seemed to draw a distinction between the suppression of testimony and an attempt to bribe witnesses, saying: "It is contended by the appellant that the attempt to suppress the testimony of this witness was in the nature of an admission that the plaintiff's cause was without merit; but we are cited to no case which holds the admission to be as broad as claimed. The rule is that the suppression of evidence is an admission that it is deemed unfavorable to the party suppressing it. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 195a; 19 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1st ed. 72. In Kidd v. Ward (1894) 91 Iowa, 371, 59 N. W. 279, we held that an attempt to bribe witnesses or jurors was an admission that the party's cause was unjust, and with this rule we are well satisfied; but an attempt to keep an adverse witness from testifying is not, in our judgment, an admission that the party is making an unjust or a false claim; witnesses see facts differently, and almost every trial of an issue of fact demonstrates that they may testify honestly and still be mistaken. When the witness is in fact present and testifies, the jury has before it his full knowledge, and is the sole judge of its character and weight, and determines whether it is favorable or unfavorable to the party." Evidence in both classes of cases seems to have been considered admissible, however. And it has been held to have been immaterial that the party making the attempt to influence the witness was acting in the case in a representative capacity. See McHugh v. McHugh (1898) 186 Pa. 197, 41 L.R.A. 805, 65 Am. St. Rep. 849, 40 Atl. 410, and the opinion of Lush, J., in Moriarty v. London, C. & D. R. Co. (1870) L. R. 5 Q. B. (Eng.) 314. Another explanation of the admissibility of such evidence was given in Drummond v. Drummond (1924) — Ala., 102 So. 112, wherein it was said: "Any effort by a party to intimidate a witness, to create bias or prejudice in his mind against the other side, or to suppress testimony, may be used as evidence against such party. The inquiry is not its effect on the witness and his testimony, but its probative force against the party resorting to such means to effect his ends. Such facts, clearly shown, often work the undoing of the party guilty of such practice. It indicates not a seeking after justice, but an effort to poison the stream of justice. The reaction is a poison to the cause of him who seeks to use it." Chicago City R. Co. v. McMahon (Ill.) supra, was an action for injuries incurred while the plaintiff was leaving a street car of the defendant. Testimony to the effect that a clerk of the defendant company had offered a witness $300 to prevent his appearance, or to influence his evidence, was held to be competent as an admission that the defendant's case was weak, the rule relating to res gestæ having no effect to prohibit its introduction. The court decided that the agent offering the bribe, and whose duty it was to investigate the circumstances of accidents and arrange the evidence in cases, had performed the illegal act while acting in, and as a part of, his employment, the company being responsible for the act. All efforts to suborn witnesses, made by a party or his authorized agent, are proper to be shown, said the court. See to the same effect, United States Brewing Co. v. Ruddy (1903) 203 Ill. 306, 67 N. E. 799. In Nowack v. Metropolitan Street R. Co. (1901) 166 N. Y. 433, 54 L.R.A. 592, 82 Am. St. Rep. 691, 60 N. E. 32, reversing (1900) 54 App. Div. 302, 66 N. Y. Supp. 533, the court, holding that the rule laid down in the Chicago City R. Co. Case was "calculated to advance justice by keeping its channels pure, held that evidence that a corporation's agent, whose duty it was to see to witnesses, had attempted to bribe a witness, was admissible without proof of a corporate act authorizing the agent to tamper with witnesses. Pointing out that a corporation can act only through agents, the court said: "Having authority to accomplish a certain result, with no limitation as to the means to be employed, his acts, so far as they directly contribute to that result, even if unlawful, are corporate acts. They are done for the corporation by an agent clothed with general authority to effect a certain purpose which they aid in attaining. Any admission made by him through acts done to carry on his branch of the business, and which reasonably tend to advance it, is regarded in law as made by the corporate body which authorized him to act for it with reference to the subject of his employment. If this evidence would have been admissible against an individual defendant, who had employed Kaufmann as he was employed, it is admissible against this corporate defendant. If an honest man by mistake employs a dishonest one to look up witnesses for him, and the latter, through excess of zeal, resorts to bribery, although it was never thought of by his employer, it is better, for cleanliness and purity in the administration of justice, that the facts should be shown, with the fullest opportunity for