Re Totten (N. Y.) supra, it was later said in a case decided in the appellate division in New York: "This rule appears to establish two propositions: First, if the depositor during his lifetime completes the gift by some unequivocal act, such as delivery of the pass book or notice to the beneficiary, the trust thereupon and thereby becomes irrevocable by any act of the depositor; second, in default of such an unequivocal act the trust remains tentative only, during the lifetime of the depositor, and revocable by him by some decisive act or declaration. If not so revoked the gift becomes absolute on the death of the depositor." Stockert v. Dry Dock Sav. Inst. (1913) 155 App. Div. 123, 139 N. Y. Supp. 986, wherein it was held that where a depositor had opened a savings bank account in trust for her niece, and had at once delivered the bank book to the latter, and there was no other evidence of the intention of the depositor, a trust was created which could not be subsequently revoked without the consent of the beneficiary. The court said: "The only evidence as to the intention of the depositor at the time the deposit was made is that she at once gave the bank book to plaintiff. That evidence,