that the subscriber made any request in this respect.

And in Twenty-third Street Baptist Church v. Cornell (1890) 117 N. Y. 601, 6 L.R.A. 807, 23 N. E. 177, where a subscription was conditional upon a certain aggregate of subscriptions, the court, in holding that it was not enforceable, said that no endeavor to obtain subscriptions was occasioned by the expressed wish or direction of the testatrix, but began and was continued irrespective of it.

And the expense incurred in securing the subscription of the person sued does not constitute consideration for the subscription, although the expense of securing others does. Brokaw v. McElroy (1913) 162 Iowa, 288, 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 835, 143 N. W. 1087. The court said that an expenditure in the form of commissions for obtaining the various subscriptions sued on differs essentially in its nature and in its equity from expenditures and obligations incurred in carrying on the enterprise for which the institution was organized, and in reliance upon which the promise was made, and cannot upon any legal principle be deemed a consideration for the promise. And consideration for a subscription agreement may be found from the fact that others were led to subscribe by the very subscription of the defendant.

Iowa-Brokaw v. McElroy (1913) 162 Iowa, 288, 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 835, 143 N. W. 1087.

Massachusetts.-Church & Congregation in Second Precinct v. Stetson (1828) 5 Pick. 506 (overruled in Cottage Street M. E. Church v. Kendall (1877) 121 Mass. 528, 23 Am. Rep. 286).

Michigan. Underwood v. Waldron (1863) 12 Mich. 73; Comstock v. Howd (1867) 15 Mich. 237.

Washington. - Depauw University v. Ankeny (1917) 97 Wash. 451, 116 Pac. 1148.

"A contribution by one naturally operates as an inducement to contributions by others. It is not unusual that publicity is given to contributions already made as an inducement to others. If it is within the contemplation of a contributor that the fact that his contribution may be announced to others as an inducement to contributions by them, and if additional contributions be made by reason of such inducement, even in part, it operates as a sufficient consideration for the promise of the first contributor. It is not essential in such a case that the additional contributions thus induced should be devoted to the same fund, or to the erection of the same building. If the original promise, when made, was intended to induce activities and expenditures by the beneficiary in pursuance of the purpose of its organization, and if such activities and such expenditures were induced thereby, even in part, it is a sufficient consideration." Brokaw v. McElroy (Iowa) supra. This case was followed and approved in Upper Iowa Conference v. Noyes (1914) 165 Iowa, 601, 146 N. W. 848.

Since a legal consideration may consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to one party, or some forbearance, judgment, loss, or responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by the other, a promise to give money to a duly incorporated university under the control of a church of which the promisor was a member, which subscription the university accepted, assuming the obligation of applying it to purposes for which it was given, and made an announcement of the gift, in the presence and with the consent of the donor, in a church convention, whereby others were induced to make subscriptions for the same purpose, is supported by a valuable consideration within the definition above given. Baptist Female University v. Borden (N. C.) supra.

But the Massachusetts court expressly repudiated this rule in Cottage

Street M. E. Church V. Kendall (Mass.) supra, stating that the suggestion in the Stetson Case (Mass.) supra, that the fact that others have been led to subscribe by another's subscription is a sufficient consideration for the latter's contract was obiter dictum and inconsistent with elementary principles. And this rule has been denied in other courts. Methodist Orphans' Home Asso. v. Sharp (1878) 6 Mo. App. 150; RE GRISWOLD (reported herewith) ante, 858. See also Presbyterian Church v. Cooper (First Presby. Church v. Cooper) (1889) 112 N. Y. 517, 3 L.R.A. 468, 8 Am. St. Rep. 767, 20 N. E. 352, supra; Twenty-third Street Baptist Church v. Cornell (1890) 117 N. Y. 601, 6 L.R.A. 807, 23 N. E. 177.

However, as pointed out in Irwin v. Lombard University (Ohio) supra, the rule in Massachusetts is that one for whose benefit a contract is made by others cannot maintain an action on it, for want of privity; and this, it is said, accounts for the decision in the Cottage Street M. E. Church Case that consideration for a subscription agreement cannot be found from the fact that others have been led to subscribe to the same purpose on the faith of the defendant's subscription.