explanation, than to exclude all evidence of the evil acts upon the ground that they were not authorized, because authority may properly be inferred from the nature of the employment. In such a case all doubt should be resolved, if possible, in the interest of clean evidence and the exposure of foul practices." But where the attempt to influence the witness is made by one not a party to the action, or shown to be an agent of a party, the latter should not be charged with the reactionary and harmful inferences and effects of an attempt to poison the stream of justice, and the evidence thereof is not admissible. See Drummond v. Drummond (Ala.) supra. In Green v. Woodbury (1875) 48 Vt. 5, an action by a man and his wife for injury to the wife on a highway, the court, holding as properly excluded evidence that the town constable offered inducements to a witness of the plaintiffs to keep away from the trial, said: "All authorized attempts of a party to suppress the testimony of the other party are clearly admissible, and are evidence that in such party's own conviction his case will not bear full investigation. They show a consciousness in such party of the weakness of his own cause. In order to be evidence against a party, such acts must be the acts of the party, either directly, or by authorization. If the plaintiffs had shown that these acts of the constable were either directly authorized, or before the trial approved, by the agent of the town, they would have been admissible. A town can only act through agents, and it would be a hardship to hold it responsible for the acts of all its citizens whose zeal might happen to outrun their discretion. As the plaintiffs' testimony failed to connect the town with these indiscreet and foolish acts of the constable, if committed as offered to be shown, the court committed no error in excluding the offered testimony." However, in Morgan v. Frees (1852) 15 Barb. (N. Y.) 352, the court held that it was competent for the defendant to show that one Miller, a witness for the plaintiff, had tried to corrupt a witness to the prejudice of the defendant, although it did not appear whether Miller was the plaintiff's agent. Snell v. Bray (1882) 56 Wis. 156, 14 N. W. 14, was an action to recover on a contract, alleged to have been made by the defendant, promising to pay the plaintiff $3,000 for releasing him from a promise of marriage, when she became married. The plaintiff offered in evidence a letter written to a woman urging her to have nothing to do with the plaintiff's cause, and signed "Sincere Friends." The court, holding the letter to have been properly received in evidence and that it was immaterial that it had been written before the action was commenced, said: "The defendant testified that he had never seen this letter before the trial, but that he requested a friend to write to Mrs. Rogers, and he thought this letter was in the handwriting of such friend and was written pursuant to his request. He does not say what he told his friend to write to Mrs. Rogers, or that this letter contains anything which he did not authorize his friend to insert in it. The court admitted the letter, and We the ruling is alleged as error. think the testimony sufficient to connect the defendant with the letter, and make him responsible for it. It was therefore admissible, if it would have been had the plaintiff himself written it. It was written and sent to Mrs. Rogers long before this action was commenced, but after the controversy had arisen in respect to the claim in suit. In substance and effect, Mrs. Rogers is counseled and warned, at the peril of injury to her credit and good name, not to aid Bertha in her attempt to compel the defendant to pay the claim in suit. It is a direct appeal to Mrs. Rogers to remain silent while the controversy should last, although she might be cognizant of facts material to the claimant. Had the letter been written pendente lite, there could be no doubt of its admissibility. It is in the nature of an admission by conduct, and tends to show that the defendant lacked an honest defense to the claim. . . In American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Nussbaum (1921) Tex. Civ. App. 230 S. W. 1102, an action for personal injuries, the court held to be admissible a question asked a witness whether she had not been offered $10 by her doctor, who also claimed to represent the defendant, to come to the defendant's building on a matter with reference to her testimony. The plaintiff's question had been preceded, it appeared, by one to the same witness by the defendant, asking whether she had been asked by them to testify otherwise than truthfully, to which she answered, "No, sir." It was observed that in any event the defendant could not complain, since its counsel had invited the question by the preceding one. It would seem from the decision in the case of Garrett v. St. Louis Transit Co. (1909) 219 Mo. 65, 118 S. W. 68, 16 Ann. Cas. 678, that evidence of an attempt to influence a witness is not admissible where it was not an improper influence. That