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trustees of the society, to pay the sums opposite their respective names so long as a certain minister shall preach to the society, is valid and binding on the subscribers so long as the minister shall continue to preach, the consideration being the preaching of the gospel by him. First Religious Soc. v. Stone (N. Y.) supra. And to the same effect is Dieffendorf v. Reformed Calvinist Church (1822) 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 12.

So, where the defendant agreed to give an acre of land to a church on condition that the society would erect thereon a suitable house of worship, the court in Macon v. Sheppard (1841) 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 334, held that the erection of a house of worship was a benefit to the promisor, and put those to whom the promise was made to trouble and expense, and that either point of view was a sufficient consideration within the rule that a valuable consideration is either a benefit to the party promising, or a prejudice, trouble, or detriment to those to whom the promise was made.

And in Hammond v. Small (1857) 16 U. C. Q. B. 371, it was held that a fund to insure the appointment of a bishop to superintend the spiritual concerns and assist in supplying the spiritual wants of the community is an object of value to church members, sufficient to form an adequate consideration for engaging to contribute to such fund, without which the desired object could not be obtained.

But in Boutell v. Cowdin (1812) 9 Mass. 254, it was held that a promissory note in aid of a fund for the support of a minister was void for want of consideration, as no benefit could accrue to the promisor.

However, in Church & Congregation in Second Precinct v. Stetson (1828) 5 Pick. (Mass.) 506, it was said that the ground of the decision in the Boutell Case (Mass.) supra, was that the subscription was void because there was no legal body to which the promise was made; further, the court said that it did not believe that that case intended to lay down the proposition that a promise made to a party capable in law of receiving it, and

compellable by law to apply the proceeds according to the original intent of the contributors, was void for want of consideration.

So, a promissory note executed by a testator shortly before his death, which on its face stated that it was for value received, delivered to the payee with a paper directing the money to be used by expending the interest thereon in the spreading of the Gospel during the lifetime of the payee, thereafter to be invested for the benefit of the Bible Society, was held to be wholly without consideration and void in Dodge v. Pond (1861) 23 N. Y. 69, for "a desire to make a gift for benevolent or charitable purposes must be executed, or it is ineffectual."

7. Discharging indebtedness.

A subscription to a fund for discharging an indebtedness of the promisee is supported by legal consideration, where in reliance upon the subscriptions money with which to pay off the indebtedness has been borrowed from other sources, since new and different liabilities have been incurred. Methodist Episcopal Church v. Garvey (1870) 53 Ill. 401, 5 Am. Rep. 51; United Presby. Church v. Baird (1882) 60 Iowa, 237, 14 N. W. 303; First M. E. Church v. Donnell (1899) 110 Iowa, 5, 46 L.R.A. 858, 81 N. W. 171; Erdman v. Eutaw Methodist Protestant Church (1917) 129 Md. 595, 99 Atl. 793; Troy Conference Academy v. Nelson (1852) 24 Vt. 189. Contra, Re Hudson (1885) 54 L. J. Ch. N. S. (Eng.) 811.

Thus, within the rule that a subscription to a charitable object becomes binding when money is expended and liabilities incurred on faith of the subscription, consideration for a subscription towards a fund for the payment of an indebtedness of a church exists, where, relying on subscriptions as a means of payment, the trustees of the church have borrowed money and paid off their original indebtedness, for in so doing they incurred a new and different liability. Methodist Episcopal Church v. Garvey (Ill.) supra.

So, an individual assumption by the trustees, of the indebtedness of a church, in reliance on a subscription for the payment of such church debt, constitutes a consideration for the subscription, rendering it valid and an enforceable obligation. First M. E. Church v. Donnell (1899) 110 Iowa, 5, 46 L.R.A. 858, 81 N. W. 171.

In First M. E. Church v. Donnell (1895) 95 Iowa, 494, 64 N. W. 412, it was held that, since a contract in writing imports a consideration, a written subscription for the purpose of liquidating the indebtedness of a church forms a valid basis for an action against a subscriber; it appeared, however, that the petition contained averments that the purpose of the subscription was the erection of a church, and that the church had been erected relying upon such subscriptions.