4. Accepting conditional subscriptions.

In a number of cases where subscribers have expressed, in plain term, conditions on which donations are made, which require of the promisee the performance of duties attended with labor or expense, an acceptance of the donation, with the consequent obligation to perform the condition, has been held to form a good consideration for the subscription.

Illinois. Whitsitt v. Preëmption Presby. Church (1884) 110 Ill. 125. See also Kentucky Baptist Education Soc. v. Carter (1874) 72 Ill. 247.

Louisiana-Homer College v. Calhoun (1877-80) Man. Unrep. Cas. 140. Maine. Fryeburg Parsonage Fund v. Ripley (1830) 6 Me. 442.

Robinson v. Nutt (1904) 185 Mass. 345, 70 N. E. 198.

New Jersey.-New Jersey Orthopædic Hospital pædic Hospital & Dispensary v. Wright (1921) 95 N. J. L. 462, 113 Atl. 144.

New York. Dieffendorf v. Reformed Calvinist Church (1822) 20 Johns. 12; Stewart v. Hamilton College (1845) 2 Denio, 403 (per Bockee, Senator); Roberts v. Cobb (1886) 103 N. Y. 600, 9 N. E. 500; Keuka College v. Ray (1901) 167 N. Y. 96, 60 N. E. 325; Genesee College v. Dodge (1863) 26 N. Y. 215; Hammond v. Shepard (1871) 40 How. Pr. 452; Reformed Protestant Dutch Church v. Hardenbergh (1874) 48 How. Pr. 414; Re Conger (1920) 113 Misc. 129, 184 N. Y. Supp. 74.

North Carolina.-See Pipkin v. Robinson (1855) 48 N. C. (3 Jones, L) 152.

North Dakota.-Thompkins v. Dinnie (1911) 21 N. D. 305, 130 N. W. 935. Wisconsin. La Fayette County Monument Corp. v. Magoon (1889) 73 Wis. 627, 3 L.R.A. 761, 42 N. W. 17.

On this theory a subscription to a church debt fund on condition that the full amount be subscribed, to be paid monthly for five years, and on the further condition that the current expenses for each year be fully met and not materially increased, except in case of unavoidable necessity, was enforced against the subscriber's estate in Robinson v. Nutt (1904) 185 Mass. 345, 70 N. E. 198.

So, the agreement of a charitable hospital that the amount pledged by a subscriber, while constituting a part of the general fund of the institution, would be devoted to the building of an operating room which was to bear the name suggested by the donor, and the further agreement by the donee to obtain a waiver, in the donor's favor, of a similar privilege of applying a subscription to the building of the operating room, which was in fact done, constitute legal consideration for the promise of the donor and renders the subscription agreement binding and enforceable against her estate. New Jersey Orthopædic Hospital & Dispensary v.

Wright (1921) 95 N. J. L. 462, 113 Atl. 144.

And the acceptance by the trustees of a parish fund, of donations to the fund, the income of which was to be used for the support and maintenance of the minister and to the payment of parish taxes which might be assessed against the subscribers, which fund was to be managed in a certain manner, amounts to an undertaking on the part of the trustees to perform the conditions of the donation and incur the necessary expenses thereof, and forms a good consideration sufficient to support the promise of each subscriber. Fryeburg Parsonage Fund v. Ripley (1830) 6 Me. 442.

So, a promise to pay a college a certain amount of money to be applied for college purposes, accompanied by a contemporaneous agreement stating that the promise had been made on condition that the college should hold its doors open upon all moral subjects, which was done, is based upon a sufficient consideration, for the agreement is evidence of a request by the subscriber that the college perform certain acts. Hammond v. Shepard (1871) 40 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 452.

In University of Chicago v. Emmert (1899) 108 Iowa, 500, 79 N. W. 285, where the balance due upon a subscription towards the establishment of a college was allowed against the estate of the subscriber, it appears that the subscription was conditioned upon a stipulated total amount being subscribed, and that that condition had been met, although the court says that where a subscription is in writing, and the signature is proved, consideration will be presumed.

