of kin to turn over to him certain property. Grandin v. Grandin (1887) 49 N. J. L. 508, 60 Am. Rep. 642, 9 . Atl. 756. In this case the court distinguished Seaman v. Seaman (N. Y.) supra, and held that it was not necessary to aver that the provision in the will for the plaintiff which he retained was not equal to his share of his father's estate as heir and next of kin as such an averment would make an issue on the adequacy of the consideration, and the court will not inquire into such adequacy where there is a subject-matter of compromise and the compromise was bona fide.

In Gaither v. Bland (1886) 7 Ky. L. Rep. 518 (abstract) which is only briefly reported, the court considered that an agreement by devisees with heirs to pay them a certain amount out of the estate in consideration that they would forbear to resist probate was an enforceable agreement up to the value of the estate.

c. Wills claimed to be lost or destroyed. In Smith v. Smith (1867) 36 Ga. 184, 91 Am. Dec. 761, where, on the death of a decedent, one of his sons claimed that he was entitled to most of the estate under a will, which was lost, and also made other claims against the estate, and the decedent's reirs and next of kin made an agreement as to the division of the estate, it was held that it should be carried out, the court saying, inter alia: "Compromises of doubtful rights are upheld by general policy, as tending to prevent litigation, in all enlightened systems of jurisprudence. Much more readily will courts of equity give effect to agreements of compromise of conflicting claims, especially when they partake of the nature of family arrangements."

In Belt v. Lazenby (1906) 126 Ga. 767, 56 S. E. 81, it appeared that a sister claimed that her deceased brother had devised to her certain real estate, but that after his death his will had been surreptitiously destroyed without being probated; and that she entered into an agreement with his widow which, among other things, provided that the widow was

to will certain property to the sister if the sister survived the widow, or, if not, to the sister's children. It was held that the agreement was valid if, at the time of the compromise, the sister honestly believed in her claims, and so made them in good faith, the court observing: "It is also well settled that in equity the termination of family controversy furnishes a sufficient consideration to support agreements for such purposes, and that its powers will be freely and readily used to enforce them."

Where a mother (the plaintiff) claimed to be a legatee under a will which she claimed had been left by her deceased son, and his widow (the defendant) claimed that the will had been destroyed by deceased, and they entered into an agreement by which the widow gave a bond to make certain payments to the mother, it was held to be error to direct a verdict for defendant on the ground that the bond was without consideration, as the question should have been sent to the jury. The court said: "It is apparent that, if the mother and the daughter-in-law acted upon their beliefs, it might result in litigation which would greatly disturb the peace of the family, and might also have a tendency to affect the honor of some members of the family." Chaffee v. Chaffee (1917) 197 Mich. 133, 163 N. W. 879.

In Hodge v. Joy (1922) 207 Ala. 198, 92 So. 171, the court sustained a family arrangement in which one of the elements was a lost will.

III. Various disputes or settlements. Similarly the courts uphold family arrangements concerning property generally.

United States.-Voorhees v. Blanton (1897) 83 Fed. 234; Bunel v. O'Day (1903) 125 Fed, 303.

California.-Racouillat v. Sansevain (1867) 32 Cal. 376.

Connecticut. Hurlbut v. Phelps (1861) 30 Conn. 42.

Georgia-Preston v. Ham (1923) 156 Ga. 223, 119 S. E. 658. Illinois. Galbraith (1877) 84

V. McLain Ill. 379; Knowles V.

Knowles (1889) 128 Ill. 110, 21 N. E. 106.

Indiana. St. Clair V. Marquell (1903) 161 Ind. 56, 67 N. E. 693.

Kentucky.-Berry v. Berry (1919) 183 Ky. 481, 209 S. W. 855.

Minnesota.-Thayer v. Pray (1910) 111 Minn. 449, 127 N. W. 392.

Missouri. See De Hatre v. De Hatre (1892) 50 Mo. App. 1.

New Hampshire.-Goodrich v. Webster (1908) 74 N. H. 474, 69 Atl. 719.

Pennsylvania.-Jourdan v. Jourdan (1823) 9 Serg. & R. 268, 11 Am. Dec. 724; Re Worrall (1842) 5 Watts & S. 111. See also Barton v. Wells (1840) 5 Whart. 225.

South Carolina.-Kennedy v. Badgett (1883) 19 S. C. 591; Gardner v. Gardner (1906) 49 S. C. 62, 26 S. E. 1001.