But in Re Hudson (Eng.) supra, where a subscription was made to the fund of a central committee for the paying off of church debts, and the subscriber paid some instalments thereon, but died before all were paid, it was held that the subscription was unenforceable as to the remainder, because of no legal consideration, although it was alleged that the committee had paid larger sums to various churches than otherwise would have been paid, on account of this subscription, although payment from this fund had induced others to contribute, although churches had incurred liabilities because of promises from the committee to help them from this fund, and although the committee itself had incurred liabilities in administering the fund; the court says that no duty was owed by the committee to the subscriber, that he could not have compelled them to act at all in the premises, but that the subscription and its acceptance were purely voluntary on both sides.

A subscription for the sole purpose of raising money to pay off an indebtedness existing against the promisee is without consideration and unenforceable, where no new or different liability is incurred or assumed upon faith of the subscription. University of Des Moines v. Livingston (1881)

57 Iowa, 307, 42 Am. Rep. 42, 10 N. W. 738, on second appeal in (1885) 65 Iowa, 202, 21 N. W. 564; Methodist Orphans' Home Asso. v. Sharp (1878) 6 Mo. App. 150; Johnson v. Otterbein University (1885) 41 Ohio St. 527; First Cong. Church v. Gillis (1896) 17 Pa. Co. Ct. 614. But see Hart's Estate (1879) 13 Phila. (Pa.) 226.

Thus, in Methodist Orphans' Home Asso. v. Sharp (1878) 6 Mo. App. 150, where the defendant had signed a subscription agreement for the purpose of raising money to liquidate a debt against the plaintiff institution, and the full amount had been subscribed and the amount paid in used in part payment of the debt, the court held that, as the debt had already been contracted, it could not be said that the institution had incurred any liability in reliance on the subscription, which was necessary in order that there be any consideration to support it.

And in Johnson v. Otterbein University (1885) 41 Ohio St. 527, it was held that the creation of a fund with which to pay off a previously incurred indebtedness of a university was not a consideration in law for the promise of one to pay, three years after date, a specified amount of money to the trustees of the school, to be used exclusively to liquidate such debt; some evidence was offered in this case to show that the university had borrowed money from other sources, relying on the subscriptions, but, as that point was not pleaded, the court did not deem it necessary to comment on it.

In First Cong. Church v. Gillis (1895) 17 Pa. Co. Ct. 614, the decision in Hart's Estate (1879) 7 W. N. C. (Pa.) 162, holding that a subscription to a fund to discharge a pre-existing indebtedness of the church was supported by sufficient consideration. was expressly disapproved, the court holding that a promise of a sum of money towards paying a pre-existing indebtedness of a church was unenforceable for want of consideration, since the promisor could not be said to have been benefited, nor the promisee to have suffered any injury or incurred

any liability, by reason of such a subscription. However, the basis of the decision in the Hart Case appears to have been that consideration could be found in the mutuality of the promises of the various subscribers.

In Congregation of Benai Abraham v. Kanner (1915) 200 Ill. App. 640, a promise, in consideration of funeral rites to be performed upon the promisor's deceased husband, to pay off the present encumbrance of a religious congregation, which promise empowered the trustees to enforce the obligation, was held unenforceable, and not founded upon a valid consideration.

It has been held, however, that consideration for a subscription to a fund for paying off the pre-existing indebtedness of an academy may be found in the obligation imposed upon and assumed by the trustees of the academy to see to and make application of the money as directed by the subscribers, so as to enable the institution to prosecute its duties of public instruction, for which it was incorporated. Troy Conference Academy v. Nelson (1852) 24 Vt. 189.

8. Miscellaneous.

Pledges to an incorporated war chest have been held valid and enforceable obligations, founded upon a sufficient consideration, where expenses have been incurred in reliance upon such pledges. Scott v. Triggs (1921) 76 Ind. App. 69, 131 N. E. 413; Mechanicville War Chest v. Butterfield (1920) 110 Misc. 257, 181 N. Y. Supp. 428; Mechanicville War Chest v. Ryan (1920) 110 Misc. 448, 181 N. Y. Supp. 576.