And where a subscription is made to a mission board with the request that the money be used for the support of work in a particular foreign field, the acceptance of such subscription by the board on those conditions, the sending of two missionaries to such field for the purpose of doing the work stipulated in the subscription, and the refraining from any attempt to raise funds for the maintenance of the work in that field, constitute sufficient consideration for the subscrip

tion. Presbyterian Bd. of Foreign Missions v. Smith (1904) 209 Pa. 361, 58 Atl. 689.

A subscriber to a fund for securing the location of a college at a certain place, on condition that a specified sum is raised, cannot avoid his subscription by showing a deficiency in the amount raised after his subscription has been accepted as sufficient by the party establishing the college, when he was a leading spirit in the enterprise, knew the subscribers, and knew what was demanded. Rogers v. Galloway Female College (1898) 64 Ark. 627, 39 L.R.A. 636, 44 S. W. 454.

And a condition in a promise to contribute a certain sum of money towards the endowment of a professorship, "when $20,000, including the amount herein specified," shall be raised for that purpose, is satisfied by the taking of notes or obligations of subscribers to that amount, for the result in such case is the same as though money had actually been paid in, since only the interest was to be used in support of the professorship. Westminster College v. Gamble (1868) 42 Mo. 411.

Likewise, where one subscribes a certain amount, payable annually, for the support of the minister in a certain church as long as the minister remains the regular preacher thereof, he is legally liable so long as the condition is fulfilled; that condition is not breached by the action of one of the ecclesiastical tribunals of the church in deposing the minister, where afterwards, on appeal to the highest tribunal, that decision was reversed. Dieffendorf v. Reformed Calvinist Church (1822) 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 12.

And where a promissory note is given as a subscription to an educational institution, to be payable when a certain total amount is subscribed to the endowment fund, or in full equal annual instalments, as the maker shall choose, and where he does not pay in annual instalments, and the four years have elapsed, and the sum stipulated has been subscribed, the beneficiary may recover on the note without proof of notice that the sub

scription has been completed. Genesee College v. Dodge (1863) 26 N. Y. 213.

In University of Chicago v. Emmert (Iowa) supra, the balance due upon a subscription towards the establishment of a college was allowed against the estate of the subscriber, the court saying that where the subscription is in writing, and the signature is proved, a consideration will be presumed; but it appears in that case that the subscription was conditioned upon a stipulated total amount being subscribed, and that the condition had been met.

And in some cases it has been held that the execution and delivery of an instrument by which the maker binds himself to contribute money to a school or charitable enterprise, on terms and conditions therein stated, and the acceptance by the donee on those terms and conditions, afford ample consideration for the promise to pay.

Barnett v. Franklin College (1893) 10 Ind. App. 103, 37 N. E. 427; Simpson Centenary College v. Bryan (1878) 50 Iowa, 293.

In Barnett V. Franklin College (Ind.) supra, where a bond, binding the obligor, her heirs, devisees, and representatives, to pay a specified sum of money to a college to be used as the capital stock of the institution, the principal to be loaned on real estate, and the interest to be used for current expenses, was held to be based upon a valid consideration, when accepted by the obligee, and binding upon the estate of the obligor, the court said: "The principle upon which promises of the character of those embraced in the present case are held to be valid is the reciprocal undertaking on the part of the promisor to pay, and the promisee to perform something of value to the promisor, though the value may only be of indirect benefit to the latter, such as the obligation in the present case that the appellee will hold and apply the funds promised in compliance. with the terms of the contract. The benefit to the promisor to be derived from the performance of the promise may consist in the introduction into

the community in which he resides or is interested, something which will permanently enhance the general value of property in such community, or will elevate the moral or educational standing thereof. On the other hand, the consideration may lie in the assumption of certain risks and the incurring of expenditures upon the faith of the promise, on the part of the obligee. In either case, and a fortiori when the two are combined, the essence of the validity of the consideration is found in the promise to pay and the acceptance of the same."