Texas. Taylor v. Taylor (1900) Tex. Civ. App. 54 S. W. 1039. Virginia. Zane v. Zane (1819) 6 Munf. 406.

England. Grene v. Grene (1710) 1 Bro. P. C. 143, 1 Eng. Reprint, 473; Davis v. Uphill (1818) 1 Swanst. 129, 36 Eng. Reprint, 326.

Ireland.-Westby v. Westby (1842) 1 Connor & L. 537, 2 Drury & War. 502, 4 Ir. Eq. Rep. 585.

Canada. Oliver v. McMillan (1907) 9 Ont. Week. Rep. 949.

In Bunel v. O'Day (Fed.) supra, the plaintiff claimed that while he was an infant a suit was brought which determined that the defendant was a legitimate child of the complainant's father, and so entitled to share with the complainant in a certain trust fund, and that the decree in that suit was obtained by false and perjured testimony, and he asked to have the decree set aside. His suit was compromised with the defendant, who afterwards endeavored to have such compromise set aside. The court, in refusing to vacate such compromise, held that "a compromise of suit between imputed brother and sister, where the question of legitimacy of the sister is involved, because of its scandalous character, is such a proper subject of domestic adjustment as to invite the favor of the court. If free from fraud, no matter how unjust the

defendant may have regarded the charge, or what different result subsequent developments might probably produce, it should stand. The value consists in the release from an uncertain position, with its anxieties, from apparent danger, and from inevitable expenses and trouble. Such compromises are especially favored by the courts when of the nature of family settlements."

Where a father and his children came to an agreement touching property claimed by the children to be community property, the court stated that the least that could be said was that a well-grounded controversy had arisen which might require years of expensive litigation to settle, and that the claim was sufficient to form the subject-matter of a valid agreement of compromise. Racouillat v. Sansevain (Cal.) supra.

In Taylor v. Taylor (Tex.) supra, the court sustained a family settlement of the community estate between the father and his children, there being a dispute in regard to the same, the court observing that "the settlement of the disputed claims is a sufficient consideration to support this contract," and that it was also supported by the assumption by the father of the payment of the remainder of the community debts.

Where two brothers, one unmarried, were partners in business, living in one family, and, on the death of the married brother, the survivor executed an agreement with the widow and children of the deceased brother, touching the partnership affairs, in which he released any debts due to him from them, it was held that this agreement was a good release to one of his nephews indebted to the firm to the extent of the uncle's one half of such debt, and the agreement rested on a good and valuable consideration, the court saying, further: "Even if this settlement was not founded on a good pecuniary consideration, as it certainly is, it might be viewed as a family settlement, and as such it should be sustained and upheld in a court of equity; and viewed in that character, if one part of it is good

every other part is equally so, as there is the same general consideration for the whole." Hurlbut v. Phelps (1861) 30 Conn. 42.

For a case approving a compromise and settlement between a sister of a decedent claiming under deeds and the husband of decedent claiming as heir at law, see Preston v. Ham (1923) 156 Ga. 223, 119 S. E. 658, which seems to have been a case of intestacy.

In Galbraith v. McLain (1877) 84 Ill. 379, where a father made a deed of part of his property to his son in lieu of his expectant portion of his father's property, the court held the son bound by the acceptance, and said: "We look upon the arrangement as one of a family nature, designed by the father as a disposition of his property without the formality of a will." And, pointing out that the son got much more in this way than he otherwise would have done, said: "In justice purely, he has no right to claim any more, nor is it fair or right he should attempt to break up this family settlement his father made, and in which he acquiesced by taking possession of his share, and enjoying it unmolested."

Where a man, in consideration of love and affection, executed two deeds of all his estate to his wife and children, giving each of them certain definite portions, and never delivered the deeds, but gave directions to his wife to lodge them, after his decease, with the town clerk for record, which she did the day after his death, it was held that a court of equity would decree that the deeds be delivered to the grantees. Jones v. Jones (1826) 6 Conn. 111, 16 Am. Dec. 35.

In St. Clair v. Marquell (1903) 161 Ind. 56, 67 N. E. 693, where a father made deeds for delivery after his death to certain of his descendants and stepchildren, and one of the deeds contained a mistake in description, the court held that that mistake ought to be reformed, and that, while the conveyances in the case may not have technically been a family settlement, yet the transaction so nearly resembled such a disposition of the property

of the grantor (who died intestate) that no violence was done to the law by applying to it the equitable principles which usually govern such arrangements. See also, for a somewhat similar case, where a wrong description in a deed was reformed, the deeds apparently being delivered during the lifetime of the grantor, Baker v. Pyatt (1886) 108 Ind. 61, 9 N. E. 112.