So, it has been held that a subscription to aid a symphony society to produce and conduct a series of highclass orchestral concerts is an express request on the part of the subscribers to the society to give the concerts, and becomes a valid and enforceable obligation, founded upon a sufficient legal consideration, when, upon that request, the society determined to give the concerts and made the necessary arrangements and incurred incidental expenses. Russian Symphony Soc. v.

Holstein (1922) 199 App. Div. 353, 192 N. Y. Supp. 64, reversing (1920) 113 Misc. 344, 184 N. Y. Supp. 707, which held that the contract was not mutually binding, and that there was no consideration therefor.

A subscription to a Y. M. C. A. building fund of a specified total is not released by the increase of such total to a much larger amount, if the addition is covered by further subscriptions, so that the enterprise will not fail; nor can a subscriber to such a fund, who permits work to progress in carrying out the enterprise for a length of time without objecting, secure a release from his subscription merely because the plans have been changed. Y. M. C. A. v. Olds Co. (1915) 84 Wash. 630, L.R.A.1917F, 1132, 147 Pac. 406.

And where one subscribing to a church building fund had acted a primary part in getting up the subscriptions and inducing others to sign and undertake the construction of the proposed church by voluntary subscriptions, of which he was the head subscriber, and had acted as the head of the building committee which had commenced and completed the building on the faith of several subscriptions, such facts all go to make up a legal consideration for his promise. Watkins v. Eames (1852) 9 Cush. Mass. 537.

Consideration for the undertaking of a subscriber to a paper wherein the subscribers agreed to pay to a treasurer, thereafter to be appointed by them, the sums opposite their respective names, to be used in erecting a church, providing that the subscriptions would not be binding unless a specified amount was subscribed, may be found from the evidence that the terms and conditions in the subscriptions have been fully met by obtaining unconditional subscriptions to the amount named, the appointment of a treasurer, the attendance by the defendant of meetings of the subscribers, at which the religious society was organized and a building committee appointed, and the defendant's knowledge of the commencement of the work on the building, its progress and

completion, without expressing any dissent, or attempting to revoke his subscription. Presbyterian Soc. v. Beach (1878) 74 N. Y. 72.

And consideration for an oral promise to subscribe a certain amount of money to a church, announced in an assembly of the members of the church, in the presence of the subscriber, may be found in the action of the trustees of the church in making this subscription a basis of credit in securing improvements for the church building. Capelle v. Trinity M. E. Church (1875) 11 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 536, Fed. Cas. No. 2,392.

And where the maker of a promissory note intended that it should go for the purchase of a building site for a public library to be built by a school district, but which he consented might be used as the board should deem best in aid of the enterprise, the expenditure of a considerable sum in holding an election by a school district, and the incurring of a valid indebtedness for a large amount by the issue of bonds voted at the election to secure money for the erection of the building, will constitute a sufficient consideration for the note. School Dist. v. Sheidley (School Dist. v. Stocking) (1897) 138 Mo. 672, 37 L.R.A. 406, 60 Am. St. Rep. 570, 40 S. W. 656.

Consideration for a subscription to the capital stock of an educational corporation, for the purpose of building a seminary, which has been accepted by the corporation, may be found in the obligation resting on the corporation to issue stock to the subscriber to the amount of his subscription, and his consequent power to control the corporation to that extent. Richmondville Union Seminary v. McDonald (1866) 34 N. Y. 379.

So, where the defendant signed a subscription to a fund for the benefit of a school, the subscription being made payable to a religious society having control of the school, the court in Seventh Day Baptist Memorial Fund v. Saunders (1893) 84 Wis. 570, 54 Atl. 1094, held that the acceptance of subscription notes by the society as security for the advancement of

money to the school, upon the faith of the notes, constituted a consideration therefor sufficient to make the notes binding.

Likewise, where a promissory note is given as a subscription to a charitable fund, and the note is discounted and the proceeds used for the purpose for which the subscription was given, the maker cannot defend against it on the ground that no consideration moved to him for its execution, for money advanced by another on the faith of such promise is sufficient. Vierling v. Horton (1888) 27 Ill. App. 263.

In Comstock v. Howd (1867) 15 Mich. 237, where the defendant, with several others, subscribed to a fund for the purpose of furnishing a free dinner to returned soldiers and their families, and in reliance upon such subscription expenses had been incurred, the court stated that there was no difficulty upon the question of consideration, for the object was a meritorious one for which people generally were willing to expend money, which, therefore, "must be regarded as worth money when promised."

