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does not become obstinate, so long as procure any other place, nor did the the husband makes no effort to induce complainant take any steps to modify her return to a home freed from the the conditions existing there, or to recontentious element."
lieve the mind of his wife in regard The facts and the conclusion, to
to the discomfort she experienced. gether with the reasons therefor, were
The evidence shows his income stated by the court in Benscoter v. to be sufficient to maintain a home. Benscoter (1909) 20 Pa. Dist. R. 349, His disposition to assist in maintain37 Pa. Co. Ct. 276, as follows: “The ing his father's home is creditable to evidence shows that the libellant took him, but his first obligation is to his his wife and lived with her in the wife and child, and it is at least due home of his parents; that this mode to her that he make an effort to create of life was disagreeable to her, and a situation which will have a tendency that she was and is willing to live with to make their married life happy." him whenever he shall furnish a suit- In Coulter v. Coulter (1913) 175 Mo. able home for her apart from his App. 1, 161 S. W. 281, which was an parents. . There is no obliga- action for support and maintenance tion on the part of the wife to live by the wife, the husband defending on with her husband's parents, and to be the ground of desertion, it appeared in subjection to a mother-in-law who that the wife had left the home prothinks she ought to have the house, vided for her because it was with her and who expects to manage it as long husband's mother, who would not alas she lives.
The husband is low the family of the wife to come to in duty bound to provide for his wife the house. While the decision in favor a separate home, and to furnish it in of the wife was based on the consent a manner suitable to his station in of the husband to his wife's living life. He is morally bound to leave elsewhere, the court said: "It is still his father and mother and cleave unto the law in this state that the wife is his wife,' and we think that the testi- bound to follow the fortunes of her mony shows him to have sadly failed husband, and to live where he chooses in the fulfilment of the obligation to live, and in the style and manner which he assumed at the time of his he may adopt.'. But this rule marriage. We hold that the wife was is not intended to make the wife the justified in withdrawing from his slave of her husband, nor to give him father's home, and remaining apart the right to subject her to avoidable from her husband until he shall pro- indignities. The duty of a wife to vide her a suitable, independent home, forsake her family and cleave to her and that in so doing she is not guilty husband is no greater nor more sacred of wilful and malicious desertion, as than the corresponding duty of the required by the divorce laws of this husband. Neither spouse has the commonwealth.”
right to demand in wantonness or The holding in McCampbell v. Mc- mere caprice the estrangement of the Campbell (1916) 64 Pa. Super. Ct. 143, other from his or her parents. For a was to the effect that a wife was not husband to take his wife where she guilty of desertion where she left her is unreasonably denied the privilege father-in-law's home, in which they of seeing members of her own family, were living, on the refusal of her hus- who are of good repute, would be an band to provide a home separate from indignity no faithful husband would his relatives, who made it unpleasant visit upon his wife.” there. The court said: “The appel- In Albee v. Albee (1891) 43 Ill. App. lant . . failed to present a case 370, affirmed in (1892) 141 Ill. 550, 31 of wilful and malicious desertion. N. E. 153, it was held not to be de
The respondent declared her sertion for a wife to refuse to live in desire to live with her husband in a the house of her mother-in-law, with home of their own, and only objected whom she did not get along pleasantto a residence in a room in the home ly. As to the effect of an antenuptial of his father. No effort was made to agreement to live there, the court said: "Much stress is laid on the fact that mistress, free from domination of outbefore the marriage she agreed to live siders. The defendant finally left and at his mother's house. Such an ante- returned to the home of her parents. nuptial contract is of no force; all She expressed her willingness to live such promises are merged and obliter- with her husband if he would provide ated by the marriage contract, which a home separate and apart from that bound the husband to leave father of his parents, but refused to return and mother and cleave to his wife.'” to his parents' home. The plaintiff
In Dailey's Appeal (1881) 10 W. N. brought action for divorce on the C. (Pa.) 420, it was held to be con- ground of desertion. The court, in structive desertion for a husband to dismissing the complaint, said: “It is allow his mother to drive his wife apparent from the record that the defrom the house, and not to provide any fendant could not get along with the other home for her.
plaintiff's parents, and that their reIt has been held that a wife who, lations were unfriendly and unpleasafter leaving her husband, informed ant.