But where a father who died testate left deeds for various children, which were delivered after the death of his widow, and one of the deeds contained a mistake in the description of the property, part of which was described in another deed and part of which did not belong to the grantor, the court refused to reform the deed, stating that it was a purely voluntary conveyance as distinguished from a family settlement. The court did not pass on the question whether there had ever been a legal delivery of the deed. Willey v. Hodge (1899) 104 Wis. 81, 76 Am. St. Rep. 852, 80 N. W. 75.

In Jourdan v. Jourdan (1823) 9 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 268, 11 Am. Dec. 724, it was held to be error not to permit the defendant in ejectment to show that a family arrangement had been made, to which the father, mother, and all the children were parties, by which it was agreed that the land of the mother should go, after her death and her husband's, to the defendant, and the land of the father to the other children; and that, in consequence of this agreement, the defendant had been precluded from any share of his father's estate.

In Kennedy v. Badgett (1883) 19 S. C. 591, the court sustained a family arrangement between a widow and her children in relation to a trust estate created by her husband by deeds many years before, the court considering that the act found just and sufficient support, as well in valuable contributions made by the widow, as in the fact of a family settlement among themselves, into the precise terms of which and the motives that induced it, in the absence of fraud, imposition, or overreaching, courts of justice are not swift to inquire.

In Gardner v. Gardner (1906) 49 S. C. 62, 26 S. E. 1001, where a testator, some years before his death, mortgaged all his real estate to his wife for a large sum, and, after his death testate, the family entered into an arrangement for settlement of his estate and the use of such mortgage, the court considered that such arrangement ought to be carried out.

In Grene v. Grene (1710) 1 Bro. P. C. 143, 1 Eng. Reprint, 473, the court sustained a resettlement of an estate created by deed as reasonable, without prejudice to the issue of the person applying to have it set aside.

In Westby v. Westby (1842) 1 Connor & L. (Eng.) 537, 2 Drury & War. 502, 4 Ir. Eq. Rep. 585, the court refused to set aside a family arrangement involving an agreement, on the one part, not to attack the validity of a marriage, holding that the personal representative of the party whose marriage was protected could not attack the agreement after twenty years' acquiescence, during which such party had had the benefit of the compromise.

In Oliver v. McMillan (1907) 9 Ont. Week. Rep. 949, it was held that a son was bound by a compromise of matters between him and his father made fourteen years before his father's death, and that he would be held to it after the death of his father.

In refusing to set aside a conveyance to a wife as fraudulent, the court said: "Mere inadequacy of consideration in honest family settlements is not a badge of fraud." Voorhees v. Blanton (1897) 83 Fed. 234.

In De Hatre v. De Hatre (1892) 50 Mo. App. 1, where an old man, being unable to carry on his farm, made an arrangement by which one of his sons should carry on the farm for his mother and in her name, it was held that the father could not bring an action of replevin to recover wheat raised by the son. The court stated that the father entered into a sort of a family arrangement, and said that a court of equity dealing with the facts would never disturb a family settlement under such circumstances.

In Thayer v. Pray (1910) 111 Minn. 449, 127 N. W. 392, a testator left his

property to his widow and other trustees, and provided for a number of legacies, including one to the plaintiff, who was possibly a niece of testator (though there are palpable clerical errors in the opinion stating the relationship). Before the final settlement of the estate, the plaintiff and others determined to take legal proceedings to compel the payment of their legacies, which would have required an investigation into the facts, and it was finally agreed between the plaintiff and the widow that, if the plaintiff would accept such sum as the trustees would thereafter give her without question, and would not press payment against the estate, that the widow would pay to the plaintiff the difference between what she had actually received from the estate and the amount of the legacy. Accordingly the plaintiff forbore any action against the estate, and thereafter brought the present action against the estate of the widow, who had died. It was held that there was a sufficient consideration for the widow's promise.