So, the acceptance by a college of endowment fund notes and their application as a basis of various liabilities incurred in conducting a school, in an honest effort to carry out the design of the founders and of all those interested in its welfare, furnished a sufficient consideration for the notes, notwithstanding that the school was not very successful financially or in the point of attendance. Lincoln University v. Hepley (1887) 28 Ill. App. 629.

So, where a college is in successful operation, the furnishing of its advantages to students, the employment of teachers, and the incurring of consequent liabilities are sufficient to raise a consideration for a subscription to the endowment fund of the college, and it may be enforced against the estate of the subscriber, notwithstanding the full amount of the endowment fund has not been raised, if the promise was not conditioned upon that. Friedline v. Carthage College (1887) 23 Ill. App. 494.

And where, relying on subscriptions already obtained, persons proposing to found a school devoted time and expense in securing a charter, and subsequently the corporation organized a school, contracted for apartments for the students, becoming liable for rents for the same, and established professorships and lectureships with salaries attached, a sufficient consideration is established for the subscription agreement of one who, without revoking his promise, knew that the corporation was proceeding on the strength thereof to part with valuable assets. Berkeley Divinity School v. Jarvis (1865) 32 Conn. 412.

So, one who has subscribed to a charitable fund, where all subscriptions were made on the condition that a subscriber should be entitled to a loan of the sum subscribed by him, by giving his note therefor, cannot question, on the ground of a want of consideration, a promissory note given by him in payment of his subscription, whereby he acknowledged that he had borrowed and received the sum subscribed by him of the treasurer, and promised to repay the same according to the conditions of his subscription. Fisher v. Ellis (1825) 3 Pick. (Mass.) 322.

And where a voluntary subscription is made for a church building fund, payable to the treasurer of an incorporated religious society, the giving of a bond by such treasurer, with sureties, conditioned to take care of the fund to be collected and to account for the same and pay over the amount for the benefit of the corporation when requested, is a sufficient and valid consideration for the subscription, for the giving of the bond with sureties is a burden of service, and when done at the request and for the benefit of another constitutes a good and legal consideration for an express promise. Thompson v. Page (1840) 1 Met. (Mass.) 565.

And where a hotel keeper agreed to subscribe a specified amount towards defraying the expenses of entertaining the delegates to a convention of a fraternal order, which subscription should be reduced by one half unless

a banquet should be given at the subscriber's hotel, the court in Lasar v. Johnson (1899) 125 Cal. 549, 58 Pac. 161, held that, upon the banquet being given at the hotel pursuant to the agreement, good consideration existed for the promise to pay the full sum of the subscription.

Consideration for an agreement to contribute funds to a college or university for founding a scholarship exists, where, after the making of the agreement, the authorities of the institution have proceeded to establish the scholarship. Buchtel College v. Chamberloix (1906) 3 Cal. App. 246, 84 Pac. 1000.

But a mere promise to pay a specified amount towards the endowment of a professorship cannot be enforced against the estate of the promisor, notwithstanding that the professorship was afterwards established, if there is nothing to show that it was established as a result of that promise. Thum's Estate (1896) 5 Pa. Dist. R. 739, 18 Pa. Co. Ct. 615.

VI. Consideration in mutual subscriptions.

Another theory advanced by a number of courts, by which the validity and enforceability of subscription agreements are upheld, is the rule, sometimes spoken of as the doctrine of a promise for a promise, that the mutual promises of persons contributing to a fund for the accomplishment of a common object, which can only be accomplished through their aggregate efforts, constitute reciprocal obligations, and are each a sufficient consideration to support the validity of another. This rule has been applied in the following cases:

United States. Capelle v. Trinity M. E. Church (1878) 11 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 536, Fed. Cas. No. 2,392.

California.-Christian College v. Hendley (1894) 49 Cal. 347 (funds to establish a college).

Connecticut. Berkeley Divinity School v. Jarvis (1865) 32 Conn. 412; North Ecclesiastical Soc. v. Maston (1869) 36 Conn. 26.

Georgia.-Wilson v. First Presby. Church (1876) 56 Ga. 554 (church

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