We do not think the dehim by letter that she was compelled fendant left her husband because she to take the step because of serious did not desire to live with him, but, quarrels with his mother, and invited on the contrary, she left him because him to come to see her, was not guilty she was not able to live happily in of wilful desertion. Edwards v. Ed- the home of his parents. There was wards (1905) 69 N. J. Eq. 522, 61 Atl. no necessity for her to live there. The 531.
plaintiff was a strong, able-bodied It is held in the reported case young man, and was able to provide (HOFFHINES V. HOFFHINES, ante, 332) her a home at another place. Under that the refusal of a wife to live with the circumstances, we think a just and her husband's parents does not con- affectionate husband should have stitute desertion, where the husband, listened to the pleadings of his wife, though financially able, refuses to and should not have arbitrarily conprovide a home separate from his rela- fronted her with a decision of either tives, with whom she cannot live hap- living unhappily with him at his pily.
parents' home, or living separate and In Young v. Young (1920) 136 Md. apart from him at another place.” 84, 110 Atl. 207, it was held that a In Mossa v. Mossa (1908) 123 App. wife was not guilty of desertion where Div. 400, 107 N. Y. Supp. 1044, the init appeared that she left home because sistence of the husband that the wife she could not live happily with her should live with his parents, with husband's parents, and he failed to whom she could not agree, was, in conprovide a separate home for her, al- nection with other circumstances, held though he was financially able to do to be constructive desertion by the so.
husband. It was held in Marshak v. Marshak In Buckner v. Buckner (1912) 118 (1914) 115 Ark. 51, L.R.A.1915E, 161, Md. 101, 84 Atl. 156, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 170 S. W. 567, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 206, 628, it appeared to be assumed that a that the refusal of a wife to live with wife might be justified in deserting her husband's parents was not deser
her husband, where he required her tion, where she was unable to live to live with his daughters by a former there happily, and her husband, marriage, if their discourtesy and anthough financially able, failed to ac- tagonism were such as to render her cede to her requests to live somewhere life miserable; but it was held that else. It appeared that the plaintiff the evidence did not show that the acts and defendant, after their marriage, of discourtesy were sufficiently serious went to live with the aged parents of to entitle her to demand a separation the plaintiff. During the two years' of the father from his daughters as a residence there the defendant was condition of the resumption of the abused, and not permitted to take marital relation, where she entered charge of the home as its exclusive into the marriage with knowledge that
the husband would not give up his not, so far as regards her husband's daughters, as she proposed, and with pecuniary means, appear to her, and appreciation of their sensitiveness to do not appear to me, to render such her presence in the household in the living necessary.” place of their deceased mother.
There is no desertion where the In Hall v. Hall (1881) 9 Or. 452, husband consents to his wife leaving, similar treatment of a wife by the hus- after a quarrel with his sister, mother, band's daughters by a former mar- and other relatives, with whom they riage was held to entitle the wife to are living. Lindenschmidt v. Lindena divorce for cruelty, the court say- schmidt (1888) 29 Mo. App. 295; Couling, as to the husband's responsibility ter v. Coulter (1913) 175 Mo. App. 1, therefor: "All these facts were with- 161 S. W. 281. in his knowledge, and he either could In Shinn v. Shinn (1893) 51 N. J. not, or would not, control his daugh- Eq. 78, 24 Atl. 1022, it was held that ters, or comply with his wife's request a wife did not desert her husband by to send them away, or make other pro- leaving him and refusing to return, vision for them. In our judgment, the because of her unwillingness to live appellant, by this course, adopted the as a boarder in the home of his relaresponsibility of their misconduct to- tives, all of whom treated her in a wards his wife, and made their cruel cool and formal manner. The court and humiliating treatment his own. said: “All Mrs. Shinn desired was a And we think, in connection with his home in which she could be mistress. own defaults in the discharge of mari- This every wife is entitled to, and it tal duties, it was sufficient to render is the duty of the husband to furnish the respondent's life burdensome, and corresponding to his circumthat there is sufficient ground to be- stances and condition in life. If it lieve that such was its effect."
