- the parties is that of bailor and bailee, rather than that of shipper and carrier." This case was affirmed in this court for the reason stated in the opinion of the supreme court in 98 N. J. L. 271, 118 Atl. 926; and in the case of Delaney v. Erie R. Co. 97 N. J. L. 434, 117 Atl. 395, in the supreme court, where a woman was riding on a commutation ticket for which she had asked and paid, but which was issued in the name of a man instead of her own, and upon which ticket she had been riding for some time, and which was at last taken up by the conductor, she was allowed to recover for the indignity and humiliation which she suffered by reason of the remarks and action of the conductor on the train; and Mr. Justice Black, writing the opinion, said, at page 437, that whether the plaintiff was negligent in not examining her ticket and discovering the error on its face was a question of fact for the jury. This case was affirmed in this court, in 98 N. J. L. 558, 119 Atl. 924. We perceive that there is a distinction between the facts of the case at bar and those in Shelton v. Erie R. Co. 73 N. J. L. 558, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 727, 118 Am. St. Rep. 704, 66 Atl. 403, 9 Ann. Cas. 883, and Colton v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 80 N. J. L. 592, 77 Atl. 1020, wherein it was held that conclusive force is to be given to the intrinsic effect of a railroad ticket as expressed on its face when tendered by a passenger, and that the face of the ticket is conclusive evidence to the conductor of the terms of the contract of carriage upon which he has a right to rely; and also the case of Wilson v. West Jersey & Because there was no contract of nonliability made by the parties to this cause in favor of the defendant company, who issued the gratuitous pass, the question of the company's liability through negligence became a factual one for the jury to pass upon. In our opinion the facts of this case (plaintiff being an invitee) presented a jury question as to whether the defendant and its agent exercised due care for her safety on the "sleigh ride." And this leads to a reversal, to the end that a venire de novo may be awarded. For affirmance: The Chief Justice, Justices Black and Katzenbach, and Judge Clark. For reversal: The Chancellor, Justices Trenchard, Parker, Minturn, Kalisch, Campbell, and Lloyd, and Judges Van Buskirk and McGlennon. ANNOTATION. Duty and liability of owner or keeper of place of amusement respecting in I. Scope, 358. juries to patrons. II. Degree of care in general, 358. [No later decisions herein.] III. Contributory negligence and assump. tion of risk generally, 358. IV. Doctrine res ipsa loquitur, 358. V. Who is liable for injuries: a. In general, 358. [No later decisions herein.] a. Animals, 359. [No later decisions herein.] b. Aeroplanes and balloons, 359. [No later decisions herein.] c. Baseball, 359. [No later decisions herein.] d. Bathing resorts or swimming pools, 359. e. Bowling alleys, 359. [No later decisions herein.] f. Circuses, 359. [No later decisions herein.] g. Electric fans, 359. [No later decisions herein.] h. Falling objects in general, 359. [No later decisions herein.] i. Grand stands; collapse of seats, guard rail, or part of structure, 360. [No later decisions herein.] j. Horse shows, 360. [No later decisions herein.] 1. Scope. This annotation is supplemental to those on the same subject in 22 A.L.R. 610, and 29 A.L.R. 29. II. Degree of care in general. No later decisions herein. For earlier cases, see annotations in 22 A.L.R. 611, and 29 A.L.R. 29. III. Contributory negligence and assumption of risk generally. In Blanchette v. Union Street R. Co. (1924) 248 Mass. 407, 143 N. E. 310, infra, VI. d, where the plaintiff was injured by sliding off the chute into shallow water, the court held that while evidence by the defendant to the effect that the plaintiff was familiar with the conformation of the beach, and evidence as to whether he had made efforts to ascertain the depth of the way to use the chute, and his posture on the particular occasion of his injury, and his knowledge of the tides and its effect upon the depth of the water below the chute, was relevant as to the inferential fact, to be proved by the defendant, that the plaintiff when injured was not in the exercise of due VI.-continued. k. Merry-go-rounds, 360. [No later decisions herein.] 1. Miniature railways or cars, 360. [No later decisions herein.] m. Piers for amusement purposes, 360. [No later decisions herein.] n. Platforms, 360. [No later decisions herein.] o. Pool rooms, 360. [No later decisions herein.] p. Races. 