Where, after a mother's will was probated, one of the sons made a claim against her estate for services, on the ground that the will was contrary to a contract he had with her, whereupon the parties interested in the estate compromised the matter, but afterwards the others sought to set aside the compromise as against such son, it appeared that the original contract between the son and the mother was in the nature of a compromise, and it was held that it was not necessary to sustain the original compromise; that the parties shoulìl have settled the controversy as the law would have done, the rule being that if there be a question about which reasonable men might well differ as to the outcome, the court will uphold an adjustment of it by the parties. Berry v. Berry (1919) 183 Ky. 481, 209 S. W. 855.

In Brunson v. Henry (1894) 140 Ind. 455, 39 N. E. 256, where an agreement was entered into between a mother and her children, under which she executed a deed to one of them, and he gave a mortgage securing a life estate

to her and securing certain sums to be paid on her death to the younger children, and some years afterwards the mother and such son endeavored to set aside the agreement secretly, she executing a will giving her estate to such son, the court considered that the original agreement ought to be carried out, but held that there was a mistake in pleading which made it error to overrule a demurrer to the complaint.

While the decision rests sufficiently on estoppel or ratification in Smith v. Tanner (1890) 32 S. C. 259, 10 S. E. 1008, the court in that case approved a family arrangement in relation to deeds executed by the mother of a family, referring to the doctrine of the upholding of family arrangements as well established.

As illustrations of resettlements of entailed estates sustained by the English courts, see Stapilton v. Stapilton (1739) 1 Atk. 2, 26 Eng. Reprint, 1, 12 Eng. Rul. Cas. 100; Wycherley v. Wycherley (1763) 2 Eden, 175, 28 Eng. Reprint, 864; Kinchant v. Kinchant (1784) 1 Bro. Ch. 369, 28 Eng. Reprint, 1183; Brown v. Carter (1801) 5 Ves. Jr. 862, 31 Eng. Reprint, 898, 5 Revised Rep. 191; Hartopp v. Hartopp (1856) 21 Beav. 259, 52 Eng. Reprint, 858, 25 L. J. Ch. N. S. 471, 2 Jur. N. S. 794; Jenner v. Jenner (1860) 2 De G. F. & J. 359, 45 Eng. Reprint, 660, 30 L. J. Ch. N. S. 201, 6 Jur. N. S. 314, 3 L. T. N. S. 488, 9 Week. Rep. 109. See also Dimsdale v. Dimsdale (1856) 3 Drew. 556, 61 Eng. Reprint, 1015, 25 L. J. Ch. N. S. 806.

In Stapilton v. Stapilton (Eng.) supra, the court sustained the settlement of family estates by a father and his two sons, there being a suspicion that the eldest son was illegitimate, notwithstanding it was afterwards found that he was illegitimate.

In Wycherley v. Wycherley (1763) 2 Eden, 175, 28 Eng. Reprint, 864, supra, the court approved the resettlement of the estate by father and son, which, among other things, secured a provision for the daughters, the court saying, inter alia: "The court will

. . attend to slight considerations for confirming family settlements and

modifications of property. They pay

a regard to reasonable motives and honorable intentions. In these cases they will not weigh the value of the consideration. They consider the ease and comfort and security of families as a sufficient consideration."

In Hoblyn v. Hoblyn (1889) L. R. 41 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 200, where a resettlement was made by an arrangement between father and son, the father having consented to a certain modification of it, the court allowed it to stand with such modification. In this case the court said: "In regarding settlements of this character, claims to upset them, and the rights of parties thereunder, the court gives weight to considerations which, on other occasions, would scarcely be allowed in the scale. The duty to preserve in the family property hitherto held by it is recognized, so is also the duty of providing for those members of the family who are not intended to succeed to the property, and the harmony which may thus be expected to be established is respected. There are frequently other considerations, such as the preservation of the honor of the family."

On the other hand, in Savery v. King (1856) 5 H. L. Cas. 627, 10 Eng. Reprint, 1046, in setting aside resettlements as far as the son was concerned, owing to undue influence on the part of his father and the solicitor, who was largely benefited, the court said: "Where a son, recently after attaining his majority, makes over property to his father without consideration, or for an inadequate consideration, a court of equity expects that the father shall be able to justify what has been done; to show, at all events, that the son was really a free agent, that he had adequate independent advice, that he was not taking an imprudent step under parental influence, and that he perfectly understood the nature and extent of the sacrifice he was making, and that he was desirous of making it."

In Bellamy v. Sabine (1847) 2 Phill. Ch. 425, 41 Eng. Reprint, 1007, 17 L. J. Ch. N. S. 105, the court set aside in part arrangements between father and