not be imputed to a husband, nor was the wife warranted in deserting him, because her control of the household was intruded upon by his daughters by a former marriage and his spinster sister, who lived with him, where the wife was not without fault in the matter, and the husband did not encourage the interference or treat her with anything resembling cruelty. Dummer v. Dummer (1898) - N. J., 41 Atl. 149. The case appeared to be merely one of an inharmonious household, the female members of which, because of infirmities of temper, took exceptions to acts of each other which ordinarily would be regarded as unobjectionable.

A wife is not justified in leaving because of the presence in the home of a half sister of the husband, of whose

relations with the husband she is unwarrantably jealous. Rickard v. Rickard (1881) 9 Or. 168, 42 Am. Rep. 799.

In Loux v. Loux (1898) 57 N. J. Eq. 561, 41 Atl. 358 (an analogous case), it was held that a single quarrel with the husband's relatives, who were visiting at the marital home, afforded no justification to the wife for leaving home.

The rule which relieves the husband from living with the parents of the wife where unpleasantness and hostility exist is somewhat modified where the wife is sickly and unable to do the work necessary to maintain a home, and the husband is financially unable to supplement her efforts in this respect. Copping v. Termini (1914) 135 La. 224, L.R.A.1915A, 222, 65 So. 132. R. E. La G.

Bills and notes, § 162 transfer of rent notes effect.

2. The transferee of rent notes attached to the lease does not, by the mere fact of transfer, become a party to the lease contract or subject to the equities between the maker and payee of the note.

Bills and notes, § 169 effect of loss of possession on liability on rent note.

3. The transferee before maturity of rent notes attached to a copy of the lease is not affected by the equities between maker and payee arising out of the fact that the maker was a sublessee and the original lease has been canceled because of the lessee's de

III.

Defendant did not file any plea of prematurity as to the six notes due, according to their tenor, respectively, on April 1, 1923, and monthly thereafter (of which more hereafter); but the defense is that said. notes are not (under the circumstances) unconditional promises to pay, but mere conditional promises to pay if value be received in rent, and that same are therefore not negotiable notes, and were received by plaintiff subject to the equities existing between defendant and said Bosco, as to whom said notes were not due because of his (Bosco's) own failure to maintain defendant in the leased premises.

In Saddler v. White, 14 La. Ann. 173, this court said: "If the consideration of the note had not failed at the time of its transfer, the maker cannot set up as a defense that the holder knew that there might be offsets against it."

In State Nat. Bank v. Cason, 39 La. Ann. 865, 2 So. 881, the court said again: "If it were known to the transferee of a negotiable note, acquired for value and before maturity, on taking it that the consideration was future and contingent, and that there might be offsets against it, this would not make him liable for the equities between the original parties. It cannot affect the negotiability of a note that its consideration is to be thereafter realized, or that from some contingency it may never be enjoyed."

In Martel v. Lafayette Sugar Ref. Co. 153 La. 248, 95 So. 706, we said:

"This doctrine [above stated] was affirmed in Pavey v. Stauffer, 45 La. Ann. 353, 19 L.R.A. 716, 12 So. 512, and again in Marx v.

N. Frey, 137 La. 948, 958, 69 So. 757, and is in accord with the general law of negotiable instruments. See 8 C. J. 509, § 718, and 3 R. C. L. 1067, § 273.

"The holder of a negotiable rent note has been held entitled to recovery thereon, even where circumstances have obliged the tenant to pay the rent a second time. Marinoni v. Levy, 9 La. App. (Orleans) 254-citing Barelli v. Szymanski, 14 La. Ann. 47, and Tulane Improv. Co. v. Green Photo Co. 124 La. 619, 50 So. 601."

IV.

It is contended, however, that the notes sued upon were not negotiable rent notes, and much reliance is placed by defendant on the following extract from the opinion of the court of appeal: "True, in this case, the notes bear the mark 'rent note,' but without any other clause or words declaring (them payable) 'as per contract,' as appeared in Continental Bank & T. Co. v. Times Pub. Co. 142 La. 209, L.R.A.1918B, 632, 76 So. 612. 632, 76 So. 612. It is, however, admitted in the statement of fact that plaintiff knew at the time it acquired the notes that they represented the rent due on a contract of sublease in which the defendant was the lessee; that they were received by plaintiff while attached to a copy of said lease; were given in connection therewith and subject to said contract." (Italics ours.)

The words which we have italicized are (we think) a misconstruction of the agreed statement of facts which, in so far as pertinent, is as follows:

"(3) That said notes represented the rent due on a certain contract of sublease between Jasper Bosco and defendant for premises described in the pleading, being given in connection with and subject to said contract." (Italics ours.)

"(5) That plaintiff actually knew the above facts at the time of the negotiation of said notes, and received said notes while attached to

a copy of said lease." (Italics ours.)

"Our interpretation thereof is that whilst it admits that the notes were received by plaintiff while attached to a copy of the lease, yet it was not intended to admit, and does not admit, that same were given to plaintiff by Bosco 'subject to said contract;' but does admit only that same were given by defendant to Bosco 'subject to said contract.' Otherwise plaintiff would simply have been admitting itself out of court; for were it admitted that plaintiff had received said notes 'subject to said contract,' there would then have been no room for controversy herein, and the case would simply have decided itself."

V.

In Continental Bank & T. Co. v. Times Pub. Co. supra, the difficulty arose over the peculiar form in which the notes were drawn, it being on that account possible, on the one hand, to construe the notes as unconditional promises to pay $150 for "value received (i. e., to be received in future rent) as per contract," or, on the other hand, as mere promises to pay "as per contract, for value received (i. e., to be received in future rent)."

In the original opinion handed down through Mr. Justice Provosty, the court held the notes to read in the first sense, viz., as absolute promises to pay $150 (value to be received as per contract); whilst on rehearing the court, through Chief Justice Monroe (Mr. Justice Provosty dissenting), held the notes to be promises (for value received) to pay $150 as per contract, saying: "A promise is not unconditional which is followed, in the same sentence, by a stipulation to the effect that it will be fulfilled as per another contract, whereby the payment is made contingent upon the nonhappening of fortuitous event."

In this connection, see Tyler v. Whitney Cent. Trust & Sav. Bank (our No. 26,255) 157 La. -, 102 So. 325.

Accordingly, it will be seen that the whole whole matter hinged upon whether the "as per contract" was connected with, and qualified, the promise to pay, or was connected with, and merely amplified, the acknowledgment of value received. And the court merely held that the "as per contract," in that instance, qualified the very promise to pay. Apart from this, the case decided nothing new or different from what had been repeatedly decided before. And the case is authority for no other proposition than that contained in the language and holding quoted above from the opinion of the chief justice; for the case clearly recognizes the doctrine that a mere statement in a note that it is a rent note, and that the consideration of the note is an instalment of rent to become due in the future, does not destroy the negotiability of such note.

VI.

Bills and notes

-effect of attaching rent note to copy of lease.

The question therefore arises, whether, since the notes, when received by plaintiff, were attached to a copy of the lease in connection with which they had been given, plaintiff therefore must be held to have taken them subject to the terms and conditions of said lease. Our conclusion is that such is not the case; that the attaching of the notes to the lease and delivery of the latter to plaintiff merely brought notice to plaintiff that the notes were rent notes, as, indeed, already appeared the face of the notes themselves. And, as we have already said, such notice brought home to plaintiff did not destroy the negotiable character of the notes. But plaintiff did not thereby become a party to said lease; leases are not rent notesnegotiable, or even transferable by mere delivery of the paper instrument by which they are evidenced.

-transfer of effect.

The situation of holders of rent