case was an action to recover for the death of the plaintiff's husband, who was killed when pushed or kicked from the defendant's street car by a conductor or another. The conductor, Crady, who had removed from the state, received a letter from the claim agent of the company, to the effect that if he did not give his testimony in the case he would probably be indicted for manslaughter. Testimony with respect to this letter was held to have been properly excluded, as there was no attempt to influence the witness not to testify for the plaintiff, or to give evidence of any particular state of facts, the threat going merely to induce the witness to return and testify. The court said: "In the absence of any testimony indicating an evil purpose on the part of the claim agent in writing the letter, the court would not be warranted in presuming his motives were sinister or improper; but, upon the contrary, we must presume his intentions were good. While neither the law nor good citizenship indorses that means of procuring the attendance of witnesses upon courts of justice, yet that fact alone should not brand the writer of the letter and his principal as trying improperly to influence the witness or his testimony." A question calling for a witness's understanding with respect to certain interviews and correspondence tending to show an attempt to bribe him by a party to the action was held to be improper in Mather v. Parsons (1884) 32 Hun (N. Y.) 338, the court saying: "Fitzgerald had been allowed to state all that was stated and all that was written to him. We think it was not permissible to ask his understanding from them that Webb 'wanted to procure (him) to swear false for money.' The same question was put to Fitzgerald as to Parsons. Parsons had given his version, and the letters had been produced. Then it was for the court to say what had been the intent of Webb and Parsons-whether they had been engaged in a crime which would consign them to the state's prison and greatly weaken, if not entirely overthrow, the defense attempted in this action." Induction of false testimony. In Egan v. Bowker (1862) 5 Allen (Mass.) 449, the court said: "The evidence offered for the purpose of showing that the plaintiff had suborned a witness to testify falsely in support of his claim against the defendants, and, in connection therewith, that in procuring such false testimony he had acted under an assumed name, was clearly competent and ought to have been admitted. These facts were in the nature of admissions implied from the conduct of the party that his claim against the defendants was false and unjust. The inference is a reasonable and proper one, that a person having an honest and fair debt which he claims to be due will not endeavor to support it by falsehood and fraud; and the fact that he resorts to such means of proof has a tendency to show that he knows he cannot maintain his suit by evidence derived from pure and incorrupt sources. Truth does not ally itself with falsehood, but falsehood will often endeavor to make it appear that truth is on its side. When, therefore, it is shown that a party to a suit has sought to suborn witnesses to swear falsely in his behalf, and has been guilty in his own person of fraud and deceit in the maintenance of his action, such evidence is competent, as an admission of the falsity or fraudulent nature of the claim." The defendant was held to be entitled to a new trial. In Longuy v. La Societe Francaise de Bienfaisance Mutuelle (1921) 52 Cal. App. 370, 198 Pac. 1011, an action against a hospital for the death of a child, wherein it appeared that the trial court had excluded testimony to he effect that the plaintiff and another had attempted to have the resident physician testify that the child's death had been due to burns, the court said: "Whether the alleged attempt on the part of plaintiff to procure Dr. Juilly to testify favorably in plaintiff's behalf took the form of threat, bribery, or solicitation does not appear, but we think the trial court should have, at least, permitted the further offer of proof, for evidence of a party's falsehood or fraud in the preparation and presentation of his case is receivable against him." In Torbert v. Cherokee Ins. Co. (1914) 141 Ga. 773, 82 S. E. 134, an action on an insurance policy, wherein it appeared that testimony of an alleged interview of the superintendent of the defendant company with a witness had been rejected, it was held that the evidence was admissible if its purport was that the superintendent was attempting to influence the witness to swear falsely with respect to something material to the defense. In Stevenson v. Avery Coal & Min. Co. (1908) 143 Ill. App. 397, an action to recover damages for the death of the plaintiff's husband, it was held that a letter from the plaintiff's attorney, which offered to stand good for the expenses of another as a witness and to see that he was well paid for his time and trouble in case of victory, was capable of being understood as an offer of a contingent interest as an inducement to the