360. q. Scenic railways, 360. r. Shooting galleries, sham battles and fireworks generally, 360. s. Skating rinks, 360. [No later decisions herein.] t. Slides, chutes, 361. u. Striking machines, 361. [No later decisions herein.] V. Theaters and buildings generally, 361. w. Walks and grounds generally, 362. [No later decisions herein.] x. Miscellaneous, 362. care, and had assumed the risk of using the chute,-nevertheless, upon the conflicting testimony, it could not be ruled as a matter of law that the plaintiff's negligence contributed to his injury, or that he had assumed the risk of using the chute, and the jury could find that the plaintiff had reasonably acted upon the assumption that the place which he used at the express invitation of the defendant was apparently safe to use. As stated in the annotation in 22 A.L.R. 616, the question of contributory negligence in respect of particular facts or situations, as distinguished from the more general principles, are considered in the appropriate subdivisions of VI. IV. Doctrine res ipsa loquitur. V. Who is liable for injuries. No later decisions herein. For earlier cases, see annotation in 22 A.L.R. 619. In Thierry v. Oswell (1925) Ala. 102 So. 903, in an action against the proprietor of a public bathing and pleasure resort, to recover damages for the drowning of plaintiff's minor child, a sixteen-year-old girl, the court held that although the defendant may have been negligent in failing to provide safeguards or warnings at a hole dredged out for deep-water swimming and diving and immediately adjacent to shallower water used for swimming, and notwithstanding said hole was so deep as to be dangerous to bathers who could not swim, and that the defendant had notice that the bathing resort was patronized by children and others unable to swim, nevertheless, if the decedent, although she did not know of the existence of the deep hole described, was notified of the danger in time to have avoided the injury, and did not use ordinary care to avoid the danger, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. In Blanchette v. Union Street R. Co. (1924) 248 Mass. 407, 143 N. E. 310, the court held that a company maintaining for hire a bathing house and beach, and in connection therewith a floating raft, with a chute or slide thereon, to be used by the bathers to dive and slide into the water, was bound to use reasonable care in maintaining the accommodations for the purposes for which they were apparently designed and to which they were adapted, and if, by reason of the shallowness of the water, the chute and the water beneath it were not reasonably safe for diving, it was the duty of the company to warn the plaintiff, as an invitee for hire, of the dangerous condition in order that he might be cognizant of the danger, and a failure to perform this duty would be negligence for which the company would be responsible unless the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence or had assumed the risk of the conditions. In Blanchette v. Union Street R. Co. (Mass.) supra, the court held that although it was within the right of the defendant to limit its obligation by a sign warning the users of the chute that it was used at their risk, to have such effect the defendant must show that the invited persons had knowledge of the sign, and that they accepted the invitation, subject to the absence of any duty of the owner and invitor to warn of dangers which were not visible to ordinary inspection. e. Bowling alleys. No later decisions herein. For earlier cases, see annotation in 22 A.L.R. 645. f. Circuses. No later decisions herein. For earlier cases, see annotation in 22 A.L.R. 645. g. Electric fans. No later decisions herein. For earlier cases, see annotation in 22 A.L.R. 647. h. Falling objects in general. No later decisions herein. For earlier cases, see annotation in 22 A.L.R. 647. In Toole v. Erlanger Fair Asso. (1925) — Ky. 269 S. W. 523, where one who had arranged to be a participant in a motorcycle race, but who had paid his admission fee into the fairgrounds, and who, erroneously assuming that the motorcycle race was on, entered upon the race track and, upon being directed to leave the track, went into an open space on the inside of same, where it might be expected that wild and unruly horses engaged in the race might bolt and cause danger to those in such a place, and was injured while there by a bolting horse, the court held that he assumed the risk of thus stationing himself there, and could not recover from the fair association. q. Scenic railways. (Supplementing annotation in 22 A.L.R. 660.) In Labadie v. Quebec (1922) Rap. Jud. Quebec 61 C. S. 119, in an action for injuries sustained on a scenic railway, recovery was denied for the reason that the injured party was in fault. r. Shooting galleries, sham battles, and fireworks generally. (Supplementing annotation in 22 A.L.R. 663.) In Blue Grass Fair Asso. v. Bunnell (1924) Ky. —, 267 S. W. 237, it was held that a fair association giving exhibitions of fireworks to paid patrons was not relieved from all liability by intrusting the conduct of the exhibition to an independent contractor; for the association was under a nondelegable duty to construct and maintain in a reasonably safe condition the