be admitted that Mrs. Shinn may not It has been held that there is no de- have been fully justified in leaving the sertion where a husband consents to place where she was boarding on the his wife living apart from him after ground of cruelty, it is very clear that she refuses to live with her stepchil- she almost immediately afterwards dren. Day v. Day (1892) 84 Iowa, 221, manifested not only a willingness, but 50 N. W. 979.
a strong desire, to live with her husIn Davis v. Davis (1887) 86 Ky. 32, band as his wife, if he would provide 4 S. W. 822, it was held not to be de- a home for
purpose. It equally sertion for a wife to leave home, where cleår to my mind that Mr. Shinn was the daughters of her husband by a convinced of this, and therefore informer marriage were kept by him in sisted upon the condition that she the home, and there lived lewd and must either come back to him and live immoral lives.
with him as a boarder in the home of In Hacker v. Hacker (1895) 90 Wis. another, or in such a house so pro325, 63 N. W. 278, the leaving of home vided with the comforts of living as by a wife was held to be justified by above indicated, but which, in my mistreatment of her by sons of the judgment, cannot be regarded as husband, in connection with acts of home corresponding with Mr. Shinn's cruelty by the husband himself.
circumstances and condition in life.” It was said in Wright v. Wright In Hall v. Hall (1911) 69 W. Va. (1899) N. J. Eq. — 43 Atl. 462, 175, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 758, 71 S. E. 104, that “the general rule that the wife the fact that the husband insisted on must accept such a home as a husband his wife living with an aged relative can afford to give her, and partake of of his, with whom her relations were his poverty, does not go so far, in my unpleasant, was adverted to in conjudgment, as to hold that the defend- nection with other circumstances jusant here was bound to live with her tifying her in leaving the home. husband's mother and sister under A husband is not guilty of desertcircumstances which she believed were ing his wife where she refuses to folinjurious to her health, and which did low him when he leaves the house of
her parents, after a quarrel between lant left the house of respondent bethe husband and father-in-law. Mayer cause of some trouble with her motherv. Mayer (1879) 30 N. J. Eq. 411. In in-law and the family. He did not dethat case it appeared that the plain- sert her... If she had good cause tiff and defendant were living with for leaving the house and home he had the plaintiff's father, when the defend- provided for her, she ought to be willant was upbraided by his father-in-law ing to live with him in a suitable for some trivial misconduct, and left house, and say so to him. She cannot at once, asking the plaintiff to go with say he deserted her when she left him. She refused, and never there- him." after offered to live with him.
The court in Jones v. Jones (1893) Leaving his wife and his home in 55 Mo. App. 523, in holding that it was his father-in-law's house as a result desertion for a wife to leave because of being told to go and not to return of "snappish complaints" made by her until he is able to support a wife, and mother-in-law, said: "The law is that not having any of his letters answered, it is the duty of the wife to share her does not constitute desertion. Sarson husband's fortunes and to remain in v. Sarson (1908) 74 N. J. Eq. 564, 70 his home, however humble, if it is all Atl. 663. In support of its holding, he can provide.... If the husband the court said: "He was obliged to sees fit to invite members of his family leave the house; he wrote to her and to live with him, his wife cannot on she refused to answer his letters, or
that account leave his home. to communicate with him in any way.
The only conclusion to be drawn from How this could be desertion on the all the evidence is that her abandonpart of the husband I do not quite
ment of her husband's roof was ca sed understand. The separation, certain- merely by her dissatisfaction with her ly, was not, in the first instance, wil- lot as wife. She had voluntarily asful on his part, for he was compelled sumed that relation. The highest into leave by his father-in-law."
terests of society forbade her to reA spouse, guilty of desertion in nounce it at will." wrongfully leaving and refusing to Similarly in Garrison v. Garrison live with the parents of the other (1907) 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1209, 104 S. W. spouse, ends the desertion by offering 980, the court, while recognizing the to return. Albee v. Albee (1892) 141 general rule, held that the facts of the III. 550, 31 N. E. 153.
case did not bring the wife within the
rule. The court said: “However, we III. Leaving of home not justified.
are firmly of the opinion that the husIn Rodenbaugh v. Rodenbaugh band's first duty is to his wife. We (1894) 17 Pa. Co. Ct. 477, an action say this, recognizing to the fullest exby a wife for divorce on the ground tent every obligation that the son owes of desertion, it was held that the wife to his parents. The husband, of in leaving her husband because of course, has the right to select a home, unhappiness in living at her mother- but he has not the right to place his in-law's home was guilty of desertion, wife where she will be subjected to as the husband was not bound to fur- indignities and abuse.