appearance and favorable testimony of the addressee, as an attempt to corrupt a witness, and admissible in evidence, if properly identified. There was, however, no proper identification in this instance. And evidence of an attempt to influence a witness was held to be admissible as tending to show a sense of guilt in Pennington v. Kansas City R. Co. (1919) 201 Mo. App. 483, 213 S. W. 137, an action by a mother to recover for loss of services consequent to an accident to her minor son, and for expense and attention in connection therewith, it appearing that the defendant street railway's claim agent had attempted to bribe a witness to give certain testimony with respect to the accident. In the reported case (DE GROODT v. SKRBINA, ante, 591) the court upholds the competency of testimony to the effect that the defendant had approached another, offering to pay her money for "standing on his side." In Moriarty v. London, C. & D. R. Co. (1870) L. R. 5 Q. B. (Eng.) 314, an action to recover for injuries to the plaintiff's wife, evidence was offerred and admitted that the plaintiff The court, have been "The con and his attorney's clerk offered to give a portion of any compensation received to another, if he would give false testimony in the action pending. Two other witnesses testified that they, too, had been approached to the same effect by the clerk, but not in the presence of Moriarty. holding the evidence to properly admitted, said: duct of a party to a cause may be of the highest importance in determining whether the cause of action in which he is plaintiff, or the ground of defense, if he is defendant, is honest and just; just as it is evidence against a prisoner that he has said one thing at one time and another at another, as showing that the recourse to falsehood leads fairly to an inference of guilt. Anything from which such an inference can be drawn is cogent and important evidence with a view to the issue. So, if you can show that a plaintiff has been suborning false testimony, and has endeavored to have recourse to perjury, it is strong evidence that he knew perfectly well his cause was an unrighteous one. The plaintiff is shown to have been taking an active part with Cox, who was acting in a certain sense as clerk to the plaintiff's attorney, and was endeavoring to suborn witnesses. And when, after that, the same Cox is shown to have solicited other witnesses to commit perjury, although the plaintiff was not present at those solicitations, yet I think there was evidence to go to the jury that what Cox then did was done in furtherance of an object which was common to him and the plaintiff, and that he was acting on the authority of the plaintiff. I think there was evidence of a conspiracy between Moriarty and Cox to suborn testimony, either to set up a false case, or by false evidence to bolster up what might be a fair one; at all events, there was matter which was very properly left to the jury; and I think this rule ought not to be made absolute on the ground that the evidence was improperly received." Suppression of witness. In Larsen V. Ward Corby Co. (1913) 184 Ill. App. 38, the principle laid down in the case of Chicago City R. Co. v. McMahon (1882) 103 Ill. 485, 42 Am. Rep. 29, was approved and applied to a case wherein it was charged that the plaintiff, who sought damages for personal injuries, and his attorney, had attempted to induce a witness to stay away from the trial, offering to make it right if he would not testify on behalf of the defendant. The exclusion by the court below of the evidence offered in this connection was held to constitute reversible error. Sid In Littlefield v. Cook (1915) 112 Me. 551, 92 Atl. 787, an action of assumpsit to recover for services rendered, etc., the court sustained an exception to a ruling of the lower court excluding the following letter, offered in evidence by the defendants and written by the plaintiff to the latter's uncle, a witness for the defendants: "We just rec'd Aunt Josie's letter and are both disgusted with same, not because you can do us any hurt for you don't know anything that would hurt us, but it shows that you are not our friends and if you do come it will be the last time we want you to ever look at us say nothing of speaking. and I are enemies forever and if you want to be the same come on as we know you are doing it on your own free will." The court said: "We think the letter was clearly admissible. It was a part of the conduct of the plaintiff relative to this suit. It was evidently an attempt on his part to dissuade one of the defendants' witnesses living in another state from attending the trial. It showed a willingness to use unfair means. A jury might regard it as evidence of a consciousness on his part that his case was weak. The conduct of parties tending to show improper motives or improper practices with respect to a suit is always admissible against them. And this letter throws so much light upon the plaintiff that we cannot say that its exclusion was not prejudicial to the defendants." In Baldwin v. Boulware (1899) 79 |