So, where a promissory note, payable to a college, was made and accepted on a parol condition that the gift should go into and constitute a permanent fund for the endowment of the college as then organized, and for no other purpose, and that the same, together with similar donations thereafter to be obtained, should never be expended nor the aggregate sum lessened, the maker may set up as a defense to an action on the note the failure of consideration, based on the violation of the conditions upon which the agreement was made, by a diminishing of the funds in establishing a law department for the college. Simpson Centenary College v. Bryan (Iowa) supra. And a similar conclusion was reached in Simpson Centenary College v. Tuttle (1887) 71 Iowa, 596, 33 N. W. 74, involving like facts.

5. Location of institution. Subscriptions made for the purpose of securing the location of an institution at a certain place become legally binding and enforceable upon the acceptance of the subscription by the representatives of the institution, and the location thereof at the place designated. Rogers v. Galloway Female College (1898) 64 Ark. 627, 39 L.R.A. 636, 44 S. W. 454; Owenby v. Georgia Baptist Assembly (1911) 137 Ga. 698, 74 S. E. 56, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 238; Chambers v. Baptist Educational Soc. (1841) 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 215; Doyle v. Glasscock (1859) 24 Tex. 200.

A subscription made for the purpose of securing the location of a college at a particular place is something

more than a subscription to public charity; it carries with it the request that the college be located at that place, and thus denied to all other places; and the granting of this request means the expenditure of money upon that place, and the bestowal of a real benefit upon the subscriber. Rogers v. Galloway Female College (Ark.) supra.

And a binding contract is made by a subscription to secure the location of a college in a certain town, when the required amount is subscribed, the subscription accepted, and the college located in that place, while agencies are constituted and put to work to carry out the enterprise. Ibid.

So, where the trustees of a denominational school propose that, if the citizens of a certain community will subscribe a stipulated amount, they will locate the school at that place, and subscriptions are made on that basis, the location of the school is the consideration which induces the subscriptions, and, if that part has been performed, there can be no pretext for denying liability on the subscription contract on the ground of a failure of consideration. Chambers v. Baptist Educational Soc. (1841) 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 215.

In Rothenberger v. Glick (1898) 22 Ind. App. 288, 52 N. E. 811, it was said that a promise by a church which was raising money by subscriptions for the purpose of erecting a new church building, to erect it upon a designated tract of land, would be a valid consideration; in that case it was held that a subscription upon such condition could not be enforced, where the church building was erected at a place other than that designated in the subscription agreement.

But where the plaintiff agreed to guarantee the payment of a sum of money and the conveyance of land to a proposed college on condition that the college should be located on a certain tract of land, and the defendant, who would be beneficially interested by a location of the college in that vicinity, subscribed and agreed to pay the plaintiff a certain amount of money, provided the college was lo

cated on the southwest section of the tract named in the plaintiff's subscription, the court in Schuler v. Myton (1892) 48 Kan. 282, 29 Pac. 163, held that the defendant's liability on his subscription could not be enforced, where the college was located in accordance with the terms of the plaintiff's subscription, but not on the particular section named in the defendant's subscription, although the defendant had orally promised to pay the amount of his subscription notwithstanding the change, there being no legal consideration for this new promise, though it was admitted that the defendant was morally bound to pay.

And the fact that a church endeavoring to raise money by subscription for the purpose of erecting a new church building has borrowed money in advance of the maturity of the payment of the subscription for the purpose of erecting a new church, will not make the promise of a subscriber binding upon him, where the subscription was upon condition that the church should be erected at a designated place, and it was erected at a different one, inasmuch as the church had no right to set aside the contract and make a new one without the subscriber's consent. Rothenberger v. Glick (Ind.) supra.

6. Preaching the Gospel.

In some cases it has been held that the preaching of the Gospel is a sufficient benefit to furnish consideration for a promise to contribute by subscription to a fund for the support of the ministry; at least, where the subscriber is a member of the sect raising the fund. Somers v. Miner (1833) 9 Conn. 458; Woodworth v. Veitch (1902) 29 Ind. App. 589, 64 N. E. 932; First Religious Soc. v. Stone (1810) 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 112.

Thus, a subscription reciting that the signers, being members of a religious society and desirous of raising a salary for the support of a minister in the society, do, in order to carry this desire into effect, promise and covenant, each for himself, individually and severally, to and with the