buildings, structures, walks, and grounds upon which its patrons were invited, to provide them with a reasonably safe place from which to view the entertainment, by locating the display at a proper distance from them, to police the grounds, and give notice to the spectators of the place to which they were assigned; neither could it delegate its duty of selecting exhibits that might be safeguarded in a way to prevent danger to spectators; but the fair association would not be responsible for injury to a patron, unless the jury should believe from the evidence "that the nature of the exhibition was such that its production would necessarily or probably become a source of danger unless guarded against, and that defendant failed to take reasonable precautions in that respect, or that it failed to exercise ordinary care in selecting a skilled and reliable manufacturer and producer to put on such exhibition; in either of which events it cannot rely on the defense of independent contractor." 8. Skating rinks. No later decisions herein. For earlier cases, see annotation in 22 A.L.R. 667. C t. Slides, chutes. (Supplementing annotations in 22 A.L.R. 668, and 29 A.L.R. 32.) The owners of a slide device similar to the slides used for children in public parks and school yards were held in Denver Park & Amusement Co. v. Pflug (1924) 2 F. (2d) 961, to be under no duty to guard against such an injury as happened to the plaintiff (an adult woman), who alleged that her injury was due to the failure to provide more than one guard at the foot of the device to check the momentum, as such an injury could not have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated, in view of the showing that 60,000 people, of whom 20,000 were children, had ridden down this device during the season without injury. The court said: "No such thing had ever happened before. Past history and experience would not have suggested to prudent men that it would happen, but, on the contrary, that experience, if suggestive at all, would be indicative that it would not and could not happen, and the defendant was not under a duty to guard against what did happen." In the reported case (DEMAREST V. PALISADES REALTY & AMUSEMENT CO. ante, 352) the holding was to the effect that one who was injured while riding gratis on a "sleigh ride" at an amusement park by virtue of a complimentary pass issued by the amusement company was an invitee upon the ride; and the question of the company's liability for her injury became a factual one for the jury to pass on, in the absence of a contract between the parties absolving the company from liability for injury to the plaintiff while in the enjoyment of a privilege extended by the pass; in other words, it was a question for the jury as to whether the company or its agents exercised care for the plaintiff's safety while on the "sleigh ride." In Givens v. De Soto Bldg. Co. (1924) 156 La. 377, 100 So. 534, it was held that the raising of seats in a motion-picture theater above the level of the aisles was not a "defect" in the construction of the building so as to justify a recovery against the lessees of the building for injury to a patron sustained by stepping from her seat on the platform into the aisle; nor was it negligence on the part of the lessees of the theater to fail to light the floor at the point where the change of level occurred, especially in view of the fact that thousands of patrons had entered and left this theater without suffering a fall. The court said: "Now the operator of a theater is not an insurer of his patrons. He need only be free from negligence; and, granting that a prudent man must exercise some degree of foresight, nevertheless he is not required to foresee that something may happen, when long experience fails to show any such happening before, unless the circumstances are such that he should have known that the happening was likely, even though it had not yet occurred. But such is not the case here. Moving pictures, as we have said, require some degree of darkness; nevertheless such theaters are never so dark that one may not see persons and objects around him, which become quite distinct after a while spent in the semidarkness. And there is no reason that we know of, or shown by the evidence in this case, why persons who have been in one of these theaters for an hour or so cannot see the floor on which they walk; nor had defendant any reason to suppose that anyone would fail to do so." In Bass v. Southern Enterprises (1924) 32 Ga. App. 399, 123 S. E. 753, allegations of the plaintiff to the effect that in leaving her seat in a theater, having paid the regular price for admission, she was injured in stepping from her seat, which was elevated slightly above the aisle, a fact unknown to her, and further allegations to the effect that it was the duty of the proprietors of the theater to arrange the theater so as to protect her when she undertook to leave, were sufficient |