Let us see, nish her a separate dwelling. Accord- then, whether or not appellant's ing to the evidence the plaintiff and charges are sufficiently sustained to defendant went housekeeping with the justify her in leaving her husband. defendant's mother. When the plain- The only evidence of abuse and intiff complained that she could not get dignities offered appellant is the statealong with her mother-in-law, the de- ment of a visitor that, upon the rare fendant advised her that he had pro- occasions she was at Mrs. Daniel Garvided a home for her as good as he rison's home, Mrs. Garrison's manner could afford, and that she could go if towards appellant was cold and disit did not suit her. Thereupon she tant; that at one time Mrs. Garrison left and brought this action. The court locked the dining room door when apsaid: “The testimony shows that libel- pellant offered to get dinner; that at
another time Mrs. Garrison rear- three weeks the wife remained she did ranged the napkins and dishes which not speak to appellant.” The dissenthad been previously arranged by ap- ing opinion also criticized the trial pellant; and that Mrs. Garrison told court for not permitting the wife to appellant she was a liar when appel- show that, when she returned to the lant accused her of pilfering. These house in answer to the husband's letare the indignities and insults that ter, the mother-in-law took the wife's were offered during a period of twenty- clothes and threw them in front of eight years. A remarkable record, it her, and told her to get out. seems to us, in view of the attitude In Klein v. Klein (1906) 29 Ky. L. which appellant assumed her Rep. 1042, 96 S. W. 848, a wife was mother-in-law's home. It does not ap- held to be guilty of desertion in leavpear that appellant ever did her part ing home after finding herself unable in that home. Her manner does not to live amicably with the husband's show that consideration or respect, to parents, where the husband was at the say nothing of love, which are natural- time trying to arrange for another ly due from the wife towards the ageá home. In so ruling the court said: parents of her husband. Simply be- “The fact that appellant took his bride cause she was not called to breakfast, to the home of his parents is not to his she lived in her own room for three discredit, nor should it militate against years, and permitted a feeble woman him. It was a comfortable home where past seventy years of age to cook her she would be well provided for, and meals, and an old man of the same age he had no cause to believe that the to carry those meals upstairs to her. relations between his wife and his When a wife occupies that position in mother would not be agreeable, and a household, and shows such utter in- it is in evidence that both he and his difference to the feelings of those father were making reasonable efforts around her, we do not see how she can to procure another home when the unjustly complain of the mere fact that timely appearance of her father and their manner is haughty or cold." his hasty action prevented the accom
In Giese v. Giese (1903) 107 Ill. App. plishment of this purpose that would 659, the prevailing opinion, in holding probably have resulted in the parties the wife unjustified in deserting the to this litigation continuing to live husband, and therefore not entitled to happily together as man and wife. The separate maintenance, stated the facts conduct and behavior of appellant's to be that, against her wishes and re- parents towards appellee was not of quest, the husband suffered the moth- such a character that it could not have er of his first wife to control the house- been borne by appellee,-at least, hold; that the day after she (the wife) until her husband could procure for left, he wrote asking her to return, her another home,—and under the cirand that she replied that she would cumstances it was her duty to have not live with him and his mother-in- remained with her husband; and when law, but would live with him and his she abandoned him to go with her daughter as as he obtained a father to his home in Wisconsin, and home, and in the meantime they might remained there for the statutory live in her house-matters standing period, the appellant was entitled to thus until the bill was filed. In the a divorce on the ground it was dissenting opinion, however, uphold- sought.” ing the desertion, the judge recited A wife is not justified in leaving these additional facts: “This woman home because the husband insists on [the mother-in-law] handled all the keeping as members of the family his household funds, and would let the children by a former marriage, aged wife do nothing. She even went to four and twelve years, who treat the the store and purchased clothing wife disrespectfully. Nickerson v. which she thought was sui for Ni son (1898) 34 Or. 1, 48 Pac. 423, the wife; and, when offended by some- 54 Pac. 277. thing the wife did or said, for the last It has